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CONTENT

THE OSCE ON THE EDGE OF A CLIFF: FROM THE ROOTS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS TO THE FUTURE OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE

Michael Augustín

Abstract: The paper explores the concept of cooperative security within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), emphasizing the key value of trust. Examining the roots of the Organization's existential crisis, the paper delves into historical events such as the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty's ratification process. The article critically assesses recent challenges the OSCE faces, particularly the impact of Russian aggression in Ukraine and Russia's veto on field operations' mandate extension, budget approval, and leadership appointments. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine further strains the Organization's functionality, testing its consensus-based model and prompting discussions on potential measures against Russia. Amidst these challenges, the paper highlights recommendations for the OSCE's future, emphasizing the importance of engagement, prioritization of consensus areas, and rebuilding trust among participating states.

Key words: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, cooperative security, Ukraine, Russia, Minsk Group
JEL: F51, F53, D73

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a regional intergovernmental organization that brings together member states in Europe, North America, and Asia, emphasizing security. Its mandate covers several aspects, including arms control, human rights protection, media freedom, and free elections. The OSCE focuses on a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security, which includes areas as diverse as arms control, diplomatic conflict prevention, confidence-building measures, human rights protection, democratization, election monitoring, and economic and environmental security. The Organization seeks to increase military security through greater transparency, openness, and cooperation. The OSCE is the largest regional security organization in the world and contributes to an overall security framework that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The OSCE is one of the international organizations based on the concept of cooperative security in international relations. The OSCE works to build trust between states, which is a crucial element of cooperative security. It represents a platform for the cooperation of states to reduce tension and prevent its escalation into an open armed conflict. Michael Mihalka (2001) extends the analysis of the relatively vague concept of cooperative security and deepens its theoretical foundations. Mihalka points out that many members of the OSCE and ASEAN are quasi-authoritarian or transitional democracies rather than consolidated liberal democracies. Even among states that lack shared values, cooperative security is possible if their ruling elites trust in a shared future and believe that working together is better than going it alone. However, Mihalka points out that non-democratic countries are limited in the possibility of cooperation. They may manage to avert war with each other – as in the case of ASEAN, but they are unlikely to develop a common position on regional threats to stability. Thus, Mihalka (2005) argues that the future success of cooperative security depends not only on the spread of liberal democracy but also on intensifying economic ties with non-

democratic countries and supporting their sense of a "security community" that serves the interests of all its members.

Thus, trust is a key value within the cooperative security concept. Above all, as a result of the military intervention in Ukraine, by which the Russian Federation violated the obligations arising from both the UN Charter and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this trust was shattered in an unprecedented way. This event also affected the very functioning of the OSCE. It resulted in the most serious crisis in the history of this international organization and the Helsinki process itself.

The paper delves into the complex challenges that the OSCE has been facing, particularly in the wake of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. The paper's primary objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the crisis within the OSCE, with a particular focus on understanding the roots of centrifugal tendencies between Russia and the West and the recent developments in the Organization. Through the paper, the author aims to explore the causes of the crisis, identify its impact on the functioning of the OSCE, and propose potential strategies for overcoming the challenges. The article endeavors to provide an explanation regarding the circumstances that can result in the reestablishment of trust between the OSCE participating states.

1 Towards the roots of centrifugal tendencies

The causes of the current crisis in the OSCE, which is of an existential nature, must be sought in the deeper past. Undoubtedly, its roots lie in an identity crisis – the question of what today's OSCE symbolizes. Development after 2008 showed that any shared understanding of the institution and the security it seeks to promote was on the wane (Reynolds and Ketola, 2022). Back in 2007, the nature of this crisis was correctly identified by Zellner (2007, p. 4) when he wrote that the situation in which the OSCE finds itself can no longer be called *„an adaptation crisis arising from a changed political environment and a new set of tasks. Rather it is a crisis of both political substance and moral legitimacy. At stake are the very foundations of the Organization"*.

The ratification of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (Adapted CFE Treaty) was among the events that fundamentally contributed to the increase in mistrust. Russia was particularly concerned about the eastward expansion of NATO. It argued that the changing security landscape in Europe, marked by NATO's expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic states, necessitated a reassessment of the CFE Treaty to address the new realities. Russia had signed an adapted version of the CFE Treaty in 1999 to reflect the geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold War. However, NATO countries, including the United States, link their ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty with Russia's fulfillment of the political commitments it undertook at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia suspended its participation in a protest against the NATO states' continuing failure to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty in December 2007 (Mützenich, 2010).

The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 was one of the turning points from which it was possible to observe divergent tendencies regarding the nature of European security. In the same year, on June 15, the Russian Federation vetoed the Western-proposed draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), as it contained an indirect reference to the territorial integrity of Georgia. For this reason, the Russian delegation refused to renew the mandate of the OSCE field mission in Georgia at the end of 2008 (EurasiaNet, 2009). The European Union

Monitoring Mission (EUMM) remained the only functional international observer mission in Georgia, but it practically only operates on the Georgian side.

The breach of trust in connection with the Georgian crisis gave the main impetus to the so-called Corfu process, which preceded the OSCE summit in Astana. Paradoxically, the call for renewed dialogue on European security came precisely from Russia. The Russian Federation already made it clear during this period that it did not feel comfortable in the architecture of European security at the time, and some states recognized the need to conduct a dialogue with Russia on this topic. Despite some criticism of the first "basket" related to the political-military dimension by the Russian Federation, Russia perceived the strengthening of the first dimension as a necessary prerequisite for the OSCE to maintain its general importance (Kropatcheva, 2012). As a new format for dialogue on European security issues, the Corfu Process followed the initiative of President Dmitry Medvedev regarding the new European Security Treaty, which would be legally binding. Western states refused to discuss it outside the framework of the Corfu process. They emphasized that these discussions should reflect the OSCE's comprehensive definition of security, with its political-military, economic, and human dimensions (Evers, 2011). Ultimately, the Corfu Process and the Astana Summit clearly demonstrated the boundaries of what is achievable and showed the limits of mutual willingness to trust each other.

Several Russian representatives tried to indicate that although security is a multidimensional matter, the main gaps were in the politico-military dimension of the OSCE, and the human dimension should primarily be discussed in human rights forums, such as in the Council of Europe (Cliff, 2012). Despite the confirmation of commitments in the human dimension area by the Astana Commemorative Declaration, since the Astana Summit, Russia and several post-Soviet states have increasingly shown indifference to the notions of human security and human rights promoted by the West (Evers, 2011). In the early 1990s, Western leaders wanted the OSCE to reflect a liberal value system. In this regard, the OSCE was perceived through the history of the promotion and success of the human rights policy, together with implementing the so-called human dimension after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, he was in 1990 established the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with headquarters in Warsaw as a specialized body whose aim is to promote democratic institutions and protect human rights in countries that are participating states of the OSCE. In short, human rights, fair elections, and development are what people want and need, but these states refused to see these projects as those that must be linked to "security" at all times (Reynolds and Ketola, 2022).

Finally, the Astana summit did not bring a satisfactory answer to Russian proposals for rebuilding European security structures. The summit deepened the existing contradictions between the NATO and EU states on the one hand and the post-Soviet states on the other (Rahr, 2010). It significantly weakened the OSCE's approach to solving long-term regional conflicts and failed to respond to the entire list of urgent security threats (Kühn, 2010).

However, the dynamics at that time cannot be explained in isolation without understanding the nature of Russian multilateralism. The Russian Federation has always used the OSCE pragmatically as one of the foreign policy instruments. Russian policy about multilateralism has always been ambivalent and combined; on the one hand, the understanding of multilateralism as a desirable norm of international relations, which, however, cannot be fulfilled in the international environment dominated by the USA, and, on the other hand, as a Realpolitik-driven strategy (Kropatcheva, 2012). The ambivalence of Russia's attitude towards the OSCE can be seen precisely in how Russia continuously demonstrated its interest in the Organization through symbolic, formal gestures and many times, it appeared that Russia was fighting for a more significant role of the OSCE in European security, but in practice, it undermined it many times by its actions (Kropatcheva,

2012). Russian multilateralism is characterized by pragmatic selectivity when Russian diplomacy resolves “high politics” issues bilaterally, while in the case of “low politics” issues, it uses multilateral negotiations and international organizations (Trenin and Lo, 2005). In reality, however, the absence of long-term consistent strategies in Russia’s foreign policy reveals that the OSCE has become a less important forum for dialogue and conflict resolution. In general, one can see among Russian representatives a gradual loss of sincere interest, disappointment, and an increasingly intense perception of the OSCE as an organization directed against Russia and Russian interests (Kortunov, 2009).

2 Recent developments in the OSCE

The OSCE encountered numerous challenges over the years, but the year 2022 proved to be exceptionally arduous. The Russian Federation launched a full-scale attack on Ukraine, giving rise to a new military conflict in Europe. Russia violated international law and the fundamental principles of the OSCE, and, moreover, it rendered several bodies and diplomatic channels inoperable as Russian representatives employed obstructionist tactics within the OSCE. The conflict posed a significant challenge to the OSCE, which operates on a consensus-based model, regarding how it could respond when a major participating state no longer adheres to the fundamental rules.

Russia’s veto terminated three OSCE missions since autumn 2021, including the ceasefire monitoring mission in Donbas. The first veto was implemented on September 2, 2021, against prolonging the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk mandate. Following this, on September 30, 2021, the mission stopped its operations. It comprised 22 observers and has been operational since July 2014 (Socor, 2021). Its work was fundamentally linked to Russia’s commitment when it signed the Minsk Protocol in September 2014 to ensure permanent monitoring of the border by the OSCE.

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) started its activities on March 21, 2014, and terminated its operations on March 31, 2022. The civilian, unarmed mission was established to facilitate the application of the Minsk Agreements and had two primary objectives: to impartially and objectively observe and report on the security situation in Ukraine and to promote dialogue among all conflict parties. However, the Russian Federation, which had blocked the consensus required to extend the mandate of the SMM, demanded the mission’s closure (Liechtenstein, 2022a).

The third closed mission, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, commenced its activities on June 1, 1999, and ceased operations on June 30, 2022. The OSCE Permanent Council was unable to extend the mission’s mandate due to the Russian Federation’s position, leading to the decision to discontinue the mission. The mission’s primary objectives were to improve Ukraine’s security and align its legislation, institutions, and practices with democratic standards (OSCE Announces Closure of Project Co-Ordinator in Ukraine, 2022). The mission focused on technical details to enhance the country’s legal framework, institutions, and practices, promoting sustainable and democratic progress.

The OSCE launched a new program on November 1, 2022, to support Ukraine’s reforms and reconstruction. As part of the program, it is expected to invest 28.7 million Euros over a three-year period (Liechtenstein, 2023a). The program is funded through voluntary contributions and is separate from the regular OSCE budget, making it difficult for Russia to interfere. The OSCE Extra-budgetary Support Programme for Ukraine comprises 23 projects that cover a diverse range of areas, including humanitarian demining, chemical threat management, environmental damage monitoring, protection of displaced persons from human trafficking risks, human rights protection tools, judicial reform support, constitutional justice enhancement, media freedom, civil society participation, youth involvement in post-war

reconstruction, and development of psychological support systems for those affected by the conflict (Extra-Budgetary Support Programme for Ukraine, 2022).

Russia's veto on approving the OSCE's annual budgets in 2022 and 2023 has significantly impacted the Organization's operations. It has made it challenging for the OSCE to allocate resources in a planned manner and meet its contractual obligations and staff salaries. The lack of budget approval has also affected the OSCE's efficiency and reputation. The Organization is now seen as less reliable in delivering its programmatic activities, which has led to a loss of credibility, trust, and legitimacy (OSCE, 2023a). The proposed budget of 138 million euros per year, which had remained unchanged for the past decade, had already been depreciated through inflation. This situation has resulted in the OSCE being unable to initiate new projects or activities, and it can only operate in a limited mode by receiving month-to-month allotments based on the 2021 budget. Consequently, the Organization has no authority to perform its functions at full capacity. Russia is abusing the budget to undermine crucial OSCE institutions, including the ODIHR and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. These two institutions have been a persistent source of annoyance for Russia (Liechtenstein, 2022b). When this paper is finalized, there is no consensus among the participating states on approving a unified budget for 2024. In response to inflation and other increasing expenses, the OSCE established a supplementary fund to support its core operating costs. These extraordinary contributions have represented the only way to prevent Organization's insolvency in 2023, according to OSCE Secretary Helga Schmid (Liechtenstein, 2023c).

Another significant challenge was the process of seeking consensus on who would chair the Organization in 2024. The OSCE Chairmanship bid launched by Estonia in November 2020 was met with resistance from Russia. The Russian resistance continued throughout the following three years. Finally, the decision to appoint Estonia to the Chairmanship of the Organization was vetoed by Russia and Belarus on November 21, 2023 (Barigazzi and von der Burchard, 2023). Since the result of this vote was clear in advance, Malta, currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, was consulted earlier with the offer to take over the Chairmanship of the OSCE. The current chair of North Macedonia conducted intense negotiations behind closed doors to avoid an unprecedented leadership vacuum in the OSCE, leading to the last-minute decision (Liechtenstein, 2023b). After exploring several alternatives, including extending the term of North Macedonia or delegating the role to Austria, the OSCE Permanent Council unanimously recommended Malta as the OSCE chair in 2024 (Murphy, 2023).

In December 2020, the OSCE appointed four top officials, including the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The initial term of three years for these officials was supposed to be rolled over into a second and final term of three years from December 2023. However, Russia has blocked the appointment of all four officials, three of whom are Western European diplomats (Socor, 2023). The OSCE's operability would be severely affected if the mandate of its high officials is not renewed. The current OSCE Chair, North Macedonia, invited the head of Russian diplomacy, Sergei Lavrov, to the 30th Ministerial Council in Skopje to resolve the deadlock and ensure the Organization's survival. To enable his plane to fly across EU airspace, the temporary lifting of the flight ban was granted. Lavrov's appearance in Skopje aimed to prove that Russia is not internationally isolated, but several foreign ministers, including the Ukrainian Minister, boycotted the meeting (von Nahmen, 2023). The OSCE Ministerial Council finally extended the office terms of Secretary General Helga Schmid, Teresa Ribeiro, Representative on Freedom of the Media, and Kairat Abdrakhmanov, High Commissioner on National Minorities, until September 2024. Matteo Mecacci's office term, Head of the OSCE Office

for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, was also extended. In addition, the Council confirmed that Malta will hold the OSCE Chairmanship in 2024 (OSCE, 2023b).

The OSCE Minsk Group, which was created by the OSCE in the 90s, to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has been one of the diplomatic channels that remained paralyzed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The group is co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States and has served many years as a mediator in facilitating negotiations between the conflicting parties to reach a peaceful resolution. In November 2020, Russia bypassed the Minsk Group and opted for direct negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan to broker the resolution of the Second Karabakh War. Following the 44-day war, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev took the position that the Minsk Group failed in its mission and should no longer deal with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as he believed that it had been resolved (OSCE Minsk Group should not be dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh..., 2022). The format of the co-chairmanship, which involved the US, Russia, and France working as a team, was frozen due to the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West after the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine in February 2022. In April 2022, Lavrov, criticized the US and France for trying to exclude Russia from the Minsk Group (Dovich, 2022). He later announced that the US and France had suspended their participation in the Minsk Group, which was falsely claimed by Azerbaijani media to confirm the end of the Minsk Group (Lmahamad, 2022). Azerbaijani parliament members repeatedly made anti-French statements during and after the 44-day war, calling on the government to remove France from the Minsk Group presidency (Azerbaijani MPs call for removal..., 2021). However, Baku did not take any steps in this direction. Despite the de facto deactivation of the co-chairmanship, the US and France have confirmed their commitment to continue their activities within the framework of the Minsk Group (Ghazanchyan, 2022). A massive exodus of Karabakh Armenians followed as a result of the military capture of the capital of the internationally unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, Stepanakert, by Azerbaijani forces in the autumn of 2023. By presidential decree by the president of Armenia's self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic of September 28, 2023, all state institutions will be dissolved by January 1, 2024, and the Republic of Artsakh will cease to exist.

Discussion and Conclusion

The current situation with the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine and the zero progress in establishing a cease-fire and peace negotiations pose a significant challenge for the OSCE to renew dialogue and rebuild mutual trust. The OSCE's core principles have been violated by Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, resulting in a far-reaching impact on the Organization's capacity to act. The OSCE faces a crucial dilemma of how governments can handle their relationship with Russia.

The OSCE's survival would be ensured if Russia ended its conflict in Ukraine, withdrew its troops, and renounced its annexation claims. However, this outcome is not currently feasible, given the present circumstances. Likewise, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation would voluntarily withdraw from the OSCE. While the OSCE may not be an organization of top priority for Russia, it provides a platform for demonstrating that Russia is not entirely isolated from the international community and can occasionally be convenient for Russian multilateral pragmatism. Since the OSCE takes decisions on the basis of consensus, suspending Russia from the OSCE is an extremely sensitive matter. The OSCE adopted the consensus-minus-one principle in 1992, which allows for political measures to be taken against a state that causes massive and gross violations of human rights, even without the consent of that state. Based on this principle, Russia could be suspended from participating in

the OSCE, analogous to Yugoslavia's suspension from 1992 to 2000 (Zellner, 2023). However, it is unlikely that Belarus and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members will vote Russia out. While making decisions without Russia may seem more straightforward, the OSCE's purpose is to provide a platform for making binding decisions with Russia. Maintaining an inclusive, pan-European dialogue with Russia on European security matters is crucial for the OSCE's future and its *raison d'être*. One day, the OSCE may be employed to de-escalate tensions and identify shared interests. Negotiating with Russia, even if it is challenging, is better than having no negotiations at all. This is why it should be a top priority for the other participating countries to keep Russia at the table.

Zellner (2023) recommends that the OSCE should engage states in areas where Russian influence is weakening and where there is an increased risk of conflict. Specifically, he suggests concentrating on the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2023) suggests that the OSCE should prioritize areas of potential consensus, such as economic connectivity and security implications of climate change, instead of antagonistic issues like human rights and arms control. She also recommends broadening political support by engaging less active participating states, such as Central Asian countries. Zagorski (2023) mentions that the West's emphasis on human rights was also a concern for the Soviet Union in the past, just as Russia is critical of the Organization's current focus on the human dimension. However, the CSCE managed to persist due to what Zagorski refers to as "asymmetric bargaining", which considered the varying interests of participating states and allowed for "balanced progress" to be achieved across the different baskets.

Currently, the level of trust between the OSCE participating states is at an all-time low. The mutual suspicion and animosity between the states are greater than what was observed in 1973 between the two superpowers and their alliances. According to Hill (2023), this situation implies that the OSCE has regressed to a point worse than its starting point. Before establishing new universal standards and initiating full-scale cooperation, restoring a certain level of mutual trust among the participating states is imperative. Following the results of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Skopje, the OSCE will continue to operate for another year. However, the Organization's ability to achieve its objectives will be limited without an approved regular budget. The upcoming Chairmanship of Malta presents an excellent opportunity to identify the foundations for re-establishing trust between the participating states and providing a new impetus for the OSCE.

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SEARCHING OF CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS OF CURRENT'S WORLD SECURITY PROBLEMS

VYBRANÉ OTÁZKY HĽADANIA KONCEPČNÝCH RIEŠENÍ BEZPEČNOSTNÝCH PROBLÉMOV SÚČASNÉHO SVETA

Ľubomír Čech

Abstract: Under the heading "common security", "cooperative security", "human security" and their connection with "democratic peace", we discover completely new problems of non-offensive defense, which are the subject of research and discussions of security experts. In the presented article, we address selected questions in the search for conceptual solutions to the security problems of the contemporary world from the point of view of their theoretical content. We point out that these concepts are based on the provisions of the liberal-idealist paradigm. Neoliberalism in international relations (practically and theoretically) has largely affected political realism, which has had a long-term dominance in shaping them. In the conclusion, we draw attention to the opinion of several experts in recent times, whether it is time to say goodbye to the illusion of the post-bipolar period, when we thought that we could easily ensure peace through purely non-military means.
Keywords: Cooperative Security, Human Security, Democratic Peace
JEL: F51, H56

Abstrakt: Pod hlavičkou „spoločná bezpečnosť", „kooperatívna bezpečnosť", „ľudská bezpečnosť" a ich prepojenie s „demokratickým mierom" objavujeme celkom nové problémy neofenzívnej obrany, ktoré sú predmetom výskumu a diskusií expertov na bezpečnostnú problematiku. V predkladanom článku sme sa venujeme vybraným otázkam pri hľadania koncepčných riešení bezpečnostných problémov súčasného sveta z hľadiska ich teoretického obsahu. Poukazujeme na to, že tieto koncepty vychádzajú z ustanovení liberálno-idealistickej paradigmy. Neoliberalizmus v medzinárodných vzťahoch (prakticky aj teoreticky) sa do veľkej miery dotiahol na politický realizmus, ktorý mal dlhodobú dominanciu na ich formovanie. V závere upozorňujeme na názor viacerých expertov v ostatnom čase, či nie je čas rozlúčiť sa s ilúziou postbipolárneho obdobia, keď sme si mysleli, že dokážeme jednoducho zabezpečiť mier čisto nevojenskými prostriedkami.
Kľúčové slová: Kooperatívna bezpečnosť, ľudská bezpečnosť, demokratický mier
JEL: F51, H56

Úvod

Koniec studenej vojny a bipolárneho rozdelenie sveta viedol k zisteniu, že výskumný arzenál spojený s chápaním bezpečnostných problémov a vývojom teoretických základov pre praktické riešenia v tejto oblasti sa ukázal ako neprispôsobený novej realite. Vznikla potreba prepracovať ho a vyvinúť nové, efektívnejšie koncepčné nástroje, ktoré dokážu tento nedostatok prekonať. Takúto úlohu podľa množstva odborníkov a bezpečnostných expertov mohli zohrať koncepty kooperatívnej a ľudskej bezpečnosti, o ktorých prvé zmienky v odbornej literatúre sa objavili už začiatkom 90. rokov 20. storočia. V nadväznosti na to získavala stále väčšiu pozornosť teória demokratického mieru. Zdôraznime, že všetky tieto koncepty vychádzajú z ustanovení liberálno-idealistickej paradigmy (v oboch jej variantách – kánonickej aj neoliberálnej). Dominancia neoliberalizmu sa tak prejavila nielen vo sférach

ekonomiky a politiky moderného globalizujúceho sa sveta. Došlo k tomu, že neoliberalizmus v medzinárodných vzťahoch (prakticky aj teoreticky) usiloval o akési vyrovnanie sa politickému realizmu, ktorý mal dlhodobo rozhodujúci vplyv na formovanie vedeckých prístupov. Pozrime sa podrobnejšie na obsah pojmov, ktoré sa čoraz viac dostávali do popredia.

1 Koncepcia kooperatívnej bezpečnosti

Táto koncepcia vychádza z postulátov liberálno-idealistickej paradigmy a má dve varianty. Prvý variant kladie dôraz na medzinárodné inštitúcie a právne normy a podľa toho ho nazývame „grotiánsky“ (alebo „racionalistický“).[1] Druhý variant preferuje univerzálnosť morálnych noriem a rešpektovanie práv jednotlivca ako na hlavné kritériu bezpečnosti. Zodpovedá „kantovskej“ (alebo „revolučnej“) tradícii. Rozdiely medzi nimi sú také veľké, že v podstate hovoríme o dvoch odlišných konceptoch. Keďže prvý z nich kladie značný dôraz na potrebu vytvorenia čo najširšej bezpečnostnej komunity, do ktorej by sa mohli zapojiť všetky zainteresované krajiny, variácia uvažovaného konceptu sa niekedy nazýva aj „participačná bezpečnosť“. V druhej verzii je bezpečnostná komunita v skutočnosti obmedzená na dosť úzky okruh svojich členov.

„Grotiánsky“ variant konceptu kooperatívnej bezpečnosti vznikal už koncom 80. rokov minulého storočia a stáli pri ňom vedci z Brookings University v USA, ktorých komunita sa často nazýva „Brookings group“. Predstavme hlavné prvky obsahu kooperatívnej bezpečnosti, ktorú títo vedci obhajujú. „Kooperatívnu bezpečnosť,“ vnímajú ako mechanizmus na odvrátenie agresie vytváraním protihrozieb a porážkou toho, od koho pochádza (Carter, A. B. - Perry, W. J. - Steinbruner, J. D., 1992, s. 7). Opatrenia smerujúce k dosiahnutiu kooperatívnej bezpečnosti by sa mali vytvárať na základe súhlasu a nie násilne a samotný systém kooperatívnej bezpečnosti by mal vychádzať z predpokladov, ktoré by široká verejnosť mohla vnímať ako legitímne. Takéto opatrenia musia byť tiež inkluzívne v tom zmysle, že všetky krajiny majú právo sa k nim pripojiť. Tieto krajiny musia dodržiavať ducha kooperatívnej bezpečnosti a podieľať sa na vytváraní jej pravidiel. Autori zdôrazňujú, že kooperatívna bezpečnosť by nemala mať formu samostatného komplexného politického režimu alebo dohody o kontrole zbrojenia. Nemalo by sa ani usilovať o vytvorenie medzinárodnej vlády.

Kooperatívna bezpečnosť, ako ju chápe skupina „Brookings group“, nemá za cieľ odstrániť všetky zbrane, zabrániť všetkým formám násilia alebo harmonizovať všetky politické hodnoty. Zameriava sa na predchádzanie hromadeniu finančných prostriedkov na závažnú, úmyselnú a organizovanú agresiu. „Zameraním sa na znižovanie organizovaných vojenských príprav samotná kooperatívna bezpečnosť nerieši priamo násilie, ktoré je hlavným zdrojom chronických konfliktov a ľudskej chudoby vo svete. Kooperatívna bezpečnosť však dáva medzinárodnému spoločenstvu základ – skutočne nevyhnutný základ – na organizovanie reakcií na občianske násilie“ (Carter, A. B. - Perry, W. J. - Steinbruner, J. D., 1992, s. 11). Ďalej autori uvádzajú hlavné zložky kooperatívneho poriadku. Ide o zložky, ako sú skúsenosti s jadrovým odstrašovaním a kooperatívna denuklearizácia; obranná konfigurácia konvenčných síl; koordinovaná medzinárodná reakcia na agresiu; zníženie vojenských investícií a šírenie zbraní hromadného ničenia; transparentnosť všetkých opatrení.

[1] Hugo Grotius bol holandský humanista, právnik a diplomat, predstaviteľ školy prirodzeného práva. Bol jedným zo zakladateľov moderného medzinárodného práva a je označovaný za jedného z prvých predstaviteľov politickej geografie (pozn. autora).

Zdôrazňujúc skutočnosť, že pojem „kooperatívna“ alebo „participačná“ bezpečnosť je čoraz rozšírenejšia, vidí francúzsky odborník na bezpečnosť D. Colard jej podstatu v tom, že „...takpovediac zhora kladie dôraz na predchádzanie konfliktom, na primeranú dostatočnosť, na stabilitu a opatrenia transparentnosti, dôvery a kontroly“ (Colard, D. 1996 s. 197). V rámci tohto konceptu tak vnímame potrebu „vzájomného spoločného bezpečia“ zahŕňajúceho systém kolektívnej bezpečnosti, ktorý sprevádzajú pravidlá správania vypracované v procese vyjednávania[2] (Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994), ako aj „normatívny základ“ − reprezentovaný najmä Záverečným aktom KBSE z roku 1975, Parížskou chartou pre novú Európu z roku 1990 atď.(Petőcz, K., 2015, s. 61-67; Parížska charta pre novú Európu, 1991).

Podobný názor má aj austrálsky výskumník D. Dewitt (1994, s. 1-15). Na základe predložených iniciatív zo septembra 1990 na zasadnutí Valného zhromaždenia OSN, ktorých autorom bol vtedajší minister zahraničných vecí Kanady J. Clark, považuje Dewitt za hlavnú vec pre systém kooperatívnej bezpečnosti prítomnosť troch prvkov: po prvé, primárnou ideou nie je zastrašovanie agresora, ale vytváranie pevných záruk na predchádzanie agresii; po druhé, alternatíva k politike spojenectiev alebo v krajnom prípade spolunažívanie po ich boku a po tretie napredovanie v oblasti nielen vojenskej, ale aj nevojenskej bezpečnosti. Je dôležité poznamenať, že podľa názoru autora by mal kooperatívny bezpečnostný systém pokrývať nielen štátnych, ale aj neštátnych, nadnárodných aktérov. Bez toho, aby vyžadoval špeciálne formálne inštitúcie alebo mechanizmy, nevylučuje možnosť ich vytvorenia, ak si to ich účastníci želajú.

Napokon, formovanie kooperatívneho bezpečnostného systému predpokladá, že štáty, ktoré sa na ňom podieľajú, „musia nevyhnutne venovať pozornosť zlepšovaniu svojej vnútornej situácie“ (Dewitt, D., s. 8). Podľa D. Colarda „súbor opatrení navrhovaných touto koncepciou môže vyústiť do skutočného bezpečnostného režimu“, ktorého hlavným poslaním by mala byť diagnostika potenciálnych kríz a príprava preventívnej diplomacie, ako aj potrebné verejné, resp. humanitárne akcie (Colard, 1996, s. 197). Domnieva sa tiež, že reorganizácia bezpečnostného systému na starom kontinente by sa mala riadiť novými prístupmi, aby sme neupadli do zdania novej verzie studenej vojny, vrátane systému blokov, rovnováhy teroru, sfér vplyvu , atď. Cestu k vytvoreniu takéhoto systému otvoril proces KBSE už v roku 1975 (Colard, 1996, s. 198).

Zástancovia druhej, „kantovskej“ verzie kooperatívnej bezpečnosti však s týmto postojom nesúhlasia. Po prvé, spája ich spoločný názor o neefektívnosti OSN a na jeho základe aj presvedčenie o potrebe konať v zmenenom bezpečnostnom prostredí nie na základe existujúcich medzinárodných noriem a princípov, ale na základe ochrany tzv. humanitných hodnôt a ideálov. Po druhé, zástancovia tohto konceptu ospravedlňujú právo krajín, ktoré sú členmi kooperatívneho bezpečnostného systému, na „humanitárnu intervenciu“ a v podstate aj na použitie vojenskej sily mimo tohto systému. Napokon, po tretie, ak vynecháme nuansy, za hlavný nástroj na dosiahnutie bezpečnosti považujú NATO (Cygankov, P. A., 2000, s. 128).

Najradikálnejšiu verziu vyššie uvedenej verzie kooperatívnej bezpečnosti prezentuje Richard Cohen. Kooperatívnu bezpečnosť vidí ako syntézu kolektívnej bezpečnosti, kolektívnej obrany a nového prístupu spojeného so spoluprácou pri riešení konfliktov novej generácie (Cohen, 1999). Kolektívna bezpečnosť dohliada v rámci organizácie suverénnych štátov na ich ochranu pred vzájomnou agresiou, zatiaľ čo kolektívna obrana „pozerá ďaleko

[2] Tie boli sformulované napr. v Budapeštianskom memorandu, čo bola medzinárodná dohoda, ktorú podpísali 5. decembra 1994 v maďarskom hlavnom meste Budapešti ukrajinský prezident Leonid Kučma, ruský prezident Boris Jeľcin, americký prezident Bill Clinton a britský premiér John Major. Čína a Francúzsko poskytli potom o niečo slabšie individuálne uistenia v samostatných dokumentoch. V rámci tohto memoranda Ukrajina sľúbila vzdať sa svojho jadrového arzenálu za čo jej ostatní signatári poskytli niektoré bezpečnostné záruky (pozn. autora).

za svoju organizačnú štruktúru v snahe chrániť svojich členov pred vonkajšou agresiou“. Čo sa týka kooperatívnej bezpečnosti, kombinujúcej prvky prvých dvoch typov, zahŕňa aj ďalší, ktorý spočíva v aktívnom presadzovaní a premietaní stability do tých oblastí susediacich s „priestorom kooperatívnej bezpečnosti“, ktoré môžu negatívne ovplyvniť bezpečnosť celej organizácie alebo jej členov.

Cohenova vízia kooperatívneho bezpečnostného systému sa skladá zo šiestich prvkov. Prvé tri sa týkajú otázok, ktorých cieľom je priblížiť koncepciu k riešeniu čisto pragmatických otázok, aby sa tento popis stal nielen koncepčným nástrojom pre ďalší výskum bezpečnostných otázok, ale skôr ako istý druh návodu, ktorým sa treba riadiť pri riešení konkrétnych problémov. Posledné tri prvky v podstate opakujú to, čo bolo povedané o vzťahu medzi kolektívnou bezpečnosťou, kolektívnou obranou a kooperatívnou bezpečnosťou. Popis kooperatívneho bezpečnostného systému končí konštatovaním, že NATO je jediný fungujúci model na svete.

Autor hneď na začiatku svojej práce uvádza, že kooperatívna bezpečnosť ukazuje na odklon od úzkych stratégií studenej vojny, ktoré boli zamerané len na dosiahnutie jasného víťazstva, a na prechod k širokej a svetlej perspektíve mieru a harmónie. Otvorene však musíme povedať, že sa ťažko zbavujeme dojmu, že v tomto vnímaní hovoríme o bezpečnosti pre úzky okruh vybraných štátov, ktoré v záujme zachovania (alebo presadzovania?) svojich spoločných záujmov nebudú váhať použiť silu vo vzťahu ku krajinám, ktoré nie sú členmi tohto systému.

V každom prípade, ľudské práva sú tu spomenuté len raz, a to len v kontexte operácie NATO v Kosove, ktorá podľa autora „predstavuje najambicióznejší pokus o projekciu stability a presadzovanie ľudských práv na území mimo kooperatívny bezpečnostný systém NATO. Pozícia R. Cohena teda, hoci zostáva v rámci liberalizmu, úzko súvisí s realizmom. Najlepšie vlastnosti z toho posledného si však vôbec nepožičiava. R. Cohen ignoruje požiadavky na medzinárodnú politiku, ktoré sa považujú za povinné pre realizmus: umiernenosť a opatrnosť, nutnosť brať do úvahy dôsledky politických rozhodnutí a činov, v maximálnej možnej miere zohľadňovať oprávnené záujmy iných aktérov atď.

Podstané črty realizmu R. Cohen v nárokoch na medzinárodnú politiku bohužiaľ nezohľadňuje. A to práve tie ktoré sa považujú za povinné pre realizmus: umiernenosť a opatrnosť, nutnosť brať do úvahy dôsledky politických rozhodnutí a činov, v maximálnej možnej miere zohľadňovať oprávnené záujmy iných aktérov atď.

2 Koncepcia ľudskej bezpečnosti

Ľudská bezpečnosť (Human Security) je v najširšom význame definovaná ako oslobodenie sa od strachu a od nedostatku. Stotožňovaná je s ochranou človeka pred takými hrozbami, ako je hlad, nemoci, represie, kriminalita, i ochranou pred pôsobením neočakávaných a škodlivých vplyvov na život človeka (prírodné a iné katastrofy). V podstate ide o zaistenie podmienok pre prežitie a dôstojný život človeka v súčasnosti a podmienok jeho pretrvania a rozvoja do budúcnosti. Koncept ľudskej bezpečnosti je nevyhnutným predpokladom pre rozširovanie možností ľudskej voľby. Najpodstatnejšími prvkami tejto voľby je možnosť žiť dlhý a zdravý život, získať primerané vzdelanie, prácu, užívať politické slobody a ľudské práva, ako i mať istotu, že príležitosti a podmienky, ktoré majú ľudia dnes, budú mať i v budúcnosti. Komplexná ľudská bezpečnosť je vyjadrená prostredníctvom zaistenia bezpečnosti v dimenziách ekonomickej, politickej, osobnej, potravinovej, sociálnej, societálnej i environmentálnej bezpečnosti. Pre človeka to znamená, že bude mať istoty v zaistení nielen svojich základných životných potrieb, ale budú vytvorené podmienky i pre jeho všestranný rozvoj, že nebude mať strach o vlastnú existenciu, o budúcnosť svoju, svojich blízkych, svojej rodiny. Zaistenie ľudskej bezpečnosti znamená aj ochranu človeka v ťažkých,

krízových situáciách, je to zbavenie ho strachu, že bude žiť v nedostatku a že mu nebude poskytnutá pomoc vtedy, keď to bude potrebovať (Hofreiter, L., 2014, s. 26-27)

Táto koncepcia má blízko ku „kantovskému“ konceptu kooperatívnej bezpečnosti. Podľa jedného z jeho prívržencov Lloyda Axworthyho, má bezpečnosť jednotlivcov v súčasnosti klesajúcu tendenciu, najmä kvôli rastúcemu počtu vnútorných konfliktov (Axworthy, L., 1999, s. 333). Nové občianske konflikty a masívne porušovanie ľudských práv, nárast násilných trestných činov, šírenie drog, terorizmu, chorôb a zhoršovania životného prostredia - to všetko si žiada nový prístup bezpečnostnej stratégii. Východiskom by malo byť vyvrátenie hypotézy, podľa ktorej bezpečnosť jednotlivcov vyplýva z bezpečnosti štátov. Autor navrhuje šesť komponentov takejto stratégie (Axworthy, L., 1999, s. 339-341).

Po prvé, keď to okolnosti oprávňujú, je potrebné rázne zasiahnuť na ochranu cieľov bezpečnosti ľudí. Bezpečnosť ľudí môže zahŕňať použitie donucovacích opatrení.

Po druhé, je bytostne dôležité posúdiť a vyhodnotiť ľudské náklady stratégií, ktorých cieľom je podpora národnej a medzinárodnej bezpečnosti.

Po tretie, bezpečnostná politika musí byť oveľa užšie začlenená do stratégie presadzovania práv jednotlivcov, demokracie a rozvoja.

Po štvrté, vzhľadom na komplexný charakter súčasných výziev kladených na individuálnu bezpečnosť by iniciatívy v tejto oblasti mali osloviť celú škálu aktérov, vrátane štátov, multilaterálnych organizácií a skupín občianskej spoločnosti. Keďže problémy, ktoré ohrozujú osobnú bezpečnosť majú nadnárodný charakter, iba multilaterálna spolupráca môže nájsť efektívne riešenia.

Po piate, účinnosť rozhodnutí bude závisieť od zvýšenej operačnej koordinácie. Napríklad úspešné mierové operácie zahŕňajú viacero rozmerov a spoliehajú sa na úzku koordináciu medzi rôznymi aktérmi, vrátane politických vyjednávačov, „modrých prilieb“, individuálnych pozorovateľov práv a predstaviteľov humanitárnej pomoci.

Po šieste, mimovládne organizácie – organizácie občianskej spoločnosti – zohrávajú čoraz väčšiu úlohu pri presadzovaní bezpečnosti ľudí a v mnohých prípadoch sú vysoko efektívnymi partnermi pri ochrane bezpečnosti jednotlivcov.

Súhlasíme s L. Axworthym, pretože sme presvedčení, že ľudská bezpečnosť a ušľachtilosť cieľov ochrany individuálnych práv nemôže vzbudzovať žiadne pochybnosti. Zároveň tu existujú aj isté trecie plochy, ktoré vyvolávajú otázky. Prvá z nich je spojená s kategorickosťou, s akou je bezpečnosť jednotlivca v protiklade s bezpečnosťou štátu. Sám Axworthy túto tézu vyvracia, keď píše, že fenomén násilia priamo súvisí s eróziou autority štátu (Axworthy, L., 1999, s. 334). Pokiaľ ide o druhú otázku, rovnako ako v prípade kooperatívnej bezpečnosti sa týka právneho postavenia a dôsledkov ozbrojeného zásahu do vnútorných konfliktov.

3 Teória demokratického mieru

Názory na kooperatívnu bezpečnosť v jej kantovskej verzii diskutovanej v tomto článku, sú do značnej miery v literatúre založené na široko rozšírenej domnienke, že čím sú štáty demokratickejšie, tým je menej pravdepodobné, že budú medzi sebou bojovať (Kulagin, B. M., 2000). Hypotéza „demokratického mieru“ v niečom veľmi pripomína teóriu, ktorá bola prezentovaná aj v bývalom ZSSR. Podľa nej socialistické štáty, ktoré sú vo svojej hlbokej podstate mierumilovné a humánne, nie sú vo všeobecnosti naklonené vojne (s výnimkou obranných vojen proti imperialistickému agresorovi) a vylučujú vojny medzi priateľmi.

Dôkazy sú metodologicky podobné. V mnohých ohľadoch sa scvrkávali na skutočnosť, že ak sa dostali demokratické krajiny do vojny alebo ozbrojenej konfrontácii

medzi sebou, znamenalo to, že vo všeobecnosti ešte nie sú úplne demokratické (napríklad Grécko a Turecko), alebo jeden z nich nie je úplne demokratický (Argentína v konflikte s Veľkou Britániou o Falklandské ostrovy). Alebo nehovoríme o vojne, keďže vojna je považovaná za ozbrojený konflikt medzi štátmi, v ktorom zomrie najmenej 1 tisíc ľudí.

Nemôžeme nespomenúť podobné argumenty týkajúce sa ozbrojených konfliktov medzi socialistickými krajinami, napríklad medzi Čínou a Vietnamom v 70. rokoch. Podľa oficiálnej verzie a na základe komentárov sovietskych odborníkov sa konflikt stal možným, pretože obe krajiny, ktoré sa ho zúčastnili, ešte nedosiahli úrovne rozvinutého socializmu.

V skutočnosti oba prístupy – „socialistického sveta" aj „demokratického sveta" – majú svoj pevný základ v tom, čo Raymond Aron nazval jednou zo štrukturálnych dimenzií medzinárodného systému. Z Aronovho pohľadu sú homogénne systémy (systémy s vysokou mierou homogenity z hľadiska politických režimov členských štátov (typu ekonomiky a ideologických názorov) stabilnejšie a menej zaťažené ozbrojenými konfliktami ako systémy heterogénne (Aron, R, 1993). Ako totiž rástla homogenita napríklad západného sveta vo všeobecnosti (a najmä západnej Európy), konflikty medzi príslušnými krajinami boli čoraz zriedkavejšie. Dnes si už len ťažko vieme predstaviť ozbrojený konflikt medzi krajinami ako Francúzsko, Nemecko, Veľká Británia, Španielsko a Portugalsko atď., čo v histórii neplatilo.

Na tomto základe je však sotva možné robiť široké teoretické zovšeobecnenia. Ako píše P. Hasner, „možno bez váhania hovoriť o ústupe medzištátnych vojen medzi vyspelými krajinami". Pokračuje však: „Uznanie tohto trendu musí byť posudzované veľmi obozretne, aby sme nepodľahli dvom pokušeniam: zovšeobecniť tento trend, extrapolovať ho na celú planétu alebo na všetky formy násilia a vysvetliť ho na základe jediného faktora, ktorým je demokracia" (Hassner, P. et al., 2000, s. 383). Prikláňame sa k názoru renomovaných výskumníkov v tejto oblasti, že nie je možné charakterizovať štáty podľa ich povahy ako vojnové alebo mierové. Považujeme za neopodstatnené tvrdenie o väčšej mierumilovnosti akejkoľvek konkrétnej formy organizácie spoločnosti, ekonomiky či vlády. Rôzne štúdie o situácii charakteristickej tak pre 20. storočie, ako aj pre 18. a 19. storočie nepreukázali príčinný vzťah medzi tým, ako často sa štát zúčastňuje medzinárodných vojen, aký vplv na to má prítomnosť demokratického alebo autoritárskeho politického systému, trhovej alebo socialistickej ekonomiky (Kinsella, D. - Rasset, B. - Starr, H. (2012).

Quincy Wright, jeden z popredných odborníkov v oblasti štúdií vojen a ozbrojených konfliktov, tvrdí, že je len ťažko možné odvolávať sa na štatistiky, ktoré by ukázali, že demokracie sú menej zapojené do vojen ako autokracie. Francúzsko bolo takmer také vojnové, keď bolo republikou, ako keď bolo monarchiou alebo ríšou. Veľká Británia zaujíma popredné miesto v zozname vojnových krajín, hoci jej forma vlády sa najdlhšie približuje demokracii. Presvedčivejší štatistický vzťah možno zistiť porovnaním tendencie k demokracii v obdobiach všeobecného mieru a ústupu od demokracie v obdobiach všeobecnej vojny. Tento vzťah však môže dokazovať, že mier produkuje demokraciu a nie, že demokracia produkuje mier" (Wright, Q., 1965, s. 841).

Toto zistenie považujeme za osobitne dôležité, pretože teória demokratického mieru naznačuje, že dosiahnutie mieru si vyžaduje úplné rozšírenie demokracie. Napríklad R. J. Rummel tvrdí: „Musíme zmierniť chudobu, rozšíriť porozumenie, presadzovať univerzálne hodnoty, presadzovať zmeny, decentralizovať vládu, klásť dôraz na snahy menšín o sebaurčenie, inštitucionalizovať riešenie konfliktov atď. (Rummel, R. J., 1997, s. 1). Položme si však otázku, ako môžu opatrenia zamerané na decentralizáciu vlád suverénnych štátov prispieť k vytvoreniu bezpečného a ešte viac kooperatívneho sveta. Mohli by sa vzťahovať napríklad na Francúzsko, krajinu oveľa centralizovanejšiu ako Spojené štáty? Alebo na Čínu, kde fungujú princípy centralizácia a vlády jednej strany?

Je celkom zrejmé, že tým sú myslené iné krajiny, napr. krajiny bývalého ZSSR, ktoré získali nezávislosť po jeho rozpadu. Tieto krajiny, z ktorých každá má, samozrejme, svoje

špecifiká, prechádzajú ťažkým obdobím prechodu od totality k demokracii. Mnohé z nich sú zničené vážnymi vnútornými konfliktmi a v niektorých nadobudli takéto konflikty charakter ozbrojených stretov. Všade sa stupňuje národnostné cítenie a medzi etnickými menšinami vládne nespokojnosť. Inými slovami, vo všetkých týchto krajinách je prechod k demokracii sprevádzaný destabilizáciou celého systému politických a spoločenských vzťahov. Vonkajšie zásahy s cieľom unáhleného „implantovania univerzálnych ľudských hodnôt" situáciu nezmenia.

Aj keď je teda záver o potrebe demokratického mieru skutočne správny (hoci jeho teoretické základy a empirické konotácie si ešte vyžadujú ďalší výskum), skúsenosti krajín prechádzajúcich prechodom k demokracii naznačujú, že takýto prechod je plný konfliktov. „V dôsledku toho," píšu J. Snyder a S. Van Evera, „americká politika šírenia demokracie môže v skutočnosti prispieť k šíreniu ozbrojených konfliktov vo svete a nie naopak. ... Namiesto bezduchého globálneho šírenia demokracie je potrebné identifikovať podmienky, za ktorých je pokojný prechod k demokracii najuskutočniteľnejší, a pomôcť zabezpečiť takéto podmienky v demokratizujúcich sa štátoch" (Snyder - Van Evera, 1998, s. 52).

V tejto súvislosti sa nevyhnutne vynárajú otázky súvisiace s právnymi aspektmi takéhoto zásahu a projekcie stability a zavedenia ľudských práv na územiach, ktoré nie sú zahrnuté v systéme kooperatívnej bezpečnosti. Táto problematika si vyžaduje samostatnú právnu analýzu.

Záver

Bezpečnosť v 21. storočí sa stala zložitým a dynamickým fenoménom, ktorý ovplyvňuje nielen životné záujmy a ciele štátov, ale aj medzinárodných organizácií a stále viac neštátnych aktérov. Preto sa tento fenomén znovu dostáva do popredia záujmu výskumov, teórií, diskusií, predikcií, špekulácií, konšpiračných teórií či špionážnych hier. Otázkami bezpečnosti vo všeobecnosti či v špecifických súvislostiach sa zaoberajú rôzne teoretické koncepcie a prístupy, od klasických až po novo sformulované.

Počas studenej vojny bola bezpečnosť prezentovaná ako ochrana a obrana. Prítomnosť hrozby nukleárnej apokalypsy však v mnohých ohľadoch podčiarkovala najmä otázku technologického ustanovenia bezpečnosti. A viazala sa na ochranu politickej komunity určitého druhu, komunity chápanej ako populácie s určitými spoločnými atribútmi, zvyčajne definované v reláciách teritória.

V súčasnosti ide o viac ako len o boj za politickú nadvládu v procese veľmocenskej rivality. Pod hlavičkou „spoločná bezpečnosť", „kooperatívna bezpečnosť", „ľudská bezpečnosť" a s tým spojené volanie po „demokratickom mieri" objavujeme celkom nové problémy neofenzívnej obrany, ktoré sú predmetom výskumu a diskusií expertov na bezpečnostnú problematiku. V predkladanom článku sme sa venovali vybraným otázkam pri hľadania koncepčných riešení bezpečnostných problémov súčasného sveta z hľadiska ich teoretického obsahu. Poukázali sme na to, že tieto koncepty vychádzajú z ustanovení liberálno-idealistickej paradigmy. Do popredia výrazne vystupujúci neoliberalizmu tak prejavil svoj vplyv nielen vo sférach ekonomiky a politiky moderného globalizujúceho sa sveta. Neoliberalizmus v medzinárodných vzťahoch (prakticky aj teoreticky) sa do veľkej miery dotiahol na politický realizmus, ktorý mal dlhodobý vplyv na ich formovanie.

V súvislosti s ostaným vývojom medzinárodných vzťahov *uznávaný britský historik Timothy Garton Ash vyslovil myšlienku, ktorá nás núti k zamysleniu:* „Sme svedkami povojnového obdobia, teda éry, ktorá začala v novembri 1989 a skončila sa 24. februára 2022. Musíme sa rozlúčiť s ilúziou povojnového obdobia, keď sme si mysleli, že dokážeme jednoducho zabezpečiť mier čisto nevojenskými prostriedkami."(Ash, T. G., 2023).

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COOPERATIVE SECURITY – THE USA AND THE EU

Peter Csanyi

Abstract: Historically, many groupings of states have tried to promote stability. Their experiences foreshadowed current cooperative security efforts. Today, three groupings of states view themselves as engaged in cooperative security — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The success of cooperative security hinges upon several factors. Above all, it requires the belief that certain countries share a common future, and that cooperation offers the best possible means of achieving their national interests. Historically, the perception of a common threat was the most frequent, as well as the most effective, basis for establishing a security system. Liberal democracy may not be necessary for cooperative security to begin or to continue, but it expands the range of options and benefits for all.
Key words: cooperative security, the USA, the European Union, NATO, OSCE
JEL: F51, F53, H56

Introduction

Traditional concepts of security do not provide adequate solutions to the current challenges of intrastate conflict and regional instability. The major schools of thought in international relations — realism and liberalism — reflect an era when war was considered to be a legitimate instrument of policy. Today, many states, especially in Western Europe, are less concerned about deterring or defending against aggression than about preserving the overall stability of their region. Such countries have much to gain by working together to decrease the likelihood of conflict. Their goal has often been called "cooperative security."

Unfortunately, many states claim to engage in cooperative security when, in fact, they mean simple cooperation. But, their rhetoric does reflect this shift in the primary security perception of states: a shift away from defending against a major threat and toward promoting stability. Historically, many groupings of states have tried to promote stability. Their experiences foreshadowed current cooperative security efforts. Today, three groupings of states view themselves as engaged in cooperative security — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In the wake of converging threats, states must re-examine internal security to protect their populations. In an operating environment where the fight with the enemy becomes physical today, buying hard security tools tomorrow is too late (Gardner, 2017). Because the world is constantly evolving, rapid advancements in technology and the metamorphosis of threat vectors will not allow NATO to rest on past successes achieved through outdated frameworks. NATO's cooperative security places the Alliance on the right path for continued success moving into 2024 and beyond, but the convergence of transregional and transnational threats requires full adherence by member and partner states to this concept's principles. Ultimate success in protecting NATO against aggression and an array of threats will depend to a significant extent on how various governments organize to meet this threat.

1 US Cooperative Security

The concept of cooperative security arose in the United States during the later stages of the Cold War period as it became apparent that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev

was not as inclined to imperial aggression as had been earlier assumed. Although Soviet forces in East Central Europe were evidently configured to attempt to occupy Western Europe in the event of war, it was conceded that such a posture could reflect an underlying intention not to initiate war, but simply to defend Soviet territory in a manner informed by the experience of World War II (1939–1945). If so, then it might be possible to stabilize the situation by negotiating measures designed to prevent surprise attack. These were officially termed confidence-building measures, but the phrase cooperative security was used as an expression of the underlying principle, namely, that each side would cede the legitimacy of territorial defense and would cooperate to impose restraint on offensive operations (Goodby, 1986).

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its alliance system, the original focus of concern essentially disappeared. A combined arms assault was no longer possible on continental scale, and the engagement of nuclear weapons in such an event was no longer the potential trigger for global catastrophe it was once considered to be. Primary security concerns shifted to more localized forms of conflict and to the process of weapons proliferation. In particular, it was recognized that the Russian Federation as principal successor to the Soviet Union had inherited a nearly intractable set of security burdens— most notably, a contracting economy that could not support the remnants of Soviet conventional forces redeployed from East Central Europe (Nolan, 1994), deterrent forces still actively engaged with the increasingly more capable American forces, and a fractured system for exercising managerial control over the massive arsenal of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had assembled.

In this new context, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, a leading American foundation, initiated a special project to address the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation with the burdens of the Russian Federation specifically in mind. The initiative was inspired by the president of the foundation, David Hamburg, and by Sam Nunn, a U.S. senator from Georgia, with cooperative security explicitly advanced as the central concept of the project. The phrase connoted not merely a stabilization of residual confrontation but a fundamental transformation of security relationships whereby all governments, the Russian Federation and the United States in particular, would collaborate in assuring the legitimate defense of sovereign territory by measures designed to preclude attack, and in establishing higher standards of managerial control over the large arsenals of nuclear weapons and stockpiles of explosive isotopes that had accumulated during the cold war. The practical effect of the Carnegie project was significant but more limited than the cooperative security concept envisaged. The project was directly instrumental in initiating and developing what came to be known as the Nunn-Lugar program through which the United States provided financial and technical assistance to the Russian Federation to secure some portion of the nuclear weapons, explosive materials, and delivery systems deactivated from the inherited Soviet arsenal. From 1991 to 2007 as the United States provided some $1.8 billion in financial assistance, approximately twenty- five hundred weapons delivery systems were jointly deactivated, and collaborative projects were undertaken at nearly all permanent installations involved in the operations of Russian nuclear forces. Originally administered by the United States Department of Defense, the scope of the effort grew to include programs managed by the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies (Posen and Ross, 1996).

The accomplishments of the program were nonetheless limited by the fact that fundamental security policy in both countries featured indefinite continuation of legacy deterrent practices, with decreasing emphasis in the United States on bilateral legal regulation and increasing emphasis on preemptive potential. Although the size of the U.S. deterrent force was reduced, it still preserved enough firepower on immediately available alert status to

decimate the Russian Federation and to threaten the retaliatory capability of its deterrent forces. That operational fact preserved confrontation as the dominant security principle and limited the scope for direct cooperation. In the academic literature, cooperative security was recognized as a departure from the self-styled realist perspective on security, which holds that national interests immutably conflict and can only be assured by superior military power—a perspective that appears to require the advantages that only the United States has recently enjoyed. With varying degrees of politeness, realist theorists rejected the cooperative security idea as indefinitely impractical in principle (Carter, 1992).

In contrast, an emerging globalist perspective holds that the process of globalization has altered the scale and character of primary threat as well as fundamental interest. The contention is that the massive forms of aggression that have been the traditional concern are very unlikely to occur because no country has either the incentive or the capacity to undertake them. Instead, the primary source of threat is said to come from civil violence and associated terrorism, apparently arising from conditions of endemic economic austerity. Those forms of violence, the argument holds, undermine basic legal order necessary to support global economic performance and thereby threaten the dominant common interest all countries have in assuring their own economic performance. If so, then cooperation for mutual protection can be expected to emerge as the primary imperative of security policy, even for the United States. It may take some time before the viability and endurance of the cooperative security idea can be reliably judged. Both its conceptual and its practical standing appear to depend on the eventual fate of the realist and the globalist perspectives—a contest that, at least in the United States, is yet to be decided.

Since World War II, US presidents have understood the tremendous value of security cooperation, prompting them to invest in alliances and partnerships. These are, after all, significant components of US national security. Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the US military, the term “integrity check” refers to a concern about an individual’s or unit’s capability or trustworthiness. Following the debacle in Kabul, the United States and its global security cooperation posture is in dire need of one.

Just look at the anger expressed by stalwart NATO allies such as the United Kingdom, which in the aftermath of 9/11 unquestionably joined in to invoke the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for collective self-defense (the first time the Alliance ever did so). That NATO launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and began a far-reaching transformation of capabilities signaled its trust in the United States’ reliability when it came to security cooperation.

Now, treaty allies and partner nations are reassessing their bilateral security relationships with the United States. It’s not just the NATO states caught off-guard by the haphazard departure from Afghanistan that will think twice before embarking upon future military campaigns with the United States. Resolute defense partners in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—likely also need overt reassurance, such as a clear national-security strategy and declared recommitments. Additionally, these partners are increasingly feeling the need to proactively raise their own defense capabilities by boosting their budgets or coordinating with allies to ensure regional security along with the United States.

Besides stress-testing the integrity of American security cooperation, the Afghanistan withdrawal also highlights the necessity of staying the course on long-term investment in mutually beneficial security partnerships with countries with which the United States has shared interests—or shared threats. Well before the fall of Afghanistan, foreign partners were

already questioning the reliability of the United States at a time when the debate in Washington about our global posture was becoming increasingly politicized.

The case for partnering with the United States needs to be clearly articulated through the presence, performance, and processes of American security cooperation. The quality of US aerospace and defense equipment, the commitment to build capabilities, and the reassurance that comes from partnering with the US military must include further transparency, accountability, and predictability of policies. If not, American allies and partners will be hesitant to collaborate with us on future shared security requirements—or simply seek cooperation elsewhere (Cooper, 2021). If alliances are indeed our "greatest asset"—whether in the Middle East, Indo-Pacific, Africa, or Europe—it is crucial for US officials to actively affirm their values through clear recommitments and presence in security cooperation, such as the recent pledges made to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The USA is not naive to believe that countries around the world have no choice but to partner with the United States. Washington must be deliberate in its efforts to prove why choosing the United States as a security partner remains the best option. Besides, in the past couple decades, the "rise of China" has become a cultural phenomenon in the United States. Pervasive throughout media, business, academics, and politics, a fixation on the increasing wealth and power of China is perpetuated by a deep uncertainty and fear that is unique to this country. It is unique not because Americans are particularly xenophobic, or have historical qualms to face—and certainly not due to geographic proximity. In fact, the fear has very little to do with any factors specific to China itself. What America sees in a rising China that no other country can see, is replacement. The possibility that, benign or otherwise, China may one day supplant the United States as the most powerful nation on Earth, is in many ways a threat foremost to American identity.

Looking for a strategy of multilateralism within the two largest multilateral exercises in the word could come across as a bit too convenient. After all, in almost every statement or publication by US officials on the strategy in East Asia, the first point made is that America's bilateral relationships in the region are the "cornerstone" of stability. With each one of these five treaty partners—Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia—the US has a long history of bilateral exercises. Most of these have remained bilateral, and of great importance to American military forces. This seemingly fundamental image of US military strategy and force structure in East Asia is what makes new developments outside this established formula so important (Hagel, 2014). The hub and spoke system are so engrained in the history of the US alliance structure that each step away from it, each year that more resources and political capital is spent towards building a more robust multilateral system, reveals more about the long-term strategic vision of the US. Stepping away, however, is not exactly what the US is doing. Just as Secretary Hagel and others have emphasized to allies elsewhere in the world that the rebalancing to Asia does not mean abandoning US commitments, the rebalancing to cooperative security does not mean an abandoning of the strong bilateral relations in East Asia (Hemmings, 2014). To do so would be counterproductive, and surely result in greater instability. The theory behind cooperative security, however, is that if it is truly successful, those old bilateral relationships will no longer be needed.

2 Cooperative Security of the EU

In the foreseeable future we will likely remain in a security environment where deterrence prevails, and political conditions will hinder comprehensively reintroducing

cooperative elements into the European security order. However, some forms of dialogue and cooperation are warranted even in such a setting. At some point, the Europeans will have to launch another serious attempt to return to a European cooperative security architecture. For this to happen, there is a need of enabling political environment and political leadership by key stakeholders of European security. As long as the war in Ukraine is ongoing and not settled satisfactorily, this is not thinkable. Once the conditions are given, such a process could draw on existing institutions. A smart combination of bilateral and multilateral formats should be aimed for. Bilateral setups such as the Istanbul process between Ukraine and Russia facilitated by Turkey or the Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) between the United States and the Russian Federation could be complemented by multilateral platforms like reinvigorated NATO-Russia Council or the OSCE. In particular, the broader discussion on the principles of the European security should be conducted on an inclusive platform like the OSCE. This would permit amplifying Europe's voice through the EU and its member states, but also allow a solid representation by Ukraine and other "in-between" or "bridge" states. A process inspired by Helsinki Process of the 1970ies, a Helsinki 2.0., could structure a broader discussion of the 21st century meaning of principles of the European security. In this sense, a revitalized OSCE could serve as a coordination platform for European security, as envisaged by the Istanbul Summit Declaration of 1999 (Greminger, 2023a).

Security in Europe is at risk. Within the span of a generation, the new era of democracy, peace and unity declared in the 1990 Charter of Paris is under threat from authoritarian and illiberal regimes, kleptocrats, and instability. Whereas, until recently, war in Europe was considered "unthinkable", in the past two decades there have been conflicts in Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Borders have been changed unilaterally by force. The dream of a Europe whole and free has been replaced by the reality of new dividing lines, even barbed wire fences and walls. Relations are marred by distrust rather than being founded on respect and cooperation. Instead of feeling secure, populations fear a wide range of threats: from pandemics, to cyber-attacks, terrorism, organized crime, and climate change, not to mention energy and job security. Changing this trajectory will require a rethinking of European security towards a more comprehensive and cooperative approach (Remler, 2019).

After the end of the Cold War, there was an assumption that Europe would develop in a linear, liberal way; countries interested in joining the European Union would start to look and act more like EU members, and the rest of the continent would go through processes of democratic transition that would lead to peace and prosperity. Although European countries are arguably better off than they were thirty years ago, the continent is far from stable. While conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia may have looked like bumps in the road in a normalization of relations between Russia and the West, the crisis in and around Ukraine has demonstrated fundamental divisions, both between Moscow and Kyiv, and between Moscow and the West.

If the United States and Russia are looking for places to work together, then the resolution of conflicts in Europe is a good place to start. Conversely, an escalation of conflict in and around Ukraine unleash a chain of events that even the great powers may not be able to control. The COVID pandemic has demonstrated how quickly basic assumptions can change. Without being doom mongers, this shock should motivate us to be prepared for other potential game changing events like a major cyber-attack (and blackouts), man-made or natural disasters, an incident in space, and other wars. We need to think the "unthinkable" in order to be in a better position to prevent it. Thinking wider Rethinking European security should involve widening our horizons: in terms of what is considered "Europe", what enhances and threatens our societies, and what we mean by security. At the moment, there is a tendency to conflate "Europe" with the European Union, and to focus on Euro-Atlantic security. For example, the current process of developing an EU Strategic Compass is designed to provide a

sense of orientation and direction for the EU as a security and defense actor and identify common priorities. Thus far in the consultation process, there has been little mention of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

However, most of the issues that have been identified relate to threats and challenges within the OSCE area, including conflicts in the EU's neighborhood, challenges from state actors (like Russia), threats by non-state actors, and hybrid threats. Therefore, while the OSCE may have been off the EU's radar when developing the strategic compass, once the compass is ready, it will no doubt point straight to the OSCE area. For example, in the short term, the EU will have a strategic interest in fostering stability in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. It will continue to promote security, freedom, and democracy in the Western Balkans. It will remain engaged in the South Caucasus. And it has a self-interest in enhancing security and cooperation in Central Asia, particularly to contain any spill-over of insecurity from Afghanistan. Many of these objectives can be achieved by working, inter alia, through the OSCE rather than just bilaterally (Greminger, 2021).

We also need to think wider, in terms of what is meant by security and threats to it. Despite the tendency towards de-globalization and states focusing on national solutions, most emerging threats and challenges transcend borders and therefore require multilateral cooperation. All countries, including great powers, have a national interest to work together on issues like climate change, pandemics, organized crime, terrorism, and migration. Indeed, they have to work together. Cooperation is realpolitik, not altruism. Furthermore, we will need to engage a wider set of actors to work on security issues – not just diplomats, politicians, or experts from the security sector, but also scientists, the private sector, civil society, academia and youth to explain and prepare for the possible impact of disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, blockchain, and nano-technology. We also need to ensure that global governance keeps pace with innovation, for example in relation to cryptocurrencies, cybercrime or automated weapons systems. Talk to your enemies.

Sadly, there has been a tendency within the past few decades to focus on security in the narrow sense of stability. With so many problems in the world, states – including in North America and the European Union – have tended to strike deals with leaders who promise stability. Upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as fighting corruption, are given a lower priority. However, such an approach undermines the very values on which open societies and security communities are based and can increase instability over the long term. As a result, accountable, pluralistic, democracies that protect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens should be the system of government that every European country aspires to. But let's be honest; not every country in wider Europe – in the OSCE area – fits that description. Yet that should not stop non-like-minded countries from talking to each other.

However, there are few places left where Russia and the West can meet and talk. The NATO-Russia Council and formal EU-Russia consultations have broken down, and there is less military-to-military dialogue than during the Cold War (Mija and Teosa, 2013). The OSCE is one of the few remaining multilateral forums to discuss European security issues and manage relations peacefully. Yet, even here, there is no sense of common purpose and no vision for the future. The Geneva Center for Strategic Policy has, therefore, launched a track 1.5 process to explore options and test ideas for promoting a more cooperative approach to security in Europe. The intention is to bring together experts from around the OSCE area, particularly from the United States, the Russian Federation and the rest of Europe, to look at process design and identify security issues on which countries have common interests. The hope is that this can feed fresh ideas and a more constructive approach into the inter-

governmental process, building up to a high-level meeting on European security, to correspond with the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2025 (Greminger, 2023b).

But hope is not a strategy. If there is to be a more cooperative approach to security in Europe, a process will have to be engineered. Some building blocks are already in place, like the Structured Dialogue process in the OSCE in Vienna, and the strategic stability dialogue in Geneva between Russia and the United States. Finland, as a possible chair of the OSCE in 2025, could play a key role in restoring the "spirit of Helsinki". Some may say that the time is not ripe to talk about cooperation because relations between Russia and the West are so bad. But precisely because relations are so bad, the case needs to be made for cooperative security; not necessarily as an alternative to deterrence, but certainly as a complement to it. This logic is not new. It was at the heart of NATO's doctrine in the late 1960s when Europe stood in the crossfire of mutually assured destruction between the USSR and the USA.

Conclusion

The success of cooperative security hinges upon several factors. Above all, it requires the belief that certain countries share a common future, and that cooperation offers the best possible means of achieving their national interests. Historically, the perception of a common threat was the most frequent, as well as the most effective, basis for establishing a security system. This was surely the case for the Concert of Europe, NATO, the EC/EU, and ASEAN.

Because national elites were willing to work together in the face of a common threat, they developed a common identity that transcended national borders and intensified their sense of a common purpose. Once formed, that new identity can be quite tenacious, permitting security arrangements to outlive the threats that first brought them together. Just as the Concert of Europe long outlasted the danger of another French revolution, so NATO and the EU have transformed themselves since the fall of communism and the full integration of Germany into Europe.

Today, the threats to Europe are increasingly transnational phenomena. They include corruption, organized crime, migration, epidemic diseases, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism. Such complex problems can only be overcome by united action across national frontiers. To the extent that threatened states work together, they gain a critical awareness of their common future, and we can expect cooperative security to become the norm.

In Western Europe and North America, cooperative security has become a way of life that is steadily moving to the east and the southeast. The security communities of these regions draw their unusual strength from one main factor: they consist of consolidated, liberal democratic states. As security communities, both NATO and — even more so — the EU have developed dense networks of multilateral institutions that foster the denationalization of security policy and serve the needs of entire regions. It is no accident that NATO and the EU both promote liberal democracy. They do so because they believe, in part, that security is better assured cooperatively among countries that have adopted the liberal democratic form of government.

Interdependence leads to a common identity — especially economic interdependence. The fact that Central and Eastern European countries seek validation of their European identity through EU membership, while several countries find it important to actively reject their Balkan identity, is indicative of this strong need for an economically protective common identity. At the same time, a need for multilateral approaches to security builds toward cooperative security. This is especially true among small countries that need to pool resources. The Baltic countries provide a good example, and recent efforts made in Southeastern Europe are promising. Consensual decision practices often aid this multilateral security approach to establishing a common identity, and hence the felt need for cooperative

security. ASEAN countries share only two common factors: a geographical propinquity and a belief in a common future, but it has succeeded as a cooperative security unit (Mihalka, 2005).

Cooperative security has been increasingly adopted as a mechanism for furthering national security. As the prisoner's dilemma illustrates, countries will behave individually in a rational manner, but in so doing will act against their own long–term interests. Relying on self–help and old–style balancing behavior has given way to cooperative efforts to promote stability. Even among states that lack common values, cooperative security is possible. ASEAN is an important practical example. Cooperative security has been approached on a case–by–case basis, but since the end of World War II several security communities have developed — most notably in Western Europe. The EU in contrast with ASEAN, gives credence to the fact that common values and a common economic destiny leads to more cooperative security. The denser the interaction among states and their citizens, the more they will find ways to further their security cooperatively. It is the EU members of the OSCE who take the organization most seriously as a venue for cooperative security. Should they wish, non–democratic OSCE members can participate in the OSCE's cooperative opportunities. However, it is clear that those members of the OSCE already united by the common values of liberal democracy best use the organization. Liberal democracy may not be necessary for cooperative security to begin or to continue, but it expands the range of options and benefits for all.

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HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Abstract: Since the beginning of the 21st century, human security has become a new paradigm in the development of international law. As it is a concept that goes beyond the traditional concept of the state - main ideas include issues related to sovereignty, peace, human rights, and currently climate change. The main goal of this paper is to outline the definitional framework and the human-rights dimension of human security as not yet stabilized concept in the international community and international law.
Key words: human security, human rights, international community, international law
JEL: K33, F51, F53

Introduction

Human security is a flexible approach and can be tailored to different contexts and topics, according to the specific context. (Gómez, O. A. – Gasper, D., 2013) Human security is context-specific: what makes people afraid and what threatens them will vary from place to place, so it requires an integrated, bottom-up approach that engages with citizens' perceptions and real-life dynamics. (UN Trust Fund for Human Security, Human Security Handbook, January 2016) For this reason, the identification of threats to individuals from the point of view of development in the international community is currently mainly related to the global increase in nationalism, which in turn has an impact on issues related to migrants and refugees, the closing of state borders, and at the same time it has a direct connection with the increase in long-lasting armed conflicts, disinformation campaigns, propaganda and cyber-attacks, while this leads to a redirection from cooperation between states (which is subsequently confirmed by some states by their withdrawals from obligations from multilateral as well as bilateral treaties).

In the introduction to the publication New threats to human security in the Anthropocene (2022), António Guterres stated that we are facing a "development paradox", i.e. that on the one hand the average life expectancy of people is increasing (while general indicators also point to healthier and richer outlived life), but on the other hand there are noticeable threatening events such as "rising geopolitical tensions, growing inequalities, democratic backsliding and devastating climate change-related weather events". (UNDP Special Report: New threats to human security in the Anthropocene, 2022) The central theme of human security from the moment of its establishment is the idea of connection with human rights issues.

The main goal of this paper is to outline the definitional framework and the human-rights dimension of human security as not yet stabilised concept in the international community and international law. Due to the effective achievement of the main aim, relevant research procedures and methods were chosen, i.e. basic research methods, especially logical methods (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, induction, deduction), and descriptive-causal methods.

1 Definitional Framework of Human Security

The first authoritative definition of human security was published in 1994 through the adoption of the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program. The report states that human security is primarily based on the protection of human life and

dignity, while its four main characteristics were defined, namely universality, interdependence of individual components, prevention as the best protection and focus on natural persons/individuals. (UNDP Human Development Report, 1994) In the mentioned report, the concept of human security was viewed through two main concepts, i.e. first of all - security against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and secondly as protection against sudden and harmful changes in everyday life (be it in households, employment, or within the community).

According to Nasu, human security has two key elements, the separation of the individual from the state and the prioritization of individuals over the state, coupled with the interconnectedness of threats. (Nasu, 2013) Considering the public nature of relations between states, this can be considered a key problem of the concept of human security in relation to public international law. As the multitude of violent conflicts and extreme poverty demonstrates, states cannot be secure if people's security is at stake. (Reveron, D. - Mahoney-Norris, 2011) It should be emphasized that no concept of human security aims to replace the role of the state in the issue of security in the international space. And although human security differs from national security by primarily focusing on the protection of the individual and not the state, which is ultimately not mutually exclusive, both security perspectives can be considered as mutually complementary and intertwined.

The lessons learned from international politics in the post-cold war era and the nature of global conflict today compel us to accept an important fact: it is impossible to protect and enhance human freedom and well-being exclusively through the traditional paradigm of national security. (Hayden, 2004) With the increasing number of armed conflicts, a humanitarian concept of human security was also created, which was and still is embodied in humanitarian intervention and in the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) concept.

Today the UNDP's 1994 definition of human security remains the most widely cited and "most authoritative" formulation of the term. (Paris, 2001) And although the practice of states has not confirmed a widely accepted and unified and universal definition of human security as it was presented in HDR 1994, several groups of states with different approaches to human security have formed in the international community.

Canada has been characterized by a minimalist approach since the beginning of the formation of human security. This approach is based on a narrow definition, and essentially on the concept of "freedom from fear", and thus it is about "focusing" on factors that incite violence and thus directly threaten the safety of the individual, such as armed conflict, international crimes, public insecurity, especially personified in failed/fragile states and the issue of organized crime. Since 2004, the EU has also been leaning towards this approach. The year 2003, was a milestone for EU because the Council of the EU for the first time explicitly referred human security as one of the goals of EU foreign and security policy, in the published report on implementation of the European Security Strategy. (European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a better world, 2003) The maximalist approach is used and argued by Japan, which takes into account all threats directed at the individual, whether direct or indirect, objective or subjective, and therefore regardless of whether the insecurity originates in under-development or in the violation of human rights (the so-called freedom from want).

The characteristics of human security are known based on the definition of seven dimensions/seven target areas, namely economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, environmental security, community security and political security. Through the given dimensions, it is possible to confuse human security with human development, even though these are two different, although closely related concepts. What is clear is that the debate regarding human security is an attempt to conceptually merge development issues with humanitarian and security issues. (Sen, 2000) Human development,

as well as human security, can be viewed through an almost identical lens, as human-centered, multidimensional and with a focus on the individual as a goal (not a means). However, reality indicates that human development is possible only if there is a state of security, and both terms must be considered complementary, given that they cannot be completely separated (even in relation to the 7 dimensions of human security), and especially considering the state as the main subject of international law.

2 The Human Rights Dimension of Human Security

National and international securities cannot be achieved without giving due respect to human security by respecting basic human rights and freedoms. (Roznai, 2014) Recent developments in the international community indicate a trend of increasing the number of armed conflicts and national tensions, and thus also massive violations of human rights through murders, rapes, ethnic cleansing, up to suspicions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which clearly demonstrates the connection between human security and human rights protection. Human rights are rights that, in principle, all human beings are entitled to, merely by virtue of being biologically human. (Howard-Hassmann, 2012) Human rights aim at the "well-being" of persons, and as such represent a prerequisite for protection against their violation. Respect and protection of human rights are embodied in the obligations of states, which should ensure the implementation of policies, mechanisms and means to fulfill these obligations.

The concept of human rights began to develop in modern international law after the Second World War, especially after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the UN General Assembly. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) In 1966, international pacts followed, namely the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It is worth mentioning the treaties protecting vulnerable groups, such as women and children whose status e.g. especially in armed conflicts, it should be primarily protected. These are treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Since human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, they are aimed at anyone, and thus they are also designed to protect the individual from his own state. (Ishay, 2008) Protection is also directed towards other individuals, organizations (both international, non-governmental and transnational corporations and other legal entities), as well as non-state actors (armed, insurgent or terrorist groups). Despite the fact that on the basis of many human rights treaties were founded monitoring bodies, they do not have significant enforcement powers in this area, and thus they cannot be characterized as bodies serving to protect human rights, or human security. Various UN human rights committees dealing with civil and political rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; racial discrimination; discrimination against women; protection against torture; children’s rights; and rights of migrant workers can assess and comment on state reports of compliance with human rights treaty obligations. (Mertu – Bourantonis, 2009) In the case of regional treaty instruments, the situation is fundamentally different, although their enforcement powers largely differ. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights allow individuals in cases where their human rights and fundamental freedoms are violated - to complain to authorities founded through the mentioned regional treaties. In situations of extreme violence and violations of human rights

on a large scale and in situations of armed conflicts and violations of humanitarian law, it is possible, to a certain limiting extent, for human security to be resolved through the UN Security Council or the International Criminal Court.

Conclusion

„Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights ...“(UN Secretary-General/Annan, 2005) In today's globalized world, cooperation and coordination between states is a necessary means to ensure sustainable peace and security, and thus, consequently, human security and the protection of human rights. Looking at human rights through the lens of human security ultimately means that human rights are not only at the center of conflict prevention, but also of post-conflict reconstruction after the end of an armed conflict. Events in the international community even today confirm what was mentioned already in 2004: The challenges facing the international community at the present time are such that, without respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the attainment of lasting peace would be impossible and human security would remain illusory. (Ramcharan, 2002)

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COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND SLOVENIA

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Abstract: This article focuses on the concept of cooperative security and its relevance to Slovenia as a small state in the international community. The changing security environment after the Cold War has demanded a new approach to ensuring international security, which includes not only traditional threats but also new uncertainties and challenges. The cooperative model of security is the main guide of liberal cooperation in ensuring security, as opposed to the competitive model of security based on realism. The paper examines Slovenia's relations with NATO and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and how it strives to fulfil its national security interests within the framework of cooperative security. The article emphasizes the importance of interdependence and sharing of responsibilities among various actors at different levels of society in ensuring effective responses to global threats and security challenges.
Keywords: Slovenia, small state, cooperative security, NATO, CSDP
JEL: F51, F53, H56

Introduction

The changed security environment after the end of the Cold War required a transformation of previous approaches to ensuring international security. They were being refined by political, economic, military, and other social changes at the regional, European, and global levels. During the Cold war, although the world was divided into two blocs, countries ensured their national security mostly against traditional threats with the use of their own (national) military systems and armed forces, while in most cases neglecting all other aspects of security and new uncertainties and threats to the individual, society, and nature. The appearance of new civilizational challenges such as retardation, socio-economic vulnerabilities, antisocial and pathological behaviour, technological and other disasters, and ecological, political, cultural, spiritual, and other problems have demanded a new approach to international security, reorganizing and restructuring how the international community operates.

The contemporary world is a world of interdependence. Sharing of responsibilities is a guiding principle of the policy ensuring the effectiveness of responding to new threats and security challenges. Not only sharing responsibilities but also threats becoming international, borderless is one of the main characteristics of the contemporary international community.

The cooperative model of security is the main guide of liberal cooperation in ensuring security, as an opposite to the competitive model of security which is based on realism. Liberalism defines that the role of the state in the international community is changing and that countries are becoming more and more interdependent. The international community also includes other actors, besides states, which operate in different levels and areas and are sub-national, supra-national and transnational. (Malešič, 2012).

They tend to cooperate and when it comes to peace and security have a strong incentive to cooperate in solving common problems for the good of the international community. Liberal theorists believe in the positive role of institutions and other types of relations between national states which moderate the relations between them and by doing so also moderate the politics of (military) power. “A large number of actors in the international community and their interactions pose many questions and establish a need to manage interactions, and relations between them and to form a system of behaviour based on common rules. “(Malešič, 2012: 270). Without a doubt, the state is still an important actor in

international relations, however, the global context in which it operates has changed dramatically, and thus also the concept of sovereignty. Today, interdependence is part of our lives on all levels, national, regional, or international.

And in those circumstances, Slovenia, as an EU and a NATO member, is striving to fulfil its national security interests, within the cooperative security framework. The paper reflects on Slovenia's relations with NATO and the EU's CSDP, considering one of its main characteristics, a small state (in the international community).

1 Understanding Cooperative Security

Security is a fundamental value of human relations, the provision of which is institutionalized by the emergence of a sovereign state and systems of states at the global level.

An individual, society or state and the international system are three entities that strive to secure the status quo in an environment which is threatening to security or try to balance mutual existence in a narrower and wider framework. Today's understanding of the phenomenon of security is necessarily holistic. "Includes all aspects of human existence and functioning in society (economic, social, political, educational, communication-informational, defence, etc.) and all levels of integration and forms of social organisation (national, regional, international, and global) (Grizold, 1999a).

International security is another concept which must not be mixed with cooperative security. International security is an internal security problem of the system of states and the world as a whole. It is the collective good of the international global society and not just the good of an individual country or federation of countries. Even though the existing international system provides its members with external sovereignty (based on the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention), not all countries are equally able and successful in providing conditions for the personal safety of their citizens. International security presupposes two interconnected institutions, the balance of power and the concert of great powers (Grizold, 1999a).

All though the concept of cooperation and alliances between different groups, families, and states, in peace and wartime, has been "a common feature of the history of mankind" (Cohen 2001), the terms collective security and collective defence are inventions of the last century.

"Both concepts imply a long–term, formal commitment between groups of states to protect the security interests of individual members within their common spheres." (ibid.)

At the end of World War II, the newly formed United Nations took up the mantle of Collective Security from the League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter[3] provide for action by member states to preserve and restore international peace and security. In the 1970s, the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, now the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), was formed to provide Collective Security to

[3] Article 41: »The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. «
Article 42: » Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.« (United Nations Charter)

virtually all of the states of the Eurasian–Atlantic region. “At best, however, both organizations have been only partially effective.” (Cohen, 2001).

Collective security looks inward to attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states. The first modern collective security organization was the League of Nations founded in the aftermath of World War I. Its members pledged to protect each other from attack by other nations within that organization. According to Cohen (2001), the idea was simple: “An act of aggression by one or more members against another would be opposed, if necessary, by force, by the other member states of the League”. For a variety of reasons, the League of Nations was ultimately not successful in achieving security and stability.

Collective security is a mean for ensuring international peace and security, which prevents and limits interstate disputes. The fundamental assumption of the design of collective security is, in addition to universal membership, the unity of states in securing peace and unity in the belief that peace and security are indivisible, which conditions collective action against potential countries violators of these values. The concept of collective security is implemented through various mechanisms and instruments institutionalized only in the League of Nations and later in the UN. Necessary prerequisites for functioning of the collective security are the universality of membership and the achievement of consensus for collective action (Grizold, 1999b).

Collective security is not the same as collective defence. A collective defence organization looks outward to defend its members from external aggression. According to Cohen (2001), collective defence organizations blossomed during the days of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Pact were founded in the aftermath of World War II. “Collective defence commits all nations, bound by treaty, to come to each other’s defence in the event any member is threatened by, or is actually subjected to, military attack by a state or states outside the treaty area” (Cohen 2001). The Brussels Treaty of 1948, the founding document of the Western Union (now the WEU), and the Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document, both contain these provisions as their central theme. Collective defence is a joint defence against an armed attack on any member state of the system collective defence. The principle of indivisibility of security in this case is based on the logic that it treats an armed attack on one country as an attack on all. The goal of the collective defence system is the deterrence of aggression and the collective and coordinated defence of all members of the alliance. The concept of collective defence, in contrast to the concept of collective security, is directed outwards – against non-member countries. The idea of collective defence is related to the system of military alliances, mainly defensive and with a balance of power (Grizold, 1999b, 42).

What differentiates collective from cooperative security is that according to Cohen (Cohen, 2001), cooperative security must look both ways, inward and outward. But it also must incorporate two further dimensions not covered explicitly by either collective security or collective defence. ” The first of these is the concept of individual security and the second is the active promotion and projection of stability into areas adjacent to the cooperative security space where instability and conflict might adversely affect the security of its members” (Cohen 2001). According to the same author “cooperative security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defence cooperation” (Cohen, 2001). In a cooperative security system, individual states’ national security objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

- Ring one: Promoting and protecting human rights within their boundaries and further afield (Individual Security)
- Ring two: Maintaining peace and stability within their common space (Collective Security)
- Ring three: Mutual protection against outside aggression (Collective Defence)
- Ring four: Actively promoting stability in other areas where conflict could threaten their shared security, using political, informational, economic, and, if necessary, military means (Promoting Stability) (Cohen, 2001).

Cooperative security is a type of security cooperation that contributes to a more stable development of relations between the subjects of international relations. The starting points of the concept of cooperative security are based on the idea of the common of security and the idea of preventing and limiting the threat to international security already on its starting point, especially within countries. The concept of cooperative security does not deny the existence and presence of conflicts in the international community, it only wants to control it with pre-accepted norms and procedures and prevent an outbreak of mass violence. It is therefore based on the principle of peaceful dispute resolution, the indivisibility of security, on a comprehensive understanding of security, with the balance of military forces and non-military security mechanisms and instruments and with the agreement between all countries on mutual regulation of the scope, composition, financing, and procedures for the use of the armed forces. Cooperative security is most often expressed in the form of one-sided (cooperatively oriented) self-restraint, restriction by the powerful countries, measures to strengthen trust and security between countries, regulating agreements weapon systems and military personnel, nuclear non-proliferation regimes, defence industry conversions, inclusive international alliances (Grizold, 1999b: 43-4).

A new component of the cooperative security system is the active promotion of external stability of national borders. A broader definition of cooperative security includes both politics, economics, and human rights. Connecting them includes continuous political consultations, free trade, and foreign and security policies, including integrated ones. Within cooperative security, states sometimes must modify the satisfaction of one's national interests for the common good. They are inevitably inherent in any cooperative and consensual relationship between countries (Cohen and Mihalka, 2001: 8-18).

2 Slovenia and Cooperative Security

With the creation of the Slovenian state in 1991, Slovenian politics also faced a dilemma regarding ensuring its national security. After becoming an independent state Slovenia has found itself in conditions significantly different to the previous period of the Cold War. While the end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a more stable and peaceful period for most of the European countries, it also marks the beginning of several low-intense armed conflicts erupting on the territories of former socialist states (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). When the Slovene independent state was being created in 1989-1990 several options were being discussed about ensuring its national security. According to Bebler (1996: 131), there were two options seriously considered: one was leaning towards unarmed and demilitarized Slovenia, and the other option was leaning towards armed neutrality. However, after 1991 Slovenian government started to reconsider its orientation towards European integration (Grizold et al, 2002: 384). Among the theoretical concepts about how Slovenia should provide the military aspect of its national security following relevant options were

discussed: formation of its armed forces and leaning to the collective security system; obtaining the armed or unarmed status of neutrality; signing of defence agreements with other countries; inclusion in NATO and/or WEU and a combination of several mentioned possibilities (Grizold, 1999a: 129). In 1994, full membership in NATO officially became a political goal for Slovenia and cooperation with NATO and within NATO has become one of the most important elements in national security policy (Grizold et al, 2002). The democratically expressed political will for Slovenia to join NATO was first clearly expressed in the supplements to the Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, adopted in Slovenia's National Assembly in January 1994.

Based on the decision expressed by Slovenia's parliament, on 30 March 1994, Slovenia became one of the first countries to be included in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the same year became an associate partner in the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA). (Nato.gov.si). At the Washington summit in April 1999, NATO member states adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). With the adoption of the Annual National Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for Carrying out the NATO Membership Action Plan (ANP MAP 1999-2000) in October 1999, Slovenia was included in the Membership Action Plan. At the NATO summit meeting in Prague on 21 and 22 November 2002 Slovenia was invited to begin accession talks for NATO membership along with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. On the 24th of February 2004, the Slovene National Assembly ratified the Washington Treaty (ibid.)

According to Grizold and Ferfila (Grizold and Ferfila, 2000), the European security system is formed on three fundamental levels: national, where states provide national security as a political and personal good with engaging the entire national security structure; multinational: with several bilateral and multilateral security agreements and international: establishing international organizations whose mission is to ensure peace and security in the international community (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE). The year 2024 marks the 20th anniversary of Slovenia's participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)[4], its activities and mechanisms. The most visible form of Slovenia's participation in CFSP[5] (and later CSDP) comes in the shape of EU missions and operations. EU missions and operations are "the most visible expression of CSDP and EU's efforts to become a more visible political and security actor in the world" (Malešič et al, 2015). Analysis of EU operations and missions (ibid) has shown that EU military operations took place mainly on the African continent, with an emphasis on the central part of Africa, while civilian operations are geographically more dispersed. Slovenia has, so far, participated in a rather low[6] number of EU operations and missions. Altogether since 2004, Slovenia has participated in six (6) EU operations and missions: EU Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUTM Mali, EUNAVFOR in the Mediterranean Sea, EUMAM UA in Ukraine, EU Chad/CAR in Chad and Central African Republic and in EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia. The number of Slovene Armed Forces' (SAF) members who have participated in EU-led operations since 2004 is also very low. Currently, in 2023 twenty-five (25) SAF members are deployed in three different EU operations (Althea[7], EUNAVFOR[8] and EUMAM UA), out of 278 SAF members being deployed abroad (Slovenska vojska, 2023).

NATO-led operations are those in which Slovenia and SAF have deployed the majority of its members and capabilities. Similar conclusions were found by Zupančič who in

[4] Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
[5] Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was established with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
[6] Compared to the number of NATO-led operations Slovenia has participated in since 2004.
[7] Bosnia and Herzegovina
[8] Italy and Mediterranian Sea

his analysis of Slovenia's participation in military operations and missions concludes that "a NATO-led discourse is overwhelmingly dominant within the national security system of Slovenia" (2014: 106). One of the main questions is whether there was an official national interest to concentrate the majority of our efforts on NATO-led operations and neglect the EU and CSDP, which has strongly influenced the role and position of Slovenia within the CSDP framework. To answer this question, we must go back in time, to the end of the nineties of the previous century, when Slovenia strongly aspired for NATO membership and has put all its foreign policy actions into reaching this goal. However, in 1999, at the NATO summit in Washington, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO in the alliance's first round of post-Cold War enlargement, Slovenia was extremely disappointed for not having received an invitation. The unofficial reason was also supposed to be the insufficient participation of Slovenia and its armed forces in NATO-led missions. So, for the decades to come, Slovenia has consciously deployed the majority of its efforts into NATO-led missions and has not stopped since.

On a declarative level, Slovenia has stated its support for strong common CFSP for several times, however on a more practical level it seems Slovenia follows and does not lead. One of the latest initiatives in CFSP in which Slovenia is taking part is the initiative to change the decision-making process to be able to find common positions faster. "Together with Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, Germany is establishing a group for greater use of qualified majority decision-making in common foreign and security policy," (RTVSLO, 2023). It is unclear and no official documents or statements can be found why Slovenia has decided to join this initiative. It must be noted that this is not a novel initiative, several similar initiatives regarding the reform of the decision-making process in the area of CFSP have been announced in the past and were unsuccessful. Time will tell what will happen to the latest German-led initiative.

On 1 July 2021, Slovenia took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Portugal. Slovenia has identified several priorities for the time of presidency, however, for this article we will focus only on the topics directly connected with CDSP. A broader debate on strategic autonomy has prevailed over the Slovenian presidency, with also emphasizing the adoption of the Strategic Compass.

After several months of debates and delays on March 21, 2023, the European Union adopted and published a document titled "Strategic Compass for Security and Defence" which can be seen as an effort to align the strategic thinking of 27 member states, each with its own foreign and defence policies. The strategic compass was meant to be a foundational document for a geopolitical EU. However, the war in Ukraine happened, setting the European continent several decades back.

The Strategic Compass was approved one month after the Russian military aggression on Ukraine and the return of war in Europe. The Russian aggression against Ukraine is a tectonic shift for Europe's security and a significant source of destabilisation for the rest of the world. What is at stake is not only the security of Europe but also the rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core. The Strategic Compass has simply been overtaken by events.

3 Small State and Cooperative Security

One of the main characteristics of Slovenia on the level of the EU and the international community is that it is a small state (Zupančič et al, 2011). The role and possible influence of

small states[9] in international politics and international relations have been frequent subjects of analysis in studies on international relations[10]. Small states' powers are limited, and their economy and military capabilities do not match those of their larger neighbours, but small states enjoy certain advantages that increase their ability to influence international politics. "Small states can become much more than negligible actors if they actively pursue their agenda and consolidate all elements of their national power to achieve their desired objectives" (Urbelis, 2015).

Being a part of a larger alliance or a supranational institution is of great importance for small states. "Supranational institutions are considered a natural ally of small states both for ensuring their representation and for championing a common interest that often reflects the small states' priorities better than a compromise just among the major powers" (Weiss, 2020: 2). According to Weiss (Ibid.), the literature has long recognized that international institutions in general, and supranational institutions in particular, allow small states to have a bigger impact on policy results, and has studied the means and channels they use. "More intergovernmental forms of cooperation, such as the CSDP, provide the small states with shelter as well, although the influence of the big states is much stronger" (Weiss, 2020, 11).
According to Urbelis (2015, 62), "Small states pursue active policies on internal NATO and EU matters". An extremely successful example of small state policies is the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission in the Baltic States. From the beginning of the NATO air policing mission in 2004, the mission was considered to be temporary. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were not satisfied with this arrangement, and they sought a permanent solution. "The Baltic states, with the assistance of the US and Denmark, persuaded other allies that NATO must agree to make temporary NATO air policing arrangement a more permanent one" (Urbelis, 2015: 70). Actively pursuing their priorities is one of the most important rules for the success of small states. "Clearly defined and persistently sought priorities can lead to amazing results unless these priorities collide with a strong opposition by larger Allies" (Ibid.). However, prioritization remains crucial; small states, because of their limited resources, cannot fight for their interests on multiple fronts. Small states must choose wisely which battle to fight. If prioritization is the first rule of success, then specialization is the second. "Specialization allows small countries to accumulate expertise in one or another particular area, thus achieving respect and importance while discussing those issues in NATO and the EU" (Urbelis, 2015, 70).

An excellent opportunity for a small state to shape and influence EU (and CSDP) decisions is the Presidency of the Council of the EU. However, it is important to note that since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the Presidency in the area of the CSDP has decreased. Urbelis (2015) analyzed Lithuania's Presidency in the second part of 2013. Based on several examples of Lithuania's influence during the Presidency (the EU's Eastern Partnerships, Energy Security, EU Battle Groups (EUBG)), Urbelis concluded "that small states can have a role by taking the Presidency of the EU Council, but its possibilities to influence decision making are limited" (2015: 77). Small states can quite easily introduce a topic onto the agenda, but when national interests come into play the role of the Presidency disappears. One very good example of Member States' national interests prevailing is the issue of the EUBG. The EU countries could not agree on the deployment option, and when

[9] De Wijk (in Urbelis, 2015: 62) emphasized that the main features of small states are easily recognized by their inability to maintain a full spectrum of military capabilities, and their limited abilities to project military power in distant regions of the world. Small states are dependent upon larger countries' military capabilities, as only they can provide the framework that small states can plug into with their available assets.
[10] Reiter et al. (in Urbelis 2015: 61) and others have created a theoretical framework for the analysis of small states' behaviour and motivations within larger international formations.

actual crises hit there was no political will to use the EUBG. The discussion clearly showed that neither the Lithuanian Presidency nor the EEAS had the power to impose any decision upon the use of force on any EU Member State. When the time for real decisions came, sovereign nations followed their national interests with little regard for the Presidency or the CSDP (Urbelis, 2015). The Presidency's powers are also limited in terms of influence on wider political debates such as the NATO-EU dialogue (Urbelis, 2015: 77).

As already mentioned in the previous paragraph on July 1st, 2021, Slovenia took over the Presidency, as the last country in the Germany-Portugal-Slovenia trio. The period of the trio's Presidency has been guided by an 18-month Programme of the Council (Council of the European Union, 2020). The trio's Presidency programme strongly focuses on plans for recovery after the pandemic, making this also the priority for the period of Slovenia's Presidency. This chapter focuses on the goals of the Presidency directly dealing with strengthening the resilience of societies and the issues of the CSDP. "The Three Presidencies are determined to take full account of the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic for the EU, also in the framework of European Civil protection. /…./ the Presidencies will aim to further enhance the EU crisis response and strengthen the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, including further development of RescEU and other capacities…./". (Council of the European Union 2020, p 10). The trio also promised to take all possible steps to increase the EU's capacity to act decisively and in unity to effectively promote Europe's interests and values and to defend and shape a rules-based international order. The trio also promised to enhance the EU's capabilities for emergency response, making it more effective in complex emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic and other threats (cyber-attacks; natural disasters, etc.) have unveiled several gaps in the EU's crisis and emergency response, while still having enough space for improvement.

Special mention was given to the Strategic Compass and the importance of "shared threat analysis providing a basis for this strategic dialogue" (Council of the European Union, 2020: 30). The trio has also emphasized the importance of several new defence initiatives[11], including PESCO[12], CARD[13] and the EDF[14]. However, what the programme lacked was a

[11] Since 2016, the EU has developed several new initiatives on security and defence. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the latest Strategic Compass are frameworks and incentives that were designed to progressively overcome the failures of the past. All these initiatives are strongly interlinked: the CDP identifies the capability priorities Member States should focus their common efforts on; CARD provides an overview of existing capabilities in Europe and identifies opportunities for cooperation; PESCO offers options on how to develop prioritized capabilities collaboratively; and the EDF provides EU funding to support the implementation of cooperative defence projects, with a bonus for the PESCO project (EDAa ,2023, Juvan, 2021).

[12] The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence policy was established by a Council decision on 11 December 2017, with 26 EU Member States. It offers a legal framework to jointly plan, develop and invest in shared capability projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of armed forces. (EDA, 2023a). The participating Member States aim to collaboratively develop a coherent full spectrum force package and make the capabilities available to the following Member States for national and multinational (EU CSDP, NATO, UN, etc.) missions and operations: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.

[13] The main aim of The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is to provide a picture of the existing defence capability landscape in Europe and to identify potential areas of cooperation. CARD was eventually approved by the EU Council in May 2017. The first full CARD cycle was launched in autumn 2019 and completed in November 2020, and has identified a total of 55 collaborative opportunities throughout the whole capability spectrum, considered to be the most promising, the most needed or the most pressing, including in terms of operational value (CARD Report, 2020). To overcome the current issues of the de-fragmentation of the European defence landscape, the conclusions of the first full CARD cycle suggest more coordinated and

clearer and stronger statement on enhancing the CDSP towards a more coherent and stronger European defence. The programme did not bring any groundbreaking CSDP issue to the European table, but only emphasized and acknowledged the importance of the existing status. With its slogan "Together. Resilient. Europe.", Slovenia has decided to focus on four priorities during its Presidency: "to facilitate the EU's recovery and reinforce its resilience, to reflect on the future of Europe, to strengthen the rule of law and European values, and to increase security and stability in the European neighbourhood" (Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021). Slovenia will focus on strengthening capacities to successfully deal with pandemics and different forms of modern and complex security risks and threats, such as large-scale cyberattacks, and will also work to further strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the EU's response to large-scale natural and other disasters. Slovenia's programme evolves from the Trio Presidency programme as it gives support to the further development of the European Civil Protection Pool and rescEU capacities, as well as increasing the efficiency of operations, including transport and logistics capacities. Unfortunately, not much attention was given to the issues of defence and the CSDP. Not only that, but surprisingly there was no mention of PESCO, CARD or the EDF anywhere in the document. One would expect at least confirmation of Slovenia's position on following and fulfilling commitments given within PESCO. As Culetto and Himelrajh (Culetto and Himelrajh, 2018) noted five years ago: "…the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2021 will be a great opportunity to advance PESCO". Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case so far, at least based on the political goals and statements written in the programme.

Conclusion

In today's changing security environment, the concept of cooperative security has become highly relevant. It demands a new approach to ensuring international security that includes not only traditional threats but also new uncertainties and challenges. Countries must work together and share responsibilities to effectively respond to global threats and security challenges. Slovenia, as an EU and NATO member, recognizes this importance and strives to fulfil its national security interests within the framework of cooperative security. By participating actively in cooperative security initiatives, small states like Slovenia can contribute to collective efforts for the good of the international community. It is crucial to promote interdependence and sharing of responsibilities among various actors at different levels of society to ensure effective responses to global security challenges. Therefore, we must continue to prioritize cooperation over competition to maintain peace and security in the world. In conclusion, the concept of cooperative security is highly relevant in today's changing security environment that demands a new approach to ensuring international security. The paper has examined Slovenia's relations with NATO and the EU's CSDP and how it strives to fulfil its national security interests within the framework of cooperative

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continuous efforts by the participating Member States over a long period in three major areas which are interlinked: defence spending, defence planning, and defence cooperation (CARD Report, 2020, Juvan, 2021).

[14] European Defence Fund (EDF) is designed to support EU collaboration in defence research and capability development by offering financial incentives for cooperation. The final decision on the setting up of the EDF was taken by the Council and the European Parliament in 2019/2020. The Fund began to function on 1 January 2021, with a total agreed budget of €7.953 billion for the 2021-2027 period. "Roughly one-third will finance competitive and collaborative defence research projects, in particular through grants, and two-thirds will complement Member States' investment by co-financing the costs for defence capabilities development following the research stage" (EDA, 2023b).

security. The interdependence and sharing of responsibilities among various actors at different levels of society is emphasized as a key factor in ensuring effective responses to global threats and security challenges. Small states like Slovenia need to participate actively in cooperative security initiatives and contribute to collective efforts for the good of the international community.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION INTEGRITY DURING THE PANDEMIC

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Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic was an extraordinary lecture for the international community in various fields, including health, security, but also communication. The reason is that the right way to communicate internally and externally will determine how citizens comply with pandemic measures, how they trust the government and, most importantly, how they stay healthy. Therefore, the aim of this article is to analyse the communication approach of the Slovak institutions and to compare it with the recognised good practices of strategic communication. To achieve this goal, the posts on the institutions' Facebook profiles on the social platform were analysed during the COVID-19 pandemic period.
Keywords: strategic communication, COVID-19, disinformation
JEL: Z00, F10

Introduction

Misinformation about various issues and events is not a recent phenomenon, although it may seem so. On the contrary, misinformation has been spreading in human society for more than 2,000 years. The first known use of disinformation dates back to 44 BC. After the assassination of Julius Caesar, there was a power struggle between Marcus Antonius and Octavius Augustus. Octavius' campaign was not much different from today's. Because of his relationship with Cleopatra, Marcus was branded a puppet of a foreign power, a womaniser and a drunkard who could not govern. The method of spreading misinformation was not much different from that of today. Octavius had short slogans stamped on coins, similar to today's tweets denigrating Marcus (Kaminska, 2017). However, one of the earliest and most famous pieces of disinformation came in 1835, when the New York Sun magazine wrote 6 articles about the discovery of extraterrestrial life on the moon. This extraterrestrial civilisation of unicorns, bipedal beavers and winged men was to be claimed by the New York Sun as a leading newspaper (CITS, 2018).

So disinformation is neither a new social phenomenon nor a new form of hybrid action. It had developed gradually since the First World War, when the Daily Mail wrote about the German practice of using the bodies of their fallen soldiers to make them fat. During the Second World War, Goebbels was a master of propaganda, so successful that the German people agreed to the Holocaust. The Cold War brought a plethora of disinformation operations from both superpowers. Soviet disinformation, for example, focused on discrediting Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thacher, but was unsuccessful with both.

Times have changed, and human societies must determine how to effectively counter disinformation. In her article, Balogh uses the case of Brexit and the US presidential elections as tangible results of propaganda and disinformation campaigns (Balogh, 2021). The pandemic is a notable case in recent history where the global community found itself ill-prepared, despite repeated warnings from scientists. Over time, however, as healthcare systems improved in both quality and quantity, governments improved their ability to respond to such crises. Initially, the response relied primarily on non-medical measures, including partial lockdowns, the formation of social bubbles, travel restrictions within and between regions or countries, remote working and learning, and the use of face masks. With the development of vaccines in 2020, pandemic management also included the challenge of

efficiently and rapidly immunising at least 70% of the population to achieve herd immunity, although there is still some scepticism about this threshold set by the WHO (Plans-Rubió, 2022).

However, Slovak institutions, no only by their fault, have not always been able to convince enough citizens to get vaccinated. Data show that in July 2021, 37.38% of the population was vaccinated and in January 2022 only 45.81%. Paradoxically, the Slovak Republic experienced the fastest rate of vaccination at a time when the availability of vaccines and syringes was limited but the interest in vaccination was high. The positive trend continued after the delivery of additional vaccines and capacity strengthening until July 2021, when vaccination coverage slowed down to 40% and de facto stopped below 50% (Our World In Data, 2023). As not enough of the population has been vaccinated, Slovakia still does not have collective immunity and vaccination levels are similar to those in Lesotho, Angola or the Central African Republic. The Czech Republic, which had a comparable baseline situation to Slovakia, fared better and reached a vaccination rate of 60% of the population (Holder, 2023). Samia Tasnim of the Texas School of Public Health argues that activating communication through information technology between at-risk populations and professionals has proven effective in the past, saving resources, and improving patient outcomes. Effective strategic communication set up by ministries on social platforms in conjunction with civil society, NGOs and academia is the key to providing verified information to potential patients and to combat misinformation associated with COVID-19 on social platforms (Tasnim, 2020).

This is why we consider the communication of ministries on social networks to be a key aspect of motivating citizens to vaccinate and counteracting misinformation and disinformation in the information space. This article does not set out to prove that strategic communication is the silver bullet for increasing vaccination rates. Pascaline Van Oost of the Université libre de Bruxelles argues that trust in institutions is an important aspect in increasing vaccination rates. In contrast, various forms of incentives such as rewards for vaccination have only a minimal effect (Van-Oost, 2022). Of course, trust in government stems from many factors and historical experiences that are difficult to change in a dynamic and uncomfortable environment such as a pandemic. However, strategic communication is key to effective pandemic management, according to Bernadette Hyland-Wood of the Queensland University of Technology, and if set up effectively can increase public trust in government (Hyland-Wood, 2022).

In order to analyse the strategic communication of government institutions, a mixed approach was selected using quantitative and qualitative analysis of posts of selected representative institutions on Facebook the social network during the observed period from March 1, 2020 to March 31, 2022. However, the Ministry of Health was not included in this research, as by its nature it communicated most actively mainly through the daily updates on the status of COVID-19 in Slovakia, current measures, practical hygiene guidelines or opportunities for travel between regions and abroad. The aim of this article is to analyse selected institutions that are not primarily involved in health but rather in strategic communication and debunking of misinformation narratives or have participated in the implementation of anti-pandemic measures. For the purposes of the study, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were selected, which together have 173 000 followers and thus can communicate to their extensive and diversified network (Figure 1).

1 Importance of consistent governmental cooperation

Effective communication plays a key role in maintaining the health and safety of citizens and maintaining trust in institutions, which is important in the times of peace as well

as in the times of crisis. However, strategic communication, or its objectives, were even more crucial during the pandemic and can be divided into two categories.

The first objective of strategic communication during the pandemic was, to increase trust in public institutions and the media (Hyland-Wood, 2022). In non-pandemic and non-war times, trust in institutions represents a kind of safe harbour for the citizens of a state: they trust that in an emergency the state will take care of them and also provide them with reliable information so that they can make the right decisions in their daily lives (Mcknight, 1998). In pandemic times, setting the right strategic communication is even more important, as trust in institutions is reflected in compliance with the measures and it is the fundamental fact, that institutions are better able to deal with crises if citizens trust them (Fan, 2021). However, the theory was not reflected to reality in most countries during the pandemic and most governments, in turn, lost the trust of citizens during the pandemic (Hanson, 2021). Subsequently, research has confirmed that lower trust in institutions was reflected in non-compliance with government measures and hence increased prevalence of the virus in society and increased mortality rates (Erceg, 2020).

The second objective of strategic communication during a pandemic was to communicate government actions in a way that would ensure their acceptance and compliance by citizens.

Nonetheless, achieving clarity and comprehensibility in communication during an evolving pandemic can be challenging. Therefore, it becomes crucial to enhance both the quality and quantity of communication, utilize reputable communication channels, and consistently elucidate adjustments in measures. Additionally, institutions should bolster the credibility of healthcare organizations, scientists, and the media, tailor strategic communication to account for the diversity of the population, and, most importantly, vigorously combat misinformation and disinformation through proactive efforts (Hyland-Wood, 2022).

2 Examination of the Slovak communication during the pandemic

Before the pandemic outbreak in Slovakia, all the ministries under observation were actively engaged in communication efforts. Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a prominent role by providing updates on repatriations and mobility restrictions. However, as time passed, their activities became more focused on conveying information about the international pandemic situation and travel-related measures.

Immediately after the start of the pandemic, the Ministry of the Interior began communicating mainly the current measures and activities of the state forces, but also refuting hoaxes and misinformation. This activity of the Ministry of the Interior was reinforced by the Hoaxes and Frauds - Slovak Police website, which has been highly monitored and appreciated for a long time (Sita, 2023). The Ministry of Defence also focused on communicating current measures and updates on the pandemic in Slovakia, but they also communicated their department's activities in relation to assistance with testing or vaccinations.

Figure 1 Activity of the selected Ministries on Facebook. Source: Official Facebook pages of the Ministries



Source: FACEBOOK (2023): Official pages of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence.

The contributions from all ministries communicated clear and understandable messages and, crucially for strategic communication, communicated with empathy and with the message that we are dealing with the crisis together (Reynolds, 2008). For example, the Ministry of Defence, which also ran the Soldiers Through the Eyes of Children project during the COVID-19 pandemic, which illustrated the efforts of soldiers to help manage the pandemic, set up communications along these lines (Ministry of Defence, 2020). Similar contributions evoking a sense of solidarity were also disseminated by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to cases when other countries provided medical material or personnel to the Slovak Republic and when, on the contrary, Slovaks abroad helped, which again pointed to mutual solidarity. However, showing solidarity can be a double-edged weapon. The institutions failed to deal with the population who refused to comply with the measures or to believe the scientific facts. As communication was not sufficiently focused on the aforementioned group of people, the sense of solidarity presented in adherence to the measures and later vaccination may have resulted in the marginalisation of people who did not adhere to the measures and their subsequent formation of communities, especially on social networks (Lupton, 2015).

Confidence in vaccination and compliance was also not helped by frequent changes in measures and unclear restrictions on the operation of establishments, where businesses did not understand why their sector was being restricted and others were not (TA3, 2021). The government crisis has brought additional problems, namely different communication of the measures directly by the government. The import of the Russian vaccine Sputnik also brought chaos to communication. From the beginning, the then Foreign Minister communicated that Sputnik was not only a vaccine but also an instrument of hybrid warfare on the part of the Russian Federation, which the then Prime Minister refused to accept (TA3, 2021). When Sputnik was not even recommended by the State Institute for Drug Control, the Prime

Minister began to discredit the claims of the Foreign Minister in addition to discrediting the Director of the Institute. In doing so, it is the unified communication of all institutions, emphasizing their credibility to each other, that is key to effectively managing the pandemic (Hyland-Wood, 2022).

Thus, the observed ministries communicated qualitatively effectively, but their efforts were hampered by the turmoil caused by the government crisis. Quantitatively, however, with the exception of the MoI, they lacked continuous and uninterrupted communication. Comparing Figures 1 and 2, it can be observed that the ministries communicated information about COVID-19 especially when its prevalence in society started to rise (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Daily Increments of COVID-19 cases



Source: OUR WORLD IN DATA (2023): Daily increments of COVID-19 cases.

The lack of communication at times of low virus prevalence may have caused frustration in society when the COVID cases increased and anti-pandemic measures were reintroductioned. Singh from the College of Communication argues that in crises like pandemics, people's ability to process difficult information over the long period of time is reduced. That is why it is necessary to maintain effective continuous communication and build a society which understands the key aspects of the issue (Singh, 2021).

The pandemic has also brought a lot of misinformation and disinformation into the information space. As research has shown, that it is the debunking, prebunking and informing citizens about how to spot misinformation or disinformation on the internet, what significantly reduces the spread of the virus (Hyland-Wood, 2022). The Department of the Interior and the Department of Defense have been debunking hoaxes and highlighting misinformation on the Internet since the beginning of the pandemic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, started to communicate the danger of disinformation via Facebook in August 2021, since its aim is not focused on health. On the other side, it the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has significantly intensified in the context of the current war in Ukraine, in which they inform the population about the latest developments and also use various tools to suppress disinformation spread in the Slovak information space.

To effectively counter disinformation, it is important to recognise that relying solely on online campaigns or responding to trends in the information space is important, but not sufficient. A truly effective strategic communications strategy requires an integrated approach that combines both online and offline activities. This holistic methodology not only increases

the effectiveness of these efforts, but also extends their reach to a broader and more diverse segment of the population. In the field of strategic communication, it is crucial to incorporate offline tools such as the organisation of exhibitions, debates or workshops. These methods can significantly increase the impact of strategic messages. It is also important to ensure that both online and offline communication initiatives are not confined to capital cities, which are often more resilient to misinformation. Instead, particular attention should be paid to regions that may face particular challenges or where residents may feel marginalised. In these areas, the physical presence of outreach professionals and officials is essential, even if it can be resource-intensive.

The next critical aspect is to take a whole-of-society approach to strategic communication. This involves engaging different sectors such as non-governmental organisations, academia, civil society and influential personalities. Such an inclusive strategy raises public awareness of issues and supports government goals in a more comprehensive way, as noted in the OECD's 2019 findings. However, as noted above, it is crucial that institutions deliver a consistent message, ideally in a unified manner. This not only increases the impact and reach of the message, but also strengthens the credibility of the institution and its representatives.

Conclusion

With the exception of the aforementioned periods of inactivity, the qualitative research of the posts suggests that the quality of the institutions' strategic communication increased during the observed period, reflecting the theoretical knowledge of effective strategic communication and its best practices in the context of a pandemic.

While highlighting the effective activities of the ministries, the success of strategic communication could have been higher if government actions were more consistent, not contradictory and communicated in the same way by all government officials. It is also necessary for effective communication of measures that institutions cooperate with each other, as the MoD, MFA and MoI have been a good examples of such approaches. However, incidents such as the Prime Minister's dispute with the State Institute for Drug Control may have undermined public confidence and the efforts of the institutions.

Nevertheless, this study should encourage further comparative research. During the pandemic, all of the European countries had quite different approaches to managing their health situation. For example, Sweden, to some extent, used similar tools of strategic communication. However, Sweden concentrated more on honest communication about the inconvenience of the restrictions or the economic costs of the pandemic. Even more importantly, Sweden took an effort to concentrate on the leadership, cooperation of the institution and trust-based measures, which, as we proved in this article, were crucial for the effective management of the pandemic (Lund University, 2020).

However, proof that Slovak strategic communication can work well when there is political consensus and public trust on the issue is the current information coverage about the war in Ukraine when the strategic communication of the institutions is united and consistent.

However, as the article points out, strategic communication requires a whole-of-society approach, but also welcomes multinational cooperation. The problem of disinformation affects not only the Slovak Republic, but also other V4 countries, which can work together to solve this problem. Cooperation between Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic should be intensified at intergovernmental level. There should also be more cooperation between NGOs in the field of disinformation. Such cooperation would lead to more effective coordination and exchange of best practices. As the information space of the V4 countries is partially interconnected, coordination and proper exchange of good practices

will be beneficial for all countries concerned. Such signs of cooperation could have been seen this year, when the Slovak and Czech foreign ministries cooperated in the campaign to commemorate the anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. Such cooperation should be strengthened and intensified, as Slovakia and the Czech Republic have a high standard of relations that should be presented and maintained.

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