



MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY

SLOVAK JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava  
2023, Volume XXI., Issue 1, Pages 61 – 78

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.53465/SJIR.1339-2751.2023.1.61-78>

ISSN 1336-1562 (print), ISSN 1339-2751 (online)

Submitted: 28. 9. 2022 | Accepted: 13. 3. 2023 | Published 15. 3. 2023

## **NOVA EFFECT IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1945-1964)**

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During the Cold War, which broke out between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc after the Second World War, the Strategic Partnership was established between Turkey and the United States (US). As a result, the two states acted together against the Soviet Union threat. Turkish-American relations, which continued well from the early Cold War to the early 1960s, have been strained from time to time because of developments in the 1960s. These relations have also had some positive (lucky) and negative (unlucky) consequences for Turkey. This study reviews Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1964. Turkish-American relations against the Soviet Union threat and communism, described as a common fall in the early years of the Cold War, were strained by what was written to Turkey by US President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, known as the Johnson letter. The study examines the breakdowns in Turkish-American relations during this period. We evaluate the impact of the development of Turkish-American relations on Turkey within the framework of the Nova effect, while the results of positive and negative development of relations were vaguely good or bad.

Key words: international relations, Turkish foreign policy, Nova effect, Cold War, Turkey, US

JEL: F50, N45

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Turkish-American relations, commenced during the Ottoman Empire, continued up and until this day. Turkey pursued a non-war policy during the Second World War and was forced by allies to join the war. Although Turkey declared war on Germany towards the end of the war, the country was left alone against the Soviet Union in the early Cold War which began after the Second World War. Realizing how great the threat of the Soviet Union and communism was over time, the United States secured Turkey with the Western security by providing military and economic assistance to Turkey with the Truman Doctrine adopted in 1947, and the strategic partnership was established between Turkey and the United States (Çelebi ve Demirağ 2011, p. 42). That was because Soviet Union and communism became a common enemy both for Turkey and the US.

After the Truman Doctrine, Turkey was included in the Marshall Assistance launched in 1948, and economic development was achieved through aid to Turkey. With these aids, Turkey has become dependent on the United States for its U.S.-oriented and one-dimensional foreign policy while feeling safe from the threat of the Soviet Union (Erhan 1996, p. 285). Turkey understood the harms of this situation in the early 1960s with the problems in Turkish-American relations.

The Cuban Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 led to the beginning of a period of softening between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. In this process, the United States removed the Jupiter missiles placed on Turkish territory against the threat of the Soviet Union against Turkey's will without consulting Turkey. After this incident, Turkey realized that international policy was negotiable against its will and a mistrust of the United States emerged (Küçükmeral 2020, p. 80).

Similarly, the issue written by US President Johnson to İsmet İnönü in 1964, known as the Johnson letter, caused a trust problem in Turkish-American relations and strained relations between the two countries. After the tensions and conflicts in Cyprus, Turkey decided to intervene on the island, and US President Johnson, considering this situation contrary to his interests in the region, sent a letter to İsmet İnönü stating that it was unacceptable for two NATO member states to fight, and that NATO was reluctant to help Turkey when it came to the Soviet Union's intervention in Turkey after such an intervention. After this letter, Turkey gave up its intervention in Cyprus (Şahin 2002, p. 26). As a result of this issue, Turkey, as part of the Western Bloc, understood that its national interest was ignored when it contradicted the interests of the United States. For this reason, Turkey started to implement a multidimensional foreign policy with the effect of the softening period. This led to Turkey's cooperation with other countries and reduced its dependence on the United States (Sönmezoğlu 1995, p. 40).

These events in Turkish-American relations showed that a positive process would lead to an unexpectedly unlucky and negative process. In this context, this study will examine the relations between Turkey and the United States between 1945 and 1964 within the framework of the Nova effect. The Nova effect, used in psychology and

especially used in the field of international relations in Chaos theory, explains that an event considered as lucky (positive) among states can have a lucky (positive) result; if an event considered unlucky (negative), it will lead to unlucky (negative) result. The study will examine Turkish-American relations within this framework. The Nova effect is a method previously unused in the field of international relations, and this study claims to be the first to examine a foreign policy event in light of the Nova effect. However, the fact that no studies have been carried out in other areas associated with the Nova effect and the absence of a tangible scientific study has led to a limited explaining of the Nova effect. This study aims to provide a meaningful layer to the literature.

The study consists of four parts. In the first chapter, Nova effect will be explained even with limited possibilities. The second chapter will focus on the international environment in 1945 and Turkish-American relations. In the third chapter, the Cuban Crisis and Johnson letter events, where there are tense events in Turkish-American relations, and their impact on Turkish foreign policy will be evaluated. In the fourth chapter Turkish-American relations will be examined within the framework of Nova effect.

## **2 LITERATURE REVIEW**

Turkey's non-war policy in the Second World War, its absence from the war and its failure to provide the assistance expected by the allies were deemed by the allies as a late decision despite cutting ties with Germany and declaring war. In particular, the Soviet Union considered Turkey's non-war in the Second World War a movement that prolonged the war and changed its policy towards Turkey. The Soviet Union aimed to have a say in the Balkans and Straits region, a region the Soviets regarded as a post-war security belt. The Soviet Union wanted to make Turkey more disadvantageous in the region by separating it from the British and Americans (Armaoğlu 2020, p. 265). In this sense, the war finally began in the strategic struggle. In this struggle, Turkey became an important country. For example, the British Foreign Office and General Staff thought that Turkey needed the Soviet Union after the war. However, Winston Churchill was angry with Turkey because of Turkey's attitude during the war. Moreover, he believed that Montreux could change it during Churchill's meeting with Stalin in Moscow in 1944, and from this moment on, Turkey's greatest fear was that the allies would leave Turkey alone against the Soviet Union. In 1945, when the allied states were close to winning the war, the Turkish government was concerned (Ateş 2014, p. 175). That was because the Turkish government feared that the British would make concessions to the Soviet Union against Turkey at the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945 (Ülman 1961, p. 26). As Turkey expected, the issue of Turkey was raised at the conference. Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, demanded that the crossings of the Straits be abandoned not only during wartime, but also in peacetime, at Turkey's initiative, and that Montreux be evaluated according to the conditions of the day. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with Stalin and decided to raise

this issue at the first meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries (Seydi 2006, p. 127).

As the allied states gained supremacy over Germany, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union became strained. On March 19, 1945, Molotov summoned the Turkish ambassador, Selim Sarper, to his office and issued a note on the termination of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, which formed the basis of Turkish relations with the Soviet Union, on the grounds that it did not meet the requirements of the time. On June 7, 1945, Molotov invited Turkey's ambassador to Moscow, Selim Sarper, again, to indicate that a new agreement could be made to resolve the problems between the two countries, and expressed his desire for arrangements in favour of the Treaty of Montreux and the Straits in favour of the Soviet Union and the transfer of Kars and Ardahan (Seydi 2003a, p. 100).

Although the Soviet Union's demands from Turkey and its main purpose worried Britain and the United States, both states understood the importance of Turkey's territorial integrity for them. However, they did not react strongly in the face of intense pressure from the Soviet Union on Turkey and expected the conditions to mature. The Potsdam Conference, which was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, also raised the issue of international status of the Straits, while Churchill and Henry S. Truman were sympathetic to this, they hold the same idea about Montreux's inability to meet current needs. However, although Truman did not object to the free passage of Soviet warships through the Straits, he turned down the Soviet Union's requests for bases (Seydi 2003b, p. 37).

In fact, Truman was the one who stood closer to the demands of the Soviet Union. For example, Truman conveyed his views on the Straits to Turkey on November 2, 1945, saying that all countries bordering the Black Sea should transit through the Straits in war and peace without their warships being subjected to any borders. Turkey considered this an acceptance of Soviet aspirations and continued diplomatic efforts to prevent it. On the one hand, Turkey aimed to bring together the views of The United Kingdom and the United States on the Straits close to it, while on the other hand it sought assurances from the United States that it would help Turkey's defence in the face of possible Soviet attacks. To achieve this objective, it was often stated that Turkey was the key country in terms of protecting Western interests in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Towards the end of 1945, the Soviets voiced their claims on Eastern Anatolia through different means, which helped to understand Turkey (Sadak 1949, p. 485-490).

As the Soviet approach grew, Washington gradually began to understand Turkey, so much so that it even received verbal assurances from America in the face of the Soviet threat. This was influenced by the expansionist policy pursued by the Soviets in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Especially after the Moscow Conference in December 1945, Truman began to harden against the Soviets. Truman now took the reports of his diplomatic representatives in Turkey and the Soviet Union more seriously. Reports from

these centres insisted that Soviet policies in the region undermined American interests and helped these countries. With the American military authorities agreeing, Truman then began preparing his own public opinion for policies against the Soviets in the Middle East region and said that the Soviet Union threatened Turkey and Greece. In fact, the assurance given to Turkey was given indirectly. For example, the funeral of Munir Ertegün, who died when he was ambassador to Washington, was brought to Istanbul on April 5, 1946, on a warship called Missouri. This visit meant that the United States would not leave Turkey alone in the face of the Soviet attack (Rozakis and Stagos 1987. p. 123).

This was replaced by a Soviet note dated August 7, 1946. The Soviets wanted the Straits to be defended jointly with Turkey. This time, however, the UK and the United States supported Turkey. With this support, the diplomatic discussions about the Straits ended with the note given by Turkey on October 18, 1946, and Turkey's integration with the West accelerated (Donova 1977, p. 280). The United States had a better understanding of the Soviet Union's policies on Turkey, and the idea that the Soviet Union had influence over Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviets' support for the Communist-influenced Greek civil war, and in particular the Soviets' reluctance to leave Iran, led the United States to pay more attention to the countries of the region. The U.S. administration's public opinion that communism was a significant threat and Britain's loss of power required the United States to be more effective. Truman decided to pursue tougher policies against the Soviets, and by the beginning of 1947, the American public began to believe that there was a threat of communism. Truman, who managed to win public support, spoke at the convention on March 12, 1947, as an official declaration of the Cold War. Truman, whose ideas would be known as the Truman Doctrine, wanted Greece and Turkey to be supported in the face of Soviet expansionism. Truman's request for aid to Turkey and Greece was approved by Congress, in which Turkey received \$100 million in cash and almost all military supplies used in the war (Friedman 2007, p. 67).

The assistance provided within the framework of the Truman Doctrine was an indication that the United States would not leave Turkey alone in the face of the Soviets. But there was also criticism of these aid, particularly allegations that America's ability to control the use of its aid on the spot abandoned the principle of full independence (Harris 1972, p. 24). Because after these aids, American goods entered the Turkish market, and at the same time, American culture began to dominate Turkey. American-style life, which began to affect the whole world, began to take effect in Turkey with this help (Warner 1974, p. 90).

Turkey, which received assistance from the United States under the Truman Doctrine, also wanted to be included in the Marshall Plan announced by US Secretary of State George Marshall on June 5, 1947. Rather, this plan envisaged the rehabilitation of Europe, whose economic structure collapsed after the war. Thinking that Europe would be under the influence of communism if economic assistance was not provided urgently, Marshall asked European countries to offer them a package of requests. Thus, European

states aimed to maintain their independence in the face of communism (Isaac and Downing 1998, p. 75). However, the Soviets, who viewed the plan as creating a front against him, reacted and prevented eastern European countries from benefiting from it. To make the Marshall Plan effective, some European countries, including Turkey, met in Paris on July 12, 1947 and established the Conference on European Economic Cooperation. In fact, the Marshall Plan did not envisage assistance to Turkey, which was not subjected to any destruction because it did not initially go to war. However, the war had a serious impact on Turkey's economy. But, according to US officials, the Truman Doctrine was sufficient to meet Turkey's urgent needs. In fact, Turkey could not contribute to the development of Europe by receiving assistance from the Marshall Plan, but by meeting the agricultural product and mineral needs of Europe. Therefore, it was said that Turkey could be helped if the request for assistance was arranged to meet these needs of Europe, and it was included in the aid scope on July 4, 1948, after Turkey accepted this requirement (Denitch, 1990, p. 24). Between 1948 and 1952, Turkey received approximately US\$ 300 million in aid and often used it for the development of agriculture (Atmaca 2014, p. 24).

As in the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish government perceived inclusion in the Marshall Plan as an indicator of Western integration and avoiding isolation in the face of the Soviet threat. Although there was an economic revival in Turkey with Marshall's assistance, the use of aid in the agricultural sector and its supervision by the United States also provoked criticism. Because Turkey started to fall under the control of the United States. Rather than acting with its own resources, Turkey aimed to overcome the economic difficulty with outside aid, which led to increased American influence in foreign and domestic policy. Turkey's next foreign policy objective was to provide western military support (LaFeber 1980, p. 39). Although American support was obtained within the framework of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, they did not have the size to guarantee Turkey's defence, so they sought a place for itself in the security structures in the Western Bloc. As a result, he joined NATO on 4 April 1949 and took his place in the western security wing as a member in 1952 (Gönlübol 1971, p. 25). The Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950, worked hard to get Turkey into NATO and achieved this goal in 1952 (Kuniholm 1984, p. 43).

After joining NATO, Turkey's Foreign and Defence policies functioned within the framework of NATO's joint defence plan. Turkey's membership in NATO was vital in a sense for the West, especially the United States, because there were 219 divisions of the USSR against NATO's 14 divisions in Europe, and this overwhelming advantage worried European countries and the United States (Leffler 1980, p. 810). In this sense, Turkey's NATO membership, which controlled the Straits, served as a set for the Soviet landing in the Mediterranean during the Cold War, and was important to secure the vital interests of the West in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Balkans, together with the bases to be built on its territory (Albayrak 2002, p. 855-857).

In the early 1950s, Turkey devoted its foreign policy to building a security belt against the Soviets, while in the second half of 1950, the Cyprus issue began to be prominently raised. In the late 1950s, the United States became more interested in the Middle East (Uslu 2003a, p. 104). For example, the Eisenhower Doctrine led to a crisis between Turkey and Arab countries, especially in Egypt and Syria, and the Soviet Union. Already, 1957 and 1958 were the years when crises erupted, especially in Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. These crises might not be against Turkey in order to gain the support of the United States in the first place, but because the United States needed Turkey to carry out its operations in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, after these crises, Incirlik Base was established in 1954. On the other hand, Turkey's security interests and the regional interests of the United States largely overlapped in these crises, so the number of U.S. aid increased significantly in this year (Bağcı 2001, p. 50). Therefore, this period was the best year of Turkish-American relations. For example, during this period, Turkey was elected to the UN Security Council for the first time by the vote of the United States (Kuneralp 1999, p. 76). In addition, a bilateral agreement was signed with the United States on March 5, 1959, under which the United States pledged armed assistance to Turkey in the face of any danger. In a sense, Turkey was well connected to the United States and ignored cold war policies and its own national strategies and policies. To prevent this situation, Turkey also tried to hold talks with the Soviet Union in 1959. However, the United States did not want this, thinking that its influence on Turkey would decrease. Turkey-Soviet Union relations already failed due to the coup in Turkey on May 27, 1960 (Göktepe and Seydi 2015, p. 216).

### 3 METHODOLOGY

Nova effect, which explains that the situation of being lucky or unlucky is relative to the time and place in which it is located, is used to define that the evaluation of the events encountered in life according to the situation may also be uncertain. It is possible that an X event that a person thinks is lucky brings with it bad things, or a Y event that a person thinks is unlucky brings good things with it. Alan Watts says, until the future is fully realized, it's impossible to know if something is good or bad. That's exactly what the Nova effect is built on (Pinkson, 2021).

The Nova effect indicates that after an incident occurs, it would be wrong to evaluate or infer about it. There is an important story about this incident. According to this story, Eric goes for a morning walk with his dog Nova. Nova, a mobile dog, begins to run to catch the rabbit, which he sees behind a bush in the area where they are hiking. Suddenly he starts running, the owner gets rid of Eric and the rabbit and Nova disappear. Eric searches for his dog for a long time, but he cannot find it. In shock at his misfortune, Eric informs his relatives about the issue and asks them for help. He will put up search ads around. He will be looking for Nova for days. He would be sorry to lose Nova. He thinks if the rabbit had not been there at that time, or if he had not loosely held Nova's

collar, he would not have lost Nova. About a week later, a woman comes to Eric's house. She has found Nova. Eric and Nova hug right after they meet. Eric is very grateful to her for finding Nova. Thank you and meet them there. Our new character Vanessa is almost the same age as our main character Eric and is also very beautiful. After they meet that day, they meet a few times and then they become lovers. The couple, who are very happy to have put their lives together, actually know that Eric's loss of Nova caused this. If Vanessa hadn't been there at the time or seen the missing persons notice, they wouldn't have met Eric and been lovers. After a happy few month, Eric gets in the car and leaves to pick up Vanessa from his house. As he crosses an intersection, a vehicle coming from the other side of the road crashes into Eric's car. Eric opens his eyes in the hospital. When he wakes up, the doctor in front of him tells him that he has survived the accident cheaply, that a few checks need to be done before he is discharged, and he leaves the room. Eric thinks he would not have had this accident if he had not met Vanessa. Eric is going to have all the checks done in a few hours. After the results come back, the doctor walks into the room and tells Eric he has some bad news. After examining the MRI results, the doctor tells Eric that he has found a tumour in his brain. He adds that Eric is diagnosed early with a tumour after a very deadly accident, without letting him get alarmed. Eric survived a major accident on his way to pick up Vanessa, whom he met because of his lost dog. Indirectly, Eric has survived because he lost Nova (Chaparwal, 2021).

The lesson from Eric and Nova's story is that what we trivially ignore can shape our lives forever. But what has had a tremendous impact in the long run is that we are ignoring the small improvements we can make. Eric's life has changed after the rabbit jumped out of the bushes. However, such incidents take place out of your control and you can do nothing (Dubey, 2021).

The results of events should be used for positive elements, as there may be positive consequences, as well as the negative effect of the Nova effect. For example, when you think of the gym, you think that one day jumping makes no difference. But in a few weeks, laziness prevails and you never think about working again. Instead, even if you work only a few days a week, you get significant long-term benefits (Dorn, 2021).

The Nova effect, which examines the Chaos theory in international relations and is a more specific example of the butterfly effect, shows that the events and developments experienced will not depend on luck, while an event that seems lucky can lead to unlucky results, and an unlucky-looking event can lead to lucky results. Since the events and developments that occur are not interconnected in some cases, it is also difficult to know the consequences of the event.

The Nova effect is a method that emerged in psychology. Although this method is known by almost everyone in the field, no academic studies have been found on this subject. There are only a few on-line sources on the subject. Religiously, this method coincides with the logic that there is good in every evil in the religion of Islam. However, theologians have not done any studies on this method. In the field of International



Relations, although it is mentioned in the field known as Chaos theory, the butterfly effect has not found itself as much as the butterfly effect in the literature. In this sense, although the Nova effect is known by almost everyone, no academic studies have been done on it. This study claims to be the first study that tries to explain an event in Turkish foreign policy within the framework of the Nova effect. With the multidisciplinary studies gaining importance in today's world, the opportunity to publish the study will enable the study to receive citations from many fields, especially psychology, and to lead the studies to be done in this field.

#### **4 RESULTS**

After the military coup on May 27, 1960, Turkish-American relations continued to progress positively. It had already been emphasized that after the coup, the military regime would adhere to all the alliances and commitments that came before it, especially NATO and CENTO. Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, who thought that Turkey could follow a policy of neutrality after the coup, sent a letter to General Cemal Gürsel, but Gürsel responded negatively to the letter (Criss 2008:104). Because military leaders, like the rulers before them, continued to see the Soviet Union as a threat and continued Turkey's relations with the United States and other Western states without changing it (Yetkin 1995, p. 189). For example, in August 1960, Jupiter MRBM missiles were deployed in Turkey, and new radio stations were established in Turkey against radio stations spreading Soviet propaganda, especially in the Eastern Anatolia region. Moreover, the aid provided to Turkey by the United States continued to increase and the American aid made in the period from May 27 to January 12, 1961 reached US\$ 300 million (Uslu 2000, p. 104).

This situation in Turkish-American relations began to change with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, alarming NATO member states and the United States. This development created a perception in the United States that it was lagging behind the Soviet Union in the nuclear race. Because the U.S. did not have a long-range missile. Due to this lack of us, the United States offered to deploy medium-range missiles to some NATO member states, NATO countries that feared Soviet pressure opposed the placement of the missiles in their territory (Göktepe 2005, p. 435). Britain, Italy and Turkey accepted the US offer. Turkey regarded the deployment of the missiles as a protection against the Soviet threat. Turkey believed that the importance of the country's geopolitical position would increase and would positively affect Turkey-US relations (Bölükbaşı and Burkett 1988, p. 56). The U.S. informed the Soviet Union that it wanted the missiles dismantled. Nikita Khrushchev wrote a letter to Kennedy informing him that if the U.S. were to lift the blockade on the island and not attack Cuba, it would remove the missiles from Cuba, and the crisis seemed to be over. But in a second letter sent the next day, he announced that he would withdraw the missiles after the United States withdrew its Jupiter missiles from Turkey (Fuelling 2017, p. 6).

Turkey rejected the US request to have the missiles removed. Turkey replied that the removal of the missiles would be a loss of public opinion. The United States did not ignore Turkey's objection and delayed the dismantling of the missiles. The dismantling of Jupiter missiles was the ultimate end under an agreement with the Soviet Union. But Turkey was unaware of the negotiations and sided with the United States during the Cuban Crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, Turkey was forced to be convinced of the dismantling of the missiles and the missiles were dropped (Türkmen 2012, p. 33). The dismantling of the missiles actually benefited Turkey. When the missiles were removed, Turkey became the target point of the Soviet Union (Uslu 2012, p. 17). The decisions taken without Turkey's knowledge during the Cuban Crisis were the first factor that led to a lack of trust in Turkish-American relations. Turkey's subsequent negotiations between the United States and the USSR have affected bilateral relations and the American image in Turkish public opinion. At the same time, Turkey's security concerns were ignored in the U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union and even its security was compromised. It has lost its status as a trusted ally in the United States (Bal 2008, p. 83).

After this incident, a letter sent by US President Lyndon Johnson to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1964 known as Johnson letter implied that the United States and NATO would not be able to defend Turkey when it came to an intervention in Cyprus, causing tensions in relations between the two countries. Turkey lost its balance with the 1960 coup and all attention has been directed towards domestic politics. Foreign policy lagged behind in society, in the press and in the memory of administrators in all areas. However, the Greek attacks in Cyprus on December 21, 1963, and the fact that the future of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots were a problem, prompted the Turkish government and the Turkish people to deal with foreign policy (Erdem 2014, p. 309). With the Declaration of Independence by the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, tensions between the Turkish and Greek people were high on the island. Problems arose due to the formation of armed forces, tax collection, the creation of municipal borders. Makarios proposed that the constitution should be amended to solve the problems. The Turkish side did not want the change to be made and tensions have increased (İnce and Olson 1977, p. 274). In 1963, there was a conflict between the two communities. The UN sent peacekeepers to the island, but the events were not over. Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, wrote to letter to US president Lyndon B. Johnson asking the US to prevent further bloodshed. The United States, on the other hand, went beyond reassuring that it would support the guarantor states. This letter, written overnight by the US authorities and prepared as an ultimatum, negatively affected Turkish-American relations (Miller 2000, p. 108). Turkey took the decision to intervene on the island before the Guarantee Agreement was fully implemented. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus could pose a Soviet threat. In this case, NATO might not have supported Turkey. Turkey could not use the weapons it received from the United States because, under the aid agreement reached on July 12, 1947, Turkey could only use the weapons it received for defensive purposes (Bostanoğlu 1999, p. 28).

Johnson wrote in his letter that he would leave Turkey alone in a possible Soviet attack and would not support Turkey's decisions. The Johnson letter achieved its goal. No intervention was made on the island, and Turkey was once again left alone.

After these events, Turkey again turned to industrialization initiatives, but Western states, especially the United States, did not welcome these initiatives. The assistance needed to complete the investments was then provided by the Soviet Union. Turkey felt that its foreign relations should be diversified, especially in the face of the missile crisis and the US position on the Cyprus issue (Uslu 2003b, p. 102). In other words, after this incident, Turkey deviated from its one-dimensional foreign policy and began a new foreign policy approach. Within the framework of this new foreign policy, the Soviet Union began to establish close relations with eastern bloc countries and non-aligned countries. In such an environment, the United States started to take steps to repair strained relations with Turkey (Yılmaz 2010, p. 41).

## **5 DISCUSSION**

In this part of the study, Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1964 will be evaluated within the framework of Nova effect. Turkey pursued a non-war policy during the Second World War, faced the reaction of allied states at the end of the war and was left alone especially against the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War. Turkey, which had a difficult time due to the soviet union's demands for a change in Montreux from Turkey and the demands for bases and territory in the Straits, tried to take part in the Western Bloc and ensure its security. In the early years of the Cold War, the West and the United States, which wanted to make Turkey pay for its non-war policy, found the demands of the Soviet Union reasonable. However, realizing the magnitude of the policies of the Soviet Union and the scale of the threat of the Soviet Union, the United States and Western states began to support Turkey. With the Truman Doctrine adopted in 1947, Turkey received US\$ 100 million in aid and Turkey found itself under the umbrella of the Western Bloc against the threat of the Soviet Union by being part of the Western Bloc. Turkey, which was included in the Marshall Aid adopted in 1948, started to develop economically (Magid 2012, p. 4).

However, Turkey's involvement in the Western Bloc and its use of US assistance led to it leaving itself to the US in many areas, economically, politically and socially, in the face of the threat of the Soviet Union and becoming dependent on the United States. While Turkey had a chance with the help of the United States in the face of the threat of the Soviet Union, this led to the unlucky situation of Turkey creating a one-dimensional foreign policy that was fully focused on the United States. This was evident in the Cuban Crisis and the Johnson letter in the early 1960s (Ünlü-Bilgiç 2015, p. 261).

The US, which deployed Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory in response to the threat of the Soviet Union, demonstrated its side with Turkey while increasing the threat to the Soviet Union for Turkey. Moreover, in 1962, after the Cuban Crisis between the

United States and the Soviet Union, the Softening Period between the two sides began, during which time it removed Jupiter missiles without asking Turkey. With this incident, a mistrust of the United States began in Turkey and it became clear that the United States would leave Turkey alone if necessary for the sake of its interests. In contrast, the dismantling of Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory has eliminated the possibility of Turkey being a direct target for the Soviet Union (Berstein 1980, p. 102). In fact, an incident that could be called unlucky for Turkey caused a lucky incident.

It is possible to see a similar situation in the Johnson letter case. As a result of the policies of the Greeks against the Turks in the Republic of Cyprus, which was established after the London and Zurich Agreements in 1960, Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus as a guarantor country. However, due to what US President Johnson wrote to Ismet Inonu in 1964, Turkey both stopped intervening in Cyprus and Turkish-American relations were severely strained. In the letter, Johnson said that if Turkey intervened in Cyprus, the United States would leave Turkey alone against the Soviet Union and prevented Turkey from intervening in Cyprus (Bölümbaşı 1993, p. 512).

After this event, Turkey realized that its one-dimensional and U.S.-oriented foreign policy was wrong and damaging. Because Turkey realized that events could occur against its will in these events and therefore understood that the country needed to develop a multidimensional foreign policy. These events, which caused tension in Turkish-American relations and could be considered unlucky for Turkey, also caused lucky events. After these events, Turkey, which pursued a unilateral foreign policy and realized that it was harmful, understood that it needed to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy and designed its new policies accordingly. After this incident, for example, Turkey began to get closer and establish economic relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries and non-aligned countries. As a result, the United States developed policies that prioritize Turkey's demands and tried to improve strained relations. This situation caused what could be called a lucky event after an unlucky incident for Turkey.

As a result, when the Turkish-American relations between 1945-1964 were handled with the Nova effect, Turkey's non-participation in the Second World War changed the perspective of the allied states, especially the Soviet Union, and Turkey was criticized for prolonging the war. In the last periods of the war, in response to the Soviet Union's demands from Turkey, the allied states left Turkey alone against the Soviet Union and Turkey faced a great danger. In fact, while it was a chance that Turkey was not involved in the war and was not invaded, it was seen as an unfortunate situation that it faced the threat of the Soviet Union at the end of the war.

Turkey, which felt the threat of the Soviet Union very seriously until 1947, was included in the Western Bloc when the US realized the threat of Communism. In this process, the US, which was disturbed and worried by the Greek civil war and the activities of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, decided to fight against Communism and helped Turkey and Greece with the Truman Doctrine. While the Truman Doctrine was ending

the civil war in Greece, Turkey entered the Western Bloc and secured itself against the threat of the Soviet Union. Turkey, which also benefited from Marshall Aid in 1948 after the Truman Doctrine, improved itself both economically and in terms of security. Moreover, it has been registered that Turkey is in the Western Bloc. On the other hand, Marshall Aid caused Turkey to be dependent on the West both economically and politically. When Turkey became economically dependent on the US, it did not produce anything. Since it procured everything from the US, it followed a US-oriented foreign policy politically. While Turkey's presence in the Western Bloc against the Soviet Union was considered as a chance, its dependence on the US was seen as a misfortune.

Because during this period, the US removed the Jupiter missiles it placed in Turkey without asking Turkey. Moreover, while Turkey was preparing for a military intervention in Cyprus in 1964, due to the letter written by the US President Johnson to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, the military intervention was abandoned and Turkish-American relations were damaged. After this event, Turkey started to follow a multidimensional and multilateral foreign policy. So much so that Turkey established relations with the Soviet Union and started to cooperate with it. He worked to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries. While the events in the 1960s were seen as bad luck, causing damage to Turkish-American relations, it was seen as an important chance because it caused Turkey to realize that its unilateral foreign policy was wrong and to pursue a multidimensional and multilateral foreign policy. In this sense, a reason seen as luck in foreign policy could lead to unpredictable and unpredictable unfortunate results, while a reason considered as bad luck can lead to an unpredictable result that may bring luck.

All positive and negative events in the international system were of course influenced by the situation in the international conjuncture. Although the events in the international conjuncture give information about what will happen about an event, they do not always give a correct result. Therefore, no matter how rational it is thought, there is always an uncertainty in the system. Although this situation is seen as disorder, it is actually order itself. From this point of view, the state of disorder that cannot be understood within the system creates an order.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

In this study, Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1964 were examined within the framework of the Nova effect, known as the Good Luck Tragedy. The Nova effect, which can be used in Chaos theory and is a more specific use of the Butterfly Effect, uses it to explain that an event in foreign policy that may be lucky for states can also lead to an unexpectedly lucky outcome. In this context, Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1964 and the positive (negative) events experienced both between the two states and in the international system during this period caused positive and negative consequences for Turkey from time to time. Moreover, it was not easy to predict the

consequences of these events. For example, Turkey, founded on October 29, 1923, worked hard to avoid entering the Second World War, which began with the attack on Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939, and pursued a non-war policy through the war. This was a lucky situation for Turkey. Because as a newly established state, Turkey's entry into the war could cause damage in many respects and put it in danger of being invaded.

During the Second World War, the warring states made many promises for Turkey to go to war. They even applied pressure from time to time. However, Turkey did not participate in the war after all. Although he declared war on Germany towards the end of the war, Turkey's non-war policy provoked a reaction from allied states and left him alone in the face of the threat of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War period that began at the end of the war. Turkey's policy in the Second World War and the threat of the Soviet Union were unlucky for Turkey, which had a serious security problem in the face of the demands of the Soviet Union.

Realizing the scale of the threat of the Soviet Union and Communism over time, Western Countries and the United States began to develop economically and secured themselves within the Western Bloc against the Soviet Union by becoming a member of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Marshall Aid, which began in 1948, and NATO, which was founded in 1949, within the framework of the Soviet Union's containment policy. It was a lucky situation for Turkey that the Soviet Union became a threat to the whole world and that Turkey was part of the Western Bloc in the face of this threat. However, Turkey's one-dimensional policy led to an unlucky outcome, as it made Turkey dependent on the United States in many areas, including political, military and economic.

Some developments between Turkey and the US in the 1960s unexpectedly caused strained and damaged relations between the two countries. This situation was detrimental to Turkey, which was in the Western Bloc in the face of the threat of the Soviet Union. Turkey understood that its one-dimensional policy did not benefit and tried to implement a multidimensional policy by taking advantage of the advantages of the new era created by the international system.

From this point of view, it was seen that the developments in Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1964 had an unexpected number of consequences according to the conditions created by both the two states and the international system, and for Turkey, these results sometimes had positive and sometimes negative consequences.

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