



CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE EU: NORTH–SOUTH CLEAVAGES AS A CONCEPTUAL MAP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Despite seventy years of continued integration, membership of the European Union is still highly differentiated. The asymmetry of economic development concerns several areas. The aim of this analysis was to identify frequent disproportions in performance, as well as differences in the perception of these countries. The method was a comparison of selected EU member states according to Rokkan's approach of binary entities and Wallerstein's center-periphery model. However, objectively verifiable facts within the conceptual mapping of reality tend to be distorted by the creation of a mental map, when we automatically consider the original EU-15 to be more advanced than EU-13. The analysis carried out does not confirm this assumption.

Key words: cross-national analysis, North–South cleavages, developmental asymmetry, economic performance, technologies, centre-periphery model, conceptual map of the EU, mental map

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1 INTRODUCTION

The process of internal differentiation of Europe is affected by multiple factors. The distinctive differentiating elements include historical conditions, both politically and economically. Political and civic developments in the last two centuries in the Northern countries have been different from those in the Southern hemisphere of Europe. Despite the Era of Nazism and World War II, the more northerly EU states have long been anchored in a democratic system of pluralistic political scene, while southern countries have struggled with authoritarian regimes, some until the mid-1970s. Differences are also evident in the degree of secularization of the state, when, metaphorically speaking, the traditions of the more civil "Nordic Protestantism and Southern Catholicism" with a higher connection to the state administration stand against each other.

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Differences on the economic level are mainly due to the initial conditions of economic development, the availability of resources and the ability to use one's own potential. While the countries of the North used the possibility of massive industrialization from the very beginning, the countries of the South faced a relatively significant delay in technological development and are still addressing differences in the sectoral structure of economies with a lower share of high technologies. The performance and employment of the Nordic countries is nowadays concentrated in the service sector, which is accompanied by a highly diversified industry focused on the most advanced technologies and producing high added value. In contrast, the regions of the South logically, thanks to favourable climatic conditions, have an extensive agrarian sector, including a higher level of employment in it, followed by an industry focused more on consumer goods, the added value of which tends to be lower. But it is not only a matter of differentiation in the sectoral or industrial composition of economies, but also in other economic areas, such as in the implementation of economic policies, in the degree of state interventions in development, in the regulation of the labour market, including institutional protection of the workforce. All this is reflected in labour productivity, overall in macroeconomic stability. There are very significant differences in the real setting of social guarantees and environmental protection. All this creates distinct dividing lines across the European Union, cleavages.

The aim of this comparative analysis of the narrative type was to find out the development differences of individual countries both in the institutional and political level, as well as in terms of economic performance, technological maturity and also in the differences in the perception of these countries.

The application of Stein Rokkan's Cleavages theory outlines the axes of fission within the EU both in the west-east direction, through the lens of today's discourse, the old-new member countries, but then also the north-south lines. Conceptual map of Europe offers a model of internal differentiation of the membership base; with the use of theory of Immanuel Wallerstein we can also identify the country's core, semi-periphery and peripherals in the European Union.

The division of individual states or regions in the EU and thus the creation of cleavages is not only determined geographically or climatically, but of course also economically, politically, socially or culturally (Brunet 2002, p. 14-15), in terms of value (Flanagan, 1980). Therefore, we can work with the definition of the cleavages of the North and the South, or with the center-periphery-semiperiphery model of ad hoc analysis of individual variables.

Among the chosen variables are the cultural conditions emphasized by Rokkan, in addition to territorial aspects and economic performance. Commonly under this category we perceive the specifics given by ethnicity, language environment, religion, traditions, mentality - generally social conditions, institutional environment.

The used concept of center-semiperiphery-periphery or cleavages was to some extent verified by the elaboration of the White Paper on the Future of Europe (European commission, 2017), when one of the five considered scenarios of EU development was the idea of a multi-speed EU. In it, it is clearly stated that some EU states will converge to the center, some to the periphery (Xin 2020, p. 5).

This article is organized as follows: the application of selected theoretical models to the comparative analysis of EU member states, although both of their main authors did not deal with the European Union in their concepts. The intention is to use historical and political analysis tools to compare the EU member base. Chosen research method is a cross-national analysis of selected characteristics of both economic, political and cultural-historical aspects, including specific social manifestations. However, it is important to note the limitations of this cross-national comparison, as its scope is too broad and not all levels can be covered here. On the other hand, even with a narrowed portfolio, it will help us to understand the differences in approaches and ultimately performance between countries. Another limitation is that this approach raises questions about the validity of the characteristics being compared (Jackman, 1985).

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS: A MODEL OF CENTRE-PERIPHERY, IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AND STEIN ROKKAN'S THEORY OF CLEAVAGES

Theory of cleavage of Stein Rokkan accompanied to a certain extent the theory of centre-periphery of Immanuel Wallerstein. These two concepts, in certain cases, can be linked, and for the needs of the analysis specific regions, in our European cases. While the focus of the Rokkan's research is in political science, Wallerstein presents its concept from the position of the historian and the economist.

2.1 Immanuel Wallerstein

Immanuel Wallerstein formulated historical/social system as a combination of historical development with its economic/social aspects (Wallerstein, 1974). Immanuel Wallerstein classifies the world economy into three basic entities – the centre, semi-periphery and the periphery (Wallerstein, 1979). Transferred to the European conditions it is about the breakdown of Europe by the performance of economic, technological, ideological and military.

Countries of the core, the centre, are the bearers of progress thanks to the invention of the intellectual, economic, or military. To a large extent determine future developments in the region. Thanks to their technological dominance of the focus on the production of commodities with higher share of value added, what is associated with a higher level of labour productivity, but also a higher wage level, which provides advanced economies with higher and more challenging aggregate demand, i. e. additional incentives for technological development. Higher dynamics lead to higher tax revenues, which ultimately allow core countries to set lower tax rates (Wallerstein 1979, p. 37-38).

Semi-periphery regions are those that are able to maintain a certain cultural, ideological autonomy, however, are influenced by the centre especially in the technology field. Their production orientation is associated with luxury goods. On the one hand, the states of the semi-periphery are used by the centre, which tries to keep it on top and thus transmits a number of unpopular steps to the intermediate actors. On the other hand, semi-peripheral states benefit from the periphery through unequal exchange relations, just as core countries do to them. But overall, the existence of a semi-periphery is actually a kind of stabilizing element of the system, because it prevents excessive polarization between the centre and the periphery (Wallerstein 1979, p. 23, 69).

In contrast, the peripheries are completely dependent on the innovation dynamics of the centres, on its decision-making processes, i.e., they are institutionally subordinate to – go through so called a-cultivation. The states of the periphery are strongly influenced by the core countries also ideologically, they become part of their promoted geo-culture (Wallerstein, 1979). This can be demonstrated quite well on the example of the European Union and the stratification of member states on fundamental problems of international relations, such as environmental responsibility, labour market protection, social guarantees, institutional standardization, all of which so significantly determine economic performance. From an economic point of view is the periphery the supplier of raw materials and commodities with lower added value, on the other hand, peripheral countries offer the centre extensive outlets for their products, but rather of the inferior type, because peripheral markets are undemanding. And even in those developed countries of the centre, lower quality products are being created, for which it is harder to find sales in developed markets (Wallerstein 1979, p. 20-26, 37-39).

The coexistence of all types of actors forming the structure of the system is therefore advantageous, but more so for the dominant economies. In short, while core countries make up advanced economies, the periphery is represented by less developed markets. The semi-periphery then creates a kind of buffer strip between the two poles of performance, maturity.

Applied to today's Europe, not only the EU, we can of course detect the core – centre, just as states in the periphery or semi-periphery, of course, not literally. According to Wallerstein's parameters of the economic core of the Europe in the present times, they are definitely Germany, Britain, the Benelux countries, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and thanks to their production, export and technological performance. It is not even necessary to emphasize their political and social stability. In the framework of the discussed perspectives of further development they moderate this debate and set the conditions for the others, i.e., that it's not just about their economic capacity, but also political power, negotiation skills. What Susanne Strange calls relational power, it means the ability of one actor to influence the decisions of the other in favour of the first (Strange 1996, p. 25-27). For accuracy, it is important to remember Robert Dahl, who thirty years earlier defined relational power as the ability to force another to do what he would not

even think to do, more precisely “make others do what they would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, p. 202-203).

Semi-periphery forms today, especially the two big countries of the southern wing of the EU – Spain, Italy in addition to Ireland, Finland, and Austria. These are countries with great potential, but is not fully realized either for reasons of incorrect economic policy, or in a certain path dependency, such as delay in industrialization or the restructuring of economies, or geographical location. These states, respectively their economies aren't innovative technology leaders, but they are powerful economies with modern sectors. A certain exception is Finland, which was an information tiger in the 90's (ad Nokia), but its innovative dynamics stopped in the first decade of the new millennium (Kučerová 2003, p. 84, 95, 106). According to Wallerstein, the non-utilization of their potential may also be due to historical aspects, political developments. Then, in the case of the southern countries, the chaos of the Italian political scene cannot be neglected for most of the 20th century, almost forty years of the totalitarian development of Spain under the leadership of Francisco Franco; historically conditioned dependence and subordination of Ireland on Britain and Finland on the Russia/Soviet Union; the collapse of the great empire of Austria and the ensuing unfortunate political development till the end of World War II.

The periphery of the EU consists mainly of the new EU member states also due to path dependency, in this case political-economic-institutional transformation of the alliance after the fall of the Iron curtain, lower economic performance and often still non-standards institutional environment. Yet, but not along with Wallerstein say that would periphery states of the EU have been politically or institutionally subordinate to countries of the centres. However, it is not just about states of the Eastern enlargement, those criteria Wallerstein's analysis meet even Greece and Portugal. The asymmetry of the real relations is apparent, despite the declared equality of all the member countries of the Union in decision-making processes.

In this case, does not apply strictly to the division of the EU on the cleavage West–East and North–South, but intertwined. Also, there aren't just a big strong centre, but also smaller centres, subject to those main - it's about the polycentric structure (Rokkan, 1970).

2.2 Stein Rokkan

Although the theory of cleavages Stein Rokkan was formulated for the needs of political science and the exploration party systems (Hloušek, 2002, p. 398), even as a key conflict lines within and polity (Rokkan 1970, p. 102) can be this concept used in international relations for the needs of the economic-institutional analysis. Political science sees cleavages as the conflict lines, in the European studies we work with them rather as fissile, demarcation divides, that doesn't necessarily mean conflict, just a difference. In any case, it's about studying the relationship between territory and politics.

Each territory is divided into centre and periphery, which is to some extent subordinate, and even used parts of the territory compared to the privileged centre, and not only in the geographical context, when we are considering in the context of the horizontal dimension of the periphery within the group. The marginalization of the position of entities in the territorial system is associated with a substantive ability to influence the decision-making processes – we are talking about a behavioural concept, i.e., the vertical dimension of the periphery within the group (Rokkan, 1970).

Cleavages in Europe express the division of society and the different goals of social groups as a result of fundamental critical points of development, which include chronologically: the religious division into affiliation of the Catholic or Protestant Church since the 14th century; a national revolution since 1789 leading to secularization efforts, that is, the separation of church and state power; industrial revolutions widening the gap between urban and rural areas, between capital and labour, the respective employer and worker; ideological revolutions since 1917 leading to a division between democracy or totalitarianism, nationalism or internationalism (Flora 1999, p. 305).

Of course, Europe was never a homogeneous in total, to its more pronounced differentiation; perhaps even the polarization contributed two significant historical processes – the national revolution and industrialization. While the national revolution led to the creation of modern states mainly on ethnic and linguistic basis and they were actually decentralisation trends in Europe, the industrial revolution, while, on the one hand led to the polarization of states, but on the technological and economic basis, on the other hand industrialization has led to more intensive relations between the individual entities. So-called axis of Blue banana - economic zone, running from northern England through London over the Benelux countries and their metropolises, continuing through the Rhineland, Switzerland to Milan, Italy has been identified as the area that traditionally has shown the greatest development potential in Europe's geo-economy (Brunet 2002, p. 15-16; Hospers, 2002). In contrast to the countries of the so-called Sun Belt, the Mediterranean region except the northern Italian regions, the technological centres of the Blue Banana have been using their potential since the industrialization of the 19th century, and all predictions speak of their continuous development and competitiveness. And, of course, shifting the focus of economic performance to the high value-added services sector. The problem with the Blue Banana model is the fact that this zone does not include Paris, and France has been one of its main proponents since the beginning of industrialization. However, the development continues - the area of the Blue Banana is changing, it is also changing its shape - today it is supposed to be a form of so-called golden soccer ball concentrated in Central Europe – especially Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland, where the focus of industrial production, including development centres (Landesmann, 2013).

The current division of European nations and policies regarding access to transnational communities, in general to the phenomenon of globalization as such, cannot

be neglected either. On the one hand, it is mainly the states of the North of the EU that promote a liberal model of policies for international trade, capital and migration. On the other hand, we are witnessing a more protective approach of the states of the South in the sense of maintaining internal control of development. This conflict over transnationalism involves both cultural and economic dimensions (Marks et al. 2021, p. 173).

The classification of Europe in the variously powerful, and otherwise influential, or dependent entities is based on similar considerations as in the fissile lines between the individual entities. For these purposes you can use the parallel lines theory, and territorially-economic dimension of cleavage – centre-periphery, city – countryside, of course, other cleavages – functional: the church – state, democracy – totalitarianism, the employer-employee, it means owner-worker (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p. 13-19).

Cleavage centre-periphery has already been largely described above. The differences or disparities in economic performance and resulting living standards between the economic-administrative centres and outlying regions of the European community tried to address almost from 60's year's 20th Century through regional and structural policy, since the 90's years and using other policies – agricultural, social, cohesion. Yet the strategic objective of balancing the levels between the (macro) regions, despite massive funding from the structural funds is not yet achieved. In the political arena is the conflict of views between the centre and periphery manifested also in the states with a broader ethnic composition, when some of them in the extreme case, promote their secessionist interests, such as the Basques or the Catalans in Spain, Corsicans in France, Scots in the UK. The referendum on the independence of Scotland took place in 2014 and a clear result for a stay within the UK, while the referendum on the break-up of Catalonia from Spain in autumn 2017 ended in a result of independence but has not yet been resolved legally in Spain. Compared to the Scottish referendum, the result of the UK-wide plebiscite was the opposite, namely Britain's exit from the EU.

Are the member countries of the EU, where the disproportion between the centres and periphery is significant enough that we are talking about the territorial dualism of the state, which may be the reason for the centrifugal tendencies of the "more successful" part of the country, the region. This is certainly about Italy, who's the division of North and South did not even 60 years of European integration and more than 50 years of financial flows from Brussels to Rome. Another example of breakdown is Belgium with pronounced performance disparities between Flanders and Valois. Territorially-economic differentiation applies to Romania. A specific example is the status of the Eastern countries, the former Soviet occupation zone and later German democratic republic. When in 1990 there was the reunification of Germany, the labour productivity was and the overall performance of the former GDR on roughly 30-40 % of Western Germany and even to this day failed to smooth out differences (Kučerová 2015, p. 148-150).

The conflict between the countries of the centre and the periphery is in the practice of the European Union, inter alia, associated more with economic requirements on fiscal and monetary discipline, that smaller and less developed countries are often not able to meet. But on the other hand, it is mostly smaller states from the EU₁₅ that follow the rules given by the Maastricht criteria. Of course, they also include Germany as a large, largest country, and the medium-sized Netherlands. In terms of macroeconomic stability and responsibility, Ireland, Finland and Austria are healthy economies compared to countries with a somewhat benevolent approach to meeting conditions - see Greece, Portugal, etc. To the fullest this was expressed in the context of creations economic and monetary union in the 90's years when the countries of the periphery of the Union, therefore, of the EU-15 had a problem with the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. Greece not fulfil even one of the five, Italy, Spain, Portugal, but also France or Belgium had weaknesses in the fiscal area, possibly with the requirement of price stability. On the contrary, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, but even then, the freshly received small economies of Luxembourg, Austria, and Finland complied with all the criteria required (EMI, March 1998). Greek fraud in 2004 confirmed not only the inadequacy of the EU control mechanisms, but especially the weakness of the Greek economy and its economic policy (Kučerová 2010, p. 219-221). Other differences in the interests of the countries of the EU's North and South manifested themselves in macroeconomic (in)stability during the Eurozone crisis of 2009-2013, in some Southern countries until 2016, when they needed financial assistance, at the expense of the whole. The attitude referred to as politics against politics (Schmidt 2019, p. 1018-1036) manifested itself in full force, when national governments, out of concern for their position on the domestic field, began to use the EU as a scapegoat and mobilized their voters against Brussels. Political fragmentation within the EU thus grew (Zeitlin, Nicoli and Laffan, 2019).

Split lines, cleavages of the city – the countryside has its beginning deep in the history in connection with the development of crafts and trade, which has driven urbanization. At the time of the industrial revolution has taken the dynamics of urbanization rapid pace, began a massive migration from the countryside to the cities. In the second half of the 19th Century began to some cities and some large businesses to provide certain social programs for their residents/employees, thus the standard of living in the cities increased significantly. But also, in the country were modernizing changes – during the first half of the 19th Century ended virtually everywhere in Europe of serfdom, which led on the one hand, leaving parts of the population into the cities and their factories, while the remaining portion of the peasants most often operated as independent peasants whose standard of living also increased. On the other hand, rapid social changes, including the gradual emancipation of women and secularization arising from industrialization were not in the country accepted. This sometimes latent, sometimes open conflict between country and city, noted the development of the European nations virtually up to now. To this day in most European countries is evident faculty of

economics and administration-social the difference between country and city, which is reflected in different electoral preferences (Rokkan 1970, p. 102, 131, 134). European integration developed a number of tools to mitigate the differences, yet still fail this conflict potential eliminates. However, there are differences between member states: while the smallest perceived differences are in the UK, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy (there it is rather the cleavage centre-periphery), the Czech Republic, on the contrary, a significant difference can be found in most new EU member countries – Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, but also in Greece, Portugal, Spain.

Just on the edge – cleavage city – countryside is today mainly associated with developing countries, where we are talking about the socio-economic dualism as the encountering of two different life strategies in the city and in the countryside, often with tragic connotations of national conflicts. Today in Europe already, fortunately there is no danger.

Another Lippset-Rokkan's cleavage is the church – state. Historically it was the position of the church in Europe, i.e., in this case the Catholic Church, the dominant from 10th Century, when church and state began to blur together in one strength. The interpretation that the secular ruler is blessed by God and therefore is subordinate to the Holy See, led in Europe to the conflict continued another few centuries. Religious wars, the reformation from the 14th century, subsequently the counter-reformation and the violent catholic reformation plunged Europe into the Thirty year's war, whose ending brought the peace of Westphalia in 1648 with one practical conclusion – cuius regio, eius religio, i. e. the who territory, his religion.

Nevertheless, the period of secularization had yet to come. The first bearer wasn't the French revolution in 1789, but the edict of tolerance of the Austrian emperor Joseph II., at the year 1781, who were Protestants, and Jews emancipated to the Catholics. In addition, it meant this edict and the de facto subordination of the church to the state as in the organizational, economic plane (Kučerová 2015, p. 55). The real secularization of European societies legislatively-based came to in 20th Century; however, continue to be in some EU countries visible religious differentiation, perhaps most notably in recent times on the island of Ireland between the Irish Catholic's and North's protestants. Newly but in some western European states emerged a cleavage between Islam and the secular state establishment – see France, Belgium, but also Netherlands, Germany, often with tragic consequences. In this case, it is indeed a conflict zone. Overall, however, the decline in the importance of churches in the overall societal environment is different in the northern countries of the EU (and of course it also differs between the new member states) and the southern countries. The EU internal market with its liberalization of labour and spatial mobility of people and institutions has weakened the social ties that bind individuals to traditional social strata (Marks et al. 2021, p. 174).

The conflicting lines of the democracy – totalitarianism in European civilization long seemed to be overcome. While many European countries underwent

democratization's attempts centuries ago, at least in connection with the transformation of the absolute monarchy in a constitutional, later, with the dismantling of the monarchy, many European states have unfortunate experience with totalitarianism in the twentieth century. 30. years 20th Century are a period in which bloomed a totalitarian ideology – from the Iberian Peninsula through Italy, Norway, Germany, later also in Greece. So much of Western Europe, called Eastern Europe for more than forty years under the yoke of communist ideology and state dictatorship. Unfortunately, this is not a surmounted by cleavage, as in recent years has intensified the populist and the far-leaning parties, and that's across the whole of Europe. And it's not only about the over-reaction to Islamic terrorism and migration crisis 2015-2016 – the first truly populist party in the parliamentary election get into government, was the Freedom Party in Austria in the year 1999.

We could also include the tendencies of national secessions in the political arena, but this does not entirely correspond to the North–South division. This is because they are Basques or Catalans in Spain, Corsicans in France or Scots in the UK. Currently, the hottest issue is Catalonia and its political elites, who are facing criminal charges for sedition after the 2017 referendum (ČTK, 2002). It must be added that the European Union, through leading politicians such as Ursula von der Layen and Charles Michel, has repeatedly made it clear that even potentially successful secessionist states would not automatically become new EU members, but would have to go through a standard admission procedure. Which would have to be approved by the member states unanimously - it is hard to assume that Spain or France would agree.

The last of us observed cleavage is an employer – employee relationship, which has its potential for conflict (Rokkan 1970, p. 102-103), although today is significantly regulated by legislation, both national and communitarian. Rapid industrialization in 19th Century did offer to provide work to millions of displaced people, but at the same time the working conditions were dismal – long working hours (12-14 hours a day six days a week), the employment of children for half the wages when the same claims on job performance, minimal safety standards, often the absence of social protection. The situation began to slowly but surely change – he created the first workers ' associations, trade unions. As the first in England 1824, then in France and some German lands in the mid-19th Century, or indications of the development of employee participation is e.g., in the German regions have emerged already as a effect of the revolutionary year 1848, but realistically until 1891 (Sekerák 2013, p. 163). At the same time, but also some great-industrialists have begun to provide some social protection to its employees.

Despite these relatively favourable steps towards the workers remained their position very uncertain. A fundamental change brought about changes in the wake of the Great depression 30. Years 20th Century. After this and after the Second World War, labour legislation and social protection for the staff expanded virtually throughout Europe, most notably in Scandinavia. However, there is a noticeable difference between

the countries of the North and the South, where the Scandinavian model, much like the German and especially French is rather bloated and leads to rigidity of the labour market. In contrast, in the Southern states – perhaps after the experience with totalitarianism – the working conditions for a long period of time were not comparable with those in the more northern lying countries; often there was an increase in social security under the pressure of the implementation of the EU internal market (Kučerová 2010, p. 249-251). In general, however, it can be traced that social conflict lines are defined primarily in terms of social attitudes and social behaviour, the stratification of which reflects the stratification of society (Hloušek 2007, p. 365).

Back to history of solution cleavage owner - worker: not only the workers, generally employees started to fight back by pooling in protective and negotiating organizations, but also later, even employers have started to create your professional chamber, where they follow the conditions of their work, i.e., including requirements for their employees. This cleavage is reflected in the politicization of both sides of the conflict and the setting up of political parties that should defend the interests of his electorate, thus the conflict has moved from the professional and social plane to a political one. Indeed, Rokkan this cleavage regarded as crucial and potentially the most explosive (Hloušek 2002, p. 400). The differences of opinion of the members of the individual cleavages create a conflicting potential for the whole society, because their sharpness of opinion is rooted in collective identities. Shared mutual community solidarity has become an obstacle to the smoothing of cleavages (Hooghe and Marks 2018, p. 111).

But there are topics dividing the company according to other criteria than the classic cleavages, or overlapping issues, which may eventually conflict's raise. We are talking then about the so-called cross-cutting cleavage (Rokkan 1970, pp. 109-110). As a logical example offers binary relationship centre – periphery and urban – rural, where often we find the same lines of conflict, but often with different connotations. History confirms that the same intersecting interests can be found in cleavages the state – church and town – countryside. In contrast, I am not convinced that ethnicity and religiosity may be an example of a cross-cutting cleavage; on the contrary, it's about the correlation link. As a typical example of a functional crossing processes causing at least a temporary barrier can be used in parallel ongoing processes of industrialization, logically and urbanization and democratization of society, including secularization. To generalize, we can understand economic and value cleavages as cross-cutting, as overarching, because they connect the fundamental motives of voters' decision-making in political competition (Flanagan, 1980), as well as the everyday decision-making of citizens. It is true that the definition of individual cleavages must necessarily change according to the development of society and the economy, when the effect of previous institutions weakens from generation to generation. Then new cleavage lines can, and do arise, which either complement or cover the old cleavages (Marks et al. 2021, p. 175).

From the beginning of the 90'20. century, after the end of the Cold War and the onset of economic globalization, we are witnessing the emergence of new cleavages, namely the national - transnational level. Its essence is the perception of the role of the nation state, government and national society in the era of transnationalism (Marks et al. 2021, p. 189-190). This fission line was particularly evident in connection with the resolution of the crises of the last decade.

Transmitted to a comparison of the development of the member countries of the EU, where we work with the concept of cleavages adapted for analysis of the differences of the North and the South, it will be necessary to the original Lipset-Rokkan´s models to modify.

Due to the coincidence of three major European crises in the last decade - the Euro zone crisis, the migration and pandemic crisis, which has turned into a macroeconomic crisis thanks to the lockdowns, that is, about a combined crisis with a synergistic effect (Kučerová 2021, p. 21, 23, 28) – the traditional concept of cleavages has been supplemented by another transnational cleavags (Hooghe and Marks 2018, p. 116-117). The pandemic crisis has contributed to further differentiation of the membership base - each country has approached the handling of the pandemic differently, so the macroeconomic or social impacts will also be different (Kučerová 2021, p 20). The solution to these deep crises did not make it possible to use traditional decision-making concepts at national level, and therefore also in the context of binary relations between the individual social partners. In all of these crises, the countries of the South were hit very hard, while the countries of the North were able to cope with the instability much better. The effects of these crises have shown the fragility of the Southern economies, so that the Union's traditional division into East and West has ceased to apply in full, rather so fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms categorized states according to the North–South division (Landesmann 2013, p. 20). Nevertheless, there was a need for transnational solidarity and, above all, for a solution at Community level. Intergovernmental approaches have failed, as have national attempts to resolve them. Despite the strengthening role of integration institutions in times of crisis, the result of public perception was a contradiction between the North and the South as between creditor and debtor societies (Laffan, 2016).

3 CONCEPTUAL MAP OF THE EU AS A MODEL OF THE INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE EU

If we understand the conceptual map as a means of structuring the research problem, or entities, as the analysis of internal context and interdependencies, then we can use it for the needs of the analysis of the internal differentiation of the EU, as a tool of systematization of the examination. Conceptual map reflects the individual vision, however, is based on the facts and has led to generalizations. We're here to work with the conceptual map of Europe, more closely to the European union, as a territorial

arrangement on the basis of the historical - political, or geopolitical and logically and geoeconomic, cultural-institutional aspects, likewise as created a conceptual image of Europe Rokkan on the basis of historical-sociological Makro model Europe (Flora 1999, p. 86).

Of course, that in the examination and especially the comparison of the European union, or its individual parts, i.e., the member states, where appropriate, of the regions we are considering, often rather in the framework of the mental map than the conceptual maps. While the mental map works with the subjective approach to the environment, including the geographical (Cabada and Jurek 2010, p. 7) and reflects the individual opinion or interests clearly, even regardless of the fact (Buzan 2007, Lynch 1960), then a conceptual map trying to detect the relationships between the individual entities of the analysis, without disregarding the reality. The framework of the rendering of a conceptual map is a *nexus causalis*, or the relationship of causality between the phenomena and processes of the examined object, in our case the European Union.

Creating a mental map of Europe is associated with its internal differentiation, while we tend to identify with some aspects and vice versa to define yourself to others – to a large extent this is logical: each of us "on the basis of their experience creates a mental map, thus a unique vision of the world determined by many factors, the most important is that the cultural-civilization competence" (Romancvov 2004, p. 408). Dividing the world into "Us" and "Them" has to do with our conscious identity, with a deliberate affinity to a particular entity. But it does mean that by deliberately staking out to others with the belief of their own superiority – sometimes. The point is that on the one hand there is the so-called European identity, the mentality often associated with the Eurocentrism like the concept of European civilization dominance in the world. On the other side but our individual mental map can lead to voluntary submissive on the basis of lack of self-confidence. An example might be the attitude of a person from Eastern Europe to German performance his political influence within the EU.

The conceptual map has to be a theoretical model, a working tool for the analysis of the examined object. Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe outlines the mutual relations between centres and peripheries in the context of the historical development of while watching the three planes, namely economic, territorial and cultural, or ethnic realities, geoeconomic and the geopolitical context (Hloušek, 2004).

4 DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Not only in the present enlarged EU towards the East, but already in the course of 20th Century, many consider diametrical differences in performance and the living standards of the countries of the West and the East. The differences result mainly from the sectoral structure of the economies, when the then East was practically a purely agrarian versus industrialized the West. The solution had to be industrialization development model, which suggested already in 1943, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and whose

instrument was supposed to be the so-called big push in the form of massive inflow of investments into the development of the industry (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, p. 209). Time has moved on, yet they are the new member countries of the EU economically less developed with a number of structural problems, therefore, it is even today valid Rokkan's cleavage West–East, respectively EU-15 – EU-13. What is to some extent associated with the baseline of the territorial cleavage of Europe, i.e., West – East, but is traceable also in the cleavage North–South. Differentiation of Europe has been indicated already above, for clarification – the countries of the South are actually four Mediterranean states (Slovenia and Croatia geographically belonging to the South, to the Mediterranean, are sorted to the political East, nevertheless, their economic structure, economic performance, macroeconomic stability, and social conditions correspond to the countries of the South.). We will consider in the context of territorially-economic plane, and institutional, because so-called value cleavages have been shown as one of the most important criteria on the voting behaviour (Flanagan, 1980).

The cause of the persistent differentiation of Europe lies in the historical aspects of different development, both in political, and economic. For the required analysis are defined the following variables – political regime (democracy versus authoritarian systems), religion and position of churches in society, urbanization, industrialization, sectoral structure of the economies.

Regarding the setting of the political regime, are between the North and the South of Europe in the 20th Century more pronounced differences. Countries of the North have at least since the end of World War II anchored democracy with a pluralism of political parties, which alternate in power based on democratic elections. Yes, of course, Germany, partly also in Norway it bears to this day the path dependency in the context of Nazism, the more emphasis on democracy. Sweden has not been since the year 1813, from the Napoleonic wars actor is no war and in the political line continues to a constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is rather representative of the society, as in Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg.

The specific case is the development of Finland 20th Century, when the Finns negotiated immediately after the Great October revolution, 1917 in Petersburg gaining independence from Russia, their freedom but did not last long because Stalin on the eve of the Second World War had a crush on some North Sea ports belonging to Finland, the Winter war 1939-40 and the Continuation war of 1941-44 the Finnish fate have sealed. The problem was in the negative experiences of the Finns with more than a hundred years of the dominion of the Russians since 1809, so in the Continuation war better fought with the USSR for the support of Hitler's Germany. And Stalin then with the Finns closed his account – by the year 1955 he drove the USSR to Finland as its “protectorate”, and even then, it retained a significant influence on the further development of Finland. The so-called Finlandization or subordination of a small state in the foreign policy of a stronger neighbour, walked into the political science terminology, nevertheless, this term is not

accepted in Finland itself due to the risk of mixing subordination with cooperation or concessions to Moscow (Vares, 2014), Finlandization did not mean Sovietization, not voluntary at all. The fall of the Iron curtain, but for the Finns marked the impetus to break away from Moscow and monitoring of Scandinavian political development completely in the democratic contours (Kučerová 2003, p. 83).

The countries of the Southern wing have their experience with authoritarian regimes, where appropriate, with dictatorship and fascism longer, up to 70's Years – of course, Italy, which came to terms with Benito Mussolini's fascism relatively quickly. Although resentments directly related to the person of Mussolini persist in part of Italian society to this day - see, for example, the celebrations of the centenary of the March on Rome on October 28, 2022 (Glisníková, 2020).

On the Iberian Peninsula managed to keep fascistic regimes until the mid-70's Years. In Portugal practically since 1932, ruled by General António de Oliveira Salazar authoritatively combination of nationalism, conservatism and corporatism under the strong support of the Catholic Church – like it was in Spain and Italy. Salazar, although he died in 1968, but his vision of the New State continued until the Carnation revolution in April 1974, which Salazar's regime toppled.

Spain is also in the 30's Years mired in political instability, whose culmination was the outbreak of the civil war 1936-39, in which clearly stood against the democratically elected government of general Francisco Franco. The civil war won and the other thirty-six years he controlled all social, political, and logically also the economic development of Spain. Spain, like Portugal, was a neutral country in World War II, but sympathies for strong-arm rule and fascism led to covert support for the Nazi Third Reich, at least through mutual trade. On the other hand, this collaboration of industry circles with Germany also involved Sweden. Greece also during the 20th Century has undergone turbulent development. First occupied by Mussolini's army, then Hitler, then the communist uprising of 1949 and the civil war, what ended with the victory of Western-oriented part of the Greek society. The democratic development of the Greek monarchy since 1952 was terminated by the military coup in 1967 and until 1974, ruled fascist the dictatorship of the so-called Black colonels. The Greek dictatorship lasted the shortest period of time; however, it still bears its sin and it in a divided Cyprus. The black colonels were trying to annex the whole of Cyprus in 1973, to which Turkey reacted strongly with the deployment of their army. Unfortunately, Cyprus has been a divided island to this day.

Since the mid of the 70th Years all the Southern European states committed to democracy, however, the path dependency of the totality is reflected to a large extent so far, what, for example, was reflected in bankrupt Greece in 2009-2013 by war and anti-German reminiscences. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's demands for fiscal restraint and willingness to reform have evoked long-hidden memories of the war and the Hitler rampage in Greece. Therefore, a transnational solution was acceptable to the Greeks

rather than a purely German, i.e., national approach. This confirms Hoogh's and Marks' hypothesis of transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2018, p. 116) .

The role of religion in modern time the European society are highly secularized, which in practical terms means separation of church from the state. If fifty years ago differences such as social class and religion were important determinants of voting behaviour, the influence of religion in voter decision-making has gradually weakened, on the contrary, it strengthens the political cleavage across social groups, when belonging to a social class does not automatically guarantee leaning towards a certain type of political party (Goldberg 2019, p. 68, 85). Back to the religion - of course, that the church still plays a significant role in the company, in the pastoral and charitable plane, but should not participate in the exercise of state power. However, the position of the Church between the states of North and South is quite a bit different. It can be stated, that nowadays mostly the church openly does not interfere in the socio-political developments, with some exceptions, which but aside from this cleavage North–South. Very strong position of ministers and in the political dimension still has the Catholic Church in Ireland and Poland, which was reflected, inter alia, upon the approval of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU of December 2000, respectively at the time of ratification of the Lisbon treaty, however, it is the states cleavage West – East.

The position of the church in society are still very significant in the countries of the South, today it's no longer in Austria, but also today no longer normative. A long time for the countries of the South, characteristic of the interconnection of church and state, or its political elites, as the Catholic or the Orthodox Church in Greece has still the character of a supra-state institution - Orthodox dogma has the status of an official religion (Kolář, 2000, p. 20). Just the religious jurisdiction of the Greek population, therefore, at least partly, the similarity of the institutional environment, it is worth warm feelings towards Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, which was reflected in disagreement with the military actions of the Allies toward Serbia during the war in the former Yugoslavia, 90th Years, against the European sanctions to Russia for annexation of Crimea in 2014, etc. While today's Nordic Protestants cooperate well with the Catholics to the South-lying countries of the Union, and on the contrary, the Orthodox church is looking for – apparently logically - ally in the East, outside of Europe, unfortunately, even at the expense of European interests. In Italy or Spain plays the Catholic Church to this day active social role, not in the sense of charity, which is imminent to the church everywhere, but offering actively in the social services supplementary to the state pillar.

Urbanization is the accompanying phenomenon of economic development; the city became the centre of crafts, trade already from the ancient times, including the Italian city-states since the Renaissance era. Industrialization initially developed depending on the available raw materials, whether from its own available resources or from the colonies. The beginnings of industrialization, we can fully connect with the states of the North, which were able to take advantage of its potential – in Europe as the first of

England, soon Belgium, Sweden, France, Germany, Austria only of the Czech historical lands; not the south of Italy, but only the northern triangle defined by the towns of Genoa-Turin-Milan (Kučerová 2003, pp. 79-81). Industrialization led to fundamental economic and social changes, whose effect is manifested in the restructuring of economies towards industrially-agrarian and in the emergence of a new social class, the proletariat. Each change has a potential conflict, therefore, arose even in the process of the industrial revolution, new cleavages, or was compounded by the already existing. Is a testament to the concentration of economic activities and the increasing wealth in Italy from 9th, or 10th Century. 11th Century became the Apennine peninsula centre of Mediterranean trade, from 16th Century but partially under the dominion of the Spanish Habsburgs. The importance of the Mediterranean cities reduced the fratricidal fight among themselves, leading to the fragmentation of state units on one side, but to their right in more ways than one on the other side. Originated the so-called city belt, which speaks Rokkan, a belt of strong cities, in which concentrated economic power, and who among themselves compete (Hloušek, 2004). To some extent required the emergency room, the predictability is somewhat drained from further modernisation challenges. Therefore, was created almost from scratch a new centre in the former periphery, i.e., compared to the antiquity and the Middle Ages north of the Alps and from the medieval centre of Europe gradually became the periphery. The development of the cities of the North was initially moderate also the nobility as in the South, but with the industrial revolution and the rich burghers, the bourgeoisie. The process of urbanization has become an accompanying phenomenon of the intensification of trade, the development of the crafts industry. In 19th Century, the pace of urbanization is so rapid that the city not only as the living and working zone, but also as administrative centres expanded. But rather in the North of Europe, the South was the industrialization of at the time almost untouched. Therefore, the share of the urban population, share of rural and agricultural activities in the South did not change much compared to the countries of the North.

Industrialization as a variable of our analysis is the significant factor. Countries of the North have undergone continuous industrialization since the second half of the 18th Century through the whole of 19th Century and didn't miss even further development in the 20th and 21st Century. It is therefore a continuous evolution built on the continuous upgrading and maintenance of comparative advantages. In a nutshell – the land of the North are actors first (the end of the 18th Century), second (end of 19th Century), the third industrial revolution (half of the 20th Century), actually already the fourth (21st Century).

While in Portugal in the 17th Century are notable elements of the pre-industrial revolution in the manufacturing stage, thanks to their extensive colonial domination and the use of its advantages, the gradual degradation of Spain thanks to the inadequate governance of the country led to the economic rigidity. There is still a noticeable gap in industrialization between the Northern and Southern EU states, or in the sectoral structure of the industry and its technological level. It is evident in one of Wallerstein's criteria of

the center-(semi)periphery model: We associate innovation dynamics with the North of the Union. The result is a different sectoral structure of the economy, when the countries of the South play a significantly more important role of the agrarian sector, both in employment and in the formation of the product.

Shortly only on the sectoral composition of economies – for the countries of the North has long been the dominant service sector, contributing over 70 % to employment, while the industry hovers under 20%, and agriculture around 4%. In the countries of the South is the proportion of different – while it is the dominant services sector, but it is rather a service of another nature than in the countries of the North: it's not primarily the financial services, software, but rather tourism, trade, transport. Even so, it works in the service of only around 6 % of the workers; in agriculture relatively more, in Greece to over 10% (Eurostat, 2021).

The sectoral focus of the economies of the North and the South over the long term is expanding, it is true that in Spain in the 90's years there was a boom of electrical engineering and IT services, but the crisis since 2008, it has inhibited. The sectoral structure of economies due to globalisation approximates, but still are noticeable differences between the North and South of the EU. Mainly in the indicators of employment and performance it is.

All this translates into lower economic performance, both in production level and export, and resulting living standards: Just a few illustrative numbers – if the states of the Euro area, to which belongs but all the analysed countries of the South, i.e., that it reduces their overall diameter, has a GDP per capita 104% of the EU average in 2021, then the result of the countries of the North must be, after deduction of the countries of the East significantly higher. Ten countries of North of the EU-15, i.e., the country before the Eastern enlargement, the reach in the parameter of GDP per capita averaged 130% (except UK with 104%), compared to the countries of the South in an average of just 82%, which is clearly less than the Czech Republic with its 91% in 2021. The eastern states of the EU reach an average of 78% within the EU (Eurostat, 2021).

Inside the structure of the European Union is not just about participation in real governance of the Union, but there are differences in the implementation of legislation by member states. And although the Czech Republic was in the so-called transposition's deficit in the long term (2006-2012) to the least disciplined members of the Union, e. g. and therefore, the following note may act inappropriately, applies even within the EU different law enforcement - *Quod licet Iovi non licet bovi* (What is permitted to God, non- isn't permitted to ox). To the new member countries are often subject to higher claims, mainly in connection with the building of the internal market, than the original member states. Unlike the attitude Brussels' centre to the new member countries, they are often the most Southern example of privileged access to the implementation of regulations - very often have a longer time for the adoption of legislation, e. g. for reasons of territorial

differentiation (Italy, Spain) and the fragmentation of the territory (Greece) (Kučerová 2010, p. 135-141).

5 CONCLUSIONS

Differences between the Northern and the Southern wing of the European Union are still evident, unfortunately, it seems that even growing. Cleavage North–South in the framework of the old EU countries, i.e., the EU₁₅ it is an indisputable contradiction in the political and institutional area (development of the political regimes, the status of churches in the state structure, value differences, often inclinations towards other political programs), in the economic dimension (the processes of urbanization, industrialization, sectoral structure of the economies). The original models of I. Wallerstein (centre-periphery) and S. Rokkan (cleavages) were used to understand the persistent differences in economic, but also political and social development, partially supplemented by their modern application to the era of globalization in the post-Cold War era.

As it was said together with I. Wallerstein, it is possible to identify the performance core of the European Union, the semi-periphery and the peripheral states. However, then we come across the political correctness of European comitology, despite apparently provable facts such as macroeconomic data, the institutional environment, incl. election results, social tension (which was not the subject of this study). Nevertheless, on the basis of the Wallerstein characteristics used, it is possible to determine where the individual member states of the Union belong - whether they form the centre or belong to the semi-periphery or which EU countries are the peripheral ones.

When comparing the individual national economies of the EU countries, a politically incorrect consideration of the winners and losers of the European integration process is offered. Why do some states, clearly southern from our analysis, show disproportions in performance, fiscal and monetary development? Why are these economies more often and more deeply affected by economic crises? It can be traced that the causes lie in not quite systemic economic policies, above all in lower fiscal discipline. However, thanks to the principle of solidarity and the mitigation of disproportions - the "losers" as classic free riders rely on EU solidarity. This gives them an advantage that negates their classic indentation from others.

The use of S. Rokkan's cleavages model made it possible to expand I. Wallerstein's economic and technological level by rather political and institutional dimensions of the differences of member countries. The original five cleavages have been updated with additional cleavage lines. Although the setting of cleavages is undergoing development in accordance with the whole of society and technology, the subjects analysed by us have proven their validity. Unfortunately, the format of this study does not allow for a more detailed analysis.

We have a tendency to consider the full EU-15 for the advanced economies, but reality may be different. Our conceptual map is often wide of reality. Today the Czech

Republic e.g., has a higher GDP per capita than Greece or Portugal, and despite the intervention of the Czech central bank, which intentionally weakened exchange rate of the Czech crown over three years. Yet it is the performance of the Czech economy, higher than Portugal or Greece, only 4% weaker than Italy and it's pushing the average across the EU. Thanks to more than 60 years of integration process, the map of Europe can be unified geographically, but economically not only remains fragmented, but the differentiation often increases. Cross-country analysis according to selected criteria, or cross-cutting cleavage, shows different perceptions of individual countries according to established mental maps. The public perceives the different attitude of the individual EU member states towards solving crises as a North-South rift, which has sharp edges and feeds on simplistic national stereotypes (Mylonas, 2012). As in every other crisis, integration mechanisms and above all the status of integration institutions were strengthened.

Where are the causes of backwardness? In the trap of dependency totality, the delay in the industrialization of it already cannot be. Inappropriate economic policy? The specific institutional environment? These are questions for further research, across the whole European Union, i.e., comparing also cleavages between the West and the East of the Union.

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