PREZIDENTSKÁ DIPLOMACIE: SROVNÁNÍ TŘÍ BRAZILSKÝCH PREZIDENTŮ

PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY: THREE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Role Brazílie na mezinárodní scéně roste od začátku nového milénia. V prezidentském politickém systému může hlava státu upravovat své zapojení do rozhodovacího procesu, a tak prezident F. H. Cardoso ukončil tradiční delegování zahraniční politiky výhradně Ministerstvu zahraničních věcí a představil nový fenomén prezidentské diplomacie. Odborníci však předpokládali, že po odchodu prezidenta Cardosa dojde k jeho úpadku. Komplexní analýza proaktivního zapojení posledních tří brazilských prezidentů do diplomatice ukazuje, že očekávání o vymizení prezidentské diplomacie se nenaplnila a že předchozí osobní zájem a zkušenost v dané oblasti mají rozhodující vliv na zahraničněpolitickou aktivitu prezidentů.

Klíčová slova: brazilští prezidenti, prezidentská diplomacie, analýza zahraniční politiky

Brazil’s role on the international scene has been growing since the beginning of the new millennium. In the presidential political system, the head of state can adjust his/her own involvement in decision-making processes, and so President F. H. Cardoso ended the traditional delegation of foreign policy exclusively to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and introduced a new phenomenon of presidential diplomacy. Scholars expected its decline after his retirement. A complex analysis of last three Brazilian presidents’ pro-active engagement in diplomacy concludes that these expectations did not prove true and that the previous personal interest and experience in the field have a decisive influence on presidents’ activity in foreign policy.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Brazil entered the new millennium as a self-confident member of a fancy club labelled BRICS and searched for international recognition as more than a regional power. The shift in labelling confirms Brazil’s success: from a regional power (Lafer 2001, Viola 2005) it transformed into a middle power (Flemes 2007, Hurrell 2006) and then into an emerging global great power (White 2010). This shift occurred during the era of President Lula da Silva, who entered the office after President F. H. Cardoso had stabilized the Brazilian economy and finance in his two previous terms (1995 – 2002).

F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva were leaders of opposite political coalitions and their administrations serve as a great base for periodization and comparison of Brazilian Foreign Policy (Figueira 2009, Lima, Duarte 2013, Sousa 2009, Vilela Neiva 2011). Most of these comparative studies of recent Brazilian foreign policy focus on outcomes of the decision-making process. They analyse regional orientations (Cervo 2010, Villa 2005), partnerships with diverse world or regional players (Pino 2012, Oliveira 2005) and the country’s emergence on the international scene (Arraes 2005, Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007, Viola 2005, Vizentini 2005).

The role of the individual in Brazilian foreign policy attracted the attention of scholars in the mid-1990’s as a response to the unprecedented involvement of President F. H. Cardoso in foreign policy-making. Scholars dealt with the term “presidential diplomacy” (Preto 2006, p. 32) without any precise definition until 1999, when Sérgio Danese published his book Diplomacia presidencial: História e Crítica (Danese 1999).

The close connection of the presidential diplomacy to F. H. Cardoso led Santiso (2002, p. 399) to the conclusion that the presidential diplomacy was only an exceptional phenomenon that would disappear with Cardoso’s successor. However, this study shows that this prediction did not prove to be true. On the contrary, Lula da Silva’s engagement in the foreign policy decision-making process went far beyond Cardoso’s (Barnabé 2009, Figueira 2009).

There are exogenous factors that can explain the increase in the president’s participation in diplomacy. The necessity to travel to summits and international meetings, in general, grew over time. If participation is an expected necessity, presidents carry out their basic obligatory tasks. If it is an exogenous trend, then the results of the contemporary President Dilma Rousseff’s involvement in this field should surpass both her predecessors. But when the first woman, Dilma Rousseff,
assumed the Presidency, it soon became clear that she focused more on domestic topics, and she tried to delegate foreign policy decision-making back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A revealing way to evaluate presidents’ foreign policy contribution is by considering main directions and topics. A comprehensive content analysis of the speeches of F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva proved that the differences between them in terms of thematic and regional orientation resulted from their affiliation with opposite political parties (Vilela, Neiva 2011). Would there be such a big difference comparing Dilma Rousseff, affiliated to the same political party as Lula da Silva? Is it the president that introduces his/her own topics, and how much space would he/she be able to reserve for them?

The aim of this study is to answer these questions by comparing how the three last Brazilian presidents were able to directly affect foreign policy in several ways: organizing the close decision unit, managing it during critical situations, presenting their own initiatives and naming topics that are vital to them.

To do so, this paper analyses the role of the three Brazilian presidents and their diplomacy, first by defining key terms building upon the existing studies and then proposing an analytical framework which results from a combination of classical approaches to the analysis of individuals’ and small groups’ role in foreign policy decision-making. After considering the presidents’ personalities, it investigates the organization of the bureaucratic environment and small decision units and their dynamics by using critical episode analysis. It continues with presidential international visits, then expands an existing content analysis (Vilela, Neiva 2011) and terminates with a short discourse analysis. All steps aim to examine and compare the three Brazilians presidents in five subsequent presidential mandates (two of both F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva and one of Dilma Rousseff).

2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Presidential diplomacy is “the personal conduct of a foreign policy agenda, which exceeds the mere routine or the assignments ex officio, by the president, or, in the case of a parliamentary system, by the Chief of State and/or by the Chief of the Government” (Danese 1999, p. 51). In order to define more activity than the non-omissible level (Cason, Power 2009, Figueira 2009), a negative definition is useful: the presidential diplomacy stands in opposition to the institutionalized professional diplomacy, and includes a more pro-active attitude of presidents towards foreign policy issues, their direct participation in negotiations and international meetings and/or

For this study, two fundamental observations are crucial: presidential diplomacy is an active personal engagement of the president and exceeds the ex officio obligations. For the purpose of analysing this phenomenon, both qualitative (personal commitment) and quantitative (exceeding the routine) methods are applied.

Initially, presidents’ personalities are assessed through their (auto)biographies (Bourne 2007, Caldeira 2011, Chade, Indjov 2011, Cardoso 2007, Paraná 2008, Pinto 2011, Segueira 2011). To identify the personal application of the decision making in foreign policy, this part observes the family situation, education, professional career, ideology and political affiliation, leadership style, special events in presidents’ lives and capacity, interest and knowledge of the foreign policy field (Danese 1999, p. 393 – 412, Cason, Power 2009, p. 126, Hermann 2001).

The individuals do not act alone in a vacuum, but within an institutional environment with their closest collaborators and advisors, so it is necessary to identify the most important bureaucratic institutions that usually partake in the decision-making process (Giaccaglia 2010, Figueira 2009, Cason, Power 2009, Spektor 2014) and within them delimit the small decision unit which decides in the critical situations. Examination of which institutions mainly participate in the quotidian foreign policy-making utilizes both official documents such as the Constitution and laws (retrieved from the portal of the Presidency, Presidência) and secondary literature (Preto 2006, Figueira 2009).

For the analysis of the small group, this paper combines methods of the decision unit framework (Hermann, 2001, p. 52), the critical episodes analysis (Malamud 2005) and case – survey study (Haney 1997). This part examines how the actors achieved decisions in the final authoritative decision unit, which is a group of those who in the case of mutual agreement have the power both to invest the government’s sources into foreign political actions and to impede other governmental groups from threatening their position (Hermann 2001, p. 52). Three types of decision-making units differ in the number of people and in relations among them. A coalition is an authoritative group where different representatives of independent bodies relevant for the decision meet. The single group consists of individuals that are members of a particular group that as one unit chooses the orientation of the policy during mutual discussions of all its members. The predominant leader is one individual that can defeat any opposition and accept a decision for him/herself and the government (Hermann 2001).
In order to examine the dynamics of the decision-making process in small groups and “personal engagement patterns” that constitute the usual way how presidents intervene and act in the diplomatic field (Cason and Power 2009, p. 122), five short case studies analyse comparable critical episodes selected in compliance with two criteria: the actors considered the situation as critical, and the situation needed a quick reaction (Legler, Lean, Boniface 2007). Five case studies for each presidential mandate assess the evolution of the crises, decision-making process, action taken and the result. All crises occurred in Latin America and included reactions to domestic events inside sovereign countries, so Brazil had to balance between non-intervention in internal affairs and its own aspiration to be the region’s leader. Presidents had to react quickly either by engaging themselves personally in the negotiations or by delegating the achievement of the desired solution to ministers and/or other Brazilian representatives.

The cases of Paraguay 1996 and 1999, Venezuela 2002, Honduras 2009 and Paraguay 2012 represented an immediate threat to democracy as the Organization of American States (OAS) considered them as a coup d’état or a credible risk of coup, because force was used to unseat the elected officials (in Paraguay in 1996, the force was used to threaten). Analysed data derive from memories of participants, official press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the President’s Office, newspapers and secondary literature (Lampreia 2008, Guimarães 2010, Amorim 2011, Couto, Soares 2013, Spektor 2014). The triangulation of data sources offers general remarks concerning how the actors participated in the decision-making process.

A widespread method to examine presidential diplomacy is to sum up foreign visits of the heads of state (Danese 1999, Almeida 2004, Figueira 2009). Growing numbers prove that presidents are more active than their usual (i.e. previous) level. The data for calculating the total number of presidential visits were collected from the official web pages of the Presidential office (Presidência) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The data concerning F. H. Cardoso come from secondary sources (Preto 2006, Almeida 2006).

In the next step, the analysis of the impact of presidents’ personalities considers topics introduced by presidents and builds upon a unique content analysis which compared thematic and regional preferences in F. H. Cardoso’s and Lula da Silva’s speeches (Vilela, Neiva 2011). It counts words belonging to pre-defined meaning categories using a pre-defined coding. Authors enabled repetition by handing over explicit rules of aggregating words to categories (Vilela, Neiva 2011, p. 72). The percentage shares show how much attention each category got among all analysed categories. Authors defined seven thematic categories: 1. Environment, 2. Peace and security, 3. Democracy and Human Rights, 4. Cooperation, 5. Institutions, 6. Social

Finally, to provide a deeper analysis of the presidential influence on Foreign Policy, the combination of social psychological and critical discourse analysis is applied to Brazilian representatives’ speeches during the Opening Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations (MRE). The tradition of an inaugurating speech dates back to 1949 and used to be carried out until 1982 exclusively by Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 1982, President João Figueiredo delivered the opening discourse. The most important international forum represents a unique opportunity to present the countries’ vision of the world, international relations, discuss current issues, present views on solutions to existing conflicts and project prevailing self-image or an official image.

3 PRESIDENTS’ PERSONALITIES

Surprisingly, although the three last Brazilian presidents belong to the same generation, they could not be more distant; each of them illustrates another core characteristic of diverse unequal Brazilian society. The main background differences among presidents rise from their regional and social-economic origins, as there are huge disparities among federal states.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso represents the conservative neoliberal wing. The internationally recognized sociologist and former Minister of Foreign Affairs was elected president thanks to the successful consolidation of Brazilian economy through Plano Real, which he had introduced as Minister of Finance. He gained strong professional authority, rational-legal authority in Weber’s perspective. In the new democratic history of Brazil, he was the first re-elected president who respected constitutional rules during both terms.
Part of Cardoso’s family comes from Rio de Janeiro in the south eastern region, which possesses the most developed industry and agriculture in the country. The traditional family obeyed the father who did his military service. F. H. Cardoso studied sociology at the prestigious University of Sao Paulo. He was convinced that Brazil could not grow until it would pay its social debt and improve the situation of its poor, unschooled inhabitants (Lampreia 2010). During the tough times of military junta, he lived in France and Chile, participated in conferences and various academic meetings, where he gained many new contacts.

Cardoso initiated his political career only during the democratic transition when he actively engaged in the Brazilian Democratic Movement, the only political party of permitted opposition. In 1982, he became a senator. Later, he founded the new Brazilian Social Democracy Party. His career continued to rise to ministerial posts in Itamar Franco’s government. He established close ties to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his short mandate as its Chief in 1992. He was soon transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1995 he became President of Brazil.

Cardoso’s presidential competitor and successor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is an outstanding example of a leader with charismatic authority. His authority arises from an exceptional charisma, absolute personal commitment and trust in his own leadership qualities (Fernandes 2012, p. 24). His personal leadership legitimized the political one. Lula da Silva’s political legitimacy and credibility develop from an undeniable democratic commitment, syndicate movement, and origin in the poor state of Pernambuco (Anderson 2011, p. 35).

Lula da Silva was born to an indigent family in the north-eastern region known for heavy droughts. Memories of the everyday fight for a living had a strong influence. The family moved to the poor suburbs of Sao Paulo, where Lula da Silva, who had not finished elementary school, began to work in the metallurgical industry. Lula da Silva lost his first wife because of insufficient medical care. He participated with his brother in the metallurgical syndicate movement, and afterwards, he became a member. This was fundamental to his future political career. The shy Lula da Silva was forced to give public speeches. Through practice and the success of the strikes, he gained self-confidence (Paraná 2008). His leading role in unexpectedly huge strikes which paralysed metallurgic production caused him to be imprisoned for one month.

In 1980, Lula da Silva co-founded the Workers’ Party and soon became its leader. Like Cardoso, he was so active in the creation of a new political party that they personified the parties (Cason, Power 2009). They ran presidential campaigns against each other as they represented the core parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum, around which other parties formed coalitions (Němec 2012). Lula da Silva
was nominated as a presidential candidate already for the elections in 1989 but did not succeed until 2002, when F. H. Cardoso terminated his second term and could not be re-elected for a third time.

Lula da Silva searched for inspiration and political cooperation abroad. His interest in international political events took shape already soon after the foundation of the Workers’ Party when he met his Polish counterpart Lech Walesa (Paraná 2008, p. 29). He supported the establishment of the forum for left-wing parties of Latin America, which gathered for the first time in 1991 to resist the “imperialistic integration” together (Almeida 2003, p. 90). During the 1990s, he became a well-known left-oriented leader both in Brazil and abroad.

Dilma Rousseff combines some traits from both of her ancestors. The well-situated middle-class family with Bulgarian roots lived in the capital of Minas Gerais, a rich state in the south-eastern region. Already as a young teenager, she started to fight against the military regime. As a guerrilla member, she participated in fourteen days training in Uruguay (Amaral 2011, p. 36) and took part in several illegal actions until she was imprisoned for two and half years. Despite being tortured, she did not reveal any sensitive information.

After the release, she moved to the most southern Brazilian state, Rio Grande do Sul, where she finished her master’s degree in economics and started to work for the local government. She spent the biggest part of her life serving in nominated positions which did not request any contact with foreign countries. During the democratic transition, she participated in the new Democratic Labour Party and its federal administration. Thanks to her abilities she became Minister of Energy and Mines in 2003, and later she was appointed the Chief of Staff by President Lula da Silva.

During her presidential candidacy, many pointed out that she had never run for an elected post and called Lula da Silva her creator (Aguiar 2010). The campaign managed to link her technocrat capabilities with the unprecedented fact that she was a woman candidate. She was portrayed as a “supermadre” – an image of a politically active woman who expands her mother’s role in politics in areas such as health, education and welfare (Chaney 1979). Dilma Rousseff accepted this image of a caring mother who can complete unfulfilled tasks.

All three presidents participated in the opposition to the military regime and in the democratic transition: F. H. Cardoso actively engaged in the only official oppositional party, Lula da Silva was a successful leader of the oppositional syndicate movement, and Dilma Rousseff was a member of a guerrilla movement. Both Cardoso and Rousseff had previous experience from public administration. On the other hand, their careers differ; while Cardoso was elected senator, Rousseff was nominated to all
her posts thanks to her work performances. Lula da Silva did not have any administrative experience before assuming the presidency, but like F. H. Cardoso, he had outstanding ability in political negotiating. They differ in leadership and authority: F. H. Cardoso’s recognition originates in his intellectual leadership (Actis 2013) and in his role in the Brazilian economy’s consolidation. Lula da Silva stands out thanks to his charismatic leadership. The authority of Dilma Rousseff could be labelled as rational-legal in Weber’s classification, based on the liberal-constitutional source of power.

4 FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY

The role of Brazilian presidents in diplomacy derives from the position as chief of executive power in the state. Compared to other South American countries, Brazil has a very clear and strict division of the independent legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive has been empowered by weakening the legislative power (Mainwaring 1997, p. 55). Moreover, among liberal democracies, there is no other nation which combines proportional representation, multipartism and a presidential system (Preto 2006, p. 15). Although there are usually many parties participating in the government coalition, the presidents need, at the same time, to manage cross-party coalitions to gain support for their proposals in the National Congress. These facts lead to the label of coelectoral (minority) presidential system (Mainwaring 1997, p. 87–91, Němec 2012, p. 99–116).

The Brazilian constitution from 1988 defines the main duties of the president and of his consulting body, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The president is the only one personally responsible for the execution of policies (Art. 84 of the Constitution). Presidents used to be passive and almost inactive in foreign policy. They used to delegate tasks exclusively to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a consequence, highly professional career diplomats from traditional diplomatic elite families ruled the institution and decided the foreign orientation of Brazil. Foreign policy used to be considered as a state, not as a public policy (Oliveira 2005, p. 23, Figueira 2009, p. 14, Faria 2013). This means that foreign policy was not negotiated within the bargaining between political parties. The orientation of the state in its international relations was independent of the political parties in power, and had continuous national interest defined and defended by the professional Ministry, which also did not change under different administrations.

Beyond the Ministry, another important domestic actor is the political party, as long as there are no presidential candidates without affiliation to a political party (Giaccalia 2010, Cason, Power 2009, Němec 2012). This political influence is reflected
in the appointments of presidential advisors: some of them come from state institutions or academia, while others come from political parties. This is crucial when considering how decisions about the participants in a close decision unit occur. This choice reveals the essential traits of presidents’ preferences and background ties and has a direct connection to the organizational model of the decision unit.

The so far unseen participation of Cardoso in foreign policy activities arose from a combination of various factors. Firstly, he was interested in international relations and had a significant international reputation as a well-known sociologist; secondly, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for a short period in 1992; and thirdly, external processes of the pluralization of actors weakened the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cason, Power, 2009). During his presidency, Cardoso transformed the executive power significantly, but most reforms were, nevertheless, finished only in the first Lula da Silva mandate.

When entering the presidential post in 1995, Cardoso chose career diplomat Luiz Felipe Lampreia as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. They had worked together in a department of planning in the transition government of José Sarney in the 1980s (Lampreia 2010). The main Presidential Office’s foreign affairs advisor Gelson Fonseca Júnior, like other advisors, was a career diplomat (Almeida 2004, p. 177). In 2001, after Minister Lampreia wished to leave the post (Lampreia 2010), the president appointed the ambitious and experienced career diplomat Celso Lafer, who had served in the ministerial post already in 1992.

Minister Lampreia, when assuming the post, was assured that the Ministry counted on an active role for the new president. The president’s neoliberal orientation on economic topics led him to pluralize the participation in international negotiations, and he broadened the domestic actors involved, primarily the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. This weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cason, Power 2009) might have been the president’s calculated action due to the diplomatic staff’s opposition to the president’s national-developmental project (Vizentini 2005). President Cardoso also concentrated more power in the executive branch by passing “executive agreements”. This procedure aimed to partly steer the legislative branch away from its participation in foreign policy decisions (Figueira 2010). During the Cardoso era, Brazil tried to intervene more actively in international relations and to strengthen its ties to the closest region first (integration in Mercosur). Then the country would connect to important global players (chiefly to the European Union) through its regional organization. This paradigmatic attitude towards the international environment gained the label “autonomy through integration” as compared to the historically dominant paradigm “autonomy through distance” (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007).
Lula da Silva’s political party’s entrance into public administration brought its complex reorganization, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The generous plan for elevating Brazil’s role in the world required a vast extension of technical background, the opening of new embassies, admission of new staff, organizing of international summits and conferences in Brazil, and visits of state representatives abroad (Figueira 2009, p. 116 – 126). The Ministry was reformed during the two first years of the first Lula da Silva mandate according to the previous F. H. Cardoso plan and the long-term objectives and ideas of the Workers Party (PT 1994, p. 30). This expansion led to the growth of diplomatic representations abroad from 150 to 230 in total; in Latin America 15 new embassies were opened, in Asia 13, and in Africa 19 (Amorim 2010, p. 226). There were Brazilian embassies in 39 out of 53 African countries by the end of Lula da Silva’s second term (Pino 2012, p. 191). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained back its lost glamour and importance and started to promote state or semi-state companies. The main foreign political trend of this era was universalism, vitally connected to the paradigm “autonomy through diversification” (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007, p. 1321 – 1324).

Lula da Silva’s unprecedentedly nominated politically affiliated people as his advisors (Lima, Duarte 2013). This proves the president’s intention to negotiate, combine and connect. The foreign policy “Troika” included the President, experienced diplomat Celso Amorim as Minister, and the President’s special advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. It is remarkable that Minister Amorim, who had already occupied this post from 1993 to 1995, was the first foreign minister affiliated with a political party in the history of Brazilian diplomacy (he changed from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party to the Workers Party in 2009). The president’s advisor Garcia was the main international relations theoretical ideologist in the Workers Party.

Dilma Rousseff inherited many features such as the basic orientation, guidelines, principles, and organization of the Ministry, and even advisors, from Lula da Silva. During her administration, there was a noticeable decline in the Ministry’s budget. Dilma Rousseff tended to appoint to prominent posts experts without political affiliation. Both her first mandate’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota and Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, were career diplomats. On the other hand, she retained the inherited presidential advisor M. A. Garcia. Minister Patriota claimed that he would protect the gains of the previous government and build on its solid base. The change at the ministerial post occurred after several misunderstandings between the president and the first minister. Dilma Rousseff normally did not intervene much in foreign policy negotiations, but she would act in crises and when she was not satisfied with the results. She “sacrificed” the minister after a conflict with Bolivia in which Brazilian diplomats and senators had organized a transfer of the Bolivian opposition leader Roger Pinto Molina to Brazil. The Minister officially resigned, and Dilma Rousseff
appointed a new one. This was the only case when the Minister of Foreign Affairs was recommended to resign during the five analysed mandates.

5 DECISION-MAKING DURING CRISSES

The presidents faced numerous crises which reveal differences among their approaches to management of the top team. In the second year of his first term, President Cardoso was confronted with an abrupt crisis in Paraguay in 1996. Although Paraguay’s transition to democracy started in February 1989, seven years later, its democracy was still fragile. General Oviedo refused to leave his post as ordered by President Wasmosy, which led to an institutional crisis in April 1996. The general managed to persuade the president to let him become Minister of Defence. The involvement of the international community in the crisis was significant, as the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (acting according to resolution AG/RES 1080 adopted in Santiago de Chile in 1991) and a representative of the United States Department of State visited Paraguay. Foreign ministers of Mercosur (Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina) promptly travelled to Asuncion, too, and made it clear that a “coup under the table” would bring sanctions to the country. Before the crisis escalated, President Wasmosy had secretely visited his counterpart Cardoso in Brasília on the 20th of April. President Cardoso expressed full support to the official, democratically elected government (Santiso 2002, p. 407), as his staff advised him (Lampreia 2008). The President coordinated his steps with his advisors and accepted the decisions coming from the institutions, especially (and naturally) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Albuquerque 1997, Couto, Soares 2013).

Unfortunately, the temporary solution of the 1996 crisis did not last long. General Oviedo managed to remain in politics; however, it was for some time only behind the stage. When his political ally won the presidential elections, Oviedo was absolved from all accusations, but later he supposedly assassinated the Vice-President L. M. Argana. President Cardoso asked the Paraguayan President Cubas to resign and followed Minister Lampreia’s advice to grant asylum for President Cubas. The Minister also strongly insisted on no weapon delivery to Paraguay. The crisis was solved in the end without the use of force. Meanwhile, President Cubas gained asylum in Brazil. Oviedo obtained asylum in Argentina and later flew to Brazil, which refused to extradite him to Paraguay to be judged for the assassination in 1999. Once again, Cardoso led the decision unit, and worked closely with the Brazilian ambassador to Paraguay and with Minister Lampreia.

Close to the end of Cardoso’s second term, another problematic South American state attracted the attention of the whole region’s community. The crisis in
Venezuela in 2002 manifested its depth already in April when the opposition movement removed President Hugo Chávez from power for several days. President F. H. Cardoso was clear about his attitude and instructed Minister Celso Lafer to expound the Brazilian point of view at the Rio Group meeting, calling upon the “democratic clause”. After multilateral threats to Venezuela, such as its possible isolation and suspension from the regional organizations, President Chávez came back to power within 48 hours. But this solution soon proved to be temporary.

Several months later, the conflict escalated again with strikes in the main Venezuelan petroleum company. Even though the escalation occurred during the Cardoso’s final term, it can serve as an outstanding example of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy activity. Both men considered the crisis as an immediate threat, with a possibility of civil war (Amorim 2011, p. 385). Lula da Silva started his engagement even before he officially entered office. He sent his closest foreign policy advisor Garcia to Venezuela. Garcia had an extremely unusual position of “special envoy of the elected president” and was probably the only conceivable person to travel to Venezuela because of his declared ideological closeness to President Chávez. The president’s active role was crucial: he visited three countries before even entering office (including the United States). Already during his second day in office, he spoke with Hugo Chávez. Based on this meeting, he assumed personal responsibility for founding a group of friends of Venezuela and tried facilitating and mediating with the Organisation of American States and other partners. The advisor, minister and president were in close touch (Amorim 2011). The president trusted his colleagues and there were no big discrepancies in what they were saying to the public. They acted as a unique compact decision unit with a strong role for its leader, the president. Garcia described the President’s role in foreign policy as a “rock star” who presents the results in the media, but who can and does indeed delegate the implementation of foreign policy to his comrades whom he can trust (Garcia 2010).

The proactive attitude of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy group emerged often, even during crises in countries that do not share borders with Brazil, such as during the Honduran coup d’état in June 2009, in which Brazil also played a significant role. President Zelaya was seized by the military and had to escape to Costa Rica. When he returned to the country in September, he lived in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Although Brazil announced that it had not helped the president to return, it did not accept any ultimatum from the interim Honduran president Micheletti. The Brazilian president, the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, and the ambassador in Honduras all clearly declared that they did not agree with the coup and would not accept the “de facto” government. To support it by acts, Brazil introduced visa for Hondurans and tried to facilitate and mediate negotiations of the crisis first within Unasul. Minister Amorim wanted to discuss it in the UN Security Council too. President Lula da Silva
also stated a request for a peaceful solution at the general opening of the General Assembly of the UN.

During Dilma Rousseff’s first term, the domestic events in Paraguay once again demanded the attention of South American states. This case displays the relations of Brazil and Mercosur to Venezuela, which became a member after the previous temporary suspension of Paraguay’s membership. The crisis started with the attempts at the impeachment of Paraguayan President F. Lugo and its successful conclusion. Dilma Rousseff received this news during the Rio+20 summit and because of its relevance, she had to participate in dealing with the issue.

Brazilian diplomacy had had information from its embassy about the complicated situation in Paraguay long before the conflict escalated, but did not believe it would go so far (Presidência). The two principal Brazilian representatives, Minister Patriota and advisor Garcia, offered different views and statements. The minister advised the president to negotiate the crisis within Unasul, which later turned out to be a worse option than possible negotiation within the longer-existing Mercosur. Solving the problem within Unasul meant that Bolivia and Venezuela participated in negotiations, which would not have happened within Mercosur. A leak of information revealed that Dilma Rousseff considered the minister’s withdrawal. In the end, the most prominent victim from the Brazilian diplomacy was the Brazilian ambassador to Mercosur, S. P. Guimarães (former secretary-general in Lula da Silva’s first term). This crisis demonstrated that the decision unit was indeed not acting as a unit, but three representatives were independent players in a loose coalition, classified as a coalition of autonomous actors according to Hermann’s classification (2001).

Applying the result criterion, even if the solution was not achieved exclusively thanks to Brazilian diplomacy, Dilma Rousseff’s attitude prevailed and differed from advisor Garcia’s position. There were no sanctions adopted towards Paraguay, and Mercosur suspended only its political membership until the next elections. Rousseff’s careful but irresolute considering of an appropriate reaction lasted a long time. It seemed that foreign policy was always in the shadow of internal affairs. The president returned to the ministry its previously lost independence, and only engaged when the relevance of the particular situation called for it. But she was able to uphold her attitude, strict supervision, and the requirement of results. In addition, she punished errors and mistakes. This was also the case of Minister Patriota, who had resigned in August 2013 after enabling the transfer of a persecuted Bolivian senator to Brazil from his refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in La Paz. He was the only minister to resign during the analysed period.
These five short case studies illustrate some differences in presidents’ management styles of the decision units in crises. Both Cardoso and Lula da Silva listened to their staff’s advice. Several protagonists from the Lula da Silva’s era remained in Dilma Rousseff’s term. At the top of the pyramid remained advisor Garcia and Minister Patriota, the vice-minister in Lula da Silva’s second term. But the management of the closest cooperation changed significantly, as Dilma Rousseff maintained a certain distance from foreign policy and did not share the negotiation skills of her predecessors.

The studies display the preference for a multilateral or bilateral approach: all tried to solve situations on a multilateral basis but in different phases of the resolution. While Lula da Silva tried first to deal with issues bilaterally and only later multilaterally, both Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff preferred first to look for a solution within multilateral, regional forums.

6 **INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL VISITS**

The phenomenon of presidential diplomacy is mostly analysed by the criterion of the total sum of presidents’ visits (Figueira 2009, p. 116 – 126, Cason, Power 2009, p. 122). These visits serve to present the country, to support international trade (Mapa 2012, p. 10) and to inaugurate new (development) projects (Pino 2012, p. 197 – 201).

This quantitative dimension shows how much the presidents participated in foreign policy. The growing participation of presidents cannot be accounted for only by their preferences; it also results from the wider trend of personal meetings and reunions (for instance, Barack Obama’s comparison to his predecessors shows an unseen number of foreign visits in his first year in office, FP, 2012). Figure 1 registers clearly the exceptional participation of Lula da Silva.

**Figure 1: Quantitative dimension of presidential diplomacy**

![Graph showing presidential visits and discourses](image-url)
In comparison to Lula da Silva, the two others were far less active. Dilma Rousseff visited fewer countries in the first year than her antecedent in any year of his two mandates. Figure 1 reveals that Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff received more visits in Brazil than they made trips abroad. This is not valid for F. H. Cardoso, who travelled slightly more abroad than he received visits in Brazil. The growing numbers of multilateral meetings may reflect a broader trend exogenous to the wish of the Presidents, but as they drop during the mandate of Dilma Rousseff, this also testifies to her disinterest in foreign policy and her bigger preferences towards domestic issues. Anyway, the total numbers during her mandate are only slightly higher than those of F. H. Cardoso. Another breaking point occurred in Lula da Silva’s Presidency: he received significantly more visits than he made, which could reflect the growing importance of Brazil and its incentives to international partners. Dilma Rousseff welcomed more visits in Brazil.

The regional comparison offers a valuable insight. While Cardoso travelled to Latin American countries and to Europe, during both Lula da Silva’s terms most representatives of these countries came to Brazil to different events and meetings. Curiously, in Lula da Silva’s first term the biggest disparity between trips abroad and received visits is from Europe. This might reflect the awakening of the European leaders who realized with some delay that there was a new important international player (Saraiva 2012).

The next two figures show on which regions the presidents focused. Of course, the differences in absolute numbers are caused partly by the number of countries included in the respective region (e.g. North vs. Latin America). In Figure 2, which depicts the bilateral visits of Brazilian presidents abroad, Latin America is by far the most represented region, followed by Europe and Africa.
The unprecedented numbers during both Lula da Silva’s terms depict his involvement in foreign policy. Most of his visits (70%) headed to the countries of the global south (Pino 2012, p. 191). African representatives started to visit Brazil more and almost reached the numbers of European representatives. The fall in the reception of foreign visits in Brazil during Rousseff’s term is also revealed.

Figure 3 displays foreign visits received by the Brazilian presidents. Again, both Lula da Silva’s terms show the enormous activity of the president. Comparison of Latin America and Europe shows that the second region played a significant role in both Cardoso’s terms (especially in the first one, confirming the strong inspiration of the European integrational project) and also in Rousseff’s first term. The significant representation by African countries in Lula da Silva’s first term reflects declared interest in this region, and orientation towards the global South.
The quantitative analysis focuses on the regional and thematic orientation of the three presidents. Figure 4 depicts the importance of the analysed regions in presidential speeches and illustrates the percentage of appearance of countries from respective regions in foreign policy speeches. South America and Europe prevail by far. The biggest difference appears in the comparison of F. H. Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff to Lula da Silva, who dedicated significantly less attention to European countries and slightly more to the African continent in his speeches, whereas Africa appeared far less in the speeches of both F. H. Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff.

Completing the previous analysis of foreign visits, Figure 4 also reveals that Lula da Silva paid more balanced attention to all regions than the other two presidents. He registered higher percentages in the least-mentioned regions and lower percentages in the most common ones. This fact proves the desire for universalism in and diversification of foreign policy in this period. Despite the declared continuity, Dilma Rousseff’s results in this analysis are surprisingly closer to F. H. Cardoso than to Lula da Silva.

Figure 4: Regions in presidential speeches

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<th>FHC 15%</th>
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The quantitative analysis of the topic priorities represents an introductory step to qualitative discourse analysis. The definition of the thematic categories (Vilela, Neiva 2011) reflects the seven most important topics mentioned in presidential speeches. Obviously, the presidents reacted to international events that are independent of their choices and preferences. However, in the vast corpus, these exogenous influences might be of lower significance than the differences of attitudes among speakers. The most essential topic for all three presidents was (by far) the economy.
followed by social inequality and international institutions. The most surprising difference appears in two categories: on the one hand, democracy and human rights, and on the other, peace and security: F. H. Cardoso mentioned the first category twice as often as Lula da Silva or Dilma Rousseff. This, of course, partly derives from the still recent democratic transition, but it contrasts with expectations (Engstrom 2012) that human rights would be a big topic for Dilma Rousseff, who was tortured during the dictatorship. On the contrary, she spoke much more about peace and security than her predecessors. The environmental topic seems to be the least significant. Only Dilma Rousseff mentioned it more often than democracy and human rights, but this may be because of the Rio+20 Summit and the president’s connection of environmental topics to the economy, development and natural resources.

Figure 5: Topics in presidential speeches

![Figure 5: Topics in presidential speeches](image)

Even if presidents are not the only authors, and the speeches’ contents do not depend exclusively on them, speeches always contain some personal traits, either non-intentionally or intentionally. This analysis focuses on the most important Brazilian representatives’ speeches in front of the main international forum, the General Assembly of the United Nations. There is no particular rule concerning whether the president him/herself or the minister should open the session (Lampreia 1999). Brazilian representatives have utilized speeches to present their basic foreign policy orientations and to express main considerations about the contemporary (urgent) international agenda. All discourses also present the main internal changes in Brazil,
Brazilian commitments to the international community (connected to the desired permanent seat in the Security Council), and current international topics, threats and trends.

Comparing the three presidents by their personal participation, F. H. Cardoso spoke at this stage only once in 2001, after the 9/11 attacks. Lula da Silva orated three times in each mandate, in 2003, 2004, 2006, and in 2007, 2008 and 2009. He decided not to participate in 2010 due to his assistance in Dilma Rousseff’s presidential campaign. In contrast, Dilma Rousseff participated in all four years during her first mandate.

These speeches constitute an occasion to express national interest to the international forum and stress the importance of the president’s own country. Brazil has desired reform of the Security Council since 1988, and it declared interest in having one seat for the first time during Itamar Franco’s presidency in 1994. All presidents make this requirement clear, but it appears only implicitly in F. H. Cardoso’s speech, whereas all speeches of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff mentioned it explicitly. Presidents stressed the evolution of Brazil and its rising importance. Cardoso’s speech and the first two speeches by Lula da Silva stated that the country would soon be prepared to fulfil its international commitments, and later that the country was already fulfilling them. In the last speech by Lula da Silva, Brazil appeared to be a country that can help others to achieve their commitments, particularly the Millennium Development Goals. Brazil has passed through a long and tough development process, and it feels ready to share its experience and knowledge. In all speeches, presidents consider Brazil to be a responsible player.

There is a remarkable disparity in the comparison of the content analysis results concerning the thematic and regional orientation with the discourse analysis of the UN presidential speeches. In particular, regions appear according to the urgency of events which occurred during the year of the speech and do not reflect intentional foreign policy orientation guidelines. On the contrary, the presidents stress the topics they consider important, and thus in this dimension there seems to be more space for choices in line with their preferences. For instance, an F. H. Cardoso speech selected topics reacting to the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. The president emphasized the fight against terrorism but warned against starting a conflict among civilizations or even religions. He broadened the topic by connecting it to development, globalization, and more responsible and just global markets. Cardoso’s themes of reducing injustice, helping the least developed countries through the liberalization of international trade, and the liberalization of pharmaceutical products (and more precisely HIV antiretroviral drugs) continued with more dynamics in speeches given by Lula da Silva.
The second president managed to link up-to-date topics with long-lasting problems and included a huge variety of critical points and events in each speech. He also revealed the country’s position and attitude towards ongoing crises, sometimes assertively stressed Brazil’s proposed solution, and criticised developed countries for their acts or lack of political will to repair damage they had caused (e.g. concerning the environment and unfair international trade). The call for reform of the Security Council and for better global governance is also emphasised. Subjects such as hunger, poverty, environment, peace, the economy and international justice appear most frequently. Lula da Silva also assumed, as Brazil’s representative, the role of protector and leader of developing countries. In the beginning, Brazil was part of this group, and its leader due to its geographical and economic dimensions, but towards the end of the second mandate, Lula da Silva presented Brazil as a model for other countries, worth being followed because of its successful development. Regional orientations correspond to the findings of the content analysis. Lula da Silva often mentioned historical linkages with Africa, contemporary cooperation with this continent and many organizations and forums Brazil took part in or even founded (e.g. IBAS or Unasul). Mentions about the situation in the Middle East are common as Brazil supports the creation of an independent Palestine. Lula da Silva often used this request for peace in the Middle East to support the image of his country as a peaceful harbour where the Jewish and Arab minorities live side by side.

Dilma Rousseff’s shorter speeches generally did not cover so many topics as her forerunners. She paid more attention to few usually contemporary events and crises (e.g. economic crises, Rio 20+ Summit and environment, the U.S. spying on their allies). The themes were discussed in greater detail. She continued constructing the image of Brazil as leader of the global South and stressed the achievements of her predecessor as well as criticism of developed countries. In the continuity of the leftist discourse of her party and predecessor, she criticised protectionism, the insufficient fight against poverty and hunger, and the lack of dialog within the international community.

The personal messages that could be linked to the individual experience of the presidents reveal differences among them. Whereas F. H. Cardoso’s sociological background appears indirectly in his speeches, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff directly speak about their personal experience. Lula da Silva uses it to strengthen his statements about the need for development, the fight against poverty and hunger, while Dilma Rousseff declared emotionally in her first speech that she was the first woman to open the General Discussion in 2010 and proclaimed the new millennium as a woman. It is Lula da Silva who uses more poetic and passionate language; he employs citations from the Bible and some Brazilian poets.
8 Conclusion

The article concludes that expectations about the decline of the presidential diplomacy of Cardoso’s successor did not prove to be right, as President Lula da Silva’s involvement reached its (temporary) peak in his second term. In a strong presidential political system, the presidents’ personalities can significantly influence foreign policy decision-making. Previous interest in a matter can lead to higher involvement in an area, as both Presidents Cardoso and Lula da Silva demonstrate. In contrast, greater ties to domestic policies led Dilma Rousseff to reduce the extent of presidential diplomacy, but we can expect that Dilma Rousseff may expand her activities in her second term, as presidents usually do.

Within the same constitutional and regulatory environment, the presidents, as heads of the executive power and accountable for the government’s decisions, can adjust relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their own cabinet according to their wish and political influence. The granting of essential posts is reflected in the cooperation among individuals in crises. As this analysis proved, the personal relations of presidents to ministers or their advisers influence the final decision. It was President Cardoso who significantly changed the situation and ended the long-lasting monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had known his minister for a long time, and this enabled the president to have a greater involvement in foreign policy-making. Whereas Lula da Silva and Cardoso chose their staff, Dilma Rousseff partly inherited them. Cardoso and Lula da Silva mostly worked closely with their friends, ministers and advisors, but it was notably different in Dilma Rousseff’s administration, since she later even removed a minister after several disputes. The five short case studies also showed that Dilma Rousseff is reactive, while Cardoso and Lula da Silva were active and introduced their own initiatives.

The results of the qualitative analysis surprisingly draw a correspondence between Dilma Rousseff and Cardoso, but distance her from Lula da Silva, although they were nominated by the same political party. The differences in thematic and even regional orientations between Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva are striking, bearing in mind that she was so supported (and even, as some say, “chosen”) by Lula da Silva, had a broad political coalition around their Workers Party and even inherited advisors and a minister. Dilma Rousseff’s frequent mentioning of Europe, which likens her to Cardoso, might have been caused by exogenous factors, such as financial crises and complex criticism of Europe. Cardoso’s and Lula da Silva’s were oriented towards the whole international community, and they both had great negotiation skills and political influence, since they both founded “their” parties.
Conclusions drawn from the proposed framework are limited due to inability to obtain all necessary information. First of all, the differences between the first and second mandate are covered only partially in the solution of crises and in the quantitative analysis of international visits. The political background, (which means the strength of government coalitions and domestic political struggles) is missing, as is the influence of public opinion. Another possibility to extend the analysis would be leadership style analysis done with the help of modern software, but which still does not exist for The Portuguese language. Another possible extension could focus on President Cardoso’s predecessor and Dilma Rousseff’s second term.

REFERENCES


