

# MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY

# JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



Vedecký časopis pre medzinárodné  
politické, ekonomické, kultúrne  
a právne vzťahy

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Dolnozemska cesta 1, 852 35 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Tel.: 00421 2 6729 5471

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## PRÍSTUP TEORIE ROLÍ A SEVEROKOREJSKÉ ANALÝZY ZAHRANIČNÍ POLITIKY

### ROLE THEORETIC APPROACH AND NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

*Lenka Caisová*<sup>1</sup>

Článek analyzuje zahraniční politiku KLDK s využitím teorie rolí. Tento teoretický a konceptuální aparát je nejprve představen a zohledněna jsou specifika jeho aplikace na případovou studii KLDK. Následně je věnována pozornost metodě obsahové analýzy, s jejíž pomocí jsou identifikovány role, které KLDK ve zkoumaném období deklarovala a rovněž je za pomoci těchto rolí interpretována zahraniční politika KLDK. V závěru je kriticky zhodnocen ústřední předpoklad teorie rolí o existenci korelace mezi deklarovanými rolemi a praktickou zahraniční politikou. Případová studie KLDK většinou potvrdila platnost tohoto předpokladu.<sup>2</sup>

Klíčová slova: KLDK, teorie rolí, národní role, obsahová analýza, analýza zahraniční politiky

In this article, I analyse DPRK's foreign policy using the role theoretic approach. I introduce the role theoretic approach with emphasis on specifics of the North Korean case. Furthermore, attention is paid to the method of content analysis, which stands for crucial methodological instrument helping me to identify the roles DPRK declared. Right after identification of the roles declared, the DPRK's foreign policy is interpreted. Finally, the core assumption of the role theory is examined, i.e. that a correlation exists

<sup>1</sup> Mgr. Lenka Caisová, PhD. Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Univerzitní 8, Plzeň, lenca.kudlacova@gmail.com.

Author focusses on the DPRK and its foreign policy and has recently finished the Ph.D. dissertation thesis dealing with this topic. She published several scientific articles in both English and Czech. Among the most recent ones, it was "Severní Korea v mezinárodních vztazích" (Acta FF, 2015), or "South Korean Civil Society Organizations as Confidence-Builders" (Perspectives, 2014).

<sup>2</sup> This article originated as a part of the grant project "Dělba moci v soudobých politických systémech [Separation of Powers in Contemporary Political Systems" (SGS-2015-006)] through the Grant Agency of the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. In significant part, it is based on analysis of materials obtained during the field research realized in the Republic of Korea in September 2015.

between rhetorically declared roles and practical foreign-political steps. I conclude with the assertion that this core assumption seems to be mostly valid but some contradictions were also discovered in North Korean case.

Key words: DPRK, role theory, national role, content analysis, foreign policy analysis

JEL: F5, Y10

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In last twenty or thirty years, the North Korean foreign policy has become a popular topic for researchers all over the world. Very often, papers emerging in that particular field of interest numerically exceed those dealing with the North Korean domestic policies. Recently, we have seen the appearance of historical works mapping the developments of North Korean diplomacy (e.g. Armstrong 2013), publications dealing with the DPRK's relations with particular countries (e.g. Suh 2014), increasing bulk of works whose authors try to detect crucial processes and determinants influencing North Korean foreign policy formation (e.g. Frank 2010) and many more. In comparison with its domestic policy, North Korean foreign policy can be examined and interpreted relatively more easily (although hardly without problems and methodological challenges). We have been able to approach more resources and materials, mainly statements and discourses delivered by North Korean political elites that were dedicated to the international community. Despite this, our knowledge in this sphere is far from complete.

I argue that the role theory can contribute significantly to the ongoing academic debate on the DPRK's foreign policy. Working with this innovative conceptual framework enables us to track down both the continuities and changes of the North Korean foreign policy and also to follow its patterns relying exclusively on primary resources. Therefore, in this paper, I decided to apply the role theoretical approach for studying the North Korean foreign policy that has not been comprehensively used in this context yet and thus, it can bring us to interesting findings. The goals of this article are threefold. Firstly, I aim to identify the roles declared by the North Korean regime between 2011 and 2015. Secondly, I want to detect and interpret changes of the North Korean role sets that emerged after the death of Kim Jong Il. Using role theoretic approach, I intend to observe both foreign-political patterns of Kim Jong Un's regime and its delimitation against his father's one. Simultaneously with the identification of the role the DPRK declares, I also provide interpretation of its foreign policy based on my role theoretical background. Third, I aim to test the core assumption of the role theory, i.e. that a correlation exists between rhetorically declared roles and practical foreign-political steps (or the role performance/enactment).

The structure of this paper is the following. First, I introduce the conceptual framework of the role theory that I intend to use with particular emphasis on its application in the North Korean case, which surely is highly specific. In this part, I highlight possible challenges that may arise from the application of the role theory on the North Korean case. Second, the methodology of the content analysis I intend to employ in addition to the role theory will be briefly presented. Third, I will apply the role theoretic framework to the analysis of foreign policy of the DPRK between 2011 and 2015. Simultaneously with the analysis of the North Korean roles I will interpret the changes in the North Korean role sets in relation to both the development of the North Korean contacts with “significant others” in the international environment (see below) and its leadership transition.

## **2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND KEY CONCEPTS**

In the very beginning of this section, I feel obligated to declare my metatheoretical background as it is not automatically obvious with a mere enactment of the role-theoretical approach. I perceive myself as a moderated social constructivist. I believe I can generate useful knowledge about the world we live in, i.e., I can actually approach the roles North Korea declares using the method of content analysis of North Korean discourses. Therefore, from epistemological point of view, similarly as Alexander Wendt (1999, p. 39–40) does, I believe in science in the framework of socially constructed world. As it has probably become obvious after reading the previous paragraph, my aim on the field of science is the understanding: I want to better understand how the North Korea perceives the part it plays in the international politics and how its interaction with other actors impact that as it can potentially facilitate the communication with the DPRK. Besides other things, I assume the change of North Korean roles relates to the interaction with the so called significant others, i.e. the primary socializing agents for particular role beholder (comp. Harnisch 2011).

The role theory I work with here has not always inclined to social constructivism. Initially, i.e. in the 1970s and afterwards when it had been introduced by Kalevi J. Holsti (1970), the absolute majority of authors working with it were strong IR realists. However, starting with the end of the Cold War and culminating after the year 2000, most authors accepted the constructivist (or interactionist) background. The interactionist role theory scholars stressed the relevance of role demands and Alter's expectations when contemplating about the role enactment and paid more attention to the process of role learning where the actors decision to accept or not to accept a role is shaped both by the others' expectation and by their own judgement of particular situation (Wehner – Thies 2014, p. 415; Harnisch 2012, p. 49; McCourt 2012, p. 379). This is the stance I accept in this paper as well.

By admitting the significant, others are the important source of the roles North Korea declares, the need emerges to find out who they are in the North Korean context.



Some actors (such as the United States or South Korea) seem to be obvious representatives of this group whereas the influence of other actors (such as various human rights groups or coalitions) on the North Korean roles' formation is much less apparent. So far, there has been a serious lack of literature dealing with this issue and thus, it is one of my component objectives in this paper to determine who the significant others were in the time period I examined.

At this place, it is also necessary to present the notions crucial for both role theoretical approach and this study. Firstly, it is a concept of role or national role which stands for the North Korean regime's expressions of its commitments, tasks and duties that are formed in the process of North Korean interactions with the significant others. In other words, the roles should be understood as a combination of self-conceptions held by Ego and expectations of the Alter (comp. Maull – Kirste 1996). By accepting the interactionist point, the claim that the roles are stable perceptions held by foreign policy makers (comp. Wish 1980) becomes increasingly challenged.

Another concept we should explain is the role set. Role set is a sum of national roles in a given time framework. Basic time unit I work with is the year and therefore, the role set as I understand it in this paper is a sum of national roles that were identified in twelve months. Furthermore, I refer to role deviance and role change in this study. Dirk Nabers (2011, p. 84) defines the role change as “a change in the shared conception and execution of typical role performance and role boundaries”. He also urges us to carefully distinguish the role change from the deviance which can be understood as behaviour which is not connected with given role and thus falls outside its frame (ibid.).

The last concept I should briefly introduce here is the role enactment. Holsti (1970, p. 245) defines it as foreign political actions or practical diplomacy employed by states. Other authors work with this concept similarly (comp. Shih 1988, p. 601).

### **3 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF APPLYING ROL THEORY ON THE DPRK CASE STUDY**

When applying the role theory to the North Korean case we must take into consideration certain methodological implications. Role theorists concur in the point that the roles are declared and enacted by the foreign-political elites or by the highest foreign policy representatives. However, when approaching the North Korean foreign policy we are confronted with a situation where we cannot unequivocally say who exactly are the foreign policy representatives constantly influencing the shape of North Korean role sets. As Lim (2002) or Koga (2009) point out, we are unable to determine the precise mechanisms of duties and responsibilities in the DPRK political system. The important foreign political statements are delivered by various authorities on various levels. Moreover, some crucial discourses such as the New Year editorials, which are generally perceived as one of the most important objects of reference for the

DPRK's policy analysis of the Kim Jong Il's era (and in the first year of Kim Jong Un's era), were published with no reference to particular author and had institutional authorship. Last but not least, after Kim Jong Un came to power in the very end of 2011, he initiated various changes in North Korean decision-making structure which became more obvious recently.<sup>3</sup> This situation leads us directly to the first challenge regarding the content analysis I intend to do: the North Korean settings make an a priori selection of the principal elites consistently in charge of foreign policy (comp. Le Pestre 1997, p. 13) questionable. Facing this problem, certain modifications of the existing approach were necessary.

It was my focus on the North Korean national roles' presentation abroad which helped me to reduce the spectrum of sources suitable for the content analysis. First, there are not many consistently accessible platforms where the DPRK presents its national roles. I argue that the North Korean English-written newspapers and magazines are the only place one can use for consistent and long term period-oriented content analysis. Additionally, my focus on the DPRK's roles abroad actually eliminated various Korean-written newspapers such as Rodong Sinmun (Workers' Newspapers in English) that are often used by the DPRK-oriented scholars from the scale of potentially useful resources as these are primarily dedicated to the domestic audiences.

In particular, I focussed on relevant parts of North Korean English-written newspaper named The Pyongyang Times.<sup>4</sup> After I did so, I thoroughly went through

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<sup>3</sup> It became obvious that in the framework of the process of consolidation of his power, Kim Jong Un initiated the changes in the decision-making structure as well. Most recently (in the end of June 2016), this resulted in the establishing of a new lead government body named the *Commission on State Affairs* chaired by Kim Jong Un which actually replaced National Defence Commission which stood for the crucial decision-making organ of Kim Jong Il's era. (comp. Grisafi 2016 or Kim 2016).

<sup>4</sup> In the framework of existing English-written North Korean medial landscape, The Pyongyang Times is the best resource for the purposes of my analysis. Of course, there is the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) website providing news adopted by North Korean medial scene. On the first sight, it might seem the KCNA could function as ideal source where one should search for the NRs. Nevertheless, this resource has many issues. First, the reports published here are often too short and thus, they do not provide sufficient space for roles to appear. Second, the reports relevant for the purposes of my investigation (i.e. the foreign political texts that are rather general) seldom appear. More often than not, the KCNA publishes either insignificant news (for example about the floral baskets or congratulations received by regime) or propaganda articles focused mainly against the United States, South Korean conservative political scene or Japan. If the foreign policy-related reports appear, they usually announce the past foreign delegations' visits to the DPRK or similar events austerely. Third, there is serious problem with availability of the online archive. Up to June 2015, the online archive of reports going back to year 1997 was available on the official KCNA website. Nevertheless, the website had been transformed thoroughly in the end of June 2015 which resulted in deletion of the archive. Additionally, even when the archive had been available, the DPRK authorities were known to alter or delete content which made systematic long-term investigation based on the

these texts for the first time and eliminated those that were too tied with particular foreign political measures. This step I made is also supported by the method used by authors in the book edited by Le Pestre (Le Pestre [ed.] 1997). In his chapter, Le Pestre points out all the authors in the book made an effort to select “only general foreign policy pronouncements, that is, the speeches that embraced a variety of issues” (Le Pestre 1997, p. 13). By identification of such general statements, I was also able to reduce the spectrum of elites who delivered the relevant texts. Kim Jong Un, North Korean Foreign Ministers, their deputies, members of the Workers' Party Korea Central Committee, National Defence Commission, Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, Korean Peoples' Army General Political Bureau/Supreme Headquarters, Cabinet, Academy of Social Sciences and the North Korean representatives/delegations at various international bodies have had significant influence on the articulation of roles.

As I have briefly mentioned above, I also worked with the articles focused on the foreign politics written by the given magazine/newspaper's redaction members. With respect to the fact news redactions members' statements articulated in articles (again, these articles cannot be too tied with description of any particular foreign political measures) are regime-controlled, it is possible to accept them as relevant resources where one should also look for the roles. To give just one example, in the beginning of the year (mainly in January or February), The Pyongyang Times usually publishes an article emphasising the crucial principles of the foreign policy for the given year where the NRs are articulated very clearly. If I omitted this kind of materials from my analysis, I would lose important resource where the roles are articulated.

Another methodological challenge which applies to the DPRK case is the non-democratic nature of the country itself leading us to important questions. What if the role-declaring actors were neither genuine nor rational? When searching for suitable analytic tools for the foreign policy analysis of the Third World countries, Sofiane Sekhri (2009) touches this issue and her conclusions can be linked to North Korean foreign policy analysis too. In particular, Sekhri (2009, p. 431) argues that neither dishonesty nor irrationality is pretext to decline the usefulness of the role theoretic approach. This is especially relevant for this paper too. Besides the fact these features can easily be found even in Western democracies, the sincerity is not really the issue I aim to investigate here. Rather, I focus on how the North Korean elites represent the role the DPRK should play in international politics and how this representation impacts the way how they conduct the actual foreign politics. Therefore, the starting point for me is the analysis of North Korean roles perceived as self-presentations of a nation on the international scene.

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KCNA online archive even more unfeasible. Due to above mentioned difficulties I decided to omit the KCNA as a source for searching for the roles.

#### 4 SEMANTIC CONTENT ANALYSIS<sup>5</sup> AND ROLE THEORY IN NORTH KOREAN CONTEXT

At the end of this theoretical section, I would like to briefly outline specific features connected with applying the content analysis as a crucial instrument for the identification of roles North Korea declares.

Generally speaking, the main aim of the content analysis I conduct is to find the statements consistent with the national roles. My research is mainly interpretative and qualitative. After sorting out the relevant extracts of the texts, I ascribe certain “qualities” to them which I call the national roles. On the basis of this ascription of “qualities”, I subsequently interpret the North Korean foreign policy. In order to delimit sufficiently representative sample of statements and articles for the content analysis, I sort out the texts according to *location, language and thematic relevance*. I have already described this process above. Therefore, it is sufficient to state here I search for rather general statements of the DPRK's regime elites and articles focused on the foreign politics in The Pyongyang Times.

There is a scale of possible ways we can implement when identifying the roles in the assorted texts. There is a possibility to *a priori* adopt Holsti's typology of 17 roles (comp. Holsti 1970) together with their delimitation. Nevertheless, if I did so, I would have become both overly tied with his categories and unable to consider the specifics of the North Korean case. Therefore, I am favorable both to taking account of the North Korean specifics when I work with Holsti's categories and to the identification of the new roles' categories if they fit North Korean case.

In particular, I start actual analysis with the identifying the relevant key words in the *baseline texts* (i.e. the texts from year 2011). These texts function as so called *referential texts*, i.e. the texts that set the standard used for subsequent comparison with the texts of the following years (comp. Hájek 2014, p. 41). I carefully analyse the baseline texts and locate the extracts where the role-expressing statements are present. Afterwards, I look at these extracts identifying rather general *key words* that regularly occur in correlation with the occurrence of a role. Like Le Pestre (1997) I believe that the observation of the key words surroundings enables me to localize the relevant extracts of texts where I can expect the occurrence of NRs. This claim is further supported by Martin Hájek who argues that “the application of such a categorized vocabulary helps us to distinguish the passages of text which deal with specific topic” (Hájek 2014, p. 39).

The key words identified in this process are: “duty”, “responsibility”, “world”, “motherland”, “people”, “country”, “nation”, “international”, “foreign”, “we” and

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<sup>5</sup> Semantical content analysis refers to the processes enabling the classification of symbols (or in our case, references national roles) according to their meaning (Janis according to Krippendorff 2013, p. 50).

“DPRK”, whereas the most relevant key words, i.e. key words whose surroundings most frequently implied the role statement, seemed to be “people”, “nation”, “country”, “we” and “international”.<sup>6</sup> Having identified the roles expressed in key words' surroundings, I label the relevant text extracts by *codes*, i.e. by the name of particular role. Subsequently, I continue with the content analysis using the key words in the following years of our dataset (i.e. the relevant texts published between 2011 and 2015). Firstly, I observe the presence of roles articulated and identified earlier. Secondly, I examine whether some new roles occurred. As the role theoretic scholars generally perceive the roles as relatively stable categories, I can expect that the roles that the majority of roles that were present in previous years will probably occur in the following years as well. Using this method, I gain a picture of the North Korean role sets which provide me with a good stepping stone for a subsequent analysis.

Let me now explain how I understand the function of the codes in my analysis. As Hájek (2014) claims, codes can have two possible functions: factual and referential whereas the latter is more relevant for my analysis. The *factual coding* requires exact definition of the actual content of the codes in advance. On the other hand, the *referential coding* refers to those codes that are created “on the fly” which implies we cannot guarantee the exact contents of the referential codes in advance. Therefore, if I accept the referential function, the code labels particular text extract as relevant with regard to the analysed topic and it actually represents rather heuristic tool which one can use for the construction of categories (ibid, p. 63–64). What are, however, the implications of accepting the referential function of the codes?

If I accepted the code in its factual function, I would have to exactly delimit and define the content of the individual NRs (used as codes) in advance. Nevertheless, with adopting of this approach, I would loose the elasticity of roles' categories, i.e. I would *a priori* decline the possibility of the meaning transformation in the framework of particular role. Therefore, I decided to work with the codes in the referential way. This means I will not guarantee the *a priori* exact meaning of the roles. Rather, I let the codes “develop on the fly”. I believe this approach is more fruitful if my aim is to observe the patterns of transformation and change of North Korean roles and role sets. I provide the definitions of individual roles in following chapter.

As my analysis is qualitative, I have to go through the texts manually in order to grasp the changing qualities of roles in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless, I used the Scantailor and Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 for the preparation of the scanned materials. *Scantailor* was mainly used for refining of the scanned materials. It helped to erase the imperfections which occurred during scanning process as these imperfections could hinder the transfer of the scanned materials to the plain text later. After refining, I transferred the materials to the plain text using *Adobe Acrobat Pro 9*. This step is

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<sup>6</sup> I aimed at selecting relevant key words that are as general as possible in order to prevent me from extensive focus just on the foreign-political particularities.

especially helpful as it enabled me to explore the key words' surrounding using the search engine built in the Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 which made the content analysis a bit easier.

## 5 NORTH KOREAN ROLE SETS BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015

*Tab. 1* below represents the role sets declared by the North Korean regime between 2011 and 2015.<sup>7</sup> The particular roles were arranged in a descending order according to the frequency of their occurrence. When identifying the role sets in the selected time framework, I paid special attention to how the meaning of individual roles has been developed and transformed. Let me now approach to the analysis of roles I identified.

*Internal Developer.* As we can see, the role *internal developer* has been dominating the role set in every year examined. When looking at the data in a pie chart (again, see *tab. 1*), this role stands for 27 % of the role set in 2011, 29 % in 2012, 23 % in 2013 and 30 % in both 2014 and 2015 role sets. In sum, it has been a stable part of the North Korean role sets and every year, it accounted for almost one third of the role sets. I identified the role *internal developer* according to various North Korean commitments to build a “thriving nation/country”, “powerful nation/country”, “prosperous nation/country”, or “civilized nation/country”. This role was also defined by Holsti in his pivotal article. He argued that its main point is that the government focuses most on issues of internal development and makes little reference to any particular function of the state in the international system. However, by perceiving itself as an *internal developer*, the state does not automatically rule out international cooperation, particularly in technical and economic matters (Holsti 1970, p. 269). This seems to work in the North Korean case too.

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<sup>7</sup> The table represents occurrences both in whole numbers as well as percentages. Please note that role incidence expressed in percentage is approximate and corresponds with the data depicted in the pie charts. I worked mainly with the printed edition of The Pyongyang Times and the online one available at <http://naenara.com.kp/>.

Tab. 1: North Korean Role Sets 2011–2015

| 2011                     | occurrences      | 2012                     | occurrences      | 2013                     | occurrences      | 2014                     | occurrences      | 2015                     | occurrences      |
|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| internal developer       | 16 (27 %)        | internal developer       | 18 (29 %)        | internal developer       | 19 (23 %)        | internal developer       | 14 (30 %)        | internal developer       | 17 (30 %)        |
| independent              | 11 (18 %)        | dignified isolate        | 11 (18 %)        | independent              | 11 (13 %)        | independent              | 6 (13 %)         | independent              | 7 (12 %)         |
| active independent       | 8 (13 %)         | independent              | 7 (11 %)         | anti-imperialist agent   | 10 (12 %)        | dignified isolate        | 5 (11 %)         | active independent       | 7 (12 %)         |
| regional peace protector | 7 (11 %)         | united nation            | 6 (10 %)         | dignified isolate        | 9 (11 %)         | united nation            | 4 (9 %)          | united nation            | 6 (11 %)         |
| anti-imperialist agent   | 4 (7 %)          | powerful country         | 6 (10 %)         | bastion of revolution    | 9 (10 %)         | powerful country         | 4 (9 %)          | anti-imperialist agent   | 5 (9 %)          |
| bastion of revolution    | 4 (7 %)          | bastion of revolution    | 4 (6 %)          | regional peace protector | 8 (9 %)          | anti-imperialist agent   | 4 (9 %)          | powerful country         | 4 (7 %)          |
| global peace protector   | 4 (7 %)          | anti-imperialist agent   | 3 (5 %)          | active independent       | 5 (6 %)          | active independent       | 3 (6 %)          | dignified isolate        | 4 (7 %)          |
| united nation            | 3 (5 %)          | active independent       | 2 (3 %)          | global peace protector   | 5 (6 %)          | global peace protector   | 3 (7 %)          | bastion of revolution    | 3 (5 %)          |
| dignified isolate        | 2 (3 %)          | example                  | 2 (3 %)          | united nation            | 4 (5 %)          | bastion of revolution    | 2 (4 %)          | global peace protector   | 2 (3 %)          |
| liberation supporter     | 1 (2 %)          | regional peace protector | 1 (1 %)          | powerful country         | 4 (5 %)          | regional peace protector | 1 (2 %)          | regional peace protector | 1 (2 %)          |
| example                  | 0                | global peace protector   | 1 (2 %)          | liberation supporter     | 0                | liberation supporter     | 0                | liberation supporter     | 1 (2 %)          |
| powerful country         | 0                | liberation supporter     | 0                | example                  | 0                | example                  | 0                | example                  | 0                |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>60 (100%)</b> | <b>Total</b>             | <b>61 (100%)</b> | <b>Total</b>             | <b>84 (100%)</b> | <b>Total</b>             | <b>46 (100%)</b> | <b>Total</b>             | <b>57 (100%)</b> |

Source: created by author. Data extracted from all The Pyongyang Times issues published between January 2011 and December 2015 excluding The Pyongyang Times vol. 2850, no. 23 of June 6, 2015.

To sum up, the main point of this role in the North Korean case is the constant emphasis on the need of internal development. The articulation of this role reflects the North Korean dismal situation regarding the constant energy and food shortages. When closely analysing the North Korean enactment of its *internal developer* role, the really interesting aspect appearing is how this role has been transformed. Between 2011 and 2012, the DPRK emphasised building a “thriving (socialist) country”, “great prosperous country” or “prosperous and powerful country” (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun and Chongnyon Jonwi 2011, p. 1, or Kim 2012a, p. 2). Although these phrases may seem to be quite vague, they are closely linked with the need of strengthening of military (and especially, nuclear) capacities and the meaning of the *internal developer* role used to be closely connected with the military build-up. Nevertheless, it started to change slowly from 2013 when regime put increasing emphasis to “economic giant building”, “civilized” or “powerful/thriving/civilized nation” building. This shift partially reflects the tendency of Kim Jong Un regime to put equal emphasis on both economy and development of nuclear weapons and it is widely known as the *byungjin* policy<sup>8</sup> (or policy of parallel development of economy and military in English). This trend became even more obvious in 2015, when special emphasis was put on building a “civilized (socialist) country” (comp. Kim J. U. 2013, p. 2, or Kim 2015a, p. 2). The prominence of references to economic development in the North Korean role statements is understandable if we consider the grave economic situation faced by the DPRK. However, how can we interpret the emphasis on “building a civilized nation/country”?

The Cambridge Dictionary defines the notion “civilized country” as a country that has a “(...) developed system of government, culture, and way of life and that treats the people who live there fairly” (Cambridge Dictionaries Online 2015). What is important here is the reference to the fact that a civilized country “treats the people who live there fairly”. This is especially interesting when we take account of the radically increased pressure on solving the North Korean human rights issues emerging from significant others. Of course, this pressure was already present in the U.S. North Korean policy after 2001. However, it was not until 2012 when the International Coalition to Stop the Crimes against Humanity in North Korea (ICNH) required more rigorous investigation of the North Korean human rights record and the pressure intensified. Even more significant in this respect was the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry to investigate Crimes against Humanity in North Korea in 2013.

Thus, we may interpret the North Korean references to “civilized-nation building” as possible expression of its sensitivity to the increased human rights pressure coming from the significant others. In simple terms, the regime seems to feel

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<sup>8</sup> *Byungjin* policy firstly appeared on March 31, 2013 during the plenary session of the Korean Workers' Party (comp. Cheon 2013, p. 1).



the necessity to assure the international public that either nothing is wrong or that it is working to improve the situation. This conclusion shows us that even a non-democratic regime of the North Korean style does pay attention to its image, prestige-building and react on the pressure from abroad. Rüdiger Frank arrives at a similar conclusion regarding image building arguing that North Korea attaches high importance to it (Frank 2010, p. 20).

Furthermore, this may remind us existing debates about the influence of norms and taboos in the international environment as discussed by Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (1996, p. 2). They try to find out why the nuclear weapons were not used and provide the alternative explanation to the deterrence theory. In particular, they claim the social and cultural meanings became attached to these weapons which gradually resulted in the refusal to use them. I argue that similar mechanism may be emerging in case of human rights norms' influence on the DPRK. Although the evidence is still very young, it seems the DPRK has actually started to reflect something what we might call *human rights abuse taboo* by labelling itself as “civilized country” recently.

Surely, this claim is relatively brave and further evidences and investigation would be needed to further support it. Nevertheless, if looking at the overall frequency of North Korean use of word “civilized” in The Pyongyang Times between 2011 and 2015, we can see its occurrence frequency has been significantly increasing as well. In particular, the articles in The Pyongyang Times tend to use this word in connection with the lives of North Korean people or above mentioned civilized nation building after 2012.<sup>9</sup> As the extract of the texts where the reference to word “civilized” were often not declarations of a role, I could not include them to my data sample. Nevertheless, this rise of occurrence frequency supports my statement about possible forming of human rights abuse taboo.

*Independent.* This is another role that has been an important and stable part of the North Korean role set. Having a brief look at *Table 1*, we can see this role accounting for approximately 18 % of the whole role set in 2011, 11 % in 2012, 13 % in 2013 and 2014 and finally, for 12 % of the 2015 role set. This role was defined by Holsti as the effort to “(...) make policy decisions according to the state's own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states” (Holsti 1970, p. 268). He also claims that the country's acknowledgement of a policy of non-alignment is usually connected with the role *independent*. This seems to be valid even in case of the DPRK. North Korea keeps emphasising its affiliation to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

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<sup>9</sup> Besides many others references, see for example Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 2012, p. 6; The Pyongyang Times 2012, p. 1; Bok 2013, p. 2; Bok 2014, p. 3, or Kim 2015a, p. 1. On the other hand, if going through the Pyongyang Times issues between 1994 and 2011, the word “civilized” in connection with North Korea occurred only very scarcely.

ideals and policies (comp. Pak 2012, p. 7) despite the fact that this platform seems to be rather inactive during the last decades.

The DPRK's statements indicating role *independent* demonstrate that the regime understands the ideal of independence as a certain condition for reaching a proper internal development of the country. As Jong (2012, p. 2) argued: "The spirit of national independence of the Korean people (...) enables them to push the development of the country". It is needed to point out that independence and self-reliance have been absolutely crucial values for North Korean regime practically since 1950s. As Charles K. Armstrong points out, ideology of Juche (which is closely connected with the principle of self-reliance) has been "the most extreme and uncompromising expression of national and economic sovereignty in the world" (Armstrong 2013, p. 53). Thus, we can expect that the role *independent* is rooted very deeply in the North Korean role sets, that it constitutes cornerstone of the DPRK's identity and that the issue of sovereignty and independence is indeed absolute and indivisible for North Korea, as Armstrong (*ibid.*, p. 292) claims. Given to such a deep nesting of the role *independent* in North Korean identity, it is neither probable this role vanishes from the role sets nor its saliency drops significantly.

From pragmatic point of view, role *independent* (and, to certain extent, *dignified isolate*, see below) are probably preserved in the role sets not only due to their firm link to North Korean identity as such as Armstrong (2013, p. 291–292) claims but also because there are strongly tied with the regime survival as such. In other words, being *independent* functions as a way for ruling elites to retain power.<sup>10</sup> This claim seems to be relevant especially in the situation when the human rights pressure gained clearer contours and became more consistent recently.

*Active Independent.* This role seems to be a relatively important milestone of the DPRK's foreign policy, too, and has been present in the role sets in every year examined. Holsti defined it as an expression of an effort of particular nation to stay *independent* and uninvolved in the military and ideological commitments together with an effort to cultivate relations with as many countries as possible (Holsti 1970, p. 262). In North Korean context, I identified mainly two dimensions of this role. First, it combines DPRK's willingness to establish multiple diplomatic relations with multiple countries whereas very vague<sup>11</sup> or no conditions are laid for this. Second, this role can be perceived as an expression of an effort to avoid any impact of increasing diplomatic ties on North Korean right to self-determination and independence. Despite the fact that the commitment of being an *active independent* is relatively vague and has rather been related to a certain group of countries than to any particular one, the DPRK has

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<sup>10</sup> The experience with disintegration of the Soviet Union probably strengthens North Korean unwillingness to renounce the roles *independent* and *dignified isolate*.

<sup>11</sup> If at all, the DPRK's role declaring actors typically laid very vague conditions for establishment of new diplomatic ties. For example, they spoke about the "friendly countries", "peace-loving countries", "independence-loving countries" or "progressive countries".

consistently adhered to it. Specifically, the *active independent* role is manifested in the North Korean effort to “(...) develop relations of friendship and cooperation with countries that are friendly” (Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun and Chongnyon Jonwi 2011, p. 1) or to “(...) continue to boost the friendship and cooperation with regional countries in line with its foreign policy of independence, peace and friendship” (Pak 2011, p. 8). If we analyse these role statements, the DPRK delimits the target group of actors with whom it is willing to be allied, i.e. with states (no non-state actors till 2015, see below) that are basically against the principles advocated by significant others (willingness to develop relations with independence-aspiring and justice-seeking nations) and which are prepared to cooperate with North Korea (this refers to a group of similarly thinking states, often outsiders within the international community with unfavourable reputation).

The DPRK probably aims not to restrict the spectrum of states with whom the cooperation might be feasible. Ming Lee (2009, p. 166) deals with the concept of “friendly countries” shortly in his study arguing that North Korean definition of “friendly countries” is judged by their willingness to support “(...) the DPRK's ideological commitment to build up a socialist fortress in the North, (...) the DPRK's bid for national unification and (whether or not, added by author) they join the United States and its camp in 'interfering with North Korean internal affairs' (like exerting pressure about North Korean human rights)” (Lee 2009, p. 166).

Starting from 2015, it seems this role has broadened its meaning. Whereas between 2011 and 2014 it was basically limited to developing friendly relations with peaceful *countries* that respect sovereignty, in 2015, for the first time ever, the regime declared its commitment to multilateralism and willingness to engage with non-state actors as INGOs or IGOs: “It [*DPRK, added by author*] plans to promote multilateral exchange and cooperation (...) with all nations (...) on both governmental and nongovernmental levels and international organizations that respect the sovereignty of the country and are friendly to it” (Sin 2015, p. 7).

If looking at *tab. 1* again, we can say the *active independent* role was prominent in 2011 (13 % in the role set) but its position in the North Korean role sets radically dropped in 2012 (3 %), 2013 (6 %) and 2014 (6 %). In 2015, it seems its relevance has increased again (12 %). We could interpret these changes as relating to the leadership change. At the time leadership transition started after the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kim Jong Un started to pay attention to power consolidation rather than turning to his allies. This explains the very small number of references to this role in 2012 and its recently increasing relevance.

Similar logic can be applied to other roles suggesting a more active foreign policy such as *regional peace protector* (it dropped from 11 % in 2011 to 1 % in 2012) or *global peace protector* (dropped from 7 % in 2011 to 1-2% in 2012). In 2012 at the same time, we can observe a strong increase of frequency of *dignified isolate* role that

implies a rather passive foreign policy and inward-looking tendencies reflecting Kim Jong Un's efforts to consolidate regime.

*Anti-Imperialist Agent.* This role represents another North Korean delimitation against the so-called arbitrariness and high-handedness of the significant others or the “imperialist states”. The DPRK has often declared the need to struggle against them as it is the only way to protect its dignity (comp. Choe 2011, p. 8). Holsti (1970, p. 264) naturally perceives this role as a typical one for the communist states that simply perceive imperialism as a serious threat they should fight against. Also, he argues that the main sources of this role include ideological principles, anti-colonial attitudes and perception of threat (ibid., p. 296).

In the North Korean case, this role was present in all the years we analysed and its content remained relatively stable – not much modification is possible regarding this role. What has slightly changed, however, is its frequency (7 % in 2011, 5 % in 2012, 12 % in 2013 and 9 % in 2014 and 2015). The increased emphasis on the *anti-imperialist agent* role in 2013 may be explained firstly, by the North Korean increased activity as far as its nuclear program is concerned that caused strong condemnation by the significant others. Secondly, the already mentioned bolstered human rights issue pressure on North Korea could also have a significant effect on the North Korean need to protest against the so-called “imperialist high-handedness” (comp. Kim 2015a, p. 3).

*Bastion of Revolution – Liberator.* This role has also been a steady part of the North Korean role sets (7 % in 2011, 6 % in 2012, 10 % in 2013, 4 % in 2014 and finally, 5 % in 2015) and is also defined by Holsti as an expression of willingness of a state to lead various types of revolutionary movements abroad and to liberate other nations or states and provide them with physical, moral, political or ideological support or inspiration (Holsti 1970, p. 260–261). Furthermore, he points this role has its source in anti-colonial attitudes, desire for ethnic unity and ideological principles (ibid., p. 296). This is in exact compliance with the North Korean statements oscillating around the aim to achieve “global independence” (Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun and Chongnyon Jonwi 2011, p. 1) or around its effort to “build a new, independent and peaceful world, which is free from domination and subjugation and from aggression and war” (The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK and the Cabinet of the DPRK 2011, p. 3).

Moreover, an important component of this role in the North Korean case is emphasizing the need of justice in the international system: “As a member of the international community, the DPRK will make every endeavour to establish fair international relations and order” (Kim I. B. 2013, p. 7). According to Holsti (1970, p. 292), actual implementation of this role should involve sending military or other supplies to revolutionary movements in different countries and undertaking extensive programs of ideological propaganda abroad. Some of these activities are relevant in

North Korean case, especially the sending of military supplies abroad or consorting with the leftist governments or parties from Third World countries. There is serious lack of literature dealing with North Korean relations with the countries and actors I called “similarly thinking” above. The article of J. Owoeye (1991, p. 632) is one of the few. He shows the DPRK strived to gain the voting support of African countries at the UN General Assembly which was essentially aimed at the diplomatic isolation of South Korea<sup>12</sup>.

*Regional and Global Peace Protector.* The role *regional protector* was defined by Holsti as an “(...) emphasis on the function of providing protection for adjacent regions” (Holsti 1970, 262). The role *global peace protector* was not identified in Holsti's study but can be identified in the North Korean case. The DPRK declared its responsibility to “(...) strive to ensure peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world” (Kim J. U. 2013, 1). Both roles seem to be a very peculiar part of the North Korean role sets as we may expect they will rather be declared by states that are endowed with material and power capabilities which the DPRK obviously lacks. Thus, how should we interpret the presence of this role in the North Korean case?

I decided not to analyse these roles separately as they basically indicate focus on the same issue (i.e. peace protection). They also share various features and important source of these roles is the threat perception which I have already mentioned before. Both of them are less significant and a complementary part of North Korean role sets which is reflected by the low level of their saliency. Both roles should be perceived as a declaration of ideational/spiritual support of peace which seems to pay lip service to the North Korean efforts to create a friendly image abroad. In that case, we may observe a certain departure from the basic statement of the role theory about an existing correlation between declared roles and practical diplomacy. During the first year of Kim Jong-un's rule, we could observe a substantially dropping frequency of both the regional and global peace protector role occurrences. In case of the global peace protector, it decreased from approximately 7 % in 2011 to 1-2 % in 2012 and in case of the regional peace protector role, the drop was even more evident, from 11 % to 1 % in 2012. Again, we could interpret this by the initial departure of Kim Jong Un's regime from rather outward-looking roles to the inward-looking ones.

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<sup>12</sup> This tactic is similar to the competition between continental China with Taiwan. The biggest success of the DPRK's anti-South diplomacy in Africa was that it was able to strengthen its ties with Mauritania and Republic of Congo to such an extent that South Korean broke off relations with these countries in 1960s (Owoeye 1991, p. 633). In 1960s and 1970s, the DPRK even provided aid to its African allies, for example to Tanzania, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Benin or Togo (ibid., p. 637–638). Last but not least, North Korea provided its African friends with military supplies as well. In this aspect, it is known it cooperated with Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Uganda, Zaire, Angolan Front of National Liberation, or Mozambique Liberation Front (ibid., p. 639–642). As we can see, the North Korean ties with Africa were really vivid in the Cold War era and many have been preserved till present.

*Dignified Isolate*. In his pivotal article, Holsti (1970, p. 270) defines the role *isolate* as expression of a certain fear of external involvements and of emphasis on the principle of self-reliance<sup>13</sup>. I decided to add the adjective “dignified” to Holsti's role *isolate* as the DPRK's references to its dignity in relationship with the articulation of its *isolate* role have been common in all of the examined time period.<sup>14</sup> To sum up, this role mainly refers to North Korean need to show the international audience that it perceives its sovereignty, dignity and political system as crucial values it is fully prepared to protect and that it is not willing to make any concessions in this respect at all.

It is interesting to observe the incidence of this role in the DPRK's role set as the enactment of this role nicely reflects the North Korean riven standpoint. On one hand, it wishes to develop relations (especially economical, technical and cultural ones) that seem to be favourable for the DPRK's regime or do not endanger the regime. This correlates with the enactment of the roles *active independent* and *internal developer*. On the other hand, the DPRK is highly suspicious to “cultural poisoning” from abroad (comp. Choe 2011, p. 8) or to any increase of foreign influence inside the DPRK, which reflects its enactment of its role “isolate”: “It is the unshakeable principle of the army and people of the DPRK not to tolerate (...) attempt to deride and encroach upon the dignity of the nation and the sovereignty of the country” (The DPRK Foreign Ministry 2012, p. 16). The suddenly increased occurrence of this role in the DPRK's role set in 2012<sup>15</sup> reflects the initial departure of Kim Jong-un's regime from a rather outward looking roles relating to the regime consolidation, as already mentioned above.

Furthermore, it is interesting to observe the emerging hierarchy between isolation and peace protection. Starting in the first half of 2012, we can say the role *dignified isolate* became superior to the roles *regional/global peace protector* as the DPRK started to emphasize that “Peace is very dear to us but the dignity of the nation and the sovereignty of the country are dearer” (The DPRK Foreign Ministry 2012, p. 16). There were many similar statements of this type during 2012 but only one occurred in 2013 and 2014 and no statement of this kind was found in 2015. Thus, the former role hierarchy has gradually been disappearing.

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<sup>13</sup> DPRK has often declared the necessity to rely only on their own resources, effort and technologies, which also complies with the principle of self-reliance or *Juche*.

<sup>14</sup> Dignity is a highly appreciated value in the North Korean context, which is also supported by Cumings (2013, p. 78) who points out that North Koreans hate to lose “face” that can be translated as “honour” or “dignity” representing an important guarantee of the regime's prestige.

<sup>15</sup> In 2011, the role *dignified isolate* formed just 3 % of the role set. However, it grew to as much as 18 % in 2012 and its relevance in the North Korean role set was high in subsequent years too (11 % in both 2013 and 2014). Recently, we can witness a slight incidence decrease (to 7 % in 2015) which may be interpreted as a result of Kim Jong Un's regime gradual consolidation reopening a possible path to more active roles.

*United Nation*. This role is not present in Holsti's typology but it seems to be useful while analysing the DPRK case. The *united nation* is another role implying passive foreign policy. It represents the need of the North Korean regime to assure the international audience that, first, the people firmly stay behind their leader and, second, reading between the lines, that the DPRK will do whatever is needed to stay united: "The mental strength displayed by the army and people who are united single-mindedly behind the leader knows no limit (...)" (Jong 2012, p. 4). Although we could see references to this role even in 2011, its incidence significantly increased in 2012 (from 5 % to 10 %), dropped in 2013 (to 5 %) and increased again in 2014 and 2015 (to 9 % and 11 % respectively). We may interpret the 2012 increase as a North Korean reaction to debates throughout the international community about a possible regime change after Kim Jong Il's death. For the DPRK, the *united nation* role also functions as a certain rhetorical instrument that can be used in its fight against the enemy/imperialists. Thus, the NRCs *united nation* and *anti-imperialist agent* are frequently declared together as a mode of delimitation against the significant others.

*Powerful Country*. We can track the birth of this role back to the first half of 2012 becoming a stable part of the North Korean role set since then. In 2012, the elites firstly declared that the DPRK had successfully developed from a small and weak country that had constantly been under the dictate of great powers into their military, ideological and political power (nevertheless, they never mention the economic power, comp. Kim 2012b, p. 1). In 2011, the references to "powerful nation building" functioned as a part of the *internal developer* role. However, in 2012 for the first time ever, North Korea labelled itself as a "powerful country". Moreover, it seems that the DPRK's perception of itself as "powerful" is mainly based on military and ideological capabilities, not on the economical ones, which remain included in the *internal developer* role: "Today our people have grown up as the highly dignified, independent motive force of the revolution, and our country is rushing forward to attain the status of a knowledge economy and a civilized nation, demonstrating to the whole world its might as a politico-ideological power and a world-class military power" (Kim 2015b, n.p.).

## 6 NORTH KOREAN ROLE DEVIANCES

In the previous section, I presented and analysed the steady parts of the North Korean role sets. However, as we can see in *Table 1*, there were some roles that occurred just now and then. One of those roles was *liberation supporter*. Holsti defined this role as an expression of rather vague and further unspecified symbolical support for liberation movements abroad (Holsti 1970, p. 263). Simply speaking, it can be defined as much more passive form of above mentioned role *bastion of revolution-liberator*.

Another role that seems to be deviant from the DPRK role set is the *example* role. Holsti defined it as a state effort to emphasise “(...) importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies” (Holsti 1970, p. 268–269). Again, the North Korean case shows some specifics as far as the enactment of this role is concerned. It emphasises certain purity, mental virtues and morality of the North Korean nation that should be admired by the world. However, with an exception at the beginning of 2012, the DPRK has not declared this role anymore (so far).

## 7 CONCLUSION

If I return to the core assumption of the role theory about an existing correlation between articulated roles and practical diplomacy that I aimed to examine, the analysis of the North Korean role sets between 2011 and 2015 has brought me to interesting conclusions. Indeed, most of the time we could observe the assumed correlation. Roles *internal developer* and *independent* constituted a significant part of the role sets of each of the examined years reflecting the DPRK's passivity in the international arena. Moreover, the roles *dignified isolate* or *united nation*, its relevance having even been strengthened during the Kim Jong Un's era, also correlate with the North Korean foreign-political passivity. However, at some places, we could observe deviations from the core assumption of the role theory. For example, the roles *global* and *regional peace protector* are supposed to imply both stronger engagement in international affairs and significant material and power capacities that the DPRK obviously lacks. As we already mentioned above, both of those roles seem to pay lip service to the North Korean efforts to create a friendly image abroad. Consequently, it is safe to say that the core assumption of the role theory seems to be mostly valid but some contradictions were also discovered.

When reflecting the transformation of the role sets in the examined time framework, the role theory seems to be a useful instrument to grasp both changes and continuities that occurred during the power transition period. There was a quite stark contrast between the role sets of 2011 and 2012. The trend was that the DPRK turned even more to a rather inward-looking foreign-political course. That was represented by a substantial increase of the *dignified isolate* role that has remained a highly relevant part of the Kim Jong-un regime's role set until nowadays. Last but not least, it seems to us that the recent North Korean role set has been shifting back to its 2011 form, with a certain enrichment, though, namely in the form of the *powerful country* role and a strengthened emphasis on the *united nation* role.

Generally speaking, the DPRK opted for rather passive and inward-looking roles that reflect its overall inactivity in the international arena. The dataset also shows that the North Korean roles were often strongly derived from its relations with the significant others. The transformation of the *internal developer* role or *bastion of revolution - liberator* role represents this. At the same time, the material prerequisites



remain an important source of the North Korean roles, which is demonstrated by the enactment of many roles implying a rather non-ambitious and inward-looking foreign policy.

To conclude, by using the role theoretic approach we proposed an innovative interpretative framework of the North Korean foreign policy, which seems to be a fruitful analytical instrument enabling us to grasp both continuities and changes in the DPRK's diplomacy. Furthermore, the role theory also opens space for further research of North Korean foreign policy. In particular, it would be valuable to examine North Korean role sets' composition and their changes in longer time period as it could bring interesting revelations as far as the roots and origins of individual roles are concerned. In future research, the attention could be paid on *problematique* of the role conflict: I was able to grasp only some bits and pieces of it in this article. Last but not least, deeper analysis of North Korean relations and interactions with Third World countries which has been scarce so far could bring us to interesting revelations too.

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## VÝCHODNÁ ÁZIA: KULTÚRNE ZÁKLADY A TRHOVÉ PARADIGMY

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### EAST ASIA: CULTURAL FUNDAMENTALS AND MARKET PARADIGMS

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*Milan Lajčiak<sup>1</sup>*

Hoci súčasná globalizácia eliminuje a zahmlieva rozdiely medzi kultúrami rôznych regiónov, historicky zakotvené myšlienkové inklinácie a preferencie rozličných kultúr zohrávajú dôležitú úlohu v prístupoch pri riešení mnohých problémov dnešného sveta. Rozdiely kultúrnych základov medzi krajinami východnej Ázie a západnými krajinami sa prejavujú v celom rade konceptov, svetonázorových postojov, hierarchiách hodnôt a odrážajú sa v odlišných sociálnych konštrukciách, organizačných modeloch, vládných schémach, ako aj v ekonomických systémoch a podnikateľskej kultúre. Prejavujú sa v individuálnych i systémových prístupoch. Rozsah odlišností ich sociálno-kultúrnej identifikácie je tak veľký, že môžeme hovoriť o rozdielnej „geografii myslenia“. Článok vysvetľuje historické súvislosti a základné faktory, ktoré sa podpísali pod tieto divergujúce koncepty a prináša ich manifestácie v trhových mechanizmoch a ekonomických aktivitách týchto krajín.

Kľúčové slová: civilizácie, konfucianstvo, myšlienkové inkubátory, koncepty interakcie, schémy vládnutia, implikácie na dnešný svet

Although the current globalization eliminates and blurs differences between cultures in various regions, historically grounded thinking inclinations and preferences of various cultures play important role in attitudes to solutions of many world problems. Differences of cultural fundamentals between East Asian and Western countries are mirrored in numerous concepts, worldviews, hierarchy of values and are reflected in different social constructs,

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<sup>1</sup> JUDr. Milan Lajčiak, Slovak Embassy to the Republic of Korea with accreditation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 389-1 Hannam-dong, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, South Korea, e-mail: emb.seoul@mzv.sk

Milan Lajčiak graduated Moscow State Institute of International Relations with major of Chinese language and East Asian studies in 1984. He has served from 1986 in diplomatic services of the former Czechoslovakia and later of the Slovak Republic, mainly in Asian countries. Currently he occupies position of the Slovak Ambassador to the Republic of Korea with accreditation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

organization models, governance schemes as well as in economic systems and business culture. They are present both at individual and systematic approaches. Scale of dividing lines of their socio-cultural identification is so great that we can talk about different “geography of thoughts”. The paper explains historical circumstances and basic factors that have subscribed to these divergent concepts and elaborates on their manifestations in market mechanisms and economic activities of these countries.

Keywords: Civilizations, Confucianism, thought incubators, concepts of interaction, governance schemes, implications for today's world

JEL Classification: Z19

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

General comparison of Eastern and Western cultures includes many disciplines, such as philosophy, psychology, archeology, sociology, political science, history, economy, business practices and can be traced through the various corridors of perceptions. The main objective of the study is not to bring fully exhaustive comparison of Eastern and Western cultures, but to examine some of the most important processes through which these two cultures in a parallel way have developed their divergent features and how their cultural specificities have been manifested into social constructs, organizational models, government schemes, solution approaches as well as into economic systems, market paradigms and business cultures. The study focuses on basic conceptual differences between the West and Confucian East through a prism of historical evolution and elaborates on a shaping of major factors of cultural fundamentals, main “thought incubators”, basic “man – nature” and “man – man” frameworks as well as divergent concepts of “harmony-relationship” for the East and “liberty-individuality” for the West. Following explanation of philosophical differences between the West and Confucian East the paper analyzes how these conceptual differences are mirrored in economic systems, market models and business practices. The purpose of the study is to contribute to understanding of the connectedness between cultural fundamentals and economic activities of East Asian countries and to elaborate on broader conceptualization how their cultural and social factors have subscribed into their economic success.

## **2 DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS**

“West” and “Western” are the terms referring to European and North American cultures that have been dominating international order in the modern history from the time of colonization. Their values are based on democratic principles, individual rights, rule of law, open debate, market economy and on ontological approaches in philosophy. The cultural orientation of the West is based on Judeo-Christian values and on the Greco-Roman heritage.

“East” and “Eastern” are the terms taken in this paper in a specific context and are referring, from a cultural point of view, to countries affected by Chinese Confucianism,

namely China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tai-wan, Vietnam and with regard to business aspects also to strong Chinese communities in South East Asia. In other words, the East is defined as a summary of societies and social groups, sharing Confucian values. They are called "Confucian Asia" or "Confucian East Asia". "East Asian economies" is the term affiliated in this paper with the countries Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tai-wan.

"Confucianism" is a term denoting the essence of Chinese tradition that has spread through centuries across East Asian region. By the late nineteenth century, the whole East Asian region was thoroughly "Confucianized", that is, Confucian values and practices penetrated daily lives of people and the whole system of government were justified with reference to Confucian ideals. Confucian teaching is associated with the person of Confucius (approximately 551-479 B.C.) and his followers - Mencius (approximately 371-289 B.C.) and Xun Zi (approximately 313-230 B.C.). Confucianism is not a religion, it does not possess belief in gods and avoids metaphysical and ontological questions. It represents an ancient moral and ethical code. Confucianism together with Taoism and Buddhism represent a harmonious unit of three basic teachings in Chinese history of thought. Within this "triangle" Confucianism and Taoism are syncretic and highly complementary.

### **3 SHAPING OF CULTURAL FUNDAMENTALS**

For understanding the cultural fundamentals one should start to look at broader scope of time and space how did humankind in its long journey on our planet almost simultaneously two to three years ago, began to formulate distinct civilizations in so many regions of the earth. The crucial breakthrough is thought to have occurred around fifty thousand years ago with appearance of Homo sapiens (intelligent humankind). Homo sapiens had to wait around forty thousand years until the end of the Fourth Ice Age around 10.000 BC when they could move from nomadic hunter-gatherer lifestyle to a sedentary pattern of agriculture and animal husbandry. This changed human affairs in a revolutionary way. Around 3000 BC the writing marked the beginning of human history as opposed to prehistory. The dawn of first urban communities appeared with new political, social, ethical problems. Knowledge began to increase settings in motion of a cultural evolution as opposed a merely biological one. Finally, around one millennium BC the accumulation of knowledge and facing problems began to reach "critical mass" in societies all across the globe. It was at this stage when gradually, around 500 years BC, most of major religions and teachings appeared – Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism and later on but still at this stage of evolution - Christianity and Islam. They subscribed strongly in forming two different concepts – "harmony-relationship" for the East and "liberty-individuality" for the West. These contrasting approaches further developed through Greco-Roman tradition and Judeo-Christian religions in the West and Daoism and

Confucian teachings in the East into number of distinguishing attitudes, world perceptions, thinking inclinations, social constructs and organizational patterns of the society.

### ***Nature environment***

Physical environment and its role in the evolution of Eastern and Western civilizations can hardly be overemphasized. Land and sea played important parts in generating cultural frameworks. It created a context of living conditions that influenced the shaping of cultural fundamentals in the East and West. Though the large expanse and east – west axis of the Eurasian continent provided both Europe and China with favorable environment for producing complex civilizations such as long-crop season, number of sorts of animal husbandry, species diversity and opportunity to interact with new inventions from other regions, on the other side, Europe was very different from Chinese landscape. While China was situated in low latitude with abundance of fauna and flora, Europe was covered by ice sheets throughout the Ice Age. Nature conditions started to form different modes relating to nature, family, community and different patterns of behavior and living in those relevant regions. Geographic confinement was another important factor. Chinese culture essentially developed in isolation, thousands kilometers, from the two cradles of Western civilization. Vast distance and difficult terrains separated China from the West and it has persisted until the Silk Road was opened two thousand years ago. This was in sharp contrast with the development of ancient civilization around the Mediterranean, where open communication and cross-cultural exchange were common (Tai 2015).

### ***Extrovert versus introvert cultural orientation***

Western civilization has become extrovert and expansive oriented focusing on exploration, exploitation and expansion. In such a civilization individual initiative was cherished and individual liberty became the ultimate value. Though there were periodic fluctuations in the West, for instance during medieval society, yet the mainstream West remains, from a broad perspective, characterized from Greco-Roman times to the modern era, by liberty ideas. Law and force were the major tools to be employed to manage society problems. Ethics and harmony between individuals was of secondary importance as the prospect of immediate profit urged and favored initiative and freedom. These two features as positive aspects are the flipside of its negative characteristics - exploitation and absolutism (Choi 2016). The East, in contrast to the West, has given a rise to introverted civilization reliant on ethics. It was the quality of modesty, moderation, humility and balance that became recommended as human virtues instead of vitality, absolutism and extremism. As China lived in a much more circumscribed environment than the West, Chinese social life was highly interdependent and it was not the liberty but harmony that was watched, harmony of humans with nature for Taoists and harmony of humans with other humans for



Confucians. With its highest imperative on harmony the East was not keen in focusing on individual liberty for keeping order. But the East had also to pay its price for not expansive culture. To confront the world is a way to free oneself and through resistance to make a way to liberty. This had subsequent impact on cultural and social development.

### ***Contextualization versus categorization***

Concepts of liberty for the West and harmony for the East were the elemental seeds, from which defining features of these respective civilizations blossomed. From these seeds grew the Western tendency of categorization (partition/separation) and Eastern tendency of contextualization (unification/integration). In other words, Western thinkers tended to detach elements from the context for their categorical consideration and discern characters of objects as separated individual entities (reductionism). Eastern thinkers in contrast tended to consider elements within context of relations, to discern objects in a complex environment focusing on relations while considering the whole much more than a sum of its elements (holism). The West had and still has the tendency to organize the world in terms of categories while the East perceives things in terms of context, in their relationships. Western focus on individuality and Eastern focus on relationships engendered two contrasting thought systems that impacted their social and economic life.

### ***Laws and liberty versus ethics and harmony***

Great teachers of the critical period were facing the problem how to lead the critical mass of people toward order, peace and self-preservation amid constant fears of raid, piracy and warfare. Laws and ethics were two fundamental concepts and two primary means they found to achieve their goals. Western expansive world gave priority to laws that guarantees the liberty, on the other hand, Eastern circumscribed world gave priority to ethics that promotes the harmony. There is a clear difference between these concepts with longstanding consequences. In the East, in contrast to the West, within the social groups, any form of confrontation such as a debate was discouraged in the pursuit not to undermine harmony. Confucian social structure and code of conduct supported this “non-rebellion” mentality and suppressing individual identity. The person was first and foremost not an individual but a primarily member of a collective or a clan, village and especially family. The individual was not, as for Greeks, an encapsulated unit who maintained a unique identity across social settings. In Confucianism, there can't be a man in isolation but only as a part of relation network.

### ***Complementarity versus dichotomy***

Ancient Greeks in the West defined two mutually exclusive spheres of reality – “the sphere of being” (human being with limited knowledge) and “the sphere of becoming the multiple and unlimited knowledge” (God - Spirit) that served as a basis for Western metaphysics. It represents perception of two different “worlds” separated from each other. This kind of thinking is connected with the western propensity of ontological issues. Principal view was a separation and exclusivity of elements, not their mutual interconnectedness. Opposites were considered as contradicting, not complementing and soul and body as two separated things. In Eastern culture the *yin-yang* philosophy represents the foundation of Eastern thought and is accepted by all schools although it is associated particularly with Taoism. This ancient concept implies interconnectedness between opposites (sun/moon, summer/winter, male/female, active/passive, creative/receptive etc.), mutually complementing and not contradicting each other. One can find similar philosophies in the West, including Heraclitus unity of opposites, but that was not a norm as in Eastern thinking. The pairing of harmony explains the relative lack of dynamism in the history of the East compared to rebellion mentality in the West. It brought the East not to dialectics but to assimilation and peaceful patterns of societal development and mechanism of ethics in contrast to the laws of the West. Yin-yang philosophy of complementarity prefers power of persuasion instead the power of enforcement (pen versus sword).

#### **4 EASTERN AND WESTERN “THOUGHT INCUBATORS”**

Based on thinking inclinations one can distinguish Western philosophers as “Truth seekers” and Eastern thinkers as “Way seekers” (Tai 2015) with significant contrasting approaches that have affected worldviews and key relationship concepts in both cultures.

##### ***Greece: incubator of public debates and “Truth seekers” culture***

Western thinking was born in the Greek thought incubator (Lloyd 1992). The Greeks were seeking truth via explicit knowledge. They thought deeply about thinking itself and pondered the “what” questions – what is the truth, what is world made of, what is real. Tradition of the debate itself acted as a key institute. Critical attitudes to authorities were common, loyalty of students to the teacher remained only while his reputation lasted. Open disagreements and questioning of teachings authorities were common practice. Reputation was obtained by reasoning with rivals and not through the position in the administration.

Early Greeks rejected empirical experience of non-casual character, non-rational way of thinking and recognized nothing less than rational, analytical, logical and explicit. The central question of the Greek philosophers was to find the durability

and stability (the unity, the being, the whole), necessary for understanding of the universe with its ever ongoing changes (plurality, birth and termination of cases).

There is a strong ontological aspect in the Western thought. Greeks with their perseverance and insistence in search for truth through logical procedures adopted ultimately idealistic dualism as an important philosophy of life and the religion that has lasted thousands of years in various forms. As a result, the western approaches and preferences become more abstract, theoretical, atomic, rational, seeking substance of things. It was only after Enlightenment that more inclusive perspectives on thought were opened. Even then dualistic thinking continued to affect the Western attitudes.

In terms of methodological approach, western thinking is analytical with inherent reductionist procedures and anatomical analyzes on elements of the whole in order to understand the whole through its components while solely relying on logical procedures. The humanity must be highly grateful to early Greeks for their immense contribution in the field of mathematics, science, philosophy and political science.

The Roman Empire continued on the Greek civilization and further developed Greek arts, literature, philosophy, adapted the Jewish ethical system, the new Christian religion, absorbed Babel astronomy and astrology, the cultural elements of Persia, Egypt and other Eastern civilizations. Romans created Greco-Roman synthesis, a rich mix of cultural elements that formed two millennia Western tradition.

### ***China: incubator of memorizing classic works and “Way seekers” culture***

Institutional framework of the birth of Chinese thought was completely different. In China, the authority of Confucius was accepted as an axiom, as a Canon, as the eternal truth that can't be questioned. Official Confucian classics prestige was enormous, although medicine, astronomy and mathematics deserved also considerable status. Education was in this context the issue of conservation, interpretation and appreciation of classical texts and in addition to that - the way to a career in the ranks of well-paid administrators and provincial councilors to the supreme ruler and ministers (Lloyd 2002). The authority was not achieved through the institution of public discussion, as in ancient Greece, but by the position in the administrative machinery, into which the scholar was positioned, depending on the results of state tests. These examinations were based on memorizing Confucian Analects, ability to reproduce, understand and to interpret the text, not going into thinking beyond the content of the text.

The Chinese long accepted the fact that the only constant in the world is the change. This was for them the apparent reality and they were seeking the way to accommodate this phenomenon. The Chinese did not asked questions “what” is the essence of the world, they were not preoccupied with the goal of providing rational accounts of reality but raised “where” questions - where is the Way of the harmony with the Nature in order to get the effective functioning of the society. Eastern thinkers

considered the thinking not as a process of abstract reasoning, but more as an activity whose immediate result should yield into practical use to society. In contrast to the Greeks they sought to understand the world more through experience than seeking explanations of the world finding theories that stands behind it. For them the reality was a concept based on a concrete observation and an empirical knowledge of the world was a kind of experiential know-how.

There is absence of ontological imperatives in Chinese mind. Chinese thinkers do not perceive any “Being” or “One” behind the reality, only Universe – the phenomenon that is universal and omnipresent. Chinese wisdom has no need for the idea of God. There is only an ever-changing processional regularity. This inclination of considerations caused that the Chinese thoughts tend to practical solutions and correlations. Chinese thought is neither analytically nor theoretically inclined but rather very pragmatic. Chinese mind has no tendency to theorize. What is typical for her are considerations in terms of respective analogies and she is prone to see things contextually, through more feminist than muscular eyes. It is avoiding abstract concepts, exclusive formal logic is not her stronghold, rather is synthetic than analytic and showing a lot of intuitive and instinctive aspects. Therefore, Chinese attitudes and thought preferences tend to be practical and correlative.

In opposition to the western reductionism Eastern thought is a holistic, pays more attention to the context, to the connections and coherence. She is interested in understanding the whole complex in its context, not through its elements. The whole is in Chinese thinking more than a summary of its components because relationship among elements are so complex and complicated that even through the deepest analysis of these elements (reductionist method typical for the Western thinking) it is impossible to understand the complex whole. Chinese thought manifests tolerance for contradictions and conflicts, and unlike prevailing majority of the Western philosophy schools it does not perceive the “opposites” (positive pole versus negative pole) as incompatible standing against each other, but as complementary and interdependent variables. In other words, he is looking for integrity and solutions in practical life in which two opposites can exist in symbiosis.

## **5 KEY CONCEPTS OF INTERACTION**

There are striking differences in “human – nature” and “human – human” frameworks of interaction between the East and the West. These differences manifest themselves further in a variety of contradictory concepts such as consciousness versus face protection, community versus individuals, order versus revolt, rule of law versus kinship relationship, obligations versus rights, pragmatic versus ontological thinking, formalism versus openness as well as different role of the trust, justice and harmony in the governing schemes of society.

### ***Human – Nature relationship***

Relationship with Nature is foundational in creating worldviews and acts as a backdrop for finite relationships for the civil society.

Western culture, in searching for answers to the most fundamental question of human existence and the relationship between man and nature, emphasized on the concept of “separation” of mind from body resulting in the separation of man from nature. Traditional western view of human nature was heavily influenced by the religion. Western worship of spirit has not paid enough critical attention to the interpretation of human nature and only Post - Enlightenment period brought the changes.

In contrast, the East considered the man as a whole, as an embodied microcosm of the universe, a part of the nature, instead of a spirit being. The fundamental was the endeavor for harmony with the nature as well as in the society. That is why the relationship between man and nature was conceptualized by “Tao” – “The Way”. It serves a similar role as Gods of the West in the sense of relationship between man and nature but the East focused on the question of human nature instead of ontological issues.

Harmony in the concept of Tao can be best explained by the principle of polarity "Yin - Yang", which explains these two poles as two complementary factors, standing for all movements of the nature. Western culture, characterizes polarity not as complementary, but as separate opposing factors. Such vision of reality greatly influenced the Chinese conceptualization of values and determined the approach to many aspects of life, including social institutions. This makes the Confucian worldview more organic and harmonious, preferring ethics of social relations instead of seeking supernatural phenomena, spirituality and religion. Mankind is considered simply as an integral part of the nature.

Transcendent questions in the Western thought, in contrast to the East, are stretching almost through the entire Western history and the issues of the creation of the universe and search for "Creator" of nature were formalized in the institution of religion.

If to compare the difference between East and West approaches concerning the relationship of the man and nature, the difference is that Tao is a concept of harmonization of the man and nature while God is above nature and by this standing, in a certain sense, separates humans from nature. The perception of these differences between East and West are of paramount importance for organizing the relationships in civil society in Chinese and Western cultures.

### ***Human – Human relationships***

Confucian people's relations are totally different from the Western world. East seeks to instill ethics in human relations for the maintenance of the order in society

without any institution of supernatural being and without religion. On the other hand, the West and Christianity with the concept of the law of God and the faith in the afterlife bring to their civilization theological character (Choi 2015).

In the East, the centerpiece of the concept of human relations is a role of ethics. The basis of this ethics is the moral integrity of every person, including the ruler of the country. The appeal to the concept of morality and the duties behavior of every individual in the vertically hierarchical social bonds represents an important public control element. In contrast to the West, not the individual but the family is the most important aspect of a person's life in the East, the foundation of one's identity, one's morality, and the source of the meaning of the life. Family members are arranged according hierarchical lines, each role with attendant duties and privileges. The ideal Confucian "Six Relations" (ruler/subject, parent/child, husband/wife, older/younger brother, teacher/pupil and between friends) are considered the basis of all social connections. Three out of six are found within the family that is a kind of testament to the importance of family in Confucian society.

This Confucian social arrangement has integrated human activities at all levels. Confucian world, society and the state are modeled as an extension of the family. Governance of the state follows the hierarchy – the leader functions as the father, the head of the family, and all citizens as his children. Society is ordered and segmented into distinct statuses, each with its own obligations and prerogatives. Confucian ethics dictates hierarchical relationships, requires subordination, identification with social roles and relies heavily on the self-control of individuals. Proper functioning of the Confucian "cosmos" depends on the loyal obedience of inferiors to superiors in the social order and the carrying out of role-defined duties. Suppression of individual interests to the interest of the group is the natural moral ethics of Confucianism. The Chinese do not understand the emphasis of individual freedoms, they focus only on what is needed for a unit to function, to which everything should be subordinate.

Society is seen as an analogy of the human body. This works only if every human body-organ performs its duties properly. Once the body organs begin to function without control (analogy of expression of individual freedom) the human body as a whole will collapse. Therefore, the first and foremost duty in Confucian society is to harmonize relations by implementation of the obligations of all individuals and groups within the established hierarchy relations. The interests of individuals have no place in such society, only the interests of groups and higher units. This is the essence of ethical principles of Confucianism. Therefore, the concept of individual human rights in Chinese society is considered by Chinese as a foreign element, "imported" from the West and despite the gradual modernization of China it is still considered that it "does not fit" the so-called Confucian tradition.

### ***“Homo Ethico-Politicus” versus “Homo Spiritus-Religiosus”***

Code of Ethics in the Confucian society with prescribed functions and rituals of behavior was the determining factor. Society life represents a set of rules and expectations of behavior of each subject according to established rules. Who swerved from this prescribed model of social interaction, was losing his face in front of others. Confucian society can therefore be described as "a culture of saving face" or as a "culture of shame" because the general pressure to comply with the Code of Ethics was so large that its failure to respect amount to shame.

The West, whose civilization values are based on Judeo-Christian traditions, was long-term building spiritual institution and within this institution the "culture of conscience" based on spiritual approaches. Moral and ethical code of society was based on responsibility of the conduct in the sight of God, who controls everything and sees everything. It meant the appeal to the observance of morality institution in front of the Supreme Creator who will judge the actions of individuals in the end, and not the appeal to respect moral code measured by other members of society. No shame in front of others, but conscience before God has become a determining factor in the behavior of the individual and the religion became an institution that had this man's relationship with God to cultivate and to guard. Regardless of whether one is alone or in the eyes of others, in both normal and problematic situations, this spiritual approach preached the man always to appeal to his/her conscience and to ask whether it is right what he conducts. His conscience as a God's hand is a communication tool with an invisible God to whom the man will confess his/her acts.

History shows that despite these concepts proclaimed by East and West, their ideals passed through periods of deep fluctuations and both cultures slipped in their ideals into deformation scales. What is important, however, is that thought preferences of both cultures resulted in two very important and highly topical issues that the East and the West still perceive in cardinal difference way.

The essence of the difference in respect of individual freedoms is that Chinese society in general emphasizes the obligations of individuals, while the West emphasizes his rights. In matters of correlations the Western culture is looking for differences between the body and mind, the existence and non-existence, the individual and society, the society and state, the man and nature. The Chinese culture strives to seek coexistence, integrity, unity, harmony, mutual respect of all things in nature and finding connectivity between the past, present and future. One of its features is to look for the ideal in the past that is reflected also in its architecture – tend to copy the past style of buildings. This is in contrast with Western architecture which is future and innovative oriented and highly diverse. One can also see beyond that a kind of Confucian effort of Chinese society for the preservation of society and stability and

rejection of social changes, while in Western culture there were in opposite way, the social movements that have become the driving force of progress.

In complexity, reflecting basic thinking inclination, behavioral orientation and socio-economic organization, Confucian society can be described as a community of *Homo Ethico-Politicus* and Western societies as *Homo Spiritus-Religiosus* (Choi 2015).

## **6 MANIFESTATIONS OF CULTURAL FUNDAMENTALS IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES**

Cultural identities between East and West are very different and they strongly manifest in economic behavior and economic structures. Confucian ethos and social homogeneity of East Asian countries as their major cultural fundamentals played important role in their industrialization period and served as a kind of a social comparative advantage. East Asian economics have historically embedded value-based and tradition-based behavioral habits of generations that to a high degree entwined traditional practices with economic organization of the region. East Asian economic stories show that their economic activities are not based only on calculus of price and rationality-determined pursuits. If one views these markets only through economic thoughts, one misses a set of social and political institutions that serve to integrate the economy. Complexity of East Asian economies needs to incorporate explanation of their social construct, organizational patterns, thinking inclinations and working tenets as well as the role of leaders in both government and business.

### ***Nexus of culture and economy***

East Asian “tigers” (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tai-wan) successful industrialization stories attracted attention of many economists. Many schools of thoughts analyzed the major factors behind their success and one can find diverse explanations. Political economy, market, cultural, institutional and international approaches have all contributed with useful set of arguments. They do not represent alternative concepts but rather complement each other and are used for different purposes. The crucial moment is that economic actions are not asocial, not merely “economically rational” in an abstract, impersonal way. Economies are built by policies, but that are the people who craft them. They act and behave according their embedded cultural fundamentals.

Today, development economists agree upon two points about East Asia. First, the region’s per capita natural resource base has been meager, the second, region’s recent growth is “meteoric”. In economist’s terms, such a record means that human capital is likely to be the key factor in the East Asian success story. Hence one can assess the weakness or strength of East Asian economies and to take culture and tradition seriously.



From early 80-ies the culture phenomenon has been invoked to explain East Asian economic success. Confucianism is a moral philosophy and in the current context one can find several important tenets conducive to economic performance of East Asian countries. To mention at least some of them: cultivation of self-discipline, codification of behavior norms, promotion of study and scholarship and discounting of secular success as the purpose of life. Through the presence of behavior norms of conduct Confucian ethos clearly has left its imprint on both, collective behavior of the labor force and inter-firm behavior but also through emphasis on study and education.

### ***Role of education in East Asian economy***

Role of education has got a special place in economic development of the East Asian region. While in the West the education has been primarily a tool for the knowledge in the East has been considered as a tool for getting governmental position (today also good job in private sector) that is equal in East Asian minds with good social status, high income and comfortable life. Under these influences, the supreme importance of education has been an imperative in mind of many parents who were ready to struggle to give their children a chance in life through education. Under the constant popular pressure for educational opportunities, from economic point of view, this would facilitate human capital formation providing highly conducive condition for economic development.

Application of cultural fundamental on economic development from evolution point of view needs to understand that moral philosophies undergo generally three stages of evolution: quintessence stage with strong effects, sublimation stage with effects starting to weaken and dissipation stage with effects tapering off (Wan 2014). During the first stage of Confucianism the formation of human capital of a pragmatic type was not likely to blossom because the education was strictly focused on imperial examinations with essay contest writing on pre-set style of obscure Confucian themes and classic text interpretations. Second stage of Confucianism coincides with the sustained rapid growth of East Asia in the second half of twenty century. The content of education has been changed from the focus of Confucian texts and code of conduct to modern practical subjects with sophisticated method of teaching but the perception of the role of education as a tool to better life has remained. Currently, with the globalization pressure, one can witness starting gradually developing the third stage of dissipation Confucian values and mixing with other regions culture fundamentals. The third stage does mean a linear line, it can progress but also get a reverse trend of revitalization Confucian values or merging with other moral philosophies into new moral patterns. Parallels with the second stage can be found also from other societies. For instance, the explosive contribution of scientists of Jewish descent came only when Talmudic scholarship was no longer the exclusive preoccupation of Jewish intellectuals. The flourishing of Western European capitalism under the Protestant

Ethic was possible when doctrinal issues did not pre-empt the best minds in those societies.

### ***Factor of social homogeneity in economy***

In addition to Confucian education phenomenon, almost all East Asian tiger economies are remarkably homogenous and it has been so at least for hundreds or even thousand years. By and large, in the process of catching up, a multi-communal society poses more challenges to human capital formation than does a homogenous society. Social homogeneity has several advantages. Human cooperation tends to be easier within particular community than across communities, transaction cost for coordination is lower and an individual is less ready to engage in opportunistic behavior. Here, Singapore – Malaysia comparison is quite instructive. Social cohesion in economic terms can be translated into corporate practices and organizational behavior and organizational behavior effort can be counted upon to improve product quality. Japanese and Koreans capitalized on such social traits to build up a comparative advantage that foreign rivals find hard to match.

### ***East Asian market practices***

Neoclassical approach can sufficiently cover the functioning of western markets but have its limits in explaining some market practices of East Asian countries because of utility of settings where its institutional assumptions are in force. These assumptions institutionalize competitive “individualism” in numerous ways in its market structure and view economic action as a kind of “asocial” concept. Its economic model conceives actors as isolated units and considers a crucial condition to keep economic actors “apart”. “Capitalists”, in this model, ideally are independent/indifferent as to the parties from whom they buy or to whom they sell. Primary function of the state is to maintain competitive conditions between autonomous economic actors, both individuals and firms and to maintain open market.

Different story goes with East Asian countries that have distinct institutional assumption of market approach. Crucial economic actor in East Asian economies is typically not the “individual” but rather the “network” in which the individual is embedded. East Asian economies are rooted in institutions that encourage and maintain “ties” and are organized through networks of economic actors that are believed to be natural and appropriate to economic development. The “relationship model” of East Asian economies negates neoclassical assumption not only in perception of actors as isolated units but also in term of expectation that price is the critical factor in purchase decision. In East Asian “network economies” with value-based business culture the buyers in series of cases favor suppliers with whom they have established relations, rather than least-cost suppliers. This violates the principle of individualistic competitive approach due to the fact that the market is conditioned with different social

construct and different value preferences. Neoclassical approach describes these practices as unfair and as market imperfections that distort their domestic economies. Criticism has been leveled mostly at the dense “networks of ties” between Asian companies that look in western eyes as cartels.

### ***East Asian “network” economies***

Particular forms of economic “embeddedness” in the structure of social networks of each society have subscribed to different organizational designs of industrialization (Orru, Biggart & Hamilton 1997). That is reflected in types of firms, their management and organizational strategies, giving every economy a distinctive character.

Japanese economy is dominated by *keiretsu*, descendants of pre-World War II family based business conglomerates *zaibatsu* which organized their business through their own financing system. Inheritance practices in Japan are based on “primogeniture”, that means the entire inheritance goes to the oldest son. This practice allowed merchant family’s fortunes to remain intact under stewardship of the heir. Successful families thus had huge sums of money available to finance the business of affiliated branches under the “badge” of the “mother house”. In a post-war period, *keiretsu*, though no more family businesses but rather networks of companies with interlocking shareholding businesses, based on *communitarian logic*, continued to rely on their own finance sources. The important point is that banks are encapsulated within business networks and functioned as direct financing houses to *keiretsu*. These market networks constitute a kind of “intercorporate alliances” or “alliance capitalism” (Gerlach 1992). Many large companies are members of these networks (Mitsubishi, Mitsu, Sumitomo, Fuji etc.). In addition to *keiretsu* there are also other linking forms of Japanese businesses, for example an affiliation of a major manufacturer with its subcontractors (Toyota “independent group”) or common investments of small neighborhood retailers.

South Korean economy resembles on the surface Japan’s market networks, but in terms of decision-making processes has some substantial differences. South Korean economy is dominated by *chaebols*, networks of conglomerates owned and controlled by single persons or families and organized vertically through “central staff”, which may be holding companies or mother firms. In difference to communitarian logic of Japanese businesses, Korean *chaebols* have *patrimonial logic* of business structure, where all powers belong only to the leader of *chaebol*. Patrimonialism has deep historic roots in South Korea and on the related logic of vertical hierarchical arrangements are organized various types of social relations as well. Companies as Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, Lucky-Goldstar are major *chaebols* controlling 90% of economic activities of top thirty *chaebol* conglomerates (Kato 2014).

Taiwan network economy is ruled by family firms and family owned conglomerates, which are called *jituanqiye* (entrepreneurial integrity groups). Taiwanese business structure is based on *patrilineal logic*. In difference to Japanese and Korean economies ruled by networks of medium sized to very large firms, Taiwanese networks link less numbers of smaller firms and occupy less central position than *keiretsu* or *chaebols*. They often cross-invest in businesses, hold multiple positions throughout the network and act as suppliers or upstream producers to downstream firms. Chinese societies practice “partible inheritance” that means the division of a family estate equally among all sons. As a result, families divide their fortunes every generation which does not allow accumulation of large sums of money. Instead, there is a great pressure within families to develop multiple businesses so that at the death of the family head each son can claim an independent enterprise. Strong social norms dictate that family members or close friends assist financially each other and system functions as alternative institutional finance arrangements. Due to this system there is relatively weak formal banking system in Taiwan. Ironically, strong family system produced the strength of Japanese banks.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan economies demonstrate diversity of institutionalized business networks and differing logics behind their structures but all of them are based on network relationships. Japanese firms enact *communitarian logic*, Korean firms represent *patrimonial logic* and Taiwanese firms reflect *patrilineal logic*. This has important implications for the ways of labor organizations, character of subcontracting relations between firms, investment patterns and other business activities. Each of networking logic is a manifestation of common cultural basis and of Confucian patterns of interaction, through which prevailing majority of socio-economic spheres of life have been organized.

Some parallels of East Asian organizational socio-economic patterns can be found also with certain Western economies. In Japan and Germany the legacy of feudalism led in modern times to strong elite classes and solid alliances between private business and the state that have maximized utility of public and private institutions. In Taiwan and Italy, where the state is much weaker and family structures are stronger, modern economic organizations cooperate on horizontal networks with strong cooperative traits at the level of small and medium businesses. In South Korea and France the historical tradition of a strong central state and fragmented regional elites has led to the “dirigiste role” of the central government in shaping their economic and industrial structure (Orru, Biggart & Hamilton 1997).

### ***East Asian governance environment***

Economic activities do not operate in a vacuum, they are rather shaped by the governance environment of every society that has enormous impact on the way of doing business. Governance style in East Asian economies during industrialization

period was very different from Western practices and can be depicted as “relation-based” versus “rule-based” systems (Li 2009). Western societies tend to follow public rules, such as law government regulations and public information. They rely on formal contracts, legal courts, lawyers and accountants to carry out transactions and protect their interest. One can call it “rule-based governance”. Confucian societies in difference to the West relied still in recent past on personal relations to conduct business. Contracts were secured more through gentleman agreements than through written paper, disputes were settled privately, public information was not regarded as trustworthy as personal contact. This is called “relation-based governance”. Rule-based communication and agreements are explicit and formal, they can be verified by third parties, documents and procedures are standardized. Relation-based communication and agreements are informal and implicit, yet each party perfectly understands what it entails. It is difficult to be verified by third party and can’t be enforced in a court of law. Rule-based and relation-based governance represent two types of governance environment that involve different social and business costs. For rule-based governance to work effectively, society must make investments to establish a large complex political and legal infrastructure. Once established, whether this infrastructure is used in one or million cases the costs will always remain approximately the same. In economic terms, rule-based system has high fixed costs but decreasing incremental costs. In contrast, relation-based governance involves low fixed costs, requires a minimal legal infrastructure but has rising incremental costs. The parties of relation-based governance are able temporarily to avoid the large upfront investment costs connected with establishing a complete legal infrastructure because rely for protection on their private connections, not the public legal system. Low fixed costs of relation-based governance system of East Asian countries was one of elements that contributed to their economic success though the system was non-transparent, flawed and with a lot of room for corruption.

Dynamics of growing business and cultivation of business relationships with outside world through global networking impacted East Asian relationship-based economies. This process imperatively moved them to embrace more rules into the governance and gradually transformed them into various stages of rule-based economies. However, old traditions have remained still deeply vested in East Asian societies until today and relation-based systems work in parallel as the “shadow eminence factor” in their business culture.

### ***East Asian business culture***

Manifestations of Confucian culture in business interactions are so wide that this issue goes beyond the current study. For illustration it should be noted at least some signs of Confucian values in the wider context of life of the South Korean society,

which is a typical example of practical reflections of Confucianism in modern business environment.

The most important factor in the management of the South Korean society for all its members is sharing the same values. To support this goal the large and medium Korean companies organize for their employees training camps including education for discipline and loyalty. In all areas of society, including the business community, there is strong hierarchy, austere formalism, career advancement is possible only with increased age, people's interaction avoids showing directly negative attitudes, strict subordination is at every social level and in most cases the responsibility is associated with collective decisions. Korean business culture differs from Western business approaches from the first moment of interaction. Koreans tend to identify themselves as members of the group and from the very beginning they show efforts to find points of contact (kinship, school, hometown, college). They construct their identity typically in relation to people with whom they have close ties, and tend to worry when they feel isolated. This is in stark contrast to Western businessmen for whom individuality plays a high role in constructing their identity (Chaïy 2012). The pride is often a question of people's own perception, but with "saving face" in the Confucian concept is all about how others perceive that person. There is probably no person in the world who would not attempt to protect his/her pride, but Koreans consider the pride and preserving their face as extremely important (Chaïy 2012). In this respect they keep a certain social distance also in the business interaction, a typical feature of Confucian business culture that the West sometimes confuses with the coldness of the person.

One of distinctive traits of Koreans is their ability to unite and bring private sacrifices to the benefit of the country. Korean vitality of unity and of the joint work is unique when being compared to many advanced nations that favor individualism and this kind of cohesion is reflected especially in times of crisis. Koreans, for example, were able to carry out individual collections of gold to help the country to pay off debt and redeem the restrictive measures of the IMF in the year 1988. Employees of companies in case of company's financial difficulties even return their salaries to contribute to the revitalization of the company. In such cases, the Koreans put the state/country to the level of their family and they perceive it as a common goal. This is a very different professional and business approach compared to Western companies.

## **7 CONCLUSION**

The purpose of the study was to contribute to a broader conceptualization of East Asian industrialization success in the second half of 20-ies century through highlighting different "geography of thinking" between East and West and through the role of cultural fundamentals in East Asian economies.

Cultural fundamentals represent a strong part of identity of the nations and multicultural societies. The study has shown that human cognition is not everywhere

the same and that historical connections and cultural affinity certainly matters. There are substantial differences between Western and Eastern civilizations that have been evolved through many centuries. The formation of cultural specificities have been conditioned by many factors including nature environment and basic thought incubators that have been transformed into cognitive processes, thinking inclinations, perception concepts, beliefs, values, organizational models, governance schemes, market structures and solution mechanisms. They are present at individual approaches as well as at systematic level and have been manifested in numerous spheres of societal and economic life.

The key for understanding East Asian cultural fundamentals are the concepts of “man – nature” relationship and the “man – man” relationship that represent basic world perception and major interaction mechanism of Confucian societies. There are numerous contradictory approaches within these two “relationship frameworks”. Confucianism like Taoism is less concerned with finding the truth than finding the Way (Tao) to live in the world. Harmony, interconnectedness and *yin-yang* complementarity instead of individualism and dichotomy are the main variables of East Asian mind. Confucian world, society and the state are modeled as an extension of the family and the society is ordered into distinct statuses, each with its own obligations, responsibilities and prerogatives. The centerpiece of the concept of human relations of the East is the role of ethics rather than the role of the law in the West. The Confucian platform of values has strongly impacted economic activities and business culture of East Asian countries. It has been manifested mainly in market structures in form of “network economies” that are based on community and family linkages where individuals work not for self-benefits but for the entire family or community. This market mechanism is clashing with some western perception where individuals are institutionalized as indifferent market units and networks are considered as cartels, as well as with neoclassic principle of the lowest price that is negated in East Asian markets by preferences of making business with “network partners” despite the higher price. Confucian sense for order and hierarchy as well as labor force mentality have served as comparative advantage of East Asian markets during their industrialization period.

Experience of East Asian economic success appears to be relevant to other countries only to a certain level and not in terms of Confucian values since many developing economies have moral philosophies of their own and the replication of East Asian experience remains intact. Experience can be followed in terms of philosophy behind economic policies. East Asia has shown that effectiveness of their economic policies was based primarily on ability of integrating these policies into their system of values and ability to utilize on social constructs and organizational models of their societies. They organized their economic development in a way that has made sense to their people, draw their economic success on their own social and cultural repertoires,

built on their own traditions and through this way tapped on people's potential. Important lesson to be taken from East Asian economic success is that cultural fundamentals are strongly connected with economic performance of the country.

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## **(NE)EFEKTÍVNOSŤ MANAŽMENTU KONFLIKTOV A MEDIÁCIE EÚ V GRUZÍNSKU A MOLDAVSKU – POHĽAD Z BERLÍNA**

### **(IN)EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION IN GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA – VIEW FROM BERLIN**

*Levan Makhashvili*<sup>1</sup>

Nedávny vývoj v krajinách Východného partnerstva, vrátane rastúcich agresívnych vojenských akcií Ruska, stupňovanie násilia, vzplanutie nových konfliktov a obnova starých, podrobilo manažment konfliktov EÚ vážnemu testu. V dôsledku nových okolností sa stalo kriticky nutné zhodnotiť minulé záväzky EÚ v riešení konfliktov a preskúmať silné a slabé stránky v jej prístupe, ktorý môže byť použitý ako vodičko pre budúce aktivity riešenia konfliktov. Tento článok posudzuje názory a vnímanie politikov prostredníctvom dopytovania insiderov v Berlíne. Obzvlášť, výskumné otázky uvažujú o tom, akým spôsobom politici v Berlíne posudzujú účinnosť manažmentu konfliktov a mediácie EÚ v Gruzínsku a Moldavsku. Bola Európska únia úspešná pri riadení alebo sprostredkovaní konfliktov v týchto krajinách? Ako sa môžu aktivity EÚ zlepšiť?<sup>2</sup>

**Kľúčové slová:** Európska únia, manažment konfliktov, Gruzínsko, Moldavsko, vnímanie

Recent developments in the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, including Russia's increasingly aggressive actions and military adventurism, escalation of violence, inflammation of new conflicts and renewal of the old ones, have put the EU conflict management abilities to a serious test. As a result of these

<sup>1</sup> Levan Makhashvili, PhD candidate. Institute for European Studies, Tbilisi State University. 1 Chavchavadze Venue, 0179 Tbilisi, Georgia. [www.tsu.ge](http://www.tsu.ge); [levanmakhashvili@gmail.com](mailto:levanmakhashvili@gmail.com)  
Levan Makhashvili is a PhD candidate researching the EU conflict resolution policy in the EU Eastern Partnership countries at the Institute for European Studies of Tbilisi State University. He obtained his MA in European Studies from Maastricht Universities in 2011 and BA in International Relations from Tbilisi State University in 2009. Levan has been teaching the EU-related courses at various universities and guest lecturing for numerous projects since 2011. He is an author of dozens of academic articles and book chapters on EU governance and EU foreign policy.

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novel circumstances, it has become critically necessary to evaluate the EU's past engagements in conflict management and examine the strengths and weaknesses in its approach, which can be used as guidelines for the Union's future conflict management activities. This article will look to gauge the opinions and perceptions of policy and decision makers by interviewing the Berlin insiders. In particular, the research questions consider how policy shapers and decision makers in Berlin perceive the effectiveness of the EU conflict management and mediation in Georgia and Moldova. Was the EU successful in managing or mediating the conflicts in these countries? How can the EU activities be improved?

Key words: European Union, conflict management, Georgia, Moldova, perceptions

JEL: F51, F52

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

Recent developments in the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, including Russia's increasingly aggressive actions and military adventurism, escalation of violence, materialization of new conflicts, renewal of the old ones, have put the EU conflict management abilities to a serious test. As a result of these novel circumstances it has become critically necessary to evaluate the EU's past engagements in conflict management and examine the strengths and weaknesses in its approach, which can be used as guidelines for the Union's future conflict management activities.

Georgia and Moldova have been selected for this purpose, as the EU has been the most active in managing conflicts in these countries. Considering that in last two decades Germany's leadership has become widely established (together with other leading EU member states) in the EU policy-making towards the Eastern neighbors, it is interesting to inquire how this process is viewed in Berlin. The research questions thus consider how do policy and decision makers in Berlin perceive the effectiveness of the EU conflict management and mediation in Georgia and Moldova? Was the EU successful in managing or mediating the conflicts in these countries? How can the EU activities be improved? This paper will look to gauge the opinions and perceptions of policy and decision makers in Berlin by interviewing the representatives of German Foreign Service (interviewee 1 - high-level official focusing on the South Caucasus, remained confidential), Bundestag (interviewee 2 - Mr. Johannes Schraps, Political Advisor to the MP Achim Barchmann [SPD - Deputy Chair of the Committee on the Affairs of the EU]), German Council on Foreign Relations (interviewee 3 - Dr. Stephen Meister, Head of Program on Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia), German Institute for International and Security Affairs (interviewee 4 - Researcher in division of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, remained confidential) and Embassy of Georgia to the Federal Republic of Germany (interviewee 5 - high-level official, remained confidential).

This study will be beneficial for all stakeholders in understanding the German thinking on and assessment of the EU conflict management in Georgia and Moldova. It will also contribute to general academic and theoretical discussions on the EU conflict resolution instruments and their (in)effectiveness. The research will help all interested parties to better formulate their policies, and approach German policy-shapers and decision-makers in a more proper manner.

First part of the paper reviews academic scholarship on conflict management and mediation, notions and assessment criteria of success in conflict management. Second part explores the EU conflict management activities in Georgia and Moldova. And third part of this article is dedicated to the view from Berlin, i.e. perceptions of the German professional insiders, on the (in)effectiveness of the European Union conflict management and mediation in these countries.

## **2 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION**

Conflict management is believed to be “an attempt by actors involved in conflict to reduce the level of hostility and generate some order in their relations” (Bercovitch & Regan, 1999, p. 3). Managing a conflict is no easy task, especially when political and ideological differences are entangled to its very roots. An effective manager needs a wide range of activities, creativity, proper instruments and some luck in order to push the counterparts, who are stuck in a deadlock, to a successful compromise (Crocker 2011; Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2007; Bercovitch, Kremenjuk & Zartman 2009).

For the purpose of this research, the EU conflict management typically is a “long-term engagement with a particular country or region, an engagement that, over time, will necessitate different conflict management policies, including military crisis management, development and humanitarian aid efforts, and mediation between conflict parties” (Wolff & Whitman 2012, p. 5). The EU documents barely use the term ‘conflict resolution’, preferring ‘crisis management’ or ‘conflict prevention’. However, in accordance with a number of researchers (e.g. Oproiu 2015, pp. 25-26), this article considers that the EU conflict management “subsumes these two sets of policies, but also covers a third, commonly referred to as conflict settlement or resolution, that is, policies aimed at finding a compromise between parties that will allow them to address remaining and/or future disputes between them by political or judicial means, rather than by recourse to violence” (Wolff & Whitman 2012, p. 5).

Frazier & Dixon (2006) identify five core forms of conflict management efforts: verbal actions, diplomatic approaches, judicial processes, administrative assistance and militaristic responses. It goes without saying that these activities are not necessarily independent and isolated from each other. To the contrary, scholars demonstrate that in most cases, they are interrelated and complement each other (Greig

& Diehl 2012; Oswiak 2014; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Bercovitch & Fretter 2004; Carneiro, Novais & Neves 2014, pp. 15-28).

The term “mediation” is defined in this research, originally developed by Bercovitch (2006, p. 290), “as a process of conflict management, related to, but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. Mediation is, in essence, a form of ‘assisted negotiation’” (see also Ramsbotham et al. 2011). A related important term is the “mediator’s mandate” as it indicates “the manner in which a third party enters the dispute” and can establish initial expectation of what the mediator’s activities and successes are or should be (Vuković 2016, p. 13). It is usually expected that the mediation efforts will be reflected in a long-lasting solution. However, it can be the case that mediation does not directly seek a formal resolution but can rather aim to improve and maintain the “communication channels between conflicting parties, [alleviate]... humanitarian crises and [explore]... elements that could be used for a final agreement in possible future mediation activities” (Vuković 2016, p. 13; Svensson & Wallensteen, 2010).

The European Union can be engaged in conflict management processes in Georgia and Moldova in the form of any action aiming at ending hostilities and other violent behavior, or addressing the roots of conflict and this way resolving the problem. For the purpose of this research, the EU engagement encompasses all actions and decisions of the EU institutions, its bodies and representatives attempting to end the conflict in these countries.

## **2.1 MEDIATION SUCCESS**

First thing, that catches the reader’s attention while talking about mediation success is that it is an abstract concept. Although there is a considerable body of work on other characteristics of conflicts and mediation (Bercovitch 1991; Levy 1998; Frazier & Dixon 2009), there is still no clear and concrete definition of success in the field of conflict mediation. It is widely defined by using other equally elusive concepts such as fairness, justice, stability, efficiency, satisfaction, etc. However, what is fairness itself? What is justice, efficiency or satisfaction? Are there measurement criteria/indicators for these concepts? It is, however, important for the development of conflict management theory and practice to have an explicit definition and unambiguous understanding of success.

Blair Sheppard (1984) suggested the consideration of the process and the outcome as two key aspects of mediation events. As Bercovitch (2006, p. 292) further clarifies, “[the] process refers to what transpires at the mediation table, and the outcome refers to what has been achieved (or not achieved) as a result of mediation”.

Such differentiation between a success in the process and a successful outcome can indeed assess of mediation more feasible.

Other scholars attempted to define success by reference to its four criteria: effectiveness, satisfaction, fairness and efficiency (Sheppard 1984; Jameson 1999; Bercovitch & Langley 1993). Susskind & Cruikshank (1987) had a different understanding of mediation, considering fairness, efficiency, wisdom and stability as its most important indices. These researchers made a valuable contribution to the academic scholarship in defining these vague notions and thus aiding the understanding of the concept of mediation success.

In an attempt to avoid ambiguity and provide a better understanding, Sheppard (1984, p. 144) breaks down the notion of fairness into several more observable indicators, including “levels of process neutrality, disputant control, equitability, consistency of results and consistency with accepted norms”. Other scholars characterize fairness as “improvement of procedure and institution of precedent, access to information, opportunity for expression”, etc. (Bercovitch 2006, p. 292; Jameson 1999; Susskind & Cruikshank 1987).

As for participant satisfaction, it is clear that if participants are satisfied with the mediation process/outcome, their positive perception of success and therefore their commitment increases. This is directly connected to another indicator of success – stability: greater the participant satisfaction in the process and/or outcome, greater the stability of the mediation process and more stable and longer-lasting the outcome. Nevertheless, as Bercovitch (2006, p. 293) neatly puts it: “party satisfaction is largely perpetual and has a very personal quality. Satisfaction is often deemed an almost emotional response to the achievement of a goal or attainment of some requirement. The sorts of goals taken into an event by those involved in conflict are personal in nature and formed by the specific configuration of their personality, environment, [values and expectations]”.

Effectiveness is a more observable indicator of mediation, as it is “a measure of results achieved, change brought about, or behavioral transformation” (Bercovitch, 2006, p. 294; Frazier & Dixon 2009). All in all, Bercovitch (2006, p. 294) concludes that “for mediation to be deemed successful, it must have some (positive) impact, or effect, on the conflict... [such as] moving from violent to non-violent behavior, signing an agreement, accepting a ceasefire or settlement, or agreeing to a peacekeeping/monitoring force/mission, among others. If any of these has occurred as a result of mediation,... the mediation was effective, and thus successful. Effectiveness allows us to observe what has changed after a mediator has entered a conflict. It is to a large extent much less subject to perceptual disagreements and more easily observable and measurable”.

For example, Achkar, Samy & Carment (2009, p. 216) believe that success in mediation is indeed not a „resolution of conflict per se, but... the cessation of violence

and the initiation of a very long process whereby adversaries can address mutual grievances and the underlying causes of hostility“.

Efficiency is another criterion of successes that needs our particular attention. It aims at the procedural and temporal dimension of conflict management and “addresses such issues as the cost of conflict management, resources devoted to it, timeliness and disruptiveness of the undertaking” (Bercovitch 2006, p. 295). Talking about efficiency, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, p. 22) imply that “[fairness] is not enough. A fair agreement is not acceptable if it takes an inordinately long time to achieve or if it costs several times what it should have”. This is an apparent indication of high importance bestowed on the notion of efficiency.

So far, we have discussed the situations when agreement has been achieved or changes have been witnessed in the conflict situation as a result of the mediation process. That is a relatively easier state of affairs, because there is something that conflict parties or impartial scholars can observe and measure. Indeed, in this case there can be either a signed agreement (success) or an absence of a signed agreement (failure). Other mid-processes, such as acceptance of mediation or implementation of the signed document, have no room in this strict success-failure dichotomy.

Nevertheless, there are often more options between these two extremes. Indeed, there are more complicated scenarios with no agreement and no change (Melin et al. 2013). In such cases, what mid-achievement can be labeled as success? For this reason, researchers (e.g. D’Estree et al. 2001) often consider several notions that are helpful in identifying a wider array of mediation success: settlement, management, resolution and transformation.

Although all are useful terms in general, two of them have particular importance for this research. In particular, as Bercovich (2006, pp. 295-296) clarifies, a “settlement takes place when conflict-generating behavior (most notably of the damaging or destructive kind) is neutralized, dampened, reduced, or eliminated”, while “[resolution]... occurs when the root causes of a conflict are addressed, thus negating the threat of further conflict-generating behavior”. Settlement may entail elements of enforcement, while resolution does not. Settlement outcome can be negotiated or imposed (Gochman & Maoz 1984; Ghosn & Bennett 2003; Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996), while resolution can be negotiated and not imposed. Primarily, settlement addresses the conflict’s symptoms, expressions, signs, while resolution targets its causes and roots. Settlement cannot and is not designed to eliminate the need of the parties to re-visit the conflict, while real successfulness of resolution can be assessed with this criterion. Most scholars acknowledge that settlement can be more effective in “value-added disputes, small-scale, interpersonal or group conflicts”, while resolution can be well suited to “interest-based disputes, large-scale, complex, international conflicts” (Bercovitch 2006, pp. 295-296).

Referring to different theories of international relations, the above-mentioned characterization of settlement vs. resolution dichotomy evidently indicates the ground upon which to build a clear understanding of mediation success. On the one hand, if scholars belong to a neo-liberal school of thought, their assessment criteria would be focused primarily on the reduction or elimination of violence and conflict-generating behavior because a full-fledge conflict resolution is not feasible due to structural arrangements and prevailing rules of a 'system defined by power politic behavior' (Bercovitch & Houston 1996). On the other hand, as Bercovitch (2006, p. 296) precisely puts it: "conflict itself is natural, unavoidable, and unlikely to be resolved [in such kind of system] and, hence, success is best judged as the ability to avert, or end, the damaging aspects of conflict". In other words, if a mediator aims at conflict settlement, or if scholars study effectiveness of this process, settlement can be reckoned as a successful mediation outcome.

However, on the other hand, if scholars belong to a school of idealistic theories of international relations, they would argue that "the possibilities of transformation and the malleability of all social situations in international relations may have more exacting requirements. If conflict is perceived as an aberration of sorts, born out of structural discrepancies, rather than as part of the natural order of things, one is more likely to consider comprehensive resolution possible, and, hence, the prime indicator of mediation success" (Bercovitch 2006, p. 296).

Researchers investigating such cases would qualify the conflict settlement as a failure or rather an insufficient success of the mediator to manage the conflict, "leaving conflict to smolder beneath the surface before erupting again" (Burton 1987, p. 32; Bercovitch & Houston 1996).

Few would argue that resolution is not a better, superior option leaving less room for eruption of violent behavior. Nevertheless, in the real world, taking into consideration the protracted destruction and hostilities, vested interests and political short-termism of adversaries and strategic players, resources invested by these actors, and many other factors, successful resolution is a rare phenomenon. For this reason, in situations where resolution is not feasible or realistic, academic scholarship often deems settlement the only successful result for the purposes of the analysis.

Another interesting dimension in assessing the mediation success is offered by Kriesberg (1991, p. 20) in his seminal work. The author explains that "mediation success is best understood as a significant (or even essential) contribution to de-escalation of conflict, movement towards an acceptable agreement or reconciliation, under the prevailing conditions". This dynamic process entails several stages that can be analyzed in the case of the EU involvement in the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. During the first stage, the mediator tries to bring the conflicting parties to the table (i.e. acceptance of mediation). Information about the conflict as well as the interests of the respective sides is critically important for a mediator who in turn can



use it to change the expectations and increase the attractiveness of the peaceful and negotiated alternatives (Rauchhaus 2006; Savun 2009). For this reason, “the first degree of success in international mediation is reflected in the mediator’s ability to transform conflictual relations and de-escalate the conflict by getting the parties to the table” (Vuković 2016, p. 35).

In case of Georgia, the EU was successful in bringing the parties to the negotiating table in the Geneva International Discussions but experienced many shortcomings within the same format of discussions (see Makhashvili, 2013). The EU as well as other mediators was often mere observer of the process instead of being active mediator, using different strategies to “increase attractiveness of a negotiated solution and highlight the ineffectiveness of confrontational methods” (Vuković 2016, p. 35).

The second stage can be that of absence/presence of formal agreement, a dichotomy that goes through the pipeline of a mediation process. It can be presumed that the EU had success in achieving a cease-fire agreement between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and mini-successes in Geneva discussions, like the establishment of Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism, its reinvigoration in Gali in 2016, locking parties to the negotiation table despite many demonstrative leave-outs and tensions throughout the years, etc. Nevertheless, if we analyze it in terms of their implementation and everyday functioning, these accomplishments can be questioned. Furthermore, academically speaking, several researchers do not even label a cease-fire agreement as a success at all because it is the least comprehensive agreement and “while [it is] the simplest form of agreement to achieve, [it is] the easiest to break” (Greig & Diehl 2012, p. 105; Vuković 2016, p. 36).

Finally, with regard to the third stage, implementation of a signed agreement is arguably the most important in assessing an overall mediation success. Beardsley (2011, p. 151) demonstrates that “mediators who commit themselves to maintaining their presence in the implementation phase strongly contribute to an agreement’s longevity”. However, mediator’s commitment, ‘will, and skill’ can be effective only in case of the parties’ readiness and willingness to compromise. Otherwise, mediator’s attempts to ‘ripen the conflict’ will not solve the problem. Thus, as Greig & Diehl (2012, p. 161) suggest, “[conflict] intensity and the nature of the issues at stake are often the primary reasons why some conflicts relapse into violence”. The latter can be identified as one of the reasons for the EU’s potential ineffectiveness in conflict resolution in Moldova and Georgia. Mediator’s strong ‘post-agreement commitment’ is indeed absent in these countries.

These three stages/degrees of success certainly cannot encompass everything but will be used in this paper for the sake of simplicity and better illustration.

Overall, the argumentation allows for the conclusion that any assessment or definition of success gives way to multiple interpretations and leads to subjective

conclusions. This is a primary source of academic confusion, or as Bercovitch (2006, p. 293) clarifies, “the perceptual nature of any interpretation of such abstract concepts, incorporated with the very fluid nature of what they may entail in a given situation, means that interpretation begs as many questions as it provides answers”. Nevertheless, while these concepts are rather elusive, we should not abandon the quest to provide a more concrete and observable description of success. In general, the following practical benchmarks, covering a wide range of potential “mini” successes during negotiations and on the ground, can be illustrative in assessing success: progress on ground; cessation of violence (e.g. ceasefire); acceptance of mediation; formal mid-agreements (e.g. IPRM); feelings of participants of the Geneva International Discussions, the European Union Monitoring Mission, the 5+2 process and the European Union Border Assistance Mission; level of hostility (hostility levels may change from the point of the mediator entering the mediation process to the point of its departure: hostility level may increase, decrease or remain same); any negotiated agreement.

Although these and the above-mentioned assessment criteria are not without merit, I have decided to let the decision-makers, policy-makers and other professionals working in the field determine whether the EU has been effective in the conflict resolution in Moldova and Georgia or not, and how so and why. In other words, the way of thinking of mediation success in this research is to relate outcomes to the perceptions of the relevant individuals. Overall, it is often not about determining success academically but rather what the participants feel and perceive in real world.

In particular, overall success in this study will be ultimately assessed according to the perceptions of the Berlin insiders who are in charge of, related to, or otherwise professionally interested in the conflict management process in the region.

Based on the Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) analytical framework, the EU as a conflict manager must have (1) capabilities to act, (2) capabilities to fund and (3) capabilities to cooperate and coordinate. First set of capabilities means that the EU has “[appropriate] policy tools and ability to deploy them in the right time”, arguably under the circumstances that there is a political will from the EU and its member states for doing so. There is indeed a wide range of EU instruments, bodies and efforts present in Georgia and Moldova demonstrated in the following chapter. The second set of capabilities includes the ability of the European Union to provide financial assistance for its own conflict management activities. This has been closely connected to the first capability and, although there have been necessary financial instruments, their usage (or rather absence of usage) has often been undermined due to the political will (Whitman & Wolff 2012, pp. 3-19). Moreover, the third set of capabilities encompasses cooperation and coordination of everything from horizontal to vertical dimensions of EU activities both externally and internally, on the ground in Georgia

and Moldova and among the Union's institutions and member states, with host countries and other stakeholders (Whitman & Wolff 2010).

### **3 EU CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIAATION IN GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA**

Since the establishment of relations with Georgia and Moldova, little was done in terms of conflict resolution up until the European Neighborhood Policy. Only several relatively important documents or events can be mentioned here that had potential impact on conflict management. This short list includes the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Georgia and Moldova that institutionalized political dialogue and formally established economic cooperation between the EU and the newly independent Eastern European countries.

Since this period, the EU has been increasingly involved in the conflict resolution processes in its Eastern neighborhood along the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, as some scholars argue, it was "more by necessity and less by choice" (Oproiu 2015, p. 24; Sasse 2009). The EU presence in its Eastern neighborhood in the most 'intensive' period of 2004-2016 can be generally characterized with the following assessment: "a reluctant EU getting more and more engaged through comprehensive policies, including in conflict management" (Oproiu 2015, p. 25; Wolff & Whitman 2012, pp. 6-7).

With the Eastern Partnership, a more targeted regional cooperation initiative launched in 2009, the EU put stronger emphasis on the conflict resolution as one of the ways to provide peace, prosperity and stable development in this strategic region. Much like the ENP, the EaP provided an asymmetric relations between the EU and EaP countries through which the Union could enforce rules via 'sticks and carrots' strategy (Oproiu 2015, p. 27). Indirectly, the EaP provided new opportunity for its members to become more attractive for the separatist regions. Indeed, on a bilateral level, Moldova and Georgia used this possibility to the maximum and formalized the Association Agreements (including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas) with the European Union. Moldova progressed further in obtaining access to the Schengen area while Georgia also got positive recognition from the European Commission but became an early victim of political and institutional struggle over the 'early suspension mechanism' in Brussels and other national capitals of the EU.

Nevertheless, both countries managed to achieve important success in the process of European integration when they signed Association Agreements with the Union, replacing the European Neighborhood Policy. The Association Agreements are often called as a "new generation" agreements because unlike previous documents, they contain a component of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and envisage concrete and deeper mechanisms for Georgia's and Moldova's relationship with the European Union. On the one hand, the Association Agreements and visa-liberalization processes are the most recent and major developments in the period of

2004-2016 in Georgia and Moldova on their quest to improve their attractiveness and this way contribute to the conflict resolution. On the other hand, these are also the most recent and arguably the most influential incentives used by the EU during this period.

The European Union has been utilizing its conflict management efforts in Georgia and Moldova on two levels. First, the higher-level process focuses on political leaders and behavioral aspects of conflict, i.e. directly or indirectly supporting and facilitating negotiations between political establishments of the adversaries, securing a ceasefire and preventing eruption of violence. Clear examples can be the visits of special representatives of the EU or the EU countries to Abkhazia before the 2008 August war, the Geneva International Discussions, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), and the EUMM in Georgia, as well as 5+2 negotiations format (to lesser extent) and the EUBAM in Moldova. Second, the lower level mediation process is primarily concerned with building confidence and understanding between the rivals, and devotes its activities to the causes and roots of the conflict rather than expressions of the problem. This is evidently demonstrated by a wide set of confidence building measures utilized by Georgia and Moldova with significant help and contribution from the European Union.

### **3.1 EU INVOLVEMENT IN GEORGIA**

Prior to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the EU's experience in conflict management was limited to the Balkans, which was torn apart by the wars that erupted after the collapse of Yugoslavia. This experience was not impressive due to divergent foreign policy preferences of the Member States and the inadequacy of the then-newly established Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In 2003, at the time when this region was not yet part of the European Neighborhood Policy and did not speak to hearts and minds of most European bureaucrats, the European Security Strategy underlined that “[violent] or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability”, and therefore, called on the EU to “take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (Council of the European Union 2003, pp.4-8). Soon after the acknowledgment of importance of the South Caucasus region, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus started functioning. However, its mandate was limited to only supporting the UN and OSCE efforts, with no autonomous EU activities.

The European Neighborhood Policy, specially established for the Union's Eastern and Southern neighbors in 2004, further stressed the importance of resolving conflicts to avoid “negative effects of conflict on economic and political development” (European Commission 2003, p. 9), and acknowledged the necessity of “increased efforts to promote settlement of the conflicts in the region” (European Commission 2003, p. 11). The document also recognized the region's significance in increasing

EU's energy independence by producing and transiting much-needed energy commodities for and to the Union. It is important to underline that conflict resolution was not an explicit objective and part of this policy (as well as of the Association Agreements later with Georgia and Moldova). However, the scholars are confident in their connection with conflict resolution arguing that "by providing political association and deeper economic integration with the EU, together with increased mobility, the partner states are incentivized to contribute to ensuring stability, to commit to share EU values and to support regional cooperation. It is in this framework that conditionality and passive enforcement can be used by the EU in order to change beliefs, behaviors and strategies of the conflict parties, rendering them more willing to negotiate for conflict settlement" (Oproiu 2015, p. 27).

With the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003 and the following radical waves of reforms taking place in the country, the EU established the EUJUST Themis, the (first of its kind) rule of law ESDP mission in the whole post-Soviet space.

The EU became more concentrated on conflict resolution when the latter became one of the priorities in the ENP Action Plan. The EU's contribution further increased with the amendment in the EU Special Representative's mandate. Indeed, the EU became the biggest international donor in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, after their patron state, Russia (Popescu 2011, p. 176). The EU invested heavily especially in the parts of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (namely, Akhlagori district and tens of villages throughout the region), controlled by central government of Georgia (later, after the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, and with giving up the de-facto control of central government, all the EU rehabilitation programs appeared to be useless).

The Russian military intervention is acknowledged to have been stopped by the EU's French presidency that brokered a 6-point ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia. The French (intrinsically, the EU) brokered mediation was the first major development since the Kosovo War, and widely accepted as a success due to the cessation of fire and the perceived readiness of Russia to cooperate.

The European Union Monitoring Mission was soon deployed according the cease-fire agreement, starting actual functioning in less than 2 months after the war, on 1 October 2008. Its mandate includes the "stabilization, normalization and confidence-building, as well as reporting to the EU in order to inform European policymaking and thus contribute to EU engagement in the region"(EUMM 2015) . The EU's initial, relatively speedy maneuvering through decision-making, financing and deployment pipelines was promising.

The European Union Monitoring Mission was accompanied by the Union's delegation in Tbilisi, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus (since 2003) and the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the crisis in Georgia (since 2008). The latter represented Georgia at the Geneva Talks supervised

and facilitated the implementation of the 6-Point Agreement. However, arguably due to the problems deriving from overlapping of competencies and functions between EUSR and EUMM, positions of the two EUSRs were merged in September 2011. The newly created EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia had new occupant of the post Philippe Lefort but enjoyed only cosmetic changes in its functioning, instruments and influence, if any. After the closure of the United Nation Mission (UNOMIG) in Abkhazia and the OSCE Mission in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, the EU became the only international actor on the ground. As a result, importance of the activities of the EUMM grew significantly.

Meanwhile, the EU started humanitarian assistance and continues to provide generous funding for confidence-building programs. Nevertheless, initial enthusiasm was soon lowered and politically stalled by the Russian obstructionism; its recognition of the secessionist regions as independent states; limiting direct people-to-people ties through the borderization process, banning of free movement of people; and hindering any political resolution.

Another institutionalized structure co-chaired by the EU but decoupled from the Union's system is the Geneva International Discussions (GIDs). An information note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia gives a comprehensive description of the format. In particular, the Geneva International Discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees have been conducted since October 2008, in line with the six-point ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 (Point 6) and its implementing measures of 8 September 2008. The format was launched on October 15, 2008 under the joint co-chairmanship of the European Union, OSCE and the United Nations. As of 15 December 2016, 38 rounds of the Geneva Discussions were held. Authorities from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States participate in the Geneva process. De-facto authorities of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia also attend the meetings via Russian delegation. All participants take part in the format in an individual capacity, thus making it possible to avoid endless and futile discussions on the legality of participation of these representatives. The participants discuss issues related to the security situation in the Georgian occupied regions and along the occupation lines, while the second working group focuses on issues related to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to places of their permanent residence.

Importantly enough, MFA information note clarifies that the Geneva Discussions is the only format of negotiations, which provides for international mediation and discussion of outstanding political and humanitarian issues between Georgia and Russia.

The GIDs-related Incidents Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) with regard to Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, agreed among the participants during

the fourth round of the Geneva discussions on 17-18 February 2009, are important tools in addressing the security situation on the ground. Indeed, the IPRMs in Gali and Ergneti, co-chaired and co-facilitated by the EU and the OSCE, are aimed at addressing the practical issues and preventing incidents on the ground and therefore constitute an important instrument for stability and confidence-building. As OSCE clarifies: the “meetings are an opportunity to discuss, among other issues: the identification of potential risks, the follow-up of incidents and the exchange of information, as well as problems affecting the communities on a daily basis” .

However, similar to the GIDs, the IPRM meetings have been no easy or smooth gatherings. Indeed, as a result of Russia’s inexorable position, the Tskhinvali-related IPRM was deadlocked for one year and resumed only after the solidified international pressure on Russia in October 2010. On 24 April 2012, the Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, General Tyskiewicz was not allowed to enter the occupied Abkhazia region of Georgia to participate in the 36th meeting of IPRM in Gali. The event was followed by uneasy developments and a subsequent suspension of the IPRM in Gali due to the harsh Russian position, up until 2016 when accumulated international pressure and political bargaining succeeded.

#### **4 VIEW FROM BERLIN**

Previous chapters reviewed the EU involvement in the conflict management activities in Moldova and Georgia. Based on the academic scholarship on conflict management and mediation demonstrated above, there can be various interpretations and opinions on whether the EU was effective and thus successful in Georgia and Moldova or not. Georgian and Moldovan views can be different compared to that of the EU or Russian. That is because all stakeholders have different expectations from the EU and thus different understanding of its success/effectiveness. For instance, in the case of Georgia, for Russians, the EU played a successful role in brokering a ceasefire. But there is nothing else to assess because the Union’s mandate is no more valid since the Russia’s recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. For the U.S., the EU was successful to broker the 6-point ceasefire agreement and bring the parties to the table, and it contributes to the de-escalation of the situation on ground. However, the U.S. believes that Russia is continuing to disrespect its obligations set out by the 6-point ceasefire agreement and the co-chairs of the GIDs (EU, OSCE, UN) fail to ultimately push the sides to a negotiation agreement. For the EU, it played a divisive role in avoiding further hostilities and continues to play an important role on the ground. For Georgians, the EU is an important element for general international pressure but fails to push Russia to an ultimate conflict resolution.

Depending on which of these perceptive sides and which of the theoretical schools one belong to, he/she may have a different understanding of the EU's effectiveness and success.

This chapter will demonstrate how the Berlin insiders perceive the (in) effectiveness of the European Union in this process. In particular, this article will exhibit the opinions of the representatives of German Foreign Service, Bundestag, German Council on Foreign Relations, German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Embassy of Georgia to the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### **4.1 HOW BERLIN VIEWS GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA**

German policy-shapers and decision-makers nowadays see Moldova and Georgia (much like Ukraine) as targets and victims of aggressive Russian intentions. They believe that Moscow is determined to prevent Moldova's and Georgia's successful drive towards European integration by all means possible and at any price. The crisis in the neighboring Ukraine and domestic challenges, clearly demonstrating existent fault lines, raise the stakes of success for these countries, where situation seems fragile. Moreover, as the interviewees argue, Russia uses the Transdnister, Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region as a trump card to try to "tame" Chisinau and Tbilisi at times when they are closest to hitting any of their European objectives. Russia immediately responds with asserting the self-professed right to act in protection of Russian speakers, Russian citizens, Russian passport holders, and other compatriots in the region, or simply retorts to the strategy of embargo and other muscle-flexing tactics.

So far, Russia seems to skillfully play its hand of brinkmanship to its advantage and capitalize on the tactics of seeming willingness to risk confrontation with the West over its so-called "existential interests", otherwise known as "spheres of influence." That is especially evident in Ukraine's case but true for Georgia and Moldova as well.

#### **4.2 WHY ARE THE EU INSTRUMENTS ULTIMATELY INEFFECTIVE?**

The Berlin insiders consider that the EU achieved several successful outcomes, including a 2008 ceasefire agreement, de-escalation of hostilities, the establishment of the GIDs, IPRMs, EUMM and various confidence-building measures in Georgia, and the establishment of the EUBAM and a number of confidence-building programs in Moldova. However, all interviewees are confident that the EU conflict management in Georgia and Moldova ultimately failed in 2004-2016 (i.e. approximately since the introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy until the entering into force of the Association Agreements). Interestingly, they claim that the following circumstances determined the ineffectiveness of the EU conflict management activities in these countries:



First, on a country level, the interviewee 1 claims that several EU member states internally struggle to formulate a single country position. The interviewee states that even Germany, the most influential member state, is often split between enthusiastic and supportive Foreign Service and skeptical Ministry of the Interior, for instance, when it comes to visa-liberalization or other mobility initiatives for the EaP countries. On an EU level, differences in the positions of the EU member states, reflected in the lack of EU's political will, significantly limits the EU's potential for conflict resolution in the region. Interviewees from the German research centers point at frequently cautious positions of France, Germany and like-minded EU member states vis-à-vis Poland and the Baltic countries (especially, with regard to the initiatives with potentially negative Russian reaction). Moreover, on an international level, EU and Russian positions and interests diverge on the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia that complicate the conflict management activities. Unlike the EU, Russia is not only a "mediator", as it is always trying to present itself, but a directly involved and interested actor. More importantly, Russia's interests and subsequent actions in the region differ significantly enough to make the EU's conflict resolution efforts ineffective.

All interviewees argue that an outcome of the diverging interests is a lack of political will, ultimately determining the EU's ineffectiveness. Furthermore, struggling to find a compromise, the EU could not even define its own interests in the region, formulate a strategic vision towards it and more importantly, it has not taken account of its previous failures. The interviewees believe that these shortcomings, all directly determined by the diverging interests/positions of the EU member states and a related lack of EU's political will, are important in explaining the EU's poor performance in conflict management in Georgia and Moldova.

Second, the EU used the instruments that were not created particularly for Georgian or Moldovan conflicts. Moreover, the EU did not use strong tools properly either, including the ones concerning visa liberalization, economic incentives, etc. The problem can be summarized by Sasse's (2009, p. 369) assessment of the ENP: the EU instruments were "politically, institutionally and financially under-equipped to do so, and it [faced] obvious external constraints, such as the role of Russia in the region". The interviewee 3 further explains this problem by arguing that this is because the EU "institutions [generally] don't think about security, it is not part of their mindset". However, the interviewee further adds that ultimately the "real problem is not that there are no instruments on ground. There are instruments there. But it is lack of political will that is not there".

Third, as interviewees emphasize, complexity of EU governance increases its slowness and further limits its effectiveness in conflict management. The complexity of the EU governance structure and working mechanisms and the amount of actors with their own divergent interests contribute to the 'lack of coherence' in the EU position, remarkably reducing EU's potential in conflict resolution in its Eastern neighborhood.

Indeed, the interviewee 3 believes that the “EU is a technical institution” and it is hard “to understand the logic of Brussels”.

Fourth, the Berlin insiders also claim that vulnerability of the EU decision-making to the external influence often hampers the process of active and fast EU engagement in its Eastern neighborhood. “If [a third country] knows with whom to talk” and “[it] can deal with informal logic of EU and its decision-making”, the EU can be influenced by the third country. In other words, the EU is a complex and slow machinery but can be influenced if approached properly, skillfully and knowledgeably. As a result, external actors can limit EU’s effectiveness in the conflict resolution processes. The interviewees hint at the active Russian lobby in Brussels and in key national capitals as well as assertive anti-Western information war aimed at dividing societies and influencing governmental or EU calculations.

#### **4.3 WHAT CAN THE EU DO MORE?**

Externally, the interviewees are convinced that the proactive EU engagement, along with strong and concerted effort and implementation of practical mechanisms ensuring the security of EU’s eastern flank, are needed now more than ever. The Western vigilance now is simply not enough. The interviewees believe that this is no time to be passive or pensive, rather the time has come for resolute steps as “only a firm stance and action will appease Moscow’s growing appetite for being a bully on the block”. Moreover, the EU, with other like-minded international actors, should do more to support these countries politically, including continuing to be both vocal with non-recognition of secessionist regions of Georgia and Moldova and actively engaged in their de-occupation efforts. Meanwhile, the EU has to support direct ties and negotiations between central governments and the breakaway regions of Moldova and Georgia. It must actively demand full implementation of the 6-point ceasefire agreement and full access for the EUMM in the Georgian regions. In addition, it must persuade Russia to withdraw its troops from Transnistria, pressurize all sides to be more compromising during the GIDs and the 5+2 negotiation formats, etc. Overall, the EU (and more broadly, the Western) response has to carry a clear message and seriousness of purpose, and be strategic, preemptive, creative, effective, consistent, and sustainable in nature.

Internally, the interviewees believe that the fact that there is an extensive system of instruments and bodies in place, does not mean that the EU should not do anything else. To the contrary, for example, some of the interviewees point at the report of the Council of the European Union and consider that there are indeed several aspects of mediation that need to be improved. In particular, they agree with the report recommendations that urge for more coherence and coordination among the EU conflict resolution-related instruments, bodies and efforts, more synergy between all levels of activities, more operational support to EU-related mediators, more developed

capacity-building skills of these mediators, and strengthened outreach and cooperation with other partners and like-minded actors, most notably, with the UN Mediation Support Unit and the OSCE . Several interviewees also suggest to include conflict resolution in the EaP priorities.

## **5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Though this research can be a starting point for many of the arguments developed in the paper, several conclusions may still be drawn from the data obtained via interviewees in Berlin.

Speaking about the inability of the EU to manage the conflict in Georgia and Moldova, one should bear these UN-related words in mind: “the responsibility of tackling the most difficult issues is passed from one actor to another, often ending up in the hands of the institution of last resort – the United Nations – which frequently has neither the resources nor the support of member states to shoulder the burden” (Crocker et al. 2001, p. 59; Vuković 2016, p. 42). Based on the perceptions of the Berlin insiders, nothing can be characterized so well with these UN-related words than the European Union’s involvement in the conflicts in its Eastern neighborhood. Indeed, the EU has been a late-comer, and was involved in the conflict management “more by necessity and less by choice”, with already vested interests, protracted destruction and polarized positions on ground. Thus, by default, the EU was expected to have fewer chances for a successful conflict resolution.

The most important shortcoming is not simply the fact that the EU member states have different interests, opinions and strategies on various external relations issues. In fact, divergent opinions may contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive and ‘all-inclusive’ approach. However, the problem is that due to a lack of political will, such comprehensive approach does not develop into a comprehensive EU action, i.e. what the Union refers to it “the effective use and sequencing of the entire range of tools and instruments” (EEAS, 2016b). Diverging EU interests do not capitalize into an all-encompassing, well-scrutinized and well-planned action. On the contrary, they rather often undermine the very foundation of such action and result in a weak and non-result-oriented action reflecting the lowest-common denominator among the EU capitals. Such actions, often poorly coordinated, are usually far from being effective.

As the interviewees claim, all the EU formats, instruments and efforts described in chapter 3 have a potential to ultimately achieve success. However, the absence of political will deriving from divergent interests between the EU member states, mismanagement of the EU instruments, complexity of EU governance and vulnerability of EU decision-making process to external interference, all contributed to the ultimate EU ineffectiveness to overcome the deadlock in the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia in 2004-2016.

The most striking and under-researched finding of the interviews in Berlin was a firm belief of the Berlin insiders that external actors can and do influence the EU decision-making both on the level of the EU and the member states. The researchers gradually begin to investigate this dimension academically. For example, in his research, Kmec (2015, p. 1) argues that “policymakers working in the CSDP structures influence the content of the CSDP while emphasizing soft- and diplomatic approaches to conflicts”. This study can be critical in understanding the importance of vulnerability of the EU decision-making towards external influences. Indeed, by influencing the EEAS staff working in the CSDP structures, the impact-seekers can influence the content of CSDP, shift its whole focus from peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks towards peace-building, and through this decrease the EU effectiveness in conflict resolution. In addition, third party countries can indirectly influence country positions by targeted information campaign or direct lobbying. However, more research data is needed to validate or reject these arguments.

Another important finding is the interviewees’ confidence that although the EU was not ultimately successful in 2004-2016, it has to continue its efforts. All interviewees recall the German modern history for their argument. For instance, in case of the GIDs, they believe that although it is not successful so far, it is the only forum where parties come face-to-face to express and discuss their divergent interests. In spite of the fact that the parties do not agree on anything substantial, existence of such format is still important for the attempts of cooperation and socialization.

The interviewees demonstrate that there is a significant difference between the EU and Russian interests and views in the EaP region. In the presence of conflict of interests between these two most important international actors involved to the greatest degree in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, what can be done for interest convergence? Academically/theoretically speaking, several developments may influence the process and facilitate a more cooperative spirit in the conflicting mediators. In turn, this may open up the deadlock between the conflicting parties and increase the chances for successful peaceful conflict resolution. Firstly, exogenous geopolitical shifts or in other words “significant developments on a systemic level caused by pivotal political, social, economic and/or natural events [may] encourage a party to rethink its guiding principles” (Vuković 2016, p. 166). Secondly, changes in conflict dynamics “might [also] induce those outside actors that are directly involved in the conflict – [e.g.] by providing logistical and/or military support – to consider using mediation as a viable option for ending the conflict” (Vuković 2016, pp. 167-168). And thirdly, bargaining for cooperation or engagement of “a defecting party in a bargaining process, where an alternative to their current behavior can be found by offering them sufficient incentives to make participation an attractive option” can be used to facilitate a change (Vuković 2016, p. 168).

In addition, mediators' cooperative spirit, their common willingness to cooperate, their common understanding of the importance of their cooperation in the process of conflict resolution (i.e. convergence of interests) is the first and the most important step in a successful mediation process. This paves a way to the second stage of coordination when the mediators clearly define their roles, assign clear duties to them and try to influence the conflicting parties in a consistent and concerted manner. This is the only way that the international mediation has a feasible chance of succeeding. On the other hand, as Vuković (2016, p. 25) rightly summarizes it, "each peacemaking activity is largely conditioned by an adequate mix of well-coordinated activities conducted by international actors that share a common goal in managing a given conflict".

None of these developments and conditions is visible on the horizon in Moldova and Georgia nowadays, and therefore the Berlin insiders remain skeptical about the success of EU's future conflict management or mediation efforts.

The Berlin insiders also argue that it was with the Russian military adventurism in Ukraine since 2014, that the EU slowly but progressively started to reconsider its role in its Eastern neighborhood and to embark on developing a geostrategic approach towards this region, rather than totally giving way to the technocratic politics (see, for example, Nitoiu 2015). The EU of its interests in the region as well as a consideration of the regional geopolitics in the EU decision and policymaking can understand this strategic approach as a clearer understanding. How will this evolve in practice from technocratic politics to high politics? Will its normative power be supported by strategic actions? Will assertiveness and greater self-confidence of the EU only be demonstrated in its statements or will it be evident in relevant foreign policy instruments (other than sanctions) for strategic action? Will the strategic approach significantly improve the EU effectiveness in tackling the regional problems, including the conflicts? These are all topics for further research. For now, the data demonstrated in this research suggests that although the EU managed to achieve several mini-successes on the bumpy road of conflict resolution in the period of 2004-2016, the EU has ultimately been ineffective on the ground. In other words, as some of the Berlin insiders suggest, the "EU was not in a position to 'fix' the problems in Moldova and Georgia". With the ongoing developments in the EU and beyond (e.g. migration crisis, aftershocks of the financial crisis, BREXIT, increasingly aggressive Russia, 'in-door' terrorism, increase of nationalistic sentiments, etc.), it is less likely that the Union will or is capable of doing so any time soon. However, being an influential normative power as well as an inspiration and a role model for many neighboring countries, it can still play a positive role in regional development.

Russia's aggression in Ukraine and in its other neighbors left the idea of Europe whole, free and at peace only in the minds of extreme optimists. The EU's sustainable Eastern policy/strategy as well as its energetic implementation can be a

potential solution for the problems in Moldova, Georgia and elsewhere in the region. Georgia and Moldova, to name a few, expressed their solid commitment to European integration, and demonstrated their sacrifices for the cause. The EU should learn the lessons of its involvement in the region in 2004-2016, and further engage its Eastern neighbors with more responsible, more proactive, more unified, more powerful, more coordinated, more enthusiastic actions, strategies, and instruments.

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## ZMĚNY V MEZINÁRODNÍM OBCHODU A SVĚTOVÉ VÝROBĚ VE SVĚTLE NOVÝCH TRENDŮ GLOBALIZACE

### THE SHIFTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WORLD PRODUCTION IN THE LIGHT OF GLOBALIZATION NEW TRENDS

*Pavel Neumann*<sup>1</sup>

Stat' analyzuje globalizaci ve vztahu k současným změnám mezinárodního obchodu a výroby. Tradiční forma globalizace vrcholila v 90. letech pod vlivem příznivých politických a ekonomických podmínek. V současnosti se však objevily překážky v tomto procesu naznačující změny globalizace směrem k jejímu novému multipolárnímu scénáři. V multipolárním systému se výroba opět koncentruje do určitých domácích lokalit, klesá offshoring a zpomaluje se dynamika obchodu v porovnání s růstem světového HDP. Posuny globalizace jsou tak zřejmě determinovány nejen cyklickými změnami, ale i strukturálními. Multipolární scénář se proto může stát konkurenční alternativou tradičního globalizačního schématu.<sup>2</sup>

Klíčová slova: globalizace, mezinárodní obchod, světová výroba

The article analyses globalization in relation to the current international trade and production shifts. The traditional globalization form culminated in the 1990s under favourable political and economic conditions. Nevertheless, nowadays, some barriers to the process have arisen suggesting the changes of globalization towards its new multipolar scenario. The multipolar system concentrates production back to particular domestic locations, which results in offshoring decrease and slows down trade dynamics in comparison with the world GDP growth. Therefore, globalization shifts might be determined not only by cyclical changes but also by structural ones. Thus the multipolar

<sup>1</sup> Doc. PhDr. Pavel Neumann, Ph.D., Katedra světové ekonomiky, Fakulta mezinárodních vztahů, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, e-mail: neumann@vse.cz.

Autor vystudoval Filozofickou fakultu UK Praha. V letech 1981-1990 a 1997-2004 na různých fakultách UK i vyučoval. Od r. 1991 působí na VŠE Praha, kde byl v r. 2006 jmenován docentem. Vyučuje zde kurzy světové ekonomiky a mezinárodní ekonomie. Odborně se specializuje na komparaci ekonomických systémů vyspělých zemí, zejména ekonomiku a hospodářskou politiku USA. Je autorem a spoluautorem řady statí, učebních textů a monografií na uvedená témata.

<sup>2</sup> Příspěvek byl vypracován za Institucionální podpory Fakulty mezinárodních vztahů VŠE.

scenario may become an competitive alternative to the traditional globalization scheme

Key words: globalization, international trade, world production.

JEL: F14, F63, O14

## 1 ÚVOD

Na základě ekonomického vývoje v posledních dvaceti pěti letech lze soudit, že proces globalizace, probíhající ve světovém hospodářství již více než jedno století, vstoupil do nové fáze. Globalizační proces již dříve propojil národní státy ve většině ekonomických i mimoekonomických sfér, přispěl expanzí trhu k ekonomickému růstu a rozvoji jednotlivých zemí, ale i celých regionů. Některé rysy novějšího vývoje však svědčí o tom, že se objevily překážky v dosavadním směru postupu globalizace a dochází ke změně jejího charakteru. Příkladem jsou nejen výkyvy v ekonomickém růstu, ale i tempu mezinárodního obchodu a mezinárodní restrukturalizace, resp. realokace výroby.

Článek si klade za cíl na podkladě tradičních vymezení globalizace, jakož i jejích nově formulovaných scénářů, analyzovat změny v dynamice mezinárodního obchodu ve vztahu k růstu světového HDP a dále v souvislosti s posuny v obchodu přiblížit i tendence nové alokace výroby (zpracovatelského průmyslu) mezi různými skupinami zemí. Vyjdeme-li tedy z hypotézy vzniku nové fáze poválečné globalizační vlny, můžeme pak posoudit, do jaké míry přináší nyní globalizace skutečnou změnu prostředí světové ekonomiky a zda jsou její nové scénáře relevantní, či nikoliv.

Stať se opírá mimo tradičních charakteristik globalizace uváděných ve starší literatuře o aktuální studie různých autorů z posledních let, zejména sledující mezinárodní obchod, včetně zpráv renomovaných institucí (WTO, atd.). Při rozboru využívá převážně metodu logicko-historické a komparativní analýzy.

## 2 GLOBALIZACE: ZÁKLADNÍ RÁMEC A POVÁLEČNÁ INTERPRETACE

Globalizace je stěžejním jevem formujícím prostředí světové ekonomiky; podle některých pramenů již více než sto padesát let. První vlna tohoto fenoménu je datována do období zhruba třiceti let před první světovou válkou (Baldwin a Martin 1999, McGrew 2008) v souvislosti s rozvojem masové průmyslové výroby v době druhé průmyslové revoluce. Klíčová perioda, v níž se etablovala moderní fáze globalizace, je pak především období po druhé světové válce, které lze považovat za druhou vlnu globalizace.

Globalizace je historickým procesem, který integruje postupně ekonomiky národních států celého světa za zvyšující se intenzity pohybu jak výsledků výroby, tak i výrobních faktorů. Protože podstatou rozvoje globalizace zůstává tržní proces, jde o snahu maximalizovat efektivitu využívaných zdrojů. Toho lze dosáhnout propojením dílčích trhů, jež vytvoří větší celky a umožní dosažení úspor z rozsahu (McGrew 2008,

s. 296-297). Je-li současně udržováno liberální ekonomické prostředí, proces by měl vyústit v klasické optimum výroby a spotřeby a zvýšení objemu národního i světového bohatství.

Globalizace se projevuje ve čtyřech základních oblastech (IMF 2000). Nejstarším projevem je rychlý růst mezinárodního obchodu, *exportu i importu zboží*. Od konce 19. století je pozorovatelný masivní *pohyb kapitálu*, současně se silící migrační vlnou (*pohybem práce*). I když je toto období již typické technickým a organizačním převratem ve výrobě, důležitým znakem globalizace, s významným dopadem do výše jmenovaných oblastí, se stává později, zejména ve druhé polovině 20. století, *mezinárodní rozšiřování znalostí a technologií*.

Ačkoliv existují různé definice globalizace, většina autorů i institucí ve svých charakteristikách akcentuje uvedené faktory, zvláště intenzitu pohybu zboží a kapitálových statků<sup>3</sup>.

Význam mezinárodního obchodu a investic narůstá v poválečném období; později se hnacím motorem druhé vlny globalizace stává tzv. neokonzervativní revoluce. Právě tato fáze významně podpořila, jak ideově, tak praktickými kroky, zbožový a kapitálový pohyb. Neokonzervativní hospodářská politika prosazovala ústup státní intervence, ekonomickou privatizaci a deregulaci, zabezpečení efektivnějšího využití zdrojů pod tlakem globální konkurence. Cílem bylo tedy maximálně zredukovat ze strany státu bariery pro podnikání, včetně mezinárodních, resp. otevřít národní hospodářství globálním trendům (Kovich 2015). To povede k dalšímu rozvoji mezinárodního obchodu i investic, které ve svých důsledcích podpoří ekonomický růst.

Tento trend se posléze promítl do procesu multilaterální liberalizace obchodu, manifestovaného v jednáních GATT/WTO, která vyvrcholila v 90. letech. Obchod narůstal v hodnotovém i fyzickém objemu, rostl také podíl exportu a importu na HDP. Do multilaterálního obchodu se postupně zapojily všechny skupiny zemí.

### 3 POSUNY GLOBALIZAČNÍHO PROCESU V PRŮBĚHU DRUHÉ VLNY

První vlna a úvodní poválečná (od r. 1945) fáze druhé vlny etablovala tedy předchozí historické rysy globalizačního procesu. Čerpala přitom z rozmachu druhé průmyslové revoluce a navazujících technologických změn po druhé světové válce.

Další fázi druhé vlny lze datovat od 90. let. Tehdy se projeví některé vlivy, jež urychlily vývoj globalizace (srovnej Natella a Keating 2015, s. 3).

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<sup>3</sup> Globalizace je “spontánní proces mikroekonomické povahy, který v závislosti na proměnách podmínek hospodářskopolitických, technologických a systémových vede k rozšiřování geografického prostoru pro výnosově akceptovatelné investování kapitálu (jeho rozptýl) a tím i k růstu a zrychlování toků hmotných a nehmotných statků v dimenzích regionálních i celosvětových.” (Bernášek 2002, s. 19); či “... rostoucí tok zboží, služeb a kapitálu přes národní hranice a jemu odpovídající vznik systému organizačních struktur, jejichž úkolem je řídit expandující síť mezinárodních ekonomických aktivit a transakcí.” (Klvačová 2003, s. 24)

- Jedná se o vlivy geopolitické: *pád komunismu* a stávajícího ideologického rozdělení světa, které vedly ekonomicky ke vzniku v podstatě jednotného světového tržního hospodářství;
- obchodní *multilaterální liberalizace* se dostala do vrcholné poválečné fáze realizací závěrů Uruguayského kola GATT;
- došlo k mimořádné růstové *akceleraci některých nastupujících rozvojových zemí* (tzv. emerging markets), které začaly aspirovat na role ústředních hráčů globalizačního procesu, příkladem je ekonomika ČLR;
- vrcholí *proces transnacionalizace*, považovaný rovněž za jeden z definičních znaků globalizace, jež se rozvinuly po druhé světové válce. Jeho reprezentantem jsou zejména velké korporace USA, ale i dalších nejsilnějších zemí;
- v souvislosti s *rozvojem evropské ekonomické integrace*, jenž je sám o sobě významným globalizačním faktorem, dochází ke změnám v mezinárodním měnovém systému: k jeho diversifikaci prostřednictvím *vzniku nové nadnárodní měny euro*, která může globálně doplnit ústřední roli amerického dolaru;
- svému jistému vrcholu se přiblížila *expanze liberalizovaných mezinárodních finančních trhů*, probíhající jak uvnitř vytvořeného jednotného vnitřního trhu EU, tak i v globálním měřítku;
- počátek nového tisíciletí přinesl *rozmach celých skupin rozvojových zemí*, včetně růstu jejich globálního potenciálu (např. země BRICS).

Další vývoj však naznačil, že globalizace dosáhla v 90. letech, resp. na přelomu tisíciletí, v daných ekonomických, politických a sociálních podmínkách svého vrcholu a její potenciál se v některých směrech vyčerpal. Během relativně krátké doby deseti let, zhruba od poloviny první dekády nového tisíciletí, se objevily překážky jejího postupu promítnuté do krizového vývoje, jenž zasáhl některé výše jmenované významné oblasti.

Jde především o *faktor finanční a hypotéční krize*, její průběh a dopady, které poukázaly na slabiny finančních trhů. Značná předchozí deregulace této oblasti ekonomiky, nedostatečné kontrolní mechanismy, přivedly finanční sféru až na pokraj kolapsu, s destruktivními dopady na ekonomický růst a zadluženost ve světové ekonomice. Krize prostřednictvím ekonomické a finanční nestability naznačila meze finanční globalizace, jestliže roste v globalizované ekonomice pravděpodobnost dominového efektu s negativními účinky.

Ekonomický *růst Číny se zpomalil*; poklesl z dvojciferného tempa z počátku 90. let až na úroveň 6-7 %, s výhledem dalšího zpomalení. Role čínské ekonomiky v globalizovaném světě sice nebyla zásadně zpochybněna, avšak její pozice „hnacího motoru“ světového hospodářství bude pravděpodobně modifikována, i vzhledem k očekávanému přechodu Číny od exportem taženého růstu ke stimulaci domácí

poptávky. Do podobné kategorie patří probíhající *útlum skupiny zemí BRICS*, které měly původně následovat čínský příklad.

Po předchozích úspěších 80. – 90. let se *zadržla liberalizace světového obchodu na multilaterálním základě*: v obchodních vztazích na mnohostranné bázi nelze zřejmě očekávat průlom srovnatelný s Uruguayským kolem GATT; odrazem tohoto stavu či jeho kompenzací je prudký nárůst regionálních dohod (Leering a Bekjarovski, s. 15-16).

*Zkomplikoval se vývoj v eurozóně*. Ačkoliv zánik nové měny nelze zřejmě očekávat, její další rozšiřování (přijímání nových členů měnové unie) se přinejmenším zpomalilo. Přitom trvá stále riziko odchodu nejslabších článků systému od společné měny.

Kromě uvedených zřetelně ekonomických témat jsou akcentovány *další problémy: politické* (např. migrační krize, islámský stát), *environmentální* (klimatické změny), atd.

Souhrn, resp. i určitá koincidence těchto krizových faktorů, ekonomických, sociálních, politicko-bezpečnostních i přírodních, naznačují určitou krizi globalizačního procesu, jehož účinky jsou jednak částečně oslabovány, zejména však přestávají působit v očekávaném směru: stávají se nejednoznačnými a obtížněji předvídatelnými.

#### 4 NOVÉ SCÉNÁŘE GLOBALIZACE

Podle některých názorů (O'Sullivan 2015, s. 4) se stává novou realitou stavu světa *multipolarita*, do níž přechází od globalizace. Proces přechodu je dlouhodobý, není v současnosti ukončen. Multipolarita je proto vnitřně rozpornou etapou. Zůstávají v ní nadále zachovány některé rysy globalizace, jiné jsou však modifikovány.

Globalizace se nemění např. ve smyslu globální spotřeby: zboží je masově šířeno do celého světa velkými nadnárodními korporacemi a obchodními řetězci, jejichž marketingová struktura a strategie je převážně globální. Globální charakter mají rovněž finanční trhy; na potenciální rizika s nimi spojená bylo již poukázáno. Centrem finančního světa jsou Spojené státy a vybrané další významné země, ovládající z velké části finanční toky a investice, při zachování ústřední role amerického dolaru.

Naproti tomu se svět stává více multipolárním v charakteru obchodních toků: obchod se více regionalizuje<sup>4</sup> za přispění jednotlivých zemí a jejich obchodních dohod, ekonomické aktivity se soustřeďují do užších oblastí, často s kontinentálním či

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<sup>4</sup> Regionalizace světové ekonomiky, resp. její nová vlna, byla již dříve popsána i v domácí literatuře (srovnej např. Cihelková a kol. 2007, Cihelková a kol. 2010, aj.) vesměs jako odraz zpomalení obchodní liberalizace na multilaterálním základě, který vede k expanzi regionálních obchodních dohod.

subkontinentálním vymezením. Regionální ekonomické aktivity se ovšem mohou dostat do rozporu s jejich financováním, které dosud podléhá do značné míry globalizovaným subjektům, jež jsou po zkušenostech z proběhlých krizí stále opatrnější při přeshraničních investicích (O'Sullivan 2015, s. 4). Rozpor je postupně řešen mobilizací regionálních finančních zdrojů a vznikem regionálních finančních center a institucí (nověji např. Asijská banka pro investice do infrastruktury – AIIB), jež případně konkurují již zavedeným globálními institucím.

Multipolarita, resp. regionalismus, přináší rovněž dílčí obrat ve formách governance. Jestliže globalizace jako tendence tradičně posiluje spíše demokratické formy vládnutí, přechod k multipolárnímu světu nevyklučuje, že při nutných limitech šíření demokracie se etablojí i méně demokratické režimy, které jsou rovněž schopné dosahovat ekonomických úspěchů. Dochází i k posunu v institucionálním zabezpečení ekonomiky. Původní přesun rozhodovacích pravomocí předávaných v procesu globalizace z jednotlivých států na nadnárodní (globální) subjekty je nyní často nahrazen jejich delegováním na instituce regionální.

Již některé předchozí studie částečně zpochybňovaly sílu a absolutní růst vlivu globalizace, tak jak byla dosud interpretována. Uvážíme-li neustále rostoucí kvantitu obchodu, např. C. Hay uvádí, že jeho podíl na HDP byl ve druhé fázi globalizace po r. 1960 srovnatelný s první fází v letech 1870-1914, případně i menší. Ani objem přímých zahraničních investic (v konstantních cenách) v poměru k HDP se, jako očekávaný důsledek globalizace, s otevřením a liberalizací národních ekonomik nezvýšil. Obchodní a kapitálové toky sílí spíše uvnitř tradiční triády (Severní Amerika, Evropa, asijsko-pacifický region), což svědčí spíše o zmíněné regionalizaci, než globalizaci světové ekonomiky (Hay 2008, s. 332). Světové hospodářství tedy není proti všeobecným soudům silně integrováno, nepředstavuje tedy ani tak vysoký stupeň globalizace. Nemění se podstatně ani úloha národních států (Hay 2008, s. 342-344).

Tyto teze korespondují s názory proudu globalizačních skeptiků, kteří tvrdí, že obvykle uváděné rysy globalizace nejsou ničím dříve neexistujícím, tedy ani výjimečným. Probíhající změny v globálním prostředí mohou dokonce přinést profit vládám a autoritám národních států a posílit je. (Held a kol. 1999).

Ačkoliv nelze pronést zásadní soud o ústupu globalizace, je tedy patrné, že její charakter je diskutován ve spojení s rozporným ekonomickým a politickým vývojem posledních dekád. V této souvislosti představil v r. 2015 výzkumný institut Credit Suisse studii zkoumající možný globální vývoj. Globalizace má podle ní tři alternativní scénáře (O'Sullivan 2015, s. 5-6).

První předpokládá posilování globalizace v tradiční interpretaci, lze ho považovat za *optimistickou variantu*. Ekonomika zde prochází jen mírným kolísáním, převládá však silný růst tažený rostoucím obchodem. Podnikání a obchod ovládají silné západní nadnárodní společnosti. Dolar zůstává ústřední měnou. Kapitál je levný a dostupný, což podněcuje jeho mezinárodní toky a posiluje interdependenci zemí.



V rámci globální governance státy spolupracují pod vedením nadnárodních institucí, které provádějí globální regulaci ekonomické činnosti; využívají přitom západní právní standardy. Demokracie se dále šíří ve světě; státy se otevírají migraci. Výsledkem pozitivních trendů je zlepšení „lidského rozvoje“ a konvergence životní úrovně.

Druhý scénář lze označit za „*smíšený*“, operuje s již citovaným vznikem multipolárního světa. Ve srovnání s první variantou je ekonomický růst nižší, selektivní dle regionů, v návaznosti na pomalejší růst obchodu, který má více regionální povahu. Podnikání a obchod je vedeno ve větší míře regionálními společnostmi. Rozšiřují se nové ústřední měny konkurující dolaru. Finanční toky kontrolují regionální finanční centra. V oblasti globální governance vzniká konkurenční prostředí mezi regionálními autoritami, které si vytvářejí vlastní sféry vlivu; vznikají nové regionální instituce s výhradním členstvím. Společenská zřízení zemí nemají nutně „západní“ podobu, ale i formu „řízených demokracií“. Rostou restriktce migračních toků; migrace má spíše místní charakter. Lokální ekonomiky jako celek bohatnou, avšak životní úroveň je více diferencovaná.

Třetí scénář představuje oproti předchozím *pesimistickou až katastrofickou variantu*. Ekonomický růst je pomalý, koncentrován do národních ekonomik; je brzděn zadlužením, klimatickými a geopolitickými šoky a také protekcionismem zpomalujícím obchod. Podnikání a obchodní činnosti přebírají spíše národní subjekty vyhraněné proti nadnárodním společnostem. V měnové oblasti roste izolace a měnové války. Finanční trhy jsou fragmentovány, roste cena kapitálu. Ve sféře globální governance vypukají otevřené konflikty doprovázené politicko-vojenskými střety, umocněné i negativními klimaticko-přírodními jevy. Státy se odklánějí od demokracie, migrace ustává, existuje tendence vyloučit migrační komunity. Nepříznivý ekonomický, politický a sociální vývoj ústí do růstu chudoby a vzniku antiglobalizačních občanských nálad a hnutí.

Na základě předložených scénářů (viz tab. 1) lze vést diskusi, který z nich by se mohl nejspíše naplnit, resp. jak tedy lze odhadovat další vývoj globalizace. Jako nejpravděpodobnější se jeví jistý kompromis mezi scénáři 1 a 2. Globalizace bude pokračovat, avšak některé její stěžejní rysy (scénář 1) budou konfrontovány či modifikovány nástupem multipolarity (scénář 2). I další autoři vyslovují souhlas s naznačeným schématem, že svět je na přechodu od „plné“ globalizace do multipolárního stavu. Tato skutečnost je rovněž potvrzována uzavíráním nových obchodních dohod podporujících regionální obchod (Neville 2016).

Jedním ze stěžejních faktorů globalizace, který naznačuje specifický vývoj a implikuje změny v charakteru globalizace, je právě mezinárodní obchod.

## **5 ZMĚNY MEZINÁRODNÍHO OBCHODU**

Jak bylo zmíněno výše, obchod a jeho růst, zvyšující se otevřenost ekonomik, představuje tradičně jeden z motorů globalizace. Obchod nemůže být posuzován jako

pouhý „vedlejší produkt“ ekonomického růstu. Představuje jeho nezávislý zdroj s dopady na životní standard (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 6). Ekonomové poukazují na pozitivní vztah obchodu a životní úrovně. Podle Frankela a Romera (1999) 1% růst podílu obchodu na HDP zvyšuje důchod na hlavu o 1,5 %. Exportéři jsou rovněž efektivnější a vstupem na zahraniční trhy zvyšují úroveň produktivity ve svém odvětví (Wagner 2012). Růst jejich produktivity je vyšší než u firem, které se omezují na domácí prodeje. Rozšířením trhu realizují i úspory z rozsahu.

Tab. 1: Scénáře budoucnosti globalizace.

|                                 | <i>1. Globalizace pokračuje</i>   | <i>2. Multipolární svět</i>  | <i>3. Konec globalizace</i>  |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|
| <b>Obchod a finanční toky</b>   | - silný vzestupný trend<br>- rostoucí interdependence<br>- malý vliv protekcionismu                             | - pomalé tempo růstu<br>- regionální zaměření<br>- regionální obchodní dohody  | - bariery obchodu, růst protekce   |
| <b>Trhy</b>                     | - nízká cena kapitálu   | - růst regionálních finančních center  | - fragmentace, růst ceny kapitálu  |
| <b>Měny</b>                     | - dominance dolaru  | - růst nových kotevních měn  | - měnové války   |
| <b>Ekonomický růst</b>          | - akcelerován rostoucím obchodem<br>- nízká makroekonomická volatilita (mimo krize)                             | - pomalejší, selektivní podle regionů<br>- regionální problémy při reakci na krizi<br>- růst poptávky v „emerging markets“ | - pomalejší, soustředěn vnitrostátně<br>- šoky vyvolané dluhy, nerovností, klimatem, geopolitickou situací |
| <b>Korporace</b>                | - růst síly multinacionálních společností   | - růst nových „regionálních hvězd“   | - „národní hvězdy“, odpor k multinacionálům  |
| <b>Globální governance</b>      | - kolaborativní charakter<br>- dominance nadnárodních institucí<br>- dominantní síla USA<br>- globální regulace | - konkurenční charakter, skryté konflikty, sféry vlivu<br>- nové regionální instituce s exkluzivním členstvím              | - otevřené konflikty<br>- geopolitické vojenské střety<br>- klimatické problémy                            |
| <b>Formy vlády</b>              | - rozšiřování demokracie  | - „řízené demokracie“ s nejasnou podstatou   | - zvraty v postupu k demokracii  |
| <b>Pohyb osob</b>               | - politika otevřenosti migraci  | - růst restrikcí migrace<br>- selektivní pohyb kvalifikovaných osob  | - přerušování migrace<br>- sociální vyloučení migrantů   |
| <b>Sociální a lidský rozvoj</b> | - větší konvergence životní úrovně (mimo méně globalizované regiony)<br>- zlepšení lidského rozvoje             | - diferenciací životní úrovně<br>- lokální ekonomiky bohatnou jako celek<br>- rostoucí spotřeba v „emerging markets“       | - rostoucí chudoba a občanské konflikty<br>- antiglobalizační sociálně politická hnutí                     |

Pramen: Zpracováno podle O'Sullivan 2015, s. 6; vlastní úprava.

Mezinárodní obchod setrval dlouhodobě v rychlém růstu posledních 40-50 let: průměrné tempo růstu hodnoty světového zboží obchodu činilo v letech 1961-2013 v průměru o 10 % ročně. Vztah ekonomického růstu a obchodu se intenzifikoval a prokazoval rysy pozitivní symbiózy ještě v 90. letech. Příznivými okolnostmi rozšiřování obchodu byly mimo jiné konec studené války, expanze čínské ekonomiky a posléze vstup této země do WTO (Neville 2016). I přes zpomalení v období finanční a hypotéční krize dosahovalo světové tempo růstu objemu obchodu v r. 2011 ještě 6,2 % a zaostávalo jen mírně za dlouhodobým předkrizovým průměrem (1987-2007), který činil 7,1 % (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Poslední období je však charakteristické ostřejším zpomalením obchodu měřeno růstem světového exportu proti dlouhodobému trendu. Export rostl v r. 2012 o 2,5 %, 2013 o 3,0 %, 2014 o 2,5 % a přibližoval se tempu HDP (WTO 2015). Tuto skutečnost považují analytici za závažnou: růst obchodu, který dříve převyšoval násobně růst světového reálného HDP, se s ním nyní vyrovnává, popř. je i nižší; klesá tedy elasticita obchodu ve vztahu k produktu (viz dále). Toto zpomalení obchodu může vytvořit riziko pro globalizaci a světový růst (Neville 2016).

Tab. 2 Růst světového zboží obchodu a světového hrubého domácího produktu (%) v letech 1995-2014: klouzavé průměry za vybraná období a poměry obou veličin.

|               | <i>1995-2000</i> | <i>2000-2005</i> | <i>2005-2010</i> | <i>2010-2014</i> |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Export</b> | 7,0              | 5,0              | 3,5              | 3,5              |
| <b>HDP</b>    | 3,4              | 2,9              | 2,3              | 2,5              |
| <b>Poměr</b>  | 2,06             | 1,72             | 1,52             | 1,40             |

Pramen: WTO 2015; vlastní výpočty a zpracování.

Podle historických zkušeností je úroveň obchodu třikrát volatilnější než úroveň produkce (Engel 2011). To znamená, že se zvýšením ekonomického růstu roste rychleji obchod a poměr se zvyšuje. Naopak v dobách ekonomického poklesu obvykle obchod klesá rychleji než HDP.

Podle analýzy ING (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 8-9) patnáct let před poslední finanční krizí byl vzájemný vztah obou veličin skutečně násobný: růst obchodu byl 1,9krát vyšší než růst HDP a rozdíl byl vyšší i proti období let 1970-2013, kdy činil 1,7. Vývoj, zvláště po r. 2011, proto představuje jistou anomálii. Jestliže v 90. letech se, jak bylo uvedeno, poměr zvyšoval a podle údajů WTO byl poměr exportu a HDP dvojnásobný v letech 1995-2000, od počátku nového tisíciletí však dochází k jeho poklesu až na hodnotu 1,4 v letech 2010-2014 (viz tab. 2). V r. 2015 byl podle WTO růst exportu o 3 %, růst HDP o 2,4 % (WTO 2016); poměr by tedy činil za tento rok pouze 1,25. Někteří autoři uvádějí, že, měřeno od poslední krize v r. 2008 do současnosti, se bude poměr obou veličin přibližovat jedné (Neville 2016).

Vývoj zatím podle analýz potvrzuje změnu relace obou těchto ukazatelů ve vztahu k předchozímu trendu (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 10). Jedná se však zatím o relativně krátké období, z něhož nelze učinit velmi přesvědčivé závěry. Jednotlivé zdroje však v případě pokračování trendu argumentují možnými negativními důsledky pro světový vývoj (Neville 2016), jestliže spatřují v tradičním elastickém vztahu HDP-obchod jeden z úhelných kamenů postupu globalizace.

## 6 PŘÍČINY ZMĚN MEZINÁRODNÍHO OBCHODU: CYKICKÉ A STRUKTURÁLNÍ

Mezi krátkodobé až střednědobé příčiny ovlivňující obchod patří *cyklické faktory*, zejména změny poptávky, které vedou ke kolísání importu. Tyto vlivy působily nepochybně v době globální krize ve druhé polovině minulé dekády, eventuálně těsně po ekonomickém zotavení; jejich vliv však v posledních letech klesal (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Kromě všeobecného poklesu poptávky ve světě v době recese v letech 2008-2009 je zvažována např. úloha Evropské unie v oslabení obchodu. EU má nejvyšší váhu ve světovém obchodu (35 % bez započtení intratrade), která vysoce převyšuje její podíl na světovém HDP (25 %). Slabý růst v této integraci (0,2 % v letech 2009-2014) vysvětloval zčásti i zpomalení světového obchodu. Vliv EU na pokles sledovaného ukazatele poměru HDP a exportu je však považován za zanedbatelný vzhledem k tomu, že při zpomalení HDP v EU zpomalil i světový růst (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 11).

Ani další faktory bezprostředně vyvolané krizí nepůsobily zásadně negativně na světový obchod. Nárůst protekcionismu ovlivnil např. světové importy pouze o něco více než jednoprocentní změnou v období po finanční krizi. Různé studie uvádějí, že i přes zvýšenou poptávku po ochraně byl nárůst obchodních restrikcí nízký a měl omezené dopady, kompenzované rovněž vlivem globálních obchodních řetězců (WTO 2014; Gawande a kol. 2011). Na druhé straně, jsou-li uvažovány potenciální pozitivní vlivy akcelerující světový obchod, kterými by mohly být pokračující jednání o multilaterální liberalizaci obchodu i uzavírání bilaterální či vícestranné obchodní dohody, jejich vliv je rovněž zatím omezený (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 16).

Hlubší důvod pro zpomalení obchodu je však spatřován v působení *dlohodobějších faktorů*, zejména *strukturálního charakteru* (Constantinescu a kol. 2015). Jde o výše citovanou změnu vztahu mezi světovým obchodem a světovým HDP, která je formulována jako *změna elasticity obchodu*: procentuální změna obchodu vztažená k procentuální změně HDP.

Dlohodobá obchodní elasticita vzrůstala, jak bylo již naznačeno, významně v 90. letech: v období 1986-2000 byl jednoprocentní růst světového HDP spojen s 2,18% růstem obchodu. Elasticita obchodu byla tehdy podstatně vyšší než v období předcházejícím (1970-1985) a následujícím (2001-2013), kdy činila shodně 1,31, a

představovala v 90. letech výraznou strukturální změnu ve vztahu důchodu a obchodu. (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Co bylo příčinou výrazných rozdílů mezi uvedenými obdobími před a po počátku nového tisíciletí? Po r. 2000 postupně klesal, zejména po krizi 2008-2009, jak bylo uvedeno, vliv krátkodobých faktorů a rostl vliv strukturálních činitelů, které měly v posledních letech (2012-2015) asi poloviční podíl na zpomalení obchodu. Jde o skutečnost, že obchod po krizi rostl podstatně pomaleji nikoliv pouze z důvodu pomalého růstu HDP, ale proto, že obchod jako takový reagoval méně výrazně na změnu HDP, tedy byl méně elastický.

V pozadí změn elasticity jsou uváděny jednak změny skladby obchodu, dále skladby HDP a také změny obchodních režimů (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Pokud jde o první příčinu, *změnu skladby obchodu*, tato skutečnost je dána měnící se fragmentací produkce. Podle některých analýz fragmentace produkce rostla v 90. letech; odrazem tohoto procesu pak byla zvýšená obchodní elasticita (Escaith a kol. 2010). Více fragmentovaná produkce totiž při větším počtu dodavatelů komponentů (včetně zahraničních) na jednotku vytvořeného produktu předpokládá větší míru exportu a importu, tedy zvýšení elasticity obchodu. Rostoucí fragmentace je rovněž dávána do souvislosti s rozmachem globálních hodnotových řetězců (GVC) (Gawande a kol. 2014). Oproti 90. letům však později dochází k pomalejší fragmentaci, možná i určité defragmentaci produkce (viz dále) a také k pomalejší expanzi GVC. Příznakem tohoto procesu je pokles hrubého obchodu vůči HDP a na druhé straně nárůst domácí přidané hodnoty, tedy i pokles dlouhodobé elasticity obchodu (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Tyto strukturální změny jsou pozorovatelné v hlavních exportních zemích. V USA se elasticita obchodu k HDP významně snížila ze 3,7 na 1,0. V ČLR došlo ke změně tohoto ukazatele z 1,5 na 1,1. Čína může být názorným příkladem zpomalení fragmentace. Její exportní zboží produkce totiž zaznamenala výrazný pokles podílu importovaných komponentů, který se snížil od poloviny 90. let do současnosti ze 60% na současných přibližně 35 %, přičemž pokles podílu je ještě výraznější v sektoru zpracovatelských exportů. Je tedy velmi zřetelná substituce zahraničních inputů domácími, potvrzovaná i růstem přidané hodnoty domácích čínských firem (Kee a Tang 2015).

Mezi další faktory, které mohou být uvažovány vzhledem k jejich vlivu na obchod, lze řadit *změnu skladby HDP*. Ta působila prostřednictvím poklesu obchodně intenzivních komponentů produktu, jako jsou investice, čímž lze také vysvětlit nižší elasticitu obchodu po globální krizi (Boz a kol. 2014).

Pokud jde o poslední faktor, *změnu obchodního režimu*, resp. protekcionismus, bylo zmíněno, že krátkodobé restriktce v bezprostřední souvislosti s krizí neměly zásadnější dopad na světový obchod. Nicméně lze soudit, že celkově pomalejší postup obchodní liberalizace, který se projevuje od počátku nového tisíciletí

ve srovnání s obdobím 1986-2000, by mohl rovněž přispívat k nižší obchodní elasticitě.

Je tedy možné shrnout, že zhruba polovina poklesu obchodu v posledních letech je přičítána zmíněným strukturálním změnám ve vztahu obchodu a HDP, kdy obchod sice roste pomaleji i kvůli pomalému růstu HDP, ale rovněž z důvodu slabší odezvy obchodu na tvorbu produktu, resp. nižší obchodní elasticity. Podobný strukturální jev může v blízké budoucnosti přetrvávat (Constantinescu a kol. 2015).

Dlouhodobý výhled však nemusí být nutně pesimistický z důvodu probíhající změny skladby mezinárodní výroby. Uvedený pokles fragmentace produkce spojovaný se zmírněním expanze GVC a poklesem obchodu se týká vyspělých zemí jako USA, popř. některých nejvýznamnějších rozvíjejících se ekonomik (Čína). Lze ovšem předpokládat nárůst dělby práce mezi regiony, kde se GVC ještě nevytvořily, jako je jižní Asie, Afrika, či Jižní Amerika. Je proto potřeba uvažovat souvislosti globalizačního posunu nejen se změnami mezinárodního obchodu, ale i s tvorbou produkce, resp. mírou jejího globálního charakteru.

## 7 ZMĚNY MEZINÁRODNÍ VÝROBY

V minulých letech byly již pozorovány a analyzovány některé globální trendy ve světové ekonomice v souvislosti se strukturálními změnami a alokací zejména zpracovatelského průmyslu (srovnej např. Neumann 2014, 2015). V některých vyspělých zemích dochází k určité revitalizaci vybraných zpracovatelských výrobních celků, jejichž celky nebo komponenty byly outsorcovány dříve do rozvojových ekonomik. Důvody návratu tohoto průmyslu jsou ztráta výrazné nákladové výhody rozvojové destinace, nové technologie rozvinutých zemí, snaha přiblížit se více domácímu náročnému spotřebiteli či lepší kontrola nad výrobou v podmínkách rostoucí ekonomické a politické volatility ve světě.

Uvedený proces znamenal narušení trendu, který vrcholil v 90. letech, kdy začaly expandovat GVC, rozvoj informační a komunikační techniky usnadňoval ekonomický styk a zlevňoval přeshraniční koordinaci. Výběry zahraniční lokality, kam byla offshorována výroba, byl silně ovlivněn především nízkými pracovními náklady. Probíhala tedy, jak bylo výše zmíněno, poměrně výrazná *fragmentace světové výroby*.

Nedávný vývoj sice ukazoval náznaky *obratu offshoringu* (tzv. *reshoring*), s možnými důsledky pro defragmentaci výroby a obchod uváděnými výše. Některé známé společnosti (např. Apple, Philips) začaly stěhovat výrobu do mateřských zemí, především z ČLR. Podle agentury Boston Consultancy Group 54 % amerických společností zvažuje nebo již uskutečnilo reshoring (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 17). PricewaterhouseCoopers uvedly na základě výzkumu v eurozóně z podzimu 2014, že téměř 60 % sledovaných firem přesunulo za minulý rok některé aktivity do domácí ekonomiky a necelých 50 % to hodlá udělat v příštích dvanácti měsících. Trend však není dosud jednoznačný. Podle posledně jmenovaného výzkumu totiž v roce 2013

současně 55 % firem signalizovalo offshoring některé části výroby (PWC 2014, s. 14). Nejasný trend proto vyvolává nyní diskusi ohledně možných výsledků alokace výroby.

Nejednoznačnost vyplývá, kromě dalších faktorů, z vývoje pracovních nákladů v lokalitách využívaných k offshoringu. Dřívější předpoklad reshoringu stavěl významně na zvýšení mezd v těchto státech. I přes rostoucí mzdu v rozvojových zemích, která tlačí formálně na návrat výroby, je ovšem mzdová úroveň např. rozvinutých ekonomik Asie a Pacifiku stále několikanásobně vyšší. Z tabulky 3 vyplývá, že průměrná měsíční mzda v Číně je 5-8 krát nižší než v Japonsku či Austrálii, což může dosud pro zahraniční producenty představovat výhodu, zvláště je-li využita pracovní síla v regionu s podprůměrnými platy.

Tab. 3: Průměrná měsíční mzda (USD) ve vybraných zemích Asie a Pacifiku v r. 2013.

| <i>Země</i> | <i>Mzda</i> | <i>Země</i> | <i>Mzda</i> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Indonésie   | 183         | Jižní Korea | 2841        |
| Vietnam     | 197         | Japonsko    | 3320        |
| Filipíny    | 215         | Nový Zéland | 3419        |
| Indie*      | 215         | Austrálie   | 4642        |
| Thajsko     | 391         |             |             |
| Čína        | 613         |             |             |
| Malajsie    | 651         |             |             |

Pramen: Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 18; vlastní zpracování.

\*rok (2011/2012)

Závažná je i skutečnost, že růst mezd v některých rozvojových zemích byl již provázen významným zvýšením produktivity. To omezilo sblížování jejich mzdových nákladů s rozvinutými zeměmi. Rostoucí produktivita buď zamezila zvyšování pracovních nákladů na jednotku produkce (např. Filipíny, Malajsie, Indonésie), toto zvyšování limitovala (Čína, Thajsko), či dokonce jednotkové náklady mírně poklesly (Indie, Jižní Afrika). Ve srovnání s tím ve vyspělých zemích až na výjimky (např. Japonsko, USA) tyto náklady rostly. Vybrané rozvíjející se trhy tedy i nadále poskytují z hlediska nákladů určitý prostor pro offshoring (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 18-19).

Další okolností je to, že některé rozvojové země (ČLR) začínají vyrábět ve větší míře znalostně intenzivní zboží, ačkoliv jednoduché levné zboží zde i nadále převládá. Některé druhy nízkonákladového zboží pak mohou částečně offshorovat do nejméně vyspělých zemí.

Nakonec lze uvést i některá další specifika, jež hovoří dosud ve prospěch offshoringu výroby do méně vyspělých zemí. „Rozvojová“ Evropa (vybrané východoevropské státy) začíná využívat pokročilejší technologie, které ve spojení s poměrně velmi kvalifikovanou a stále relativně levnou pracovní silou mohou

zabezpečit efektivní výrobu se stabilními jednotkovými náklady; pozitivní úlohu zde hraje i dobrý vzdělávací a zdravotní systém spolu s kvalitní infrastrukturou. Předností Asie je naopak velký a pružný pracovní trh. Uvedená pozitiva jsou schopna kompenzovat rostoucí mzdy (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 20-23).

Lze tedy shrnout, že růst mezd v Asii a rozvojové Evropě zatím zpomalil offshoring, jehož tempo se zřejmě nevrátí na předkrizové hodnoty, avšak nezastavil ho. Při konstatování nedostatku přesnějších dat analýzy pouze odhadují, že dosud existuje aktivní offshoringová bilance, i přes růst reshoringu v posledních letech (Leering a Bekjarovski 2015, s. 23-24). Tyto skutečnosti je také nutné brát v úvahu, činíme-li závěry o postupu fragmentace, resp. defragmentace výroby.

## **8 ZÁVĚR**

Na základě předchozího rozboru lze konstatovat, že globalizační proces prochází v posledních dvou až třech dekáдах složitým, proměnlivým vývojem. V 90. letech dosáhla globalizace určitého vrcholu vlivem politických a ekonomických změn: ukončení politicko-ideové bipolarity vedlo ke sjednocení světové ekonomiky. V souladu s tím zintenzivnil proces mezinárodního obchodu posílený pokrokem v multilaterální obchodní liberalizaci, regionální integraci, jež zaznamenala kvalitativní i kvantitativní rozvoj, a pokračující celkové ekonomické liberalizaci. Světová ekonomika současně pocítila pozitivní dopady ekonomické akcelerace vybraných skupin méně vyspělých zemí. Nadnárodní charakter výroby umožnil hlouběji integrovat tyto státy do světové ekonomiky a vytvořit specifický typ mezinárodní dělby práce, vycházející ze značné fragmentace výroby, specifické alokace jejích komponentů (offshoring) a posilování obchodních toků mezi různými skupinami zemí zabezpečované expanzí globálních hodnotových řetězců.

Uvedené faktory můžeme považovat za určité znaky kulminace tradičně definované globalizace. Počátek nového tisíciletí však přinesl komplikace pro globalizační proces, které se promítly postupně do globální krize, zmírnění ekonomického růstu a zpomalení obchodu, společně se změnami regionální alokace výroby.

Lze si položit otázku, zda tyto jevy skutečně představují novou fázi ve stávající globalizační vlně a zda si globalizace udrží dosavadní charakter, nebo projde zásadnější změnou.

Je zřejmé, že v průběhu globalizace dochází po globální krizi k částečné defragmentaci produkce. Výroby se nově soustřeďují jako celky z nákladových příčin více do jednotlivých lokalit, ať už jde vlivem nejnovějších technologií o koncentraci nejvyspělejší produkce do rozvinutých ekonomik, či v případě mid-tech produkce do nejrychleji se rozvíjejících emerging markets, jako Čína; jednodušší výroby jsou pak alokovány do méně rozvinutých států. Tyto skutečnosti mohou vysvětlovat pokles offshoringu produkce ze strany vyspělých ekonomik a rovněž pokles tempa obchodu,



kteřý se promítá v poměru jeho dynamiky vůči růstu světového HDP, konkrétně ve snížení elasticity obchodu. Zvolnění tempa obchodu má tak příčiny nejen cyklické, krátkodobé (globální recese, pokles poptávky), ale i strukturální. Částečně se projevuje i zpomalení obchodní liberalizace, i když nikoliv nárůst přímého protekcionismu.

Pokles offshorovaných výrob je zřetelný, i když offshoring dosud převládá nad zpětným přesunem produkce do domácích ekonomik vlivem rostoucí produktivity ve vybraných zemích, které si navzdory zvýšení pracovních/mzdových nákladů udržují nákladovou konkurenceschopnost. Na této bázi se utváří nová dělba práce, která klade pravděpodobně menší nároky na dynamiku obchodu i expanzi globálních hodnotových řetězců; případně roste regionální zaměření obchodních styků. Obchodní prognózy předpovídají sice později posílení světového obchodu, stejně jako zvýšení poměru růstu obchodu a růstu HDP, avšak vlivem pokračujícího reshoringu nikoliv na předkrizovou úroveň.

Zdá se, že výše analyzované procesy směřují ekonomický vývoj spíše k multipolárnímu uspořádání světové ekonomiky a jsou v jisté kontrapozici k dosavadnímu globalizačnímu trendu: zatím se zpomaluje globální růst a obchod, důraz se však přesouvá na regiony, které se mohou selektivně rozvíjet, byť s různou dynamikou. Globalizace tedy může tendovat k novému scénáři, i když jeho naplnění nemusí být absolutní.

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## ZLOŽITÁ CESTA K EGYPTSKO-IZRAELSKEJ MIEROVEJ ZMLUVE Z ROKU 1979

### THE LONG ROAD TO THE 1979 ISRAELI EGYPTIAN-PEACE TREATY

*Karol R. Sorby*<sup>1</sup>

Októbrová vojna v roku 1973 bola piatou vojnou medzi Egyptom a Izraelom. Po ukončení bojov vo všetkých predošlých vojnách sa politická situácia ocitla v slepej uličke. Októbrová vojna bola prvou vojnou, po ktorej malo nasledovať politické urovanie. V letnom sídle amerických prezidentov, v Camp Davide, bola podpísaná dohoda podpísaná Egyptom, Izraelom a Spojenými štátmi. Skladala sa z dvoch dokumentov, jeden obsahoval hlavné zásady pre „spravodlivé, úplné a trvalé urovanie blízkovýchodného konfliktu“ a vyriešenie palestínskeho problému „vo všetkých aspektoch“. Druhý predkladal rámec pre mierovú zmluvu medzi Egyptom a Izraelom. V tejto štúdiu sa budeme venovať egyptsko-americko-izraelským rokovaniam, ktoré sa začali koncom roku 1973 a vyvrcholili podpisom egyptsko-izraelskej mierovej zmluvy v marci 1979.<sup>2</sup>

Kľúčové slová: októbrová vojna, dohody o odpútaní síl, USA ako jediný prostriedok, zmeny egyptského prístupu, hospodárska politika „otvorených dverí“, nárast islamskej aktivity v Egypte, vylúčenie Egypta z Ligy arabských štátov.

The 1973 October War was the fifth Egyptian-Israeli war. In all previous wars political deadlock followed the ending of hostilities. The October War was the first war to be followed by a political settlement. On 17 September 1978 the Camp David agreement was signed by Egypt, Israel and the United States. It consisted of two documents, one establishing the guiding principles for “a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East

<sup>1</sup> prof. PhDr. Karol Sorby, DrSc. Katedra medzinárodných politických vzťahov, Fakulta medzinárodných vzťahov, Ekonomická univerzita, Dolnozemska cesta 1/b, 852 35 Bratislava 5, e-mail: karol.sorby@euba.sk.

Autor je vedúci vedecký pracovník Ústavu orientistiky SAV, docent Fakulty medzinárodných vzťahov Ekonomickej univerzity v Bratislave, popredný slovenský arabista, historik, vysokoškolský učiteľ a diplomat. Vyštudoval v Bratislave na Filozofickej fakulte Univerzity Komenského. Doktorát získal na Filozofickej fakulte Karlovej univerzity v Prahe. Hodnosť kandidáta historických vied obhájil v Historickom ústave SAV.

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conflict,” and for the resolution of the Palestinian problem “in all its aspects.” The other provided a framework for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This paper will examine the Egyptian-American-Israeli negotiation process, which started in 1973 and culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of March 1979.

Key words: the October War, disengagements agreements, USA as the sole mediator, changes in the Egyptian attitude, economic “open door” policy, growth of Islamic activity in Egypt, Egypt’s expulsion from the League of Arab States

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Hoci prekročenie Suezského prielavu 6. októbra 1973 bolo oslavované ako veľké arabské víťazstvo a výsledok strategického génia egyptského prezidenta Anwara as-Sādāta, zásluhu na ňom mal najmä náčelník generálneho štábu egyptskej armády, generálporučik Sacdaddīn aš-Šādī, ktorý však bol krátko po vojne zbavený funkcie pre názorové rozpory s prezidentom. (Aš-Šādī 1980, s. 245; El-Gamasy 1993, s. 266). Skutočné arabské víťazstvo dosiahli producenti ropy na čele so Saudskou Arábiou, ktorí znížili ťažbu a štvornásobne zvýšili ceny, takže Európe a Japonsku pred príchodom zimy hrozili vážne výpadky dodávok tejto suroviny. Ťažba sa mala znižovať každý mesiac o päť percent, pokiaľ sa Izrael nestiahne zo všetkých území, ktoré obsadil vo vojnách v rokoch 1967 a 1973 a neuzná právo Palestínčanov na sebaurčenie. (Shlaim 2001, s. 327-8). Psychologický efekt takejto „ropnej diplomacie“ bol zničujúci a členovia európskeho Spoločného trhu sa ponáhľali spriatelieť sa s Arabmi, podporiť ich požiadavky na palestínsku štátnosť a dištancovať sa od Izraela. Tento povojnový trend vysvetľuje, prečo Izraelčania, hoci prenikli hlbšie na arabské územie ako kedykoľvek predtým, smútili, zatiaľ čo Arabi sa tešili. Účinnosť „ropnej zbrane“ ešte znásobil Irán, ktorý zvýšil ťažbu aj ceny, aby získal výhodu z arabského ropného embarga (Bell 2005, s. 415-19). Víťazstvo Anwara as-Sādāta bolo aj tak pozoruhodné. Znova otvoril otázku Sinajského polostrova a ďalších území okupovaných Izraelom a odzbrojil svojich arabských kritikov, ktorí ho označovali za chválenkára. Teraz mohol Egypt nasmerovať na vlastný národný kurz.

Triumf Anwara as-Sādāta mal významné dôsledky tak na medzinárodnej, ako aj na domácej úrovni. Na medzinárodnej úrovni vrátil izraelsko-arabský konflikt do centra udalostí a africké štáty sa rozhodli prerušiť diplomatické styky s Izraelom (Goldschmidt 2004, s. 166). Problémy Blízkeho východu hrali v rokovaniach OSN, odkedy bola založená, neporovnateľne väčšiu úlohu, ako bola jeho veľkosť a počet obyvateľstva. Obe superveľmoci v októbri 1973 ukázali hĺbku svojej zaangažovanosti cenou zbraní, ktoré dodali bojujúcim stranám a úsilím ovplyvňovať udalosti tak, aby si posilnili vlastné strategické pozície. (Sella 1981, s. 107). Prezident Richard Nixon hneď po zastavení paľby uviedol všetky ozbrojené sily USA do stavu najvyššej bojovej

pohotovosti v snahe zastrašiť ZSSR pred ďalšou eskaláciou zbrojenia na Blízkom východe (Bell 2005, s. 404).

Vzhľadom na to, že na konci októbrovej vojny sa izraelské sily dostali až na západný breh Suezského prielavu a egyptské boli na východe od neho, hrozilo veľké nebezpečenstvo obnovenia bojov. Henry Kissinger, odišiel na Blízky východ v nádeji, že zorganizuje medzinárodnú mierovú konferenciu, ktorej by spoločne predsedali obe supervelmoci, a nádeje na mierové urovnanie sa zdali reálne (Kissinger 2003, s. 417). Hlavnou starosťou egyptského prezidenta bolo uvoľniť tretiu armádu na Sinaji, ktorú už po dohode o zastavení paľby, obkľúčili izraelské sily. Henry Kissinger sľúbil, že pritlačí na vládu Goldy Meirovej, aby umožnila Egyptanom zásobovať tretiu armádu potravinami a iným nevojenským materiálom. Ani Izrael, ani Egypt nemali záujem púšťať sa do nových bojov na fronte, preto sa dohodli, že povedú priame rokovania v stane postavenom na 101. kilometri cesty Suez-Káhira (El-Gamasy 1993, s. 325; Kissinger 2004, s. 606). Keď Američania a Sovieti vydali spoločné pozvanie na mierovú konferenciu do Ženevy, ktorá sa mala konať koncom decembra 1973, obe strany súhlasili. Sýria účasť odmietla, pretože nebola pozvaná Organizácia pre oslobodenie Palestíny (OOP), ale ženevská konferencia sa aj tak zišla. Po úvodných vystúpeniach delegátov, ktoré trvali celý deň, sa strany dohodli, že rokovania odložia na neurčito, s cieľom využiť čas na technické rokovania o odpútaní nepriateľských síl (Calvocoressi 2001, s. 417).

Nepriame rozhovory medzi Egyptom a Izraelom sprostredkúval Henry Kissinger, keď odštartoval proces, ktorý dostal meno „kyvadlová diplomacia“ medzi Jeruzalemom a Káhirou, aby sa dosiahla aspoň dohoda o odpútaní síl. Anwar as-Sādāt tým, že sa vzdal požiadavky na okamžité stiahnutie Izraela za hranice roku 1967, dokázal zaistiť jeho stiahnutie za líniu vzdialenú 10 km od Suezského prielavu, čo sa zhodovalo s líniou, ktorú egyptské vojská dosiahli na začiatku útoku (Herzog 1982, s. 322). Neskôr, v roku 1974, Henry Kissinger dokázal sprostredkovať podobnú dohodu medzi Izraelom a Sýriou. Tento diplomatický výkon vydláždil cestu pre návštevu Richarda Nixona na Blízky východ, prvú cestu amerického prezidenta po F. D. Rooseveltovi. Americko-egyptské vzťahy, ktoré boli prerušené v roku 1967, sa dramaticky zlepšili, počínajúc výmenou veľvyslancov a obnovou americkej pomoci (Calvocoressi 2001, s. 420).

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Po počiatočných úspechoch arabských armád v októbrovej vojne a dovedy neslýchanom prejave arabskej hospodárskej a politickej solidarity, si Anwar as-Sādāt musel uvedomiť rastúci politický, finančný a strategický význam arabského sveta. V rozhovore pre časopis Time v marci 1974 povedal: „Arabskú jednotu považujem za najväčší výdobytok slávnych októbrových dní ... myslím, že v tomto kurze budeme pokračovať“ (Israeli 1979a, s. 460). V ďalšom vystúpení pred zástupcami egyptských

študentov zo zahraničia, v apríli 1974 s veľkým zveličením hrdo vyhlásil, že „šiesty október zmenil svet vojensky, hospodársky aj politicky. Rovnováha síl sa zmenila rovnako ako mapa Blízkeho východu ... šiesty október nastolil novú arabskú situáciu, ktorá predstavuje najväčšie výdobytky za storočia“ (Israeli a, 1979, s. 466). Preto boli mnohí prekvapení, keď sa rozhodol obetovať možnosti vojenskej a politickej jednoty dosiahnutej v rokoch 1973 – 1974 a stavil na výlučné prostredníctvo USA. Navyše, zmenil egyptské spojenectvá tak, že panarabské smerovanie nahradil zdôrazňovaním „Egypt predovšetkým“, čo mal byť začiatok oddelenia Egypta od svojho arabského prostredia.

Možno si položiť otázku prečo Anwar as-Sādāt napriek správne mu zhodnoteniu skutočnej a potenciálnej sily Arabov a napriek sile egyptského národného (panarabského) cítenia, sa vybral cestou odčlenenia Egypta od hlavného arabského prúdu. Natíska sa odpoveď, že odmietanie egyptského panarabizmu bolo považované za nevyhnutnú súčasť politickej stratégie, ktorá počítala s vyčlenením Egypta z arabského tábora, ktorý bol jednoznačne proti separátnemu mieru s Izraelom. Prezident očakával, že takáto stratégia dokáže Washingtonu nové „umiernené“ smerovanie Egypta, ktoré nazval ideologickou otvorenosťou, aby uľahčil zaradenie Egypta do Američanmi vedeného geopolitického a strategického systému v regióne. Niet totiž pochýb, že Washington si želal v Egypte oslabené panarabské cítenie, keďže tvorcovia jeho politiky považovali panarabizmus automaticky za radikalizmus a nacionalizmus, ktoré sa považovali za hrozbu pre americké záujmy v regióne. Politické kruhy v Egypte a egyptská inteligencia chápali, že vydeľovanie Egypta z hlavného arabského prúdu bolo určené pre uspokojenie Washingtonu (Bahā'addīn 1977, s. 157).

Na druhej strane Anwar as-Sādāt mohol úprimne veriť, že jeho stratégia oddeľovania egyptského nacionalizmu od arabského, sa nakoniec ukáže ako najlepšia nielen pre Egypt, ale aj pre vec Arabov. Bol presvedčený, že iba USA dokážu rozriešiť arabsko-izraelský konflikt, a preto je dôležité, aby sa Egypt už ďalej nedržal myšlienky ozbrojeného boja, ktorý mnohí Arabi – vzhľadom na izraelské odmietanie stiahnuť sa z okupovaných arabských území – ešte stále považovali za nevyhnutný. A jediný spôsob ako dokázať Američanom svoju úprimnosť, bolo ukázať, že už Egypt opustil arabský prúd a teší sa na nové vzťahy s USA. Anwar as-Sādāt nepochybne poskytol veľa náznakov, že Egypt pod jeho vedením sa už nedrží starého spôsobu myslenia, ktorý bol hlavnou charakteristikou prístupu arabských štátov k arabsko-izraelskému konfliktu. V jednom rozhovore v roku 1975 to zhrnul: „Nanešťastie, my v arabskom svete sme stále ovládaní citmi. Povedal som to v Kuvajte. Dokonca aj bez rezolúcie 242 sa Izrael stal skutočnosťou (fait accompli) v hraniciach z roku 1967 z jednoduchého dôvodu, že obe superveľmoci, ktoré ovládajú svet, obhajujú túto skutočnosť“ (Israeli 1979b, s. 912).

Postoj egyptského prezidenta v období po októbrovej vojne bol známy a bol v súlade so závermi arabského summitu konaného v Rabate koncom októbra 1974. Počas



rokovaní s USA a následných rokovaní s Izraelom verejne podporoval postoj, ktorý zhrnul v jednom vystúpení takto: „Kľúčovou otázkou na Blízkom východe je palestínsky problém. Pokým nebude vyriešený, v oblasti nebude pokoj. Palestínsky štát by mal byť vytvorený na Západnom brehu a v pásme Gazy a to by mohlo upokojiť región“ (Israeli 1979a, s. 773). Keď ho kritici obviňovali, že dohody s USA a s Izraelom nie sú v súlade s jeho postojom k arabskej otázke, prezident odpovedal, že sa drží zásad prijatých v Rabate, že jediným legitímnym predstaviteľom Palestínčanov je OOP a že Arabi naďalej trvajú na navrátení okupovaných území. Problémom však zostávalo protirečenie medzi deklarovanou politikou a cieľmi, lebo uskutočnené kroky naznačovali smerovanie k separátnym dohodám, ktoré boli v rozpore s jeho vyhláseniami. Takto Anwar as-Sādāt zbavený možnosti hroziť použitím sily, strácajúci arabskú podporu a nesnažiaci sa zlepšiť si vzťahy Sovietskym zväzom, musel veriť, že jeho viera vo Washington mu umožní dosiahnuť vytýčené ciele a potvrdí múdrosť jeho stratégie. Keby bol vecne zhodnotil povahu americko-izraelských vzťahov a postavenia jednotlivých aktérov, bol by asi zmiernil svoje optimistické predstavy.

Anwar as-Sādāt bol presvedčený, že iba USA môžu zaistiť urovnanie arabsko-izraelského konfliktu, lebo držia 99 % kariet (Bahā'addīn 1977, s. 133). Netajil sa tým, že celá jeho stratégia závisí od toho, či USA vyvinú tlak na Izrael pre dosiahnutie – na základe rokovaní – mierového urovnania konfliktu. Avšak napriek jasným signálom, že USA nereagujú tak ako dúfal, naďalej Washingtonu dôveroval a prijal politiku postupných krokov, bez ohľadu na pretrvávajúcu kritiku, že jeho politika vyčleňuje Egypt z arabského košiara. Naďalej odpovedal kritikom, bez presvedčivého dôkazu, že sleduje zásadnú zmenu americkej politiky v regióne. Tvrdil (29. apríla 1974), že USA nielen garantujú prímerie, ale aj implementáciu rezolúcie 242. To je nový americký postoj voči nám a úplný posun v postoji k mieru v regióne. Oba závery boli jasne nesprávne.

Henry Kissinger, nový americkej architekt politiky, zjavne poľahky presvedčil Anwara as-Sādāta aby uveril, že USA nastúpili úplne novú blízkovýchodnú politiku a on (Kissinger) je poverený, aby ju realizoval v najlepšom záujme všetkých zainteresovaných strán. Anwar as-Sādāt v jednom rozhovore v marci 1974, bez toho, aby si uvedomil, že sám Kissinger pridelil Izraelu úlohu strážcu amerických záujmov v regióne, nešetril chválou na jeho adresu (Israeli 1979a, s. 515). Jeho hodnotenie zahraničnej politiky USA v regióne, ako aj Kissingerov názor na Izrael však nebili podložené ani sledom udalostí ani realistickým odhadom prebiehajúcich skutočností. V skutočnosti Anwar as-Sādāt občas prezradil svoje rozčarovanie a zúfalstvo nad postupom Američanov, ktoré boli v príkrom rozpore s tým, čo hovoril svojim občanom. Prezident zrejme úprimne veril, že USA nemôžu obhajovať izraelské výboje, lebo by to bolo v rozpore s ich oficiálnou politikou. Bol zúfalý z americkej nečinnosti, resp. netrpezlivý z pomalého postupu americkej diplomacie, a zrejme nebral do úvahy, že očakávanie nestrannosti zo strany USA nie je namieste.

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Politické medové týždne medzi Washingtonom a Káhirou zapadali do inej veľkej politickej zmeny Anwara as-Sādāta, ktorú nazval infitāh – otvorenie sa (Hajkal 1988, s. 181). V dobách arabského socializmu Džamāla cAbdannāsira boli všetky veľké podniky v štátnych rukách, takže trieda vlastníkov výrobných prostriedkov bola výrazne oslabená. Napriek tomu mnohí ešte vlastnili dosť pôdy a nehnuteľností, aby žili na nadpriemernej úrovni. Zníženie vlastníctva pôdy na 50 faddānov na osobu v roku 1969 sa dotklo niektorých ľudí, ale táto výmera ešte stále stačila na bezstarostný život, najmä keď sa tam pestovalo ovocie a zelenina, alebo včelstvá a dobytok.

Prvý signál zmien sa objavil v Októbrovom dokumente (Waraqat uktūbar). Bol to nový politický program, ktorý prezident 4. apríla 1974 predložil parlamentu na schválenie. Aj keď dokument formálne vyjadroval lojalitu voči zásadám revolúcie z roku 1952, vrátane socializmu a arabského nacionalizmu tvrdil, že ich uplatňovanie sa musí prispôbiť zmeneným podmienkam (Israeli 1985, s. 200). Októbrový dokument nahrádzal základné programové dokumenty predošlého obdobia ako Chartu národnej akcie z roku 1962, Program 30. marca z roku 1968 a Program národnej akcie z roku 1971, a v hospodárskej politike nastal prechod od revízie socialistickej orientácie k orientácii na trhové hospodárstvo (Gombár 2009, s. 635). Prezident uviedol, že výdobytky nāsirizmu zostanú zachované (v Egypte bolo ešte veľa robotníkov a úradníkov, ktorí sa mali dobre za predošlého režimu), ale niektoré „odchýlky“ druhej polovice 60. rokov budú opravené „otvorením sa“ novému medzinárodnému hospodárskemu prostrediu. Anwar as-Sādāt zatiaľ ukazoval doľava, ale točil sa doprava, ale zakrátko vydal ďalšie vyhlásenia, ktoré fakticky odstránili dedičstvo nāsirizmu (Shehata 2010, s. 24-5).

Infitāh – hospodárska politika otvorených dverí zavedená v Egypte v roku 1974 – bola jednou z hlavných stránok zmeny politiky Džamāla cAbdannāsira. Infitāh odstránil prakticky všetky obmedzenia pre zahraničný kapitál v Egypte v nádeji, že pritiahne zásadné zahraničné investície do egyptského hospodárskeho rozvoja. Z toho dôvodu bol prijatý Zákon 43/1974, povoľujúci zahraničným spoločnostiam investovať do súkromného sektora a vytvárať spoločné podniky (joint venture) s verejným sektorom (Shehata 2010, s. 30). Skutočne boli pritiahnutý veľký objem kapitálu, ale znamenal iba malý reálny príspevok pre dlhodobý produktívny rozvoj (Waterbury 1983, s. 155-6). Veľké sumy kapitálového prílivu mali však hlboké spoločenské dôsledky. Deregulácia trhu, ktorá sprevádzala injekcie zahraničnej pomoci (prvotný zdroj zahraničných kapitálových vkladov) pritiahol cudzie podniky a stimuloval rozvoj domáceho súkromného obchodu v súťaži o doláre zo zahraničnej pomoci. Vznikla zvláštna sociálna vrstva okolo priemyslu zahraničnej pomoci, pestujúca rast

spotrebného priemyslu závislého od importu. To následne prispelo k nadmernej stimulácii spotrebného trhu s cudzím tovarom v Egypte na ujmu domáceho tovaru a služieb (Hajkal 1988, s. 181-4).

Arabský socializmus však vytvoril aj novú buržoáziu, triedu manažérov, ktorí sa vyšvihli v štátnych podnikoch a niektorí našli spôsoby ako sa obohacovať na úkor štátnej pokladnice. Tak príslušníci starej ako aj novej buržoázie dúfali, že sa uvoľnia pevné opraty zostávajúce ako dedičstvo arabského socializmu. Navyše, Anwar as-Sādāt videl rastúce bohatstvo arabských ropných štátov ako bohatý zdroj kapitálu (Waterbury 1983, s. 133). Dúfal tiež, že sa mu podarí pritiahnúť späť aj časť egyptského kapitálu, ktorý spolu s kapitalistami unikol za hranice následkom politiky arabského socializmu, popri ďalších zdrojoch (remitencie), ktoré Egyptania zarobili v posledných rokoch v zahraničí.

Októbrová vojna znásobila hodnotu arabskej ropy a vzrástla príťažlivosť Egypta ako krajiny, do ktorej sa oplatí investovať výnosy (Kňazev 1986, s. 82-3). Po prvý raz sa prezident stal v Egypte populárnym; Egyptania počúvali keď oznamoval nové iniciatívy a zlepšila sa pracovná morálka. Egypt začal obnovovať mestá na západ od priplavu, Port Saíd, Ismācīlīju, Suez a ďalšie. Rekonštrukčné práce sa stali zlatou baňou pre egyptských stavebných podnikateľov, z ktorých najväčším bol prezidentov priateľ cUtmān Aḡmad cUtmān (Waterbury 1983, s. 181-3). Jeho spoločnosť pracovala na Vysokej priehrade a ďalších stavebných projektoch v arabských ropných štátoch. Propaganda pracovala na plné obrátky, aby útočila na výdobytky dosiahnuté v období Džamāla cAbdannāḡira a poukazovala na to, že jeho politika priniesla iba porážky a závislosť od ZSSR. Na druhej strane vyzdvihovala Anwara as-Sādāta, ktorému pripísala zásluhu za prekročenie Bar-Levovej línie, za úspechy ropného embarga a za čiastočnú izraelskú evakuáciu (Hajkal 1975, s. 333-9). Výsledkom tejto kampane bolo odmietnutie predošlej politiky nepriateľstva voči Izraelu, obnovenie vzťahov s USA a otvorenie krajiny slobodnému podnikaniu a zahraničným investorom.

Zatiaľ čo väčšina egyptského obyvateľstva videla len málo úžitku, ak vôbec nejaký, z hospodárskej politiky Anwara as-Sādāta, z infitāḡu obrovsky profitovala privilegovaná menšina. V egyptskej spoločnosti dramaticky vzrástla vrstva boháčov – z 500 milionárov v roku 1975 na 17 tisíc v roku 1981 (Hajkal 1988, s. 181). Táto mimoriadne bohatá a mocná egyptská buržoázia (tzv. tučné mačky), ktorá zbohatla vďaka príjmom z rozšírených hospodárskych kontaktov so Západom, sa stala novou silou v egyptskej politike. S jej rastom očividne vzrástol aj rozsah korupcie v egyptskej spoločnosti. To ostro kontrastovalo s ožbračovaním mestských stredných vrstiev, najmä zamestnancov verejného sektoru, ktorí videli, že ich životná úroveň je narušená infláciou a ktorí sa stávali stále viac závislými od štátnych podpôr. Kontrastovalo to aj s vazalizáciou roľníckej populácie, keďže rozdeľovanie poľnohospodárskej pôdy a produkcie bolo deregulované (Vatikiotis 1985, s. 427). Ďalej infitāh priniesol so sebou aj príval západných myšlienok a materializmus, ktorý hrozil zaplaviť tradičné hodnoty

egyptských muslimských más. Ako odpoveď na takéto odcudzenie a obranu tradičných hodnôt, významný počet egyptských muslimov (najmä mladých a z nižšej strednej vrstvy) sa obrátil k neoaktivistickému islamu.

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Keď Anwar as-Sādāt dokázal priniesť mier, Egyptania dúfali, že sa zbavia ťaživých nákladov piatich vojen, ktoré vybojovali (a trvajúcich zbrojných pretekov) s Izraelom. Hoci prezident ešte stále slovné podporoval arabský nacionalizmus, prešiel k politike „Egypt predovšetkým“, ktorá sa lepšie zhodovala s približovaním sa jeho krajiny k rozvinutému Západu. Zlom nastal v septembri 1975, keď Henry Kissinger dokázal presvedčiť obe strany, uzavreli druhú sinajskú dohodu. Za ďalší ústup izraelských vojsk za priesmyky Džiddī a Mītlā, sa Anwar as-Sādāt zriekol vojny ako prostriedku na urovnanie izraelsko-arabského konfliktu a súhlasil s obmedzením počtu egyptských vojsk a tankov na navrátených územiach východne od Suezského prieplyvu a Suezského zálivu. Hoci Henry Kissinger a Anwar as-Sādāt tvrdili, že diplomacia postupných krokov vracia Egyptu územia (najmä sinajské ropné polia), ktoré stratil vo vojne, kritici cítili, že dobrý obchod urobil Izrael a že skutočná cena, ktorú Egypt zaplatí, je strata vedúceho postavenia v arabskom svete (Riad 1981, s. 295). Zavraždenie saudskoarabského kráľa Fajsala a vypuknutie občianskej vojny v Libanone len zvýraznilo obraz arabskej politickej nestability (Vadney 1992, s. 445).

Anwar as-Sādāt, presvedčený o svojej politickej prezieravosti, stále dôveroval Washingtonu a 1. júna 1975 v Salzburgu počas návštevy prezidenta Geralda Forda, súhlasil, že Suezský prieplyv bude znova otvorený pre plavbu napriek tomu, že Izraelčania odmietli jeho rozumnú žiadosť, stiahnuť jednotky na bezpečnú vzdialenosť od prieplyvu. Prieplyv bol otvorený 5. júna 1975, čím bola splnená prvá požiadavka Izraela pre prijatie dohody o neútočení, keďže tým bol Egypt zbavený možnosti obnoviť prípadné vojenské oslobodenie okupovaného územia. Odmietol každú kritiku, že podľahol americkému tlaku a izraelskému vydieraniu a svoj krok označil za diplomatické víťazstvo (Israeli 1979b, s. 902). Prezident, aby zakryl svoje beznádejné postavenie, sa čoraz častejšie uchýľoval k veľkým gestám. Autoritárska povaha egyptského režimu sa prejavila v početných nezhodách prezidenta s najvyššími administratívnymi kruhmi, osobitne v rezorte zahraničných vecí, ktoré sa chceli vyhnúť závislosti od jedného štátu, prezident vsadil všetko na svoje presvedčenie, že USA nakoniec prinútia Izrael, aby sa stiahol z okupovaných arabských území.

Dvoma dohodami o odpútaní síl z rokov 1974 a 1975 v americkej réžii, sa Anwar as-Sādāt vydal na cestu rovnako pripraveného mieru, ktorého cenou – ako si musel byť vedomý – bude nastolenie egyptsko-americko-izraelského strategického spojenectva na úkor tradičnej úlohy Egypta v arabskom svete. Keď prijal túto líniu, natoľko znížil svoje rokovacie možnosti, že tie teraz spočívali na tom, čo sú USA a Izrael ochotné ponúknuť. Vzhľadom na to, že strategickým cieľom Henryho

Kissingera bolo oddeliť Egypt od arabských a palestínskych požiadaviek a ďalej izolovať „radikálne“ sily v regióne a tým oslabiť sovietsky vplyv a vydlážiť cestu urovnaniu prijateľnému pre Izrael, podarilo sa mu dosiahnuť tento cieľ takmer bez odporu Egypta. Svojou horlivou snahou dosiahnuť urýchlené prijatie do amerického tábora, Anwar as-Sādāt urobil ústupky, ktoré rozladili členov vlády, udivili jeho amerických priateľov a potešili jeho izraelských nepriateľov.

Anwar as-Sādāt často menil rozhodnutia vlády „ako pozornosť“ voči americkým priateľom. Okrem toho zásadné rozhodnutia prijímal sám na osobných stretnutiach s vedúcimi predstaviteľmi USA a Izraela bez toho, aby o nich informoval členov vlády. Túto situáciu výstižne charakterizoval Muḩammad ḩasanajn Hajkal, keď napísal, že Anwar as-Sādāt nedokázal rozoznať veľkosť víťazstva, ktoré mal v roku 1974 na dosah. Vtedy mal v rukách všetky tromfy: ropnú zbraň, podporu arabskej a značnej časti svetovej verejnej mienky a ZSSR bol stále pripravený podporiť ho. On sa však tomu všetkému otočil chrbtom. Namiesto toho si vybral vojenské prehliadky na počesť víťazstva a obdiv kamier. Ignoroval svojich arabských spojencov a priateľov a rozhodol sa, že región prebuduje sám so svojím priateľom Henrym Kissingerom (Golan 1976, s. 152; Hajkal 1988, s. 141).

A tak kým minister zahraničných vecí Ismācīl Fahmī chcel posilňovať arabskú jednotu pod egyptským vedením, prezident považoval vedúcu úlohu Egypta za samozrejmu. Kým minister naliehal na rozvíjanie vzťahov so ZSSR, ktoré by boli protiváhou jednostranného prozápadného kurzu, prezident, napriek ťažkostiam pri získavaní dodávok zbraní z USA, to odmietal (Fahmy 1983, s. 175). Zhoršovanie vzťahov so ZSSR nezaručovalo Egyptu zlepšené vzťahy s USA kde škandál „Watergate“ spôsobil zjavnú politickú nestabilitu, napriek obnoveniu potravinovej pomoci podľa Zákona 480 (Burns 1985, s. 220). Anwar as-Sādāt so sklamaním sledoval stále užšie vzťahy USA s Izraelom a nenadchlo ho ani zvolenie Jimmyho Cartera, lebo Demokratická strana bola tradične viac proizraelská ako republikáni a bol presvedčený, že Henry Kissinger je jeho priateľ. Nepáčila sa mu ani snaha prezidenta Jimmyho Cartera dosiahnuť úplné arabsko-izraelské urovanie za účasti Palestínčanov a ZSSR (Finkelstone 1996, s. 222).

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Egypt si mal vziať poučenie zo svojho päťročného zásahu do jemenskej občianskej vojny, aby nezasahoval do arabských sporov, ale Anwar as-Sādāt „sa stal pilierom Reaganovej protikomunistickej politiky v oblasti“ a bez váhania posielal jednotky egyptskej armády zasahovať v Ománe, Líbyi, v Čade a v Zaire (Hajkal 1988, s. 448). Rozdiel medzi ním a jeho predchodcom bol ten, že kým Džamāl cAbdannāḩir bojoval v Jemene, aby pomohol republikánskej vláde nahradiť reakčnú monarchiu, Anwar as-Sādāt použil egyptské ozbrojené sily, aby pomohli Západu potláčať oslobodzovacie hnutia. Bolo prirodzené, že za týchto okolností mu ZSSR znížil a

nakoniec zastavil vojenskú pomoc, pričom ho obvinil, že ťahá Egypt do imperialistického tábora. Anwar as-Sādāt sa sťažoval, že Sovietsi zadržávajú zbrane a náhradné diely a odmietajú súhlasiť, aby Egypt reštrukturalizoval platby svojich dlhov. Koncom roku 1975, keď inflácia prekročila úroveň 30 % a zahraničné investície zaostávali, egyptská vláda si brala krátkodobé pôžičky za úroky blížiacie sa k 17 % ročne a egyptský dlh u ZSSR prekračoval 7 miliárd USD (Sella 1981, s. 134).

Keďže v rokoch 1975 a 1976, na Egypt tlačili tak arabskí, ako aj západní veritelia, egyptská vláda, aby zlepšila prítlačivosť svojej ekonomiky pre zahraničný kapitál, znižovala vládne výdavky a devalvovala egyptskú libru. Jednako rozhovory o odpútaní síl s Izraelom v rokoch 1974 – 1975, politika „otvorených dverí“ a zreteľná orientácia na Západ, najmä na USA, priniesli oveľa skromnejšie výsledky ako prezident očakával. Zostával obrovský dlh u ZSSR za dodaný vojenský materiál, zahraniční investori boli opatrní, očakávaná pomoc od bohatých ropných štátov neprichádzala a masívne dotácie do základných potravinových a spotrebných článkov museli pokračovať (Waterbury 1983, s. 171). Odmietnutie Moskvy urobiť zmeny v platobných podmienkach nahnevali Anwara as-Sādāta, preto v marci 1976 egyptská vláda jednostranne vypovedala Sovietsko-egyptskú zmluvu o priateľstve a spolupráci z roku 1971, ktorá bola jednou z hlavných opôr Egypta v jeho boji za upevnenie nezávislosti a za odstránenie dôsledkov izraelskej agresie v roku 1967. Tým ukončil prenájom egyptských námorných zariadení sovietskej flotile a nakoniec vyhlásil, že nevyplatí 1,5 miliardy USD za posledné zbrojné dodávky. Tým si znepriatelil sovietsku vládu, ktorá začala hľadať užšie zväzky s inými arabskými režimami (El-Hussini 1987, s. 206-7).

Anwar as-Sādāt s nedôverou hľadel na nářirovské tendencie v Arabskom socialistickom zväze (ASZ). Uvedomil si, že musí pripustiť väčšiu slobodu prejavu a pluralitu politických strán, preto v marci 1976, povolil vytvorenie viacerých frakcií reprezentujúcich v ASZ odlišnú politickú orientáciu. Po dlhom uvažovaní boli v rámci ASZ vytvorené tri oficiálne platformy alebo tribúny (minbar): Strana demokratické socialistické unionistické zoskupenie (Hizb at-Tadžammuc al-wahdawī al-iřtirākī ad-dīmuqrātī) reprezentujúca ľavicu, Strana Misr (Hizb Misr) reprezentujúca stred a Liberálna strana (Hizb al-ahrār) reprezentujúca pravicu. Tieto tri strany sa v roku 1976 zúčastnili volieb, v ktorých v 352 členom Ľudovom zhromaždení (Madžlis ař-řačb) režimom podporovaná platforma stredú získala 280 kresiel, liberálna platforma 12 kresiel a ľavicová platforma 2 kreslá (Hilal 2002, s. 211; Cooper 1982, s. 205). Stojí za zmienku, že z 1660 registrovaných kandidátov vo voľbách 897 boli nezávislí (Beattie 2000, s. 197). Krátko po parlamentných voľbách prezident oznámil premenu týchto troch platforiem na politické strany, pričom Strana Misr, ktorá slúžila ako jeho vlastná frakcia, sa stala dominantnou, režimom riadenou stranou a zvyšným dvom stranám pripadla úloha opozície.

Začiatkom roku 1977 sa Anwar as-Sādāt musel stiahnuť zo sveta medzinárodných vzťahov, aby čelil výzve svojej moci doma. Rastúci egyptský zahraničný dlh viedol k ťaživým splátkam, ktoré v tom čase boli vyššie ako ročná hodnota vývozu tovarov a služieb. To musela zaplatiť väčšina Egyptanov. Medzinárodný menový fond v snahe pomôcť Egyptu posilniť hospodárstvo, navrhol o. i., aby boli štátne dotácie na niektoré spotrebné tovary znížené. Politika dotovania nízkych cien chleba, ryže, cukru, čaju, tuku na varenie, plynu v propán-butánových fľašiach, petroleja a ďalších potrebných tovarov sa začala počas druhej svetovej vojny, na uľahčenie života chudobných vrstiev. Keďže Egypt v roku 1976 dovážal viac ako polovicu pšenice, ktorú obyvateľstvo spotrebovalo, vláda musela vyčleniť obrovské sumy na pokrytie týchto dovozov, aby udržala ceny chleba a múky na umelo nízkej úrovni (Hinnebusch 1988, s. 71).

Keď egyptská vláda nakoniec v januári 1977 prijala isté opatrenia a znížila dotácie na vyše dva tucty spomínaných základných tovarov, v celom Egypte vypukli obrovské nepokoje, počas ktorých 70 ľudí zomrelo po zrážkach s bezpečnostnými silami a vyše 1 200 bolo uväznených (Hajkal 1988, s. 186-9. Hoci vina za januárové nepokoje bola pripísaná na vrub ľavice, bolo známe, že sa ich zúčastnili aj militantné islamské skupiny (Mortimer 1982, s. 291). Konečnou črtou infitāhu – úzko spätou s uvedenými stránkami – bol masový odchod egyptských pracujúcich do arabských ropných štátov. V roku 1978 sa odhadovalo, že skoro 1,5 milióna Egyptanov pracuje mimo vlastnej krajiny. Navyše, Egypt sa stával čoraz závislejším od remitencií, ktoré posielali domov títo pracujúci v zahraničí (Waterbury 1983, s. 212).

Pozitívnu stránkou politiky otvorených dverí bola zdanlivá hospodárska obnova Egypta. Jej najzjavnejšou stránkou bol obrovský stavebný rozmach v mestách v oblasti priplavu, ktorý umožnil ich obyvateľom, aby sa do nich niekoľko rokov po vojne vrátili. Stavebníctvo dostalo priestor aj v Káhire a Alexandrii (Cooper 1982, s. 207). Keď v roku 1977 prekročil počet egyptského obyvateľstva 40 miliónov, oživil sa plány na vybudovanie satelitných miest v púštnych oblastiach v okolí Káhiry a inde. Iným sprievodným znakom infitāhu bol návrat zahraničných bánk, vrátane amerických ako Chase-Manhattan a Bank of America, aby podnikali v novom Egypte. Kým predtým najväčšia pôžička akú kedy Egypt dostal od Svetovej banky bolo 60 miliónov USD na rozšírenie Suezského priplavu, v rokoch 1974 – 1975 dostal 227 mil. USD (Hajkal 1988, s. 174). Súkromné zahraničné investície prichádzali hlavne z arabských štátov a Iránu, ktoré vkladali svoje zvýšené príjmy z ropy viac do nehnuteľností ako do výrobných podnikov, ale Anwar as-Sādāt vymámil veľké sumy peňazí od vládcov Saudskej Arábie a Kuvajtu. Egyptu sa však nepodarilo pritiahnuť americký, európsky a japonský kapitál v takej miere ako sa očakávalo.

Najväčší úžitok z tohto rozmachu mala egyptská buržoázia, ktorá oslavovala svoj návrat po rokoch socializmu tým, že investovala svoje peniaze do pozemkov v mestách, do vil, bytov a hotelov a menej do výrobných podnikov (Hinnebusch 1988, s.

50). Pre roľníkov infitáh znamenal koniec pridelovania pôdy z veľkostatkov, zhoršené služby od vidieckych družstiev a zdravotných stredísk, zhoršujúce sa platobné podmienky za ich produkciu. Egypt, ktorý bol po stáročia vývozcom obilia, sa od konca 50. rokov stal ich dovozcom. Nová hospodárska politika urobila z Egypta exportéra vlastného obyvateľstva, roľníkov rovnako ako inžinierov, lekárov, učiteľov a remeselníkov, ktorí za lepšími mzdami odchádzali do bohatých arabských štátov (Waterbury 1983, s. 212). Z hľadiska 2,5 % ročného prírastku obyvateľstva, emigrácia bola krátkodobou výhodou, ale rozdeľovala rodiny a vytvárala nové nerovnosti v príjmoch a nedostatok kvalifikovaných robotníkov a roľníkov. Robotníci v súkromných spoločnostiach zarábali v nových pomeroch viac ako tí, ktorí pracovali v upadajúcich podnikoch verejného sektoru. Vzhľadom na rozbužnenú byrokráciu, cenová inflácia prekonala rast miezd pre štátnych úradníkov, učiteľov v školách a univerzitách, lekárov a zdravotných sestier v štátnych nemocniciach a iných štátnych zamestnancov (Hinnebusch 1988, s. 70).

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Odporúčanie MMF znepokojilo väčšinu ministrov, ale pre zvyšujúci sa dlh Egypt už nebol pánom svojho hospodárskeho života. Vláda teda ukončila dotovanie tovarov, ktoré nepatrili k najnutnejším ako pivo, hladká múka, kryštálový cukor, biely chlieb a cestoviny a obmedzila ho len na obyčajný chlieb, tuk na varenie, bôb a šošovicu. Oznámenie týchto opatrení vyvolalo najväčšie nepokoje v Egypte od roku 1952 (Hajkal 1988, s. 186-7). Chudoba vyšla do ulíc protestujúc proti opatreniam pričom dochádzalo k útokom na obchody s luxusným tovarom a na nočné podniky. Keď polícia nedokázala potlačiť nepokoje, vláda použila špeciálne jednotky armády a v zrážkach zahynulo niekoľko stovák demonštrantov. Ľudia neprotestovali proti infitáhu za to, že bol liberálny, ale pre vzrastajúcu nerovnosť. Rozsiahle násilné nepokoje v januári 1977 poukazovali na politické riziko, ktoré hrozilo vláde keby siahla na túto stránku sociálneho štátu (Kňazev 1986, s. 154-9).

Vláda okamžite obnovila všetky dotácie na tovary bez ohľadu na náklady, len aby sa zabránilo ďalším nepokojom. Táto politika sa stala jednou zo skutočných príčin vyplácania veľkých súm americkej pomoci poskytovanej od roku 1979. Okrem toho pohraničná vojna s Líbyou v júli 1977, zvyšujúca sa miera muslimského extrémizmu a pokusy Carterovej administratívy obnoviť ženevskú konferenciu, pohnali egyptského prezidenta k tomu, aby dramaticky zmenil svoju politiku. Napriek tomu, že sa ocitol v slepej uličke a hrozili mu nepokoje vyplývajúce z obrovskej nespokojnosti ľudu, Anwar as-Sādāt urobil ďalšie z dramatických krokov, ktorými sa preslávilo jeho funkčné obdobie. Vo februári 1977 zorganizoval referendum, ktorého otázky boli formulované tak, aby mu dali zdanie bezvýhradnej ľudovej podpory (Beattie 2000, s. 222).



Úspešné referendum prezident využil tak, že v novembri 1977 odletel do Jeruzalema, aby oslovil izraelský parlament. Žiaden arabský vodca verejne nerokoval s nijakým izraelským vodcom, nieto aby tento štát navštívil, od jeho vzniku v roku 1948. Anwar as-Sādāt jasne povedal novinárom, že nejde uznať Izrael alebo s ním uzavrieť mier bez súhlasu ostatných Arabov (Bell 2005, s. 407). Väčšina expertov sa domnievala, že volebná kampaň, ktorá vtedy prebiehala v Izraeli, udrží pri moci koalíciu Strany práce a Anwar as-Sādāt sa pripravoval, že bude rokovať so Šimonom Peresom, ktorého považovali za liberálneho v arabských záležitostiach, ale víťazom izraelských volieb sa neočakávane stal Menachem Begin, ultrapravicový vodca koalície Likud (Hajkal 1988, s. 193).

V prejave pred parlamentom 9. novembra 1977 Anwar as-Sādāt oznámil, že pri hľadaní mieru s Izraelom je ochotný ísť až na koniec sveta alebo dokonca do knesetu v Jeruzaleme (Israeli 1985, s. 228). Keď sa ho americkí žurnalisti a delegáti kongresu pýtali či to myslí vážne, prezident potvrdil svoju ochotu rokovať priamo s Beginovou vládou. Iste, keď sa pýtali Menachema Begina ako odpovie na takú iniciatívu odpovedal, že s potešením pozve Anwara as-Sādāta na návštevu Izraela a uzavrie mier. V priebehu dvoch týždňov, ignorujúc naliehavé prosby mnohých štátnikov arabských krajín (a viacerých členov vlastnej vlády), aby nešiel, prezident sa vydal na cestu. Na letisku v Tel Avive ho vítal izraelský prezident, premiér a celá vláda. Počas jednodňovej návštevy Anwar as-Sādāt položil veniec k pamätníku neznámeho izraelského vojaka, pomodlil sa v mešite al-Aqšā a predniesol výrečný prejav v knesete (Shlaim 2001, s. 360-1; As-Sādāt 1978, s. 323-5). Aj keď jeho mierové podmienky boli rovnaké ako predtým – stiahnutie izraelských vojsk zo všetkých okupovaných území a právo na sebaurčenie palestínskeho ľudu – skutočnosť, že prišiel do Jeruzalema a uznal jeho existenciu (s hlavným mestom Jeruzalemom) zdramatizovalo jeho túžbu po mieri a postavilo Begina do pozície, kde väčšina ľudí očakávala, že urobí podobné ústupky. Tie však nikdy neurobil.

Toto bol prvý zo série krokov, ktoré viedli k Američanmi sprostredkovaným rokovaniam medzi Izraelom a Egyptom a k podpísaniu formálnej mierovej zmluvy. Za týchto podmienok sa Izrael zaviazal, že sa v priebehu troch rokov stiahne zo Sinajského polostrova. Egypt súhlasil s tým, aby izraelské lode plávali cez Suezský prieplyv a medzi oboma štátmi boli naviazané plné diplomatické a obchodné vzťahy. USA boli ručiteľom zmluvy, ktorý mal dohliadať na sťahovanie izraelských vojsk zo Sinajského polostrova a jeho následnú demilitarizáciu, pričom sa zaviazal, že bude poskytovať obom štátom vojenskú a hospodársku pomoc. Otázka palestínskej autonómie bola odsunutá kým nebudú ukončené kroky vytvárajúce dvojstranné vzťahy a dôveru. (Shlaim 2001, s. 368-9).

Mnohí zahraniční pozorovatelia sa obávali, že prezidenta zavraždia počas alebo po návšteve do Jeruzalema, keďže mnohých Palestínčanov táto cesta mimoriadne nahnevala. Po návrate do Káhiry ho však očakávalo búrlivé privítanie. Bolo jasné, že

mnohí Egypťania túžili po mieri, najmä za podmienok, ktoré prezident stanovil vo svojom prejave. Marxistická ľavica a islamská pravica však nemali také pocity, aj dvaja egyptskí ministri zahraničných vecí rezignovali krátko po sebe. Z arabských vlád otvorene podporili túto politiku Sudán, Maroko, Jordánsko a Omán (Beattie 2000, s. 229). Väčšina západných vlád a obyvateľov zdravili túto novú mierovú iniciatívu. Carterova administratíva, aj keď bola prekvapená, rýchlo podporila Anwara as-Sādāta a vyradila svoje plány na nové zvolanie ženevskej konferencie a na hľadanie všeobecného urovnania za účasti Palestínčanov (Quandt 2001, s. 194-6).

Anwar as-Sādāt okamžite zvolal medzinárodnú mierovú konferenciu do hotela Mena House pri pyramídach, ale dostavili sa iba USA a Izrael. Menachem Begin 25. decembra 1977 opätovoľ návštevu, ale jeho rozhovory s Anwarom as-Sādātom neposunuli mierový proces dopredu (Riad 1981, s. 308). Počas januára 1978 obe strany vytvorili vojenské a politické komisie, aby pracovali na technických otázkach mierového urovnania, ale potom čo Menachem Begin predniesol necitlivý prejav, Egypt rokovania prerušil. Jablkom sváru bol Sinajský polostrov. Begin ponúkol vrátenie polostrova, ale Izraelčania si chceli ponechať existujúce židovské osady ako prístav Jamit, kým Egypťania chceli ich vyprázdnenie a vrátenie (Fahmy 1983, s. 285). Citlivý problém predstavovali Palestínčania pod izraelskou správou, ktorým sa egyptské stanovisko nepáčilo, ale mnohí Egypťania to chápali ako nevďak za obeť, ktoré pre nich priniesli v piatich vojnách proti Izraelu. Mierová iniciatíva Anwara as-Sādāta vzbudila nádeje ľudí, že arabsko-izraelský konflikt bude čoskoro vyriešený. Na druhej strane väčšina arabských štátov cítila, že Egypt je nevďačný a zle sa im odmenil za morálnu a finančnú podporu, ktorú mu poskytovali od roku 1967. Na zúženom stretnutí na najvyššej úrovni v decembri 1977 v líbyjskom Tripolise odmietli separátne egyptsko-izraelské mierové rozhovory a vytvorili Front neustúpnosti a odmietania (Džabhat as-sumūd wa-t-tasaddī).

Administratíva Jimmyho Cartera bola ochotná uchýliť sa k heroickým opatreniam, len aby priniesla mier na Blízky východ. Anwar as-Sādāt chcel dosiahnuť úplnú dohodu, ktorá by obsahovala aj klauzulu o palestínskom štáte, eufemisticky nazvanom „domovina“. Izrael a jeho prívrženci nechceli vrátiť okupovaný Západný breh a pásma Gazy Palestínčanom, v obave, že by sa tieto územia dostali pod vládu OOP. Ak Jimmy Carter, Anwar as-Sādāt a Menachem Begin chceli mier, museli vymyslieť vzájomne prijateľný plán pre Palestínčanov. Nasledovali viaceré stretnutia na rozličných úrovniach a nakoniec sa títo traja vedúci predstavitelia zišli v septembri 1978 v Camp Davide (štát Maryland) letnom sídle amerických prezidentov na stretnutí, kde sa po dvojtýždňových rokovaní podpísali mierové dohody (Hinnebusch 1988, s. 67).

Výsledkom rokovaní v Camp Davide bol návrh separátnej mierovej zmluvy medzi Izraelom a Egyptom, ktorá sa netýkala ostatných arabských krajín a vágne formulovaný „rámec“ poskytujúci „autonómiu“ pre obyvateľov pásma Gazy a

Západného brehu, ktorý sa mal dosiahnuť do piatich rokov pod vedením dočasnej samosprávnej administratívy. Kráľ Husajn mal byť prizvaný na rokovania, ale on sa odmietol zúčastniť. Zdanie bratských pocitov medzi vedúcimi predstaviteľmi bolo dojemné, ale klamlivé. Menachem Begin celou osobnosťou a neústupnosťou dráždil nielen Anwara as-Sādāta, ale aj Jimmyho Cartera, ale on len obhajoval záujmy vlastnej krajiny lepšie ako ostatní. Stiahnutie vojsk zo Sinajského polostrova malo nasledovať v postupných krokoch a Egypt mal nadviazať plné diplomatické styky s Izraelom bez ohľadu na škody, ktoré to spôsobí jeho vzťahom s ostatnými arabskými krajinami. Obe strany mali ďalej rokovať o dosiahnutí „autonómie“ pre Palestínčanov pod izraelskou vládou, Begin totiž nemal rád slovo „samospráva“ a mal iné predstavy o obsahu rokovaní (Quandt 2001, s. 237). Skeptici to interpretovali tak, že budú môcť slobodne opustiť okupované územia a odstáť sa do iných arabských krajín. Beginova vláda rýchlo ukázala, že Palestínčania nezískajú nijakú kontrolu nad vlastnými životmi; oznámila, že na Západnom brehu bude naďalej budovať židovské osady a doterajšie rozširovať.

Keď sa plánovali mierové rozhovory v Camp Davide, k Frontu neústupnosti a odmietania vytvorenému radikálnymi arabskými štátmi sa pripojili Tunisko, Jordánsko a nakoniec aj Maroko. Arabskí vodcovia sa zišli, aby odmietli postup Anwara as-Sādāta. Ponúkali mu miliardy USD na hospodársku pomoc, keď sa vráti do arabského „košiaru“ a ukončí svoju mierovú iniciatívu, ale zbytočne. Nikto sa potom nemohol čudovať, prečo ostatné arabské štáty odsúdili dohody z Camp Davidu. Aj Jordánsko a Saudská Arábia sa pripojili k Frontu neústupnosti a odmietania vedeného Irakom a Sýriou napriek tomu, že minister zahraničných vecí USA Cyrus Vance navštívil Ammán, Damask a Rijád a snažil sa získať podporu pre mierovú dohodu (Finkelstone 1996, s. 234; Riad 1981, s. 314-5).

Na pozvanie Iraku sa v dňoch 1.-4. novembra 1978 konala v Bagdade konferencia na najvyššej úrovni, na ktorej chýbali iba Omán a Sudán. Na tomto „summite odmietnutia“ prítomní vládcovia odsúdili dohodu a poslali do Káhiry delegáciu s ponukou pomoci vo výške 2 miliardy USD, keď nebude podpísaná mierová zmluva s Izraelom. Anwar as-Sādāt však odmietol delegáciu prijať. A tak bagdadska konferencia odhlasovala rezolúciu, že v prípade podpisu mierovej zmluvy s Izraelom, arabské štáty zastavia Egyptu doterajšiu hospodársku pomoc a bude voči nemu uplatnený hospodársky a politický bojkot (Beattie 2000, s. 229).

Podpis Anwara as-Sādāta na zmluve s Izraelom ešte nebol istý, keď požadoval od Izraela podrobný časový rozvrh na odovzdanie kontroly nad Západným brehom a pásmom Gazy. Cyrus Vance nevedel urobiť viac ako získať od Izraela hmlistý záväzok rokovať. To bolo pre Egypt príliš málo a americká skupina medzinárodných právnikov a odborníkov na Blízky východ nedokázala vymyslieť formulu, ktorá by vyhovovala požiadavkám Jeruzalema aj Káhiry. Jimmy Carter sa znova musel stretnúť s oboma stranami, kým súhlasili s kompromisnými formuláciami. USA za museli zaplatiť 3

miliardy USD Izraelu na náklady evakuácie Sinajského polostrova a Egyptu 2 miliardy na vojenskú pomoc. Obe strany očakávali a aj dostali ďalšiu hospodársku pomoc. Zbigniew Brzezinski, prezidentov poradca pre národnú bezpečnosť, nedokázal presvedčiť ani Jordánsko ani Saudskú Arábiu, aby podporili zmluvu. Izraelský parlament (kneset) schválil zmluvu až po ostrej diskusii a 26. marca 1979 Menachem Begin a Anwar as-Sādāt mohli podpísať mierovú zmluvu na trávniku pred Bielym domom, a tak formálne ukončili vojnový stav medzi svojimi krajinami (Riad 1981, s. 338).

Tento vývoj vyvolal zdesenie väčšiny ostatných arabských štátov: □addām □usajn koncom marca 1979 zorganizoval druhý bagdadský summit. Tu najvyšší predstavitelia arabských štátov prerušili diplomatické styky s Egyptom, vylúčili ho z Ligy arabských štátov a sídlo LAŠ premiestnili z Káhiry do Tunisu. V máji 1979 sa zišla Islamská konferencia v marockom Feze a tiež zrušila členstvo Egypta v tejto organizácii a odmietla zmluvu z Camp Davidu (Beattie 2000, s. 230). Anwar as-Sādāt hnevivo reagoval na kritiku. On sa nepovažoval za zradcu arabskej veci, ale za priekopníka, ktorý arabskému svetu ukazuje jedinú cestu otvorenú preň na znovuzískanie území stratených v roku 1967 (Rabinovich 2004, s. 26).

\* \* \* \* \*

Jeruzalemská iniciatíva Anwara as-Sādāta, dohody z Camp Davidu a podpis mierovej zmluvy s Izraelom urýchlili vnútropolitické zmeny v Egypte. Opozícia voči zmluve prišla hlavne od zvyškov nā□irovskej ľavice a od silnejúcich islamských síl. Boli zaskočení týmito krokmi, ktoré sa natoľko líšili od línie, ktorú Egypt v arabskom svete presadzoval uplynulých tridsať rokov. Jednako, Anwar as-Sādāt sa mohol spoľahnúť na politickú vrstvu, ktorá mala rovnaké názory ako on vo veci národnoštátnych záujmov Egypta (Shehata 2010, s. 32). Navyše, zmes egyptského nacionalizmu a presvedčenia, že tieto kroky ohlasujú novú, úspešnejšiu budúcnosť Egypta, vytvorili spočiatku značné ľudové nadšenie.

Po uzavretí mieru s Izraelom Egyptania dúfali, že sa znížia výdavky na armádu a zostane viacej peňazí na budovanie priemyslu, vzdelanie, sociálne reformy a celkové zlepšenie ich životnej úrovne. Predpokladali, že vláda Menachema Begina v dobrej viere urýchli rokovania o palestínskej autonómii. Prívrženci mierového procesu dúfali, že ostatné arabské vlády uznajú svoju chybu a budú nasledovať Egypt. Očakávali aj zlepšenie vzťahov s USA, ktoré povedie k zvýšeniu investícií a prílivu turistov zo západných krajín a nahradí výpadky príjmov od štátov sovietskeho bloku a neústupných Arabov (Vatikiotis 1985, s. 433). No napriek tomu, že Egypt v marci 1979 uzavrel s Izraelom mier a hospodárske pomery sa zlepšili, nádeje sa plnili len čiastočne. Egyptská vláda začala nakupovať nové drahé zbrane z USA, s odôvodnením, že je to na obranu pred Líbyou, ale v skutočnosti kvôli tomu, aby egyptská armáda aj naďalej podporovala režim a jeho politiku. Izraelská vláda však

brzdila každý pokrok smerom k palestínskej samospráve v obave, že premena okupovaných území na samosprávne jednotky môže viesť k vzniku teroristických útvarov, ktoré by ohrozili bezpečnosť Izraela (Shlaim 2001, s. 382).

Okamžitá prosperita, ktorú Anwar as-Sādāt sľuboval svojim krajanom, však väčšinu Egyptanov znova obišla, hoci niektoré skupiny egyptskej spoločnosti začali profitovať z hospodárskych príležitostí, ktoré im ponúkal rozvíjajúci sa súkromný sektor. Nerovnomerné rozdelenie bohatstva, ktoré nikdy nezmyslo z egyptskej spoločnosti sa vypuklejšie prejavilo, keď sa pre bohatých sprístupnili nové formy spotreby. Kritika takého vývoja sa nevyhnutne zostrila, nielen z ľavej strany politického spektra, ale aj zo strany islamských kruhov. Keď tie isté skupiny k tomu pridali odsudzovanie stále vzrastajúcej závislosti Egypta od USA a zjavne separátneho mierového procesu s Izraelom, vznikla z toho rozsiahla kritika režimu, na ktorú bol Anwar as-Sādāt mimoriadne citlivý (Hinnebusch 1988, s. 75).

Dlhotrvajúci autoritársky režim sa prejavil v pravom svetle, keď Anwar as-Sādāt vypísal ďalšie referendum, aby získal ľudový súhlas na zákony, ktorými by zlomil politický dissent. Zákon hanby (Qānūn al-cajb) zakazoval šírenie ateizmu alebo triedneho boja, ktoré dávajú mladým ľuďom zlý príklad, tlačenie alebo vysielanie falošných správ, ktoré by mohli znepokojiť verejnú mienku, sformovať ilegálnu organizáciu alebo znevažovať vládu. Tresty mohli zahŕňať zbavenie občianskych práv, zákaz vycestovania odňatím cestovného pasu, domáce väzenie, zbavenie majetku. Hoci právnici a bojovníci za občianske práva namietali voči tomuto zákonu, prezidentovi vyhovoval, lebo mu poskytol nový náhubok pre jeho politických oponentov (Hajkal 1988, s. 194-6).

Prezident, aby presadil súhlas so svojimi názormi, sa stále viac spoliehal na kontrolu štátnej správy a bezpečnostných služieb. Tých, ktorí mali iný názor, považoval prinajlepšom za vinných z nerozumnosti a prinajhoršom za podvratníkov celého politického a spoločenského poriadku. Koncom leta 1981 predviedol túto tézu zatknutím prakticky každého prominentného kritika svojho režimu, bez ohľadu na jeho politické smerovanie. Jednako, zatiaľ čo väčšina jeho pozornosti sa sústreďovala na jeho verejných kritikov, v pozadí boli oveľa nebezpečnejší nepriatelia (Hinnebusch 1988, s. 77).

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