

# MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY

## JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



Vedecký časopis pre medzinárodné  
politické, ekonomické, kultúrne  
a právne vzťahy

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Fakulty medzinárodných vzťahov  
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## ÚVODNÍK: ČASOPIS MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY V ROKU 2015

### EDITORIAL: THE JOURNAL IN 2015

*Eudmila Lipková*<sup>1</sup> – *Samuel Goda*<sup>2</sup>

Vážení čitatelia,

aktuálne číslo časopisu Medzinárodné vzťahy otvára štrnásty rok svojej úspešnej existencie. Z malého regionálneho časopisu vydávaného dvakrát ročne sa postupne stáva uznávaný medzinárodný štvrťročník s autorskou základňou z mnohých štátov sveta. Časopisu sa podarilo vďaka úsiliu redakcie, no najmä vďaka neustále sa zvyšujúcej kvalite príspevkov, etablovať v databázach ako EBSCO, ProQuest či Index Copernicus. Sme preto veľmi radi, že v tomto trende úspešne pokračujeme čoho dôkazom je aj zaradenie nášho časopisu do databázy The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). Členovia medzinárodnej vedeckej rady časopisu dnes pochádzajú zo 17 štátov ležiacich na štyroch

Dear readers,

the current issue of the Journal of International Relations enters its fourteenth year of successful existence. From a small regional magazine published twice a year, it is gradually becoming a recognized international quarterly with authors from many countries and regions of the world. Magazine, thanks to the efforts of the editorial office, but mainly due to the ever increasing quality of the contributions, reached to become indexed within databases such as EBSCO, ProQuest and Index Copernicus. We are therefore very pleased that this trend has continued successfully which is being proved by the inclusion of our magazine into the database „The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI)“.

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kontinentoch, sú nimi renomovaní odborníci z oblasti medzinárodnej ekonómie, medzinárodných vzťahov a medzinárodného práva.

V súlade s plánom znižovania počtu príspevkov v prospech ich vedeckej hodnoty publikoval v roku 2015 časopis Medzinárodné vzťahy 18 vedeckých statí, 2 recenzie, 1 článok informačného charakteru a jeden článok v sekcii Názory. Celkom sa na príspevkoch ročníka 2015 podieľalo 27 autorov z desiatich štátov sveta. Podiel statí v anglickom jazyku predstavoval viac než polovicu všetkých uverejnených vedeckých článkov. Z hľadiska obsahu možno 9 článkov zaradiť do oblasti medzinárodnej ekonómie, 7 do oblasti medzinárodných vzťahov a 1 do sféry medzinárodného práva. Mnohé publikované články mali významné interdisciplinárne črty.

Podiel vydaných článkov na počte článkov doručených do redakcie sa držal približne na úrovni roka 2014, kedy bolo zamietnutých 56% doručených príspevkov. Priemerný čas medzi doručením článku redakcii a jeho vydaním predstavoval 137 dní; priemerný čas medzi doručením článku a vystavením recenzných posudkov bol 49 dní, čím sa časopis zaraďuje medzi lídrov nielen v stredoeurópskom regióne. Nijaký autor nečakal na recenzné posudky dlhšie ako 4 mesiace, pričom veľkú časť článkov oponenti posúdili do 50 dní.

Dlhodobé nastavenie podmienok a trendov smerovania časopisu

Members of the International Scientific Council of the magazine today come from 17 states from four continents, they are renowned experts in the field of international economics, international relations and international law. In accordance with the plan to reduce the number, respectively quantity of published articles to their scientific value, the magazine Journal of International Relations published in 2015 18 scientific papers, two reviews, one article for information purposes, and an article under the section views. Total contributions to the year 2015 accounted for 27 authors from ten countries around the world. Share of the articles in English accounted for more than half of all published scientific articles. In terms of content, the contributions could be divided into 9 articles in international economics, 7 in international relations and one in the sphere of international law. Many published articles have significant interdisciplinary features. The share of published articles on the number of total delivered articles to the editors are held approximately at the level of year 2014, which were rejected by 56% of contributions received. The average time between the delivery of the article to the editor and the issuance amounted to 137 days; the average time between the delivery of an article and exposing reviews was 49 days, which makes the magazine ranked among the leaders not only in Central Europe. No author expected for review ratings for more than four months, with a large part

jednoznačne smeruje k ďalšiemu zvyšovaniu kvality publikovaných článkov a v postupnom zmedzinárodňovaní autorskej a čitateľskej základne. Aj ostatný trinásty ročník je toho jasným dôkazom. Ďalšou konštantnou ambíciou redakcie je predovšetkým úspešné indexovanie časopisu v celosvetovo uznávaných databázach SCOPUS a Web of Science. Uvedomujeme si, že ide o dlhodobý proces, sme však presvedčení, že aj vďaka Vám v tomto vysoko konkurenčnom prostredí môžeme uspieť. Tešíme sa na nové články!

Redakcia

of the article opponents delivered within 50 days.

In line with our long-term trends and vision of the future direction of the magazine, it is clearly heading towards further improving the quality of published articles and the gradual internationalization of the author and readership. And last magazine's thirteenth year, is a clear evidence. Another constant ambition of the editors is to successfully lead the Journal to the world renowned Scopus and Web of Science. We are aware that this is a long-run process, but we are convinced that, first and foremost thanks to you, we will succeed in this highly competitive environment. We look forward to new articles!

Editors





## VEĽKÝ ČIERNOMORSKÝ REGIÓN V MENIACOM SA GEOPOLITICKOM KONTEXTE

### THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION WITHIN THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

*КИНДЫБАЛЮК Оляна\*\* (KINDIBALYK Olyana)<sup>1</sup>*

#### Abstract:

The article analyzes the situation in the Wider Black Sea region in conditions of instability and tensions of world system, reveals the geopolitical aspects of opposition between regional and extra-regional forces and non-state actors in the region. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the concept of „Wider Black Sea Region”, which is regarded as a process embodied in the space with the changing geography and gaining its weight due to its geopolitical importance.

The main difficulty was to find the correct definition of the investigated area, the boundaries of which are thought not in geographical, but on the contrary – in geopolitical categories. At the same time the internal integrity of the region didn't become an apparent that further complicates the perception of the Wider Black Sea region as an image of a single organic integrity. In this regard, the development of „a wider Black Sea resource” by virtue of integration projects such as the CIS, BSEC should be defined as not very successful. There was no states consistency on important issues, concentrated in the region. Moreover there was no single integration centre, which could perform as the guarantor of regional security.

Key words: the Wider Black Sea region, the integration processes, the region, the Russian Federation, the United States, the EU and NATO.

## 1 „VEĽKÝ ČIERNOMORSKÝ REGIÓN“: MEDZI TEÓRIOU A PRAXOU

V praxi súčasných medzinárodných vzťahov posledných rokov je veľmi populárna koncepcia „veľkých priestranstiev“. Ide o existenciu rozľahlých teritoriálnych formácií s viac

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Kandidátka politických vied, docentka, vedecká pracovníčka Inštitútu právnických a politických štúdií Akadémie vied Moldavska, vedúca katedry svetovej politiky medzinárodných vzťahov Európskej univerzity Moldavska (Kišinev, Moldavská republika).

menej dohodnutými, pohyblivými hranicami, ktoré sa nazývajú regióny. Z technického hľadiska sa k pôvodnému názvu regiónu pridáva slovo „veľký“. V podstate to svedčí o zahrnutí do regiónu ďalších krajín, ktoré majú viac geopolitických, ako geografických dôvodov sem patriť. Mimoriadne aktuálne je to z hľadiska prehlbovania celkovej nestability vo svete, pod vplyvom premeny medzinárodného systému a formovania polycentrického modelu sveta. Ako názorný príklad môže poslúžiť región „Veľká Európa“, „Veľký Blízky východ“ alebo tiež „Veľký Čiernomorský región“, ktorého logickým pokračovateľom sa stal „Veľký Čiernomorsko-kaspický región“.

Existenciu daných formácií nie je možné skúmať odtrhnuté od geopolitických zmien. Naopak, procesy premeny sveta a sfér vplyvu bezprostredne prispievali ich vzniku. Treba však priznať, že pri určovaní hraníc týchto formácií čoraz väčšmi prevláda geopolitické kritérium nad prísne geografickým. V súvislosti s týmto priestorové hranice takéhoto útvaru sa stávajú syntetickými, a sám región sa mení s útvarem s prevažne geopolitickým obsahom. Ako príklad môžeme uviesť proces pretvárania východnej Európy na „Strednú a východnú Európu“ (ďalej SVE). Iniciátorom prehodnotenia európskych hraníc a autorom tohto pojmu bol nemecký kancelár Helmut Kohl. (Rasmus 2007) V jeho chápaní používanie termínu „Východná Európa“ vo vzťahu k Poľsku, Českej republike alebo Maďarsku nebolo správne, pretože takýto pohľad je umelým vynálezom čias studenej vojny, obdobia blokového, štruktúrneho protikladu Západu a Východu. V ponímaní Helmuta Kohla tento termín sa vzťahuje na Bielorusko a Ukrajinu. A zasa koncepcia „Stredná a východná Európa“ sa zakladá na chápaní toho, že štáty, ktoré zahŕňala, sa majú znova spojiť so Západnou Európou. Treba však povedať, že v poľskej politológii, (Aleksium, Beauvois, Ducray, Kloczowski 2009) ba aj v historiografii, sa Poľsko zaraďuje do Strednej a Východnej Európy (tomuto aspektu sa budeme venovať v ďalšej časti príspevku). Navyše, hovoriť, že krajina patrí do Východnej Európy, pokladáme za nekorektné a nevedecké.

Treba povedať, že poľskí historici významne prispeli do rozpracovania koncepcie SVE a príslušnosť Poľska k tomuto regiónu. Takýto názor zastával aj významný vedec J. Kloczowski, z iniciatívy ktorého vznikol v roku 1991 nešťátny Inštitút Strednej a východnej Európy v Ľubline. V roku 2000 pod vedením profesora Kloczowského vyšla dvojdielna kniha „Dejiny Strednej a východnej Európy“. Špecifikum SVE, podľa poľských historikov spočíva v osobitnej ceste rozvoja krajín tohto regiónu, ktorý je v podstate totožný s hranicami Rzeczypospolitej v období jej najväčšieho teritoriálneho rozšírenia. (Aleksium, Beauvois, Ducray, Kloczowski 2009) Profesor Kloczowski konštatuje, že hlavná úloha takéhoto prístupu spočíva v dokazovaní, že vývin Ruska a jeho dnešných hraníc a regiónov SVE prechádzal rôznymi etapami. (Biblikov, Tiškov, Volkov 2006)

Širokej palete prístupov k určeniu hraníc regiónu SVE sa nedá v podstate, vyhnúť, pretože sa dotýka nielen problému súčasnosti, ale aj minulosti. Rovnako dôležitou je otázka historickej pamäti a dedičstva komparatistiky. Všetky tieto otázky

vynášajú na povrch v interpretácii hraníc ustavične nové a nové obsažné vrstvy. Ako príklad môžeme spomenúť koncepciu „Druhej Európy“, ktorá podľa názoru Fedotovovej V.G. má za cieľ označiť krajiny SVE za krajiny „druhej ligy“ (Fedotova 1997) modernizácie. Bez ohľadu na nepretržité diskusie otázka hraníc danej koncepcie je do dnešného dňa sporná tak v prísne akademických kruhoch, ako aj v politických, ktoré nesúvisia s nijakou vedeckou argumentáciou.

Plastičnosť a nestálosť regionálnych hraníc – je neodmysliteľne spojená s vývinom geopolitických formácií. Je to vlastne dôkaz toho, že hlavným obsahom geopolitických procesov je konfrontácia aktérov medzinárodných vzťahov v boji za zdroje prežitia a rozvoja. Ako príklad môžeme uviesť suroviny (energetické zdroje, surovinové, vodné a i.), ako aj ochranu národných záujmov štátov s cieľom zabezpečiť si bezpečnosť, čiže ochranu svojho životného priestranstva.

V dôsledku hore uvedeného sa na svetovej mape zjavujú teritoriálne kombinácie, ktorých regionálne hranice sa dostávajú do veľkej závislosti od vzájomne súvisiacich faktorov. Po prvé, od geopolitických záujmov jednotlivých krajín, ktoré formujú región a od ich schopnosti vplyvať na geopolitické rozloženie síl, tak v regióne, ako aj za jeho hranicami, a tiež od mimo regionálnych aktérov, ktorí majú záujem o prítomnosť v danom regióne. Po druhé, od rovnováhy síl v regióne. A po tretie, od aktuálneho stavu medzinárodných vzťahov.

Všetky tri faktory sú úzko prepojené. Stabilitu zaručuje rovnováha. Všetky spolu zaručujú poriadok, čo platí nielen teoreticky, ale aj prakticky. Niet pochyb, že ide o silovú rovnováhu, to jest o možnosti štátu vplyvať na charakter vzťahov vo vlastnom záujme a mať pritom prevahu. Nemusi sa to dosahovať použitím vojenskej sily, ale nevylučuje to použitie nátlaku, prinucovania a hrozieb. Aj tu existuje široká škála nástrojov vplyvu na konkrétne krajiny a ich združenia. Napríklad, silové akcie, ekonomický a propagandistický nátlak, zasahovanie do vnútorných záležitostí a podobne.

Udalosti okolo hraníc Veľkého Pričernomororského regiónu zdôrazňujú jeho význam vo svetovej politike. Stretli sa tu záujmy nielen vnútri regionálnych krajín, ale tiež záujmy USA, EÚ, NATO a ďalších aktérov, hoci treba povedať, že Pričernomoršie aj pred ukrajinskou krízou pociťovalo pomerne silnú vojensko-politickú prítomnosť USA a NATO, ktorí sa tam pokúšali o dlhodobú prítomnosť. V roku 2004 USA vyhlásili predislokáciu amerických vojsk zo západnej Európy do východnej. Za toto obdobie sa geografická časť Čiernomoria pretransformovala tak z hľadiska formy, ako aj z hľadiska obsahu, na aktívny priestor realizácie vojensko-politickej stratégie USA, a krajiny, ktoré sa zaviazali plniť túto stratégiu – sa premenili na mobilné vojenské základne. Rozhodujúcim faktorom, ktorý obmedzoval prítomnosť zahraničných štátov v Čiernomorskom bazéne, je Konvencia Montreux z roku 1936<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The Convention regarding the regime of the straits signed at Montreux on July 20th, 1936. Dostupné na: [http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux\\_ENG.pdf](http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf)

Ale po vstupe Rumunska a Bulharska do NATO v roku 2004 a po tom, čo tu boli vybudované vojenské námorské základne, USA fakticky mohli mať zaručenú kontrolu nad západným Pričernomorím. Medzitým víťazstvo vo voľbách pravicových strán z proamerickéj strany Bojka Borisova „Občania za európsky rozvoj Bulharska“ im umožnila ešte väčšmi sa upevniť pozície v tomto regióne<sup>1</sup>. Úloha Bulharska v tejto otázke stúpila, keď Turecká republika odmietla umiestniť veliteľské centrum NATO na svojom území. Turecko sa skutočne obávalo, že si naruší vzťahy s Ruskou federáciou, a preto sa neodhodlalo k takémuto kroku. Keď sa však Krym stal pokračovaním hraníc Ruska, metafyzicky zmenil rozloženie síl na Čiernom mori. Došlo k novým metamorfózam. Rusko začalo zvyšovať svoj vojenský potenciál. Možno pozorovať aktivizáciu zvýšeného počtu lodí a ponoriek ruskej Čiernomorskej flotily, ako aj posilnenie pobrežnej ochrany. Na Kryme sa momentálne nachádzajú zoskupenia pozemných vojsk, ktorých úlohou je zabezpečiť obranu polostrova. Niet pochýb o tom, že aktivita síl NATO, teraz už bezprostredne pri ruských hraniciach, si bude vyžadovať odvetné akcie, v podstate zodpovedajúce reálnej politike. A v tomto zmysle, tento vojensko-technický krok bude vynúteným opatrením krajiny.

Ozbrojený konflikt na Ukrajine veľmi presvedčivo preukázal pohyb sveta smerom k polycentričnosti. Nebudem sa venovať otázke, prečo Ruská federácia reagovala na udalosti v roku 2013- 2014 tak, ako reagovala, pretože je to široká téma, ktorú nemožno obsiahnuť v rámci jedného článku. Sústredím sa na realitu, aká je.

A otázka, ktorá nás zaujíma, je otázka samej existencie Veľkého Pričernomorského regiónu. Takáto zóna existuje, či je to len zveličovanie? V tomto kontexte sa logicky natíska iná otázka. Ak pripustíme, že takáto zóna nie je zveličením, tak v čom spočíva jej existencia a čo predstavuje? A ďalšia nemenej dôležitá otázka je: ako zapadá do ustavične sa meniacej reality?

Odpoveď na tieto otázky treba hľadať predovšetkým v geopolitických štúdiách o priestranstvách a dávať do súvislostí existujúci teoreticko-metodologický výklad s realitou dneška, čiže s transformáciou medzinárodného systému nebezpečenstiev a perspektív, ktoré so sebou pre štáty a ich zoskupenia prináša.

Pojem „veľké priestranstvo“ (Großraum) rozpracoval nemecký filozof a politický teoretik Carl Schmitt (1941). Podľa neho geopolitický priestor (Großraum) je obranným pásom pre silnú mocnosť a táto si ho bráni ako zónu vlastných záujmov.(Schmitt 1941) Znamená to, že najlepšie predvída existenciu vedúcej mocnosti v regióne, ktorá si sama vytvára za hranicami svoj vlastný rádius pôsobenia a prostredníctvom geopolitických technológií si udržiava akcieschopnosť. Podľa C. Schmitta (1941) Eurázia predstavuje rôznorodý konglomerát etnických spoločenstiev, štátov a kultúr, čo v podstate sťažuje možnosť formovať jednotné priestranstvo. Bolo by preto prirodzené založiť v jeho hraniciach

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<sup>1</sup> Voľby do parlamentu v Bulharsku vyhrala strana expremiéra. Dostupné na : <http://www.unian.net/world/787310-vyiboryi-v-parlament-bolgarii-vyiiigrala-partiya-eks-premera.html>.

niekoľko veľkých geopolitických útvarov a riadiť ich z pružného centra. Z hľadiska hore uvedenej definície je veľmi zaujímavý útvar ako Veľký Pričernomorský región (The Wider Black Sea region). V geopolitickej klíme súčasnosti sú hranice tejto zóny geograficky nejednoznačné. S Čiernym morom hraničí šesť štátov – Bulharsko, Rumunsko, Ukrajina, Rusko, Gruzínsko a Turecko. No zóna Veľkého Pričernomorského priestranstva, na hranice ktorého sme poukazovali, na začiatku, je teritoriálne pomerne rozľahlá. Patria sem tri z piatich štátov Organizácie čiernomorského ekonomického priestranstva, ktoré nemajú prístup k moru, vrátane Moldavska, ktoré sa nachádza medzi Ukrajinou a Rumunskom, v blízkosti Čierneho mora. Vďaka svojej geografickej polohe jeho južná hranica siaha takmer k Čiernemu moru, ku ktorému je prístup cez Dnesterský liman a Dunaj. Grécko je pomerne blízko ústia Bosporu, ktorý spája Čierne more a Stredozemské more. Arménsko, síce nehraničí s Čiernym morom, ale rozprestiera sa v jeho blízkosti. Treba sem zaradiť aj Azerbajdžan a Albánsko – dve krajiny, ktoré, aj keď nesusedia s čiernomorským pobrežím, ale rozprestierajú sa na brehoch iných morí: Azerbajdžan pri brehu Kaspického mora, Albánsko pri brehoch – Adriatického mora. Logicky sa nám zdá neprirodené zahrnutie Azerbajdžanu a Albánska do čiernomorského regiónu. Napríklad, vynára sa otázka: prečo Albánsko je súčasťou čiernomorského priestranstva, a také Macedónsko – nie?

Pripomínam, že organizácia *Čiernomorská* hospodárska spolupráca<sup>1</sup> združuje dvanásť štátov Pričernomorja a Južného Balkánu. Iniciátorom jej vzniku bolo Turecko, ale *Čiernomorská* hospodárska spolupráca sa nestala sebestačnou regionálnou organizáciou. Navyše, nemala jednotného lídra, každý štát bol ponechaný sám na seba a konal na vlastnú zodpovednosť. Napriek tomu, že na technickej úrovni organizácia prijala celý rad dôležitých dokumentov, ako „Bosporská deklarácia“<sup>2</sup> a „Deklarácia summitu o Čiernomorskej hospodárskej spolupráci“<sup>3</sup>, jej činnosť to nijako zvlášť neovplyvnilo a nepridalo jej to na funkčnosti. A ešte jedna vec: rôznosť krajín v ich geopolitickom rozvoji: Rumunsko a Bulharsko sú členmi Európskej únie a NATO, zatiaľ čo Turecko – nie je členom Európskej únie, ale je členským štátom NATO, a udalosti z augusta 2008 mali za následok vážne zhoršenie rusko-gruzínskych vzťahov.

Akonáhle Ruská federácia uznala v auguste 2008 nezávislosť Abcházska a Južného Osetska (Cchinvalského regiónu), Gruzínsko prerušilo s ňou diplomatické vzťahy. Neskôr, po odstúpení prezidenta Saakašviliho, síce došlo k istej normalizácii vzťahov, ale rétorika ich politického obsahu zostáva nezmenená, pretrváva v nej prvok akejsi podmienenosti, ktorý má

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<sup>1</sup> Čiernomorská hospodárska spolupráca. Členské štáty: Azerbajdžan, Albánsko, Arménsko, Bulharsko, Grécko, Gruzínsko, Moldavsko, Ruská federácia, Rumunsko, Srbsko, Turecko a Ukrajina. Pozorovatelia: Rakúsko, Bielorusko, Nemecko, Egypt, Izrael, Taliansko, Poľsko, Slovensko, USA, Tunis, Francúzsko, Chorvátsko a Česká republika, Konferencia Energetickej charty, Medzinárodný čiernomorský klub a Európska komisia.

<sup>2</sup> Bosforskoje zajavlenije, Stambul, 25 ijuňa 1992 g., Dostupné na: <http://www.pabsec.org/pabsec/aksisnet/file/rus/08%20BSEC%20Bosphorus%20statement.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Deklaracija o Černomorskom Ekonomičeskom Sotrudičestve, Stambul, 25 ijuňa 1992 g., Dostupné na: <http://www.pabsec.org/pabsec/aksisnet/file/rus/09%20BSEC%20declr%201992.pdf>.

d'aleko do vyriešenia stavu. Ide tu o štatút územia, ktoré Ruská federácia uznáva ako suverénne štáty, a Gruzínsko nástojí na obnove územnej celistvosti, čiže na „návrate“ nezávislého Abcházska a Južného Osetska do gruzínskeho štátu. Nemenej dôležitou otázkou je aj euroatlantické smerovanie Gruzínska k zblíženiu so západnými štruktúrami. Pripomínam, že v septembri 2014 na summite NATO vo Walese bol schválený balík opatrení, ktorý aktívne odporuje úsilie Gruzínska stať sa členom aliancie. A 27. augusta 2015 otvorili na území Národného učebného centra v Krcanisi (neďaleko Tbilisi) učebno-tréningové centrum NATO<sup>1</sup>.

Pokiaľ ide o tento problém, zvláštnu pozornosť si zasluhuje pozícia Ruskej federácie, ktorá jednoznačne dala najavo, že zahraničnopolitická voľba Gruzínska je jeho výlučné právo. Medzi oboma krajinami sa však zachováva „zakázané pásmo“, ktoré ak Gruzínsko prekročí, tak zo strany Ruska bude nasledovať celý rad dôsledných odvetných opatrení. Konkrétne, ak Gruzínsko vstúpi do NATO, tak Južné Osetsko sa stane súčasťou Ruskej federácie.

Prax medzinárodných vzťahov neraz presvedčivo dokázala, že konflikty tesne súvisiace s otázkou suverenity, najmä ak ide o normalizáciu vzťahov medzi krajinami, vedú obyčajne do slepej uličky. Tu sa nedá očakávať podstatný pokrok. Zároveň však bez ohľadu na existenciu zložitých protirečení a vzájomných nárokov, treba priznať, že Gruzínsko je krajina, ktorá je po stránke konfesionalnej, kultúrnej a historickej Rusku veľmi blízka. Nič to však nemení na skutočnosti, že návrat rusko-gruzínskych vzťahov do prijateľnej polohy bude dlhodobý a zložitý.

Asymetria v rámci Čiernomorského regiónu jestvuje nielen prípade Gruzínska, ale tiahne sa aj po línii rusko-tureckých vzťahov. Situácia s ruským lietadlom SU-24, ktoré zostrelila turecká armáda v novembri 2015, sa negatívne odrazila na vzťahoch medzi týmito krajinami, treba však podotknúť, že ani pred touto udalosťou sa rusko-turecké vzťahy nevyvíjali smerom k zabezpečeniu regionálnej bezpečnosti a upevneniu geopolitického a geoenergetického potenciálu regiónu, skôr šlo len o dvojstranné zmluvy. Presnejšie, tieto krajiny podpísali zmluvy o výstavbe prvej tureckej jadrovej elektrárne v lokalite Akkuyu v južnej provincii Mersin. Rátalo sa s vybudovaním štyroch energoblokov, ktoré mali mať kapacitu 1,2 gigawatov podľa ruského projektu „AES 2006“ s vodovodným energetickým reaktorom. Keď Bulharsko odstúpilo od výstavby „Južného prúdu“, Rusko ho preorientovalo do Turecka a nazvalo ho „Tureckým prúdom“ (Turkish Stream)<sup>2</sup>. Problém regionálnej bezpečnosti sa ukázal vo svetle ešte väčších hrozieb a výziev. Navyše, čiernomorské krajiny neboli jednotné pri riešení energetického problému. Plynovod „Južný prúd“ mal pôvodne prechádzať po území Bulharska, ale

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<sup>1</sup> *Učebno-trenirovočnyj centr NATO otkryt v Gruziji.* Dostupné na: <http://sputnik-georgia.ru/politics/20150827/228410797.html>.

<sup>2</sup> *Turkish Stream.* Dostupné na: <http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/turkish-stream/>.

Bulharsko podľahlo tlaku USA a odmietlo výstavbu plynovodu cez svoje územie. Úmysel stavať tento plynovod neodolal nátlaku úradníkov Európskej únie, na ktorých tlačili USA. Šlo tu o prehru hneď v niekoľkých smeroch – prehra ruskej strany v otázke lobingu, aby „Južný prúd“ získal štatút „transeurópskej energetickej siete“ TEN. Tento štatút automaticky umožňoval vyhnúť sa dosahu tretieho energetického balíčka. To po prvé. A po druhé, to bol neúspech v otázke získania povolenia na jeho výstavbu od Bulharska. Podľa nášho názoru, náhle rozhodnutie obrátiť plynovod iným smerom, do iného štátu, nebolo dobre premyslené. Nehovoriac už o tom, že šlo o veľkokapacitný plynovod s veľkými finančnými a časovými nákladmi. Pri riešení tejto otázky v podstate šlo väčšmi o emócie, než o zdravý rozum.

Pri analýze rôznych modelov integrácie, ktoré sa rozšírili v hraniciach Veľkého čiernomorského regiónu, nemožno nespomenúť výskyt celého radu alternatívnych integračných projektov, ktoré ťažili z konfliktu s Ruskou federáciou. Ide o GUUAM (Gruzínsko, Ukrajina, Uzbekistan, Azerbajdžan, Moldavsko), neskôr GUAM (Gruzínsko, Ukrajina, Azerbajdžan, Moldavsko), o štruktúru, zjavne orientovanú proti Rusku, ktorá mala za cieľ zabezpečiť energetickú bezpečnosť svojich členských štátov. Druhým projektom bola integrácia v rámci *Spoločenstva demokratického výberu*, ktorej oficiálnym iniciátorom sa stalo Gruzínsko, ktoré zastupovala ministerka zahraničných vecí Salome Zurbichvili a Ukrajina, ktorú zastupoval Borys Tarasiuk. Treba však konštatovať, že prevažne politický charakter týchto útvarov nemohol dosiahnuť výsledok, ktorý by stál za pozornosť a upútal by na seba vážnu pozornosť.

## **2 PRETVORENIE SVETOVÉHO SYSTÉMU MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOV A PROBLÉMY SPOLUPRÁCE A KONFRONTÁCIE VO VEĽKOM ČIERNOMORSKOM REGIÓNE**

Po rozpade bipolárneho systému sa svet ocitol pred potenciálnou výzvou vážnych zmien, ktoré urýchlili závislosť krajín a regiónov sveta. Svet sa stal otvorenejším. Nastal nebyvalý rozmach regionalizácie medzinárodných vzťahov. Krajiny sa ocitli v centre integračných procesov. Všetko uvedené zmeny začali pripravovať svet k novej fáze evolúcie prostredníctvom integrácie a regionalizácie.

Z hľadiska zdravého rozumu reakcia štátov, ktoré aj pred ústupom bipolárneho modelu usporiadania sveta vystupovali v úlohe objektu, a nie subjektu medzinárodnej politiky, stať sa časťou regionálnych združení, sa dala predvídať. Stredne veľké štáty v dôsledku objektívnej reality boli nútené vstupovať do vznikajúcich integračných zoskupení. Inak by len ťažko mohli reagovať na výzvy, v epicentre ktorých sa ocitli, hoci, mohlo by sa zdať, že hľadanie vlastnej identity, nezávisle od zložitosti okolitého prostredia, ktorú prinášal nový proces organizácie sveta, by mohol byť vynikajúcim stimulom na to, ako sa izolovať od ostatných a venovať sa vlastnému vývoju. Získanie

vlastnej suverenity však ešte nezaručovalo sebestačnosť, naopak, poukazovalo na to, že sa treba vedieť samostatne vyrovnat' s výzvami systému, ktoré mali existenčný charakter.

Osobitne sa to týkalo štátov, ktoré získali samostatnosť v dôsledku rozpadu Sovietskeho zväzu. Zvládnuť novovzniknutú situáciu izolovane nebolo možné. Otázkou izolácie začali tieto štáty riešiť tak, že sa zapojili do regionálnych združení. Pre silné štáty sa regionalizácia stala priestorovým meradlom moci, aj keď takáto sila je pomerne relatívna, nie absolútna kategória možností štátu.

Toto sa najväčšmi dotklo Ruska. Objektívne vzaté, strata globálneho líderstva by sa mala kompenzovať iniciovaním vlastných projektov, zodpovedajúcich obnove vlastných síl, ale fakticky menšiemu oslabeniu zdedenej moci po veľkých geopolitických stratách. Hypoteticky by sa dalo pripustiť, že iniciovanie takých projektov, ako napríklad sformovanie Spoločenstva nezávislých štátov (SNS), malo za cieľ vrátiť novovzniknuté štáty do bývalého priestranstva a hraníc, len už s iným štruktúrnym obsahom.

Ako výstižne napísal Fernand Braudel „Priestranstvo je realita nielen dnešná, ale vo veľkej miere aj včerajšia.“ (Braudel 1994) A v praxi to spočiatku aj tak bolo. Vznik regionálnych združení spravidla zodpovedalo rôznym úlohám, ale sledovalo jediný cieľ – krajina, ktorá iniciovala projekt, nadobúdala inú politickú váhu.

Regionalizácia procesov začala využívať pluralizmus kontrastov a integračných dilem, čo určite malo svoj geopolitický podtext. Na jednej strane, vznikli integračné projekty pre zväzové republiky, ktoré navrhovalo Rusko, na druhej strane, vznikali združenia, ktoré iniciovala „stará“ Európa alebo USA. Okrem toho nemalú úlohu zohráva premyslenosť a konštruktívnosť zahraničnej politiky hlavných aktérov medzinárodných vzťahov v tom či onom regióne. Ak máme na mysli napríklad Strednú a Východnú Európu, tak úloha Nemecka ako hlavného aktéra tu je jednoznačná. Ak analyzujeme situáciu, ktorá vznikla v postsovietskych krajinách, v prvom rade v SNS, tak v tomto regióne badať veľký vplyv Ruska, ale bez vedomej a dobre premyslenej stratégie, čo malo za následok stratu vplyvu Ruska na tieto krajiny.

Stratégia vplyvu nie je nič iné, ako cieľavedomé rozširovanie vplyvu prostredníctvom aplikácie rozličných geopolitických technológií. Nepochybne, ide o zdĺhavý proces, ktorý ráta so zapojením širokého a pružného spektra nástrojov, ale pomáha získať očakávané výsledky. Ide vlastne o dobre premyslené metódy práce s vládnucimi elitami, s novo konštituovanými elitami (kontraelitami) a miestnymi masovo-komunikačnými prostriedkami, čo si vyžaduje vybudovať efektívny systém kontroly medzi mocou a opozíciou, vytvoriť potrebnú väčšinu zvonku, s bohatými skúsenosťami a množstvom politických a hospodárskych vzťahov. Samozrejme, toto si vyžaduje systematickú prácu s opozíciou, ktorá sa mení na podriadený prvok, čiže, keď treba, podriadi sa režimu elít. Je to akýsi kontrolovateľný pluralistický režim, čo



v mnohom umožňuje, ak už nie sa celkom vyhnúť, tak aspoň kontrolovať efekt „farebných revolúcií“, *majdanov*, ktoré obyčajne majú rozličné pomerne fatálne následky, o ktorých sa potom hovorí ako o výsledkoch transformácie politických režimov. Dôležitú úlohu má práca s mládežou.

Práve analýza vplyvu ruskej a americkej stratégie na jednotlivé krajiny postsovietskeho priestranstva umožňuje konštatovať, že ruský faktor je slabý, čoho dôkazom je opačná „lojalita“ vládnucej elity voči Rusku.

Toto isté platí aj o Moldavsku, kde proruské nálady boli po rozpade ZSSR pomerne silné, ale pre nepremyslenú politiku Ruskej federácie a najmä pre uvalenie sankcií na dovoz moldavského tovaru, Moldavsko sa čoraz väčšmi Rusku vzdalo. Rusko nemalo jasnú stratégiu ohľadne postsovietskeho priestranstva, a tak začalo strácať vplyv dokonca aj na také štáty, ako je Bielorusko a Kazachstan, ktoré spolu s Ruskom iniciovali vznik Eurázijského zväzu.

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## CELKOVÁ FAKTOROVÁ PRODUKTIVITA A JEJ DETERMINANTY V EURÓPSKEJ ÚNII

### TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

*Petra Čekmeová<sup>1</sup>*

Problematika európskej produktivity je ústrednou témou mnohých ekonomických a politických debát vzhľadom na fakt, že relatívne nízka miera produktivity predstavuje seriózný problém pre európske ekonomiky. Cieľom práce je odhadnúť tempo rastu celkovej faktorovej produktivity v jednotlivých členských štátoch Európskej únie a identifikovať jej najvýznamnejšie determinanty. V práci aplikujeme metódu rastového účtovníctva a Bayesiánskeho priemerovania modelov. Analýza je prevedená na ročných dátach pre 19 členských štátov a pokrýva obdobie 1996-2014. Výsledky naznačujú, že najrobustnejším faktorom s pozitívnym efektom je otvorenosť a že výrazný vplyv má aj aktívna politika na trhu práce.<sup>23</sup>

**Kľúčové slová:** Celková faktorová produktivita, Determinanty celkovej faktorovej produktivity, Európska Únia, Bayesiánske priemerovanie modelov, Rastové účtovníctvo

The issue of the European productivity is a central theme of many economic and policy debates as a relatively low level of productivity constitutes a serious problem for the European economies. The aim of this paper is to calculate the total factor productivity growth for the European member states and find out its most significant determinants. As analytical tools we apply the growth accounting method and the Bayesian Model Averaging. The

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<sup>2</sup>Príspevok vznikol za podpory špecifického výskumného projektu No. MUNI/A/1223/2014 na Masarykovej univerzite.

<sup>3</sup>Príspevok vznikol na základe práce *Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in the European Union*, ktorá bola prezentovaná na konferencii *Medzinárodné vzťahy 2015: aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky a politiky*.

analysis is executed on yearly observations for 19 member states of the European union covering the period from 1996 to 2014. The results suggest that the most robust factor with positive effect is the openness and that the considerably high impact can be attributed to active labour market policies.

Key words: Total Factor Productivity, Determinants of Total Factor Productivity, European Union, Bayesian Model Averaging, Growth Accounting

JEL: C11, E60, E47

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The issue of the European productivity and its improvement is a central theme of many economic and policy debates. It is not surprising given the fact that the relatively low level of productivity constitutes a serious problem for the European economies. More precisely, many economists and policy makers are concerned about the development of the European total factor productivity due to its significant contribution to the economic growth and decisive impact on the national competitiveness. Therefore, a continuously declining trend of total factor productivity in the European Union is alarming. However, to be able to improve the European productivity it is necessary to know the factors which are responsible for this unfavourable development.

The total factor productivity is often considered as the most comprehensive method to measure the national productivity. Compared to other measures, it takes into account a contribution of different production factors to the economic growth. The problem with this measure lies in the availability of relevant data (mainly in the case of smaller economies or longer time periods). Thus, own estimations of the total factor productivity can be really useful.

The aim of this paper is to calculate the total factor productivity growth for the European member states and find out its most significant determinants. In order to calculate the growth rates of total factor productivity we apply a method based on growth accounting. The estimated values will be used as dependent variables in the analysis of the productivity determinants. As the economic theory provides a large set of possible factors, which could explain the variation in the European total factor productivity, an inference based on one (possibly incorrect) regression model is precarious. To overcome the problem of model uncertainty we apply a method called Bayesian model averaging. By application of this method, the contribution of explanatory variables will be assessed based on a weighted average over all possible models. The analysis is executed on yearly observations for 19 member states of the European Union (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia were excluded from the analysis regarding the availability of data) covering the period from 1996 to 2014.

The paper is organized as follows. After a short introduction, the second section introduces the issue of total factor productivity and its determinants in order to provide a brief theoretical explanation for the choice of variables in the empirical part. The third section includes descriptions of the method used for the calculation of the total factor productivity growth and of the Bayesian model averaging method. The data applied in this study are also presented in this section. The fourth section presents the empirical results, namely the development of total factor productivity in the member states of the European Union and the results of the Bayesian model averaging. The last section contains concluding remarks summarizing the main findings of our analysis.

## **2 THEORY OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS**

Total factor productivity (TFP)<sup>4</sup> reflects the ability of production factors to jointly generate output (Compnet Task Force 2015). On the contrary to partial measures of productivity, it considers the contributions of labour, physical, human and other intangible capital to the output growth (The Conference Board 2015b). With respect to its computation, TFP growth is derived as residual catching up that part of output growth which cannot be attributed to extensive factors.

Economists and policy makers are interested in the development of TFP as it is considered to be the most important factor of GDP growth and cross-country differences in income. The crucial role of TFP in explaining economic growth was already approved in the works of Abramowitz (1956), Solow (1957) and later by Romer (1990), Krugman (1994) or Hall and Jones (1999). Moreover, total factor productivity can be used as proxy for national competitiveness (for instance: CompNet Task Force 2015).

In the context of endogenous growth theories the primary role in fostering productivity belongs to technological progress and human capital. The innovation based theories, developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), relies on the stimulating effects of R&D activities through their impact on innovations. Both domestic and foreign R&D activities matter. The transmission of technologies through trade and FDI was emphasized by Coe and Helpman (1995) or Nadiri and Kim (1996). As Aiyar and Feyrer (2002) pointed out various factors such as openness, geography, legal framework, human capital, can influence the efficacy with which new technologies are adopted.

The human capital based theories of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1998) emphasize the positive effect of skilled labour force on the productivity growth. The same conclusion is made by empirical works of Barro and Lee (2001) or Benhabib and Spiegel (1991). Skilled workers are more capable to efficiently use existing technologies and create new ones (Gehring et al. 2014). Moreover, human capital

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<sup>4</sup> As synonym for Total factor productivity is also used a term Multi-factor productivity (MFP).

facilitates the adoption of innovations from abroad. Authors such as Berman et al. (1998) or Redding (1996) pointed out the complementary relation between technological progress and human capital.

The institutional theories brought a significant contribution to the analysis of productivity drivers concluding that an institutional framework is decisive for the country's long-term development (for example: Acemoglu et al. 2001). Based on this fact, researchers incorporated various institutional factors in their analysis such as bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, crime and market regulations, civil liberties and political rights (Hall and Jones 1999). With shift in perception of growth determinants, the contribution of labour market institutions to productivity improvements we also taken into account (for example: Lacinio and Vallanti 2013).

The impact of international collaboration has been already mentioned. Beside its positive effect on technological spillover, FDI could boost productivity through their impact on the degree of domestic competition (Griffith et al. 2003). Similarly, foreign trade creates pressures on the competitive position of domestic firms (Greenway and Kneller 2007).

Among the other factors with noticeable impact on the productivity development we can include ICT (Gordon 2000), infrastructure, relative size of services in the economy and development of financial markets (Luintel et al. 2010), share of private savings, size of government, initial level of economic development and share of urban population (Danquah et al. 2013). Moreover, Baudry and Green (2002) showed that population growth facilitates innovations due to population pressures.

### 3 METHODS AND DATA

In the literature we can identify various methods how to calculate (estimate) the TFP. In this paper, we introduce a methodology based on growth accounting which was elaborated by Diewert (1976) and applied in numerous empirical studies. It is an alternative to the econometric approach which is frequently used in recent studies. Naturally, both approaches have certain shortcomings. In our case we rely on the former one due to the lack of sufficient data (too short time series could lead to unreliable results in the case of the econometric methods) (Ganev 2005, p. 6).

According to this method, the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) is approximated by the first difference of logarithm of GDP and it is decomposed via the following equation

$$\Delta \ln Y_t = \frac{1}{2} [a_t + a_{t-1}] \Delta \ln K_t + \frac{1}{2} [b_t + b_{t-1}] \Delta \ln L_t + \Delta \ln A_t \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_t$  denotes a GDP,  $K_t$  stands for a capital stock,  $L_t$  is a number of employed persons,  $A_t$  is a measure of the total factor productivity and  $a_t$ ,  $b_t$  represents the shares of labour and capital incomes in total income.

As the total factor productivity growth rate catches up that part of output growth which cannot be attributed to the growth rate of production factors (labour and capital), the total factor productivity growth rate is calculated as follows:

$$\Delta \ln A_t = \Delta \ln Y_t - \frac{1}{2} [a_t + a_{t-1}] \Delta \ln K_t - \frac{1}{2} [b_t + b_{t-1}] \Delta \ln L_t \quad (2)$$

Before the application of the equation (2) in an empirical analysis, we need to calculate the level of capital stock in the given economy due to the unavailability of data in the national accounts. In this paper we execute the calculation of  $K_t$  by the permanent inventory method. Its basic equation can be described as

$$K_t = I_t + (1 - \delta) K_{t-1} \quad (3)$$

where  $I_t$  denotes a gross investment and  $\delta$  is a rate of depreciation. According to Ganev (2005) we assume that the rate of depreciation is  $\delta = 0,05$ .

The application of permanent inventory method for capital stock calculation allows us to calculate the capital stock recursively back in the time. Then, the equation (3) can be rewritten in the following way:

$$K_t = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (1 - \delta)^i I_{t-1} + (1 - \delta)^n K_{t-n} \quad (4)$$

where  $n$  denotes a fixed moment in time for which we express the initial level of capital stock and  $i$  represents the length of time between the actual and initial year.

The initial level of capital stock is given by:

$$K_0 = I_0 / \delta \quad (5)$$

If we assume full depreciation of the capital, the equation (4) becomes:

$$K_t = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (1 - i\delta) I_{t-1} + (1 - n\delta) K_{t-n} \quad (6)$$

In this paper we use the latter formulation for the capital stock (i.e. linear depreciation method according to the equation (5)).



The rate of labour income in the total income is derived as a ratio of the compensation of employees (for which data are available) to the GDP. As the rate of labour income and the rate of capital income give together one, the latter is computed as follows:

$$b_t = 1 - a_t \quad (7)$$

As it was presented in the section 2, neither the economic theory nor the empirical literature allows us to unequivocally identify a set of explanatory variable for productivity determinants. As we have numerous options how to specify an empirical model for explaining the TFP growth in the European Union we face the problem with model uncertainty.

Formally, the generic representation of an empirical model for the TFP growth is the following:

$$y = \beta X + \epsilon \quad (8)$$

where  $y$  represent a dependent variable (TFP growth),  $X$  is a matrix of explanatory variables (TFP determinants),  $\theta$  is a matrix of estimated parameters and  $\epsilon$  are residuals. If we have  $K$  potential explanatory variables, we will have  $2^K$  possible combinations of regressors. It means, there are  $2^K$  different models under consideration, each with certain probability of being the correct model (Benito et al. 2011).

The method applied in this paper provides a way to overcome the problem with model uncertainty via the method called Bayesian model averaging (BMA). This method allows us to estimate all the possible models (as combinations of different regressors) from the given set of productivity determinants and assess the importance of each explanatory variable (CompNet Task Force 2015).

With certain simplification, this method consists of four steps. First, assumptions about prior distribution on the model space and parameter space are made. Second, the posterior distribution of each regressor coefficient for every model including that regressor is estimated. Third, a weighted average posterior distribution is calculated from all posterior distributions with weights given by posterior model probabilities. Fourth, the variables are ranked regarding their posterior inclusion probability that could be considered as a robustness measure in BMA approach (Danquah et al. 2013).

More formally (according to Benito et al., 2011), let us we consider  $2^K$  possible models indexed as  $M_j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, 2^K$ . The posterior for the parameter given  $M_j$  is defined by a posterior, a prior and likelihood for each model in the following form

$$g(\beta^j | y, M_j) = \frac{f(y|\beta^j, M_j) g(\beta^j | M_j)}{f(y|M_j)}. \quad (9)$$

The posterior density of the parameters for all the models is calculated as followings

$$g(\beta|y) = \sum_j^{2^K} P(M_j|y) g(\beta|y, M_j) \quad (10)$$

where  $P(M_j|y)$  is a posterior model probability given by

$$P(M_j|y) = \frac{f(y|M_j) P(M_j)}{f(y)} \quad (11)$$

where  $P(M_j)$  is a prior model probability.

The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) for the variable  $k$  is defined as a sum of posterior model probabilities of all models that include that variable:

$$PIP = P(\beta_k \neq 0|y) = \sum_{\beta_k \neq 0} P(M_j|y). \quad (12)$$

In this paper we apply a static panel regression based on the methodology introduced by Moral-Benito (2011) which is an application of the BACE approach described in Sala-i-Martin (2004) and its panel data version with fixed effects. We use a software package implemented by Blazejowski and Kiatkowski (2015) in GRETLL.

Regarding a calibration of the model, we apply the Uniform Model Prior assuming that all models are identically probable a priori. It also means that the prior inclusion probability for the given regressor is set to 0,5 and that the prior expected model size is set to 0,5\*K. With respect to the prior distribution on the parameter space, we apply the Uniform Information. The application of those priors should outperform any other possible combinations (Eicher et al. 2011).<sup>5</sup>

To calculate the total factor productivity growth rate, according to the proposed growth accounting method, the annual data on gross domestic product, gross fixed capital formation, number of employed persons and compensations of employees for the period from 1995 to 2014 were applied. In the second step, the estimated values of the TFP growth were used as dependent variable to conduct the BMA analysis with aim to find out the main determinants of the European TFP growth.

Despite the fact that the BMA can be used for a large set of possible explanatory variables, some criteria for data collection need to be taken in account (CompNet Task Force 2015, p. 66). First of all, the economic theory served as basis for the choice of our explanatory variables. Second, the character of variables and their relevancy for policy makers were taken in account. We focused on long-term indicators rather than those related to business cycle, as the unfavourable trend of the productivity growth constitutes a long-term problem in the European Union. Moreover,

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<sup>5</sup> The same assumptions on priors are used in Raftay (1995), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Moral-Benito (2011) or Danquah et al. (2013).

the variables that could not be influenced by policy measures were not included. Third, as we used a balanced static panel data model, the availability of data for the whole period and all countries was a crucial factor in the selection process. Finally, we considered the statistical properties of selected variables and highly correlated variables were excluded from the dataset. Moreover, with respect to higher robustness of results in model averaging approach in the case of smaller number of regressors (Benito et al. 2011, p. 14) we did not use the variables that represent proxies for the same theory.

In total, 20 explanatory variables were included in the analysis. To approve our assumption about the crucial role of long-term factors, we included the GDP gap in the analysis to control the effect of real GDP fluctuations on the productivity growth. The whole set of variables with short description and information about their sources is reported in the Table 1.

Tab. 1: Description of variables and their sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Description</i>
ALMP	OECD.Stat	Public expenditures on active labour market policies (% of GDP)
Civil liberties	Freedome House	Index of civil liberties (0-7)
COE	Eurostat	Compensation of employees
Consumption	OECD.Stat	Household consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
EPL	OECD.Stat	Strictness of employment protection, index (0-7)
FDI	UNCTADstat	Inward flows of foreign direct investments (% of GDP)
GCI	Eurostat	Gross fixed capital formation
GDP	Eurostat	Gross domestic product
GDPgap	Own estimations	Difference between potential and real GDP
Infrastructure	OECD.Stat	Transport infrastructure investments (% of GDP)
Internet users	WDI	Internet users (per 100 people)
L	Eurostat	Number of employed persons
l_GDP p.c.	TED	Logarithm of GDP p.c. (PPP, in USD)
Life expectancy	WDI	Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Minimum wages	OECD.Stat	Minimum wages relative to median wages
Openess	WDI	Export and import as % of GDP
Patents	OECD.Stat	Total patent applications
Political rights	Freedome House	Index of political rights (1-7)
Population density	WDI	People per sq. km of land area
Population growth	TED	Population growth (% change)
Share of services	WDI	Services (% of GDP)
Tertiary education	Eurostat	Population with tertiary education (% of total)
TFP	TED	Total factor productivity growth (% change)
Trade unions	OECD.Stat	Trade union density
U benefits	OECD.Stat	Public expenditures on unemployment (% of GDP)

Note: TED – Total Economy Database, WDI – World Development Indicators

Source: Own construction.

The interference was executed on 19 member states of the European Union for the period from 1996 to 2014.

#### 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS – TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS

The long-term development of the total factor productivity in the European Union (EU) is unfavorable. Although there was a slightly rising trend of TFP before the global financial crisis, the EU is still less productive than the USA. According to our calculations based on data from Pen World Table the productivity level in the EU, measured by TFP, was just 78% of the US level in 1990 and only 76% in 2010. The average productivity gap of the EU with USA during these 20 years reached 22 percentage points. Looking at the country level data, only three countries (Ireland, Luxembourg, United Kingdom) enjoyed an average TFP level higher than the US level during the period from 1990 to 2010.

Tab. 2: Index of TFP (2005=1) in the member states of the European Union

<i>Country</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2010</i>
Austria	0,914	0,996	0,984	Italy	1,035	1,055	0,935
Belgium	0,967	1,009	0,959	Latvia	0,967	0,803	0,925
Bulgaria	1,152	0,898	0,945	Lithuania	1,060	0,797	0,976
Croatia	1,071	0,857	0,964	Luxembourg	0,916	1,013	0,882
Cyprus	0,809	0,968	0,979	Malta	0,920	1,079	0,994
Czech republic	1,089	0,913	1,058	Netherlands	0,918	0,986	0,997
Denmark	0,842	0,978	0,945	Poland	0,648	0,893	1,065
Estonia	0,866	0,851	0,931	Portugal	1,004	1,053	0,970
Finland	0,816	0,954	0,962	Romania	0,767	0,734	1,014
France	1,016	0,993	0,958	Slovakia	0,915	0,853	1,136
Germany	1,095	1,073	1,015	Slovenia	0,907	0,920	0,983
Greece	0,919	0,981	0,901	Spain	1,178	1,043	0,967
Hungary	0,874	0,868	0,963	Sweden	0,811	0,941	0,992
Ireland	0,829	1,098	0,915	United Kingdom	0,842	0,950	0,967

Source: Own calculations based on The Conference Board Total Economy Database™ (2015a).

However, it is necessary to point out that we can observe certain differences in productivity levels (TFP) among the member states. The indexes of TFP in 1990, 2000 and 2010 for the individual member states are reported in the Table 2. Not surprisingly, the old member states are generally more productive than those with membership acquired after 1995. From the reported data, we can observe another important trend - stagnation of TFP in the majority of countries. Only few countries (for example: Romania or Poland) enjoyed a significant increase in the level of their TFP between 1990 and 2010.

Tab. 3: Average TFP growth rates in the member states of the European Union

<i>Country</i>	<i>1996 2000</i>	<i>2001 2005</i>	<i>2006 2010</i>	<i>2011 2014</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>1996 2000</i>	<i>2001 2005</i>	<i>2006 2010</i>	<i>2011 2014</i>
Austria	5,26	-2,00	-3,21	4,01	Italy	3,53	-1,06	-2,79	2,21
Belgium	3,91	2,14	2,53	2,73	Latvia	-	4,73	5,08	2,92
Bulgaria*	-	3,93	2,92	-1,86	Lithuania	-	5,67	5,58	2,94
Croatia*	-	3,45	1,29	-1,09	Luxembourg	-3,06	-3,22	4,54	3,09
Cyprus	-	3,54	-3,60	1,81	Malta	-	-3,51	-2,49	1,58
Czech republic	3,95	4,37	3,80	0,90	Netherlands	5,93	-2,74	-4,02	3,62
Denmark	4,96	-2,22	-3,72	3,82	Poland	5,53	3,61	-3,03	2,48
Estonia	-	5,76	5,94	1,36	Portugal	4,99	2,88	2,32	4,06
Finland	5,43	1,39	-3,57	1,89	Romania	5,47	8,47	-6,96	1,52
France	5,05	-3,81	3,05	3,03	Slovakia	5,46	5,34	-5,66	1,25
Germany	3,77	4,11	-4,29	5,35	Slovenia	-	3,73	-3,17	4,12
Greece*	3,73	-3,22	2,25	3,13	Spain	4,16	-1,53	2,35	2,71
Hungary*	4,95	3,42	-2,75	-2,30	Sweden	4,94	2,23	4,27	2,05
Ireland	6,43	2,19	4,09	2,79	United Kingdom	4,41	3,16	2,41	4,27

Note: \*average for 2010-2014 instead of 2011-2014, - data are not available

Source: Own calculation based on the estimations of TFP growth rates.

Regarding the dynamics of the TFP, it shows greater variability among the countries and periods. In the Table 3, we present the averages of estimated growth rates of TFP for the individual member states of the European Union. The estimation of yearly growth rates (from 1996 to 2014) was provided according to the methodology described in the Section 3.

To sum up the main observations from the presented data, three important fact can be mentioned. First, the best results (in terms of the highest productivity growth) were recorded in the second part of 1990s almost in all countries which corresponded with the continuously increasing trend of the TFP level during that period. Second, negative growth rates of TFP, or at least a slowdown in productivity growth, were already observed in the majority of EU member states before the global crisis. Thus, we suppose that the crisis was not the main factor of the falling productivity in the European Union. It more likely constituted a catalyst which revealed the long-term structural problems of the European countries. Third, only few member states reached higher growth rates of TFP in the first part of 2010s than in the 1990s. The latter is alarming in the context of the future development of the European productivity. However, if we want to improve the situation in the European Union, it is inevitable to know the factors which are responsible for this disturbing trend.

The empirical results of Bayesian model averaging for potential determinants of TFP growth in the European Union are presented in the Table 4.

Tab. 4: Determinants of total factor productivity growth – BMA approach

<i>Variable</i>	<i>With fixed effects</i>			<i>Without fixed effects</i>		
	<i>PIP</i>	<i>Cond.Mean</i>	<i>Cond.Std.</i>	<i>PIP</i>	<i>Cond.Mean</i>	<i>Cond Std.</i>
Fixed effects	0,062	0,013	0,043	-	-	-
<b>Internet users</b>	0,989	-0,034	0,008	<b>0,991</b>	-0,035	0,008
<b>Population growth</b>	0,568	-1,081	0,412	<b>0,599</b>	-1,083	0,412
<b>Openess</b>	0,479	0,010	0,004	<b>0,519</b>	0,010	0,004
ALMP	0,378	1,041	0,482	0,407	1,044	0,483
Infrastructure	0,279	-1,049	0,522	0,286	-1,041	0,523
Consumption	0,251	-0,061	0,038	0,253	-0,060	0,039
GDPgap	0,219	0,000	0,000	0,246	0,000	0,000
Share of services	0,177	-0,056	0,034	0,192	-0,056	0,034
Life expectancy	0,185	-0,174	0,116	0,179	-0,166	0,118
Patents	0,106	0,000	0,000	0,116	0,000	0,000
FDI	0,110	0,020	0,017	0,108	0,020	0,017
l_GDP p.c.	0,088	-0,505	1,117	0,096	-0,514	1,114
U benefits	0,077	-0,219	0,273	0,086	-0,227	0,268
Trade unions	0,065	0,006	0,011	0,072	0,006	0,012
Minimum wages	0,061	-0,428	0,956	0,066	-0,398	0,961
Tertiary education	0,059	-0,002	0,043	0,063	-0,002	0,043
Population density	0,055	0,000	0,002	0,060	0,000	0,002
EPL reg. contracts	0,052	0,040	0,295	0,058	0,036	0,295
Civil liberties	0,050	0,059	0,427	0,058	0,067	0,427
Political rights	0,050	0,059	0,427	0,057	0,573	1,626

Source: Own estimations.

The Table 4 reports the posterior inclusion probability (PIP) and the posterior moments conditional on inclusion of a given regressor in the empirical model, i.e. conditional means (Cond.Mean) and conditional standard deviations (Cond Std.), for both versions of panel data models. The variables are considered to be relevant (robust)

for explaining TFP growth if their PIP is higher than the prior inclusion probability set to 0,5. Moreover, the variable has a conditional mean significantly different from zero, if the ration of its Cond.Mean to Cond. Std. exceeds two in absolute value. It approximately corresponds to 95 % Bayesian coverage region that did not include zero (Danquah et al. 2013).

The two models under consideration are static panel data model with fixed effect and pooled OLS without fixed effects. Looking at the PIP of the fixed effects in the first model, it seems that the country specific unobserved heterogeneity does not constitute a robust factor of the TFP growth in the European member states. Based on this fact we rely on the results of the second model. One we considered the second model, three variables appeared to be robust, namely (a) number of internet users (proxy for information and communication technologies), (b) population growth and (c) openness. All of these variables have posterior means significantly different from zero.

The results suggest that the most important factors with positive impact on the TFP growth in the European Union is the share of total export and import on GDP (openness). Regarding the relatively high level of openness in many European countries, this result is not surprising. Moreover, this conclusion is in compliance with the economic theory. Foreign trade allows us to introduce foreign technologies and increases the degree of domestic competition having in turn positive impact on the national productivity.

On the contrary, the additional two robust determinants have negative effect on the European TFP growth. Theoretically, a high rate of population growth should have favourable impact on the productivity. In the case of the European Union, the negative impact of this variable could be interpreted as a negative effect of the actual demographic trend in the European countries (declining population growth) on the growth rate of TFP. The result in case of the last robust variable is surprising as we supposed that ICT should have positively influence on the country's productivity. It could be caused by the fact that the users of internet are also those who are students, unemployed or workers in low-productivity sectors. It seems that other proxy for ICT need to be used for proper inference.

With exception of public expenditures on active labour market policies the other variables have the probability of posterior inclusion considerably low. In recent years many European countries have implemented various labour market reforms with aim to increase the flexibility of markets and improve the employment (mainly after the crisis). The sign of conditional mean indicates positive impact of these reforms on the European productivity. We did not find an evidence of an important role of GDP fluctuations measured by GDP gap. The large portion in the European total factor productivity growth is explained by variables with long-term character. The PIP lower



than 0,5 confirms our assumptions that the crisis was only a catalyst which revealed the deep-rooted structural problems of the European countries.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

The total factor productivity is often considered as the most comprehensive method to measure the national productivity. The higher is the total factor productivity of the country the higher is its economic performance and its competitiveness. Therefore, the relatively low level of the European total factor productivity constitutes a serious problem for the European economies.

The aim of this paper was to calculate the total factor productivity growth for the European member states and find out its most significant determinants. Providing the calculations, we created a dataset of the growth rates of total factor productivity for each member states of the European Union for the period from 1996 to 2014. Regarding the presented data, three main conclusions can be mentioned. First, the best results were recorded in the second part of 1990s almost in all countries. Second, negative growth rates of total factor productivity were already observed in the majority of EU member states before the global crisis. Third, only few member states reached higher growth rates of TFP in the first part of 2010s than in the 1990s which is alarming in the context of the future development of the European productivity.

On the contrary to other empirical works dealing with the issue of the European productivity, we were able to consider a large set of possible productivity determinants thanks to the Bayesian Model Averaging method. The empirical results suggest that the most robust factor with positive effect on the European total factor productivity in the analysed period is openness. On the contrary, the other robust factors, namely population growth and number of internet users (proxy for information and communication technologies) have negative impact. Moreover, a considerably high positive impact can be attributed to active labour market policies.

We did not find an evidence of an important role of GDP fluctuations measured by the GDP gap. On the contrary, the empirical results show that the largest portion in the variation of the European total factor productivity growth is explained by variables with long-term character rather than by economic fluctuations. Thus, we conclude that the crisis was only a catalyst which revealed the deep-rooted structural problems of the European countries. If the European authorities wanted to improve the level of productivity in the member states, well defined structural measures should be taken.

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## RUSKÁ MAKKÁ MOC V BALTSKÝCH KRAJINÁCH

### RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER IN THE BALTIC STATES

*Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik<sup>1</sup>*

Predkladaný článok sa zameriava na súčasný výskum, ktorý poukazuje na fakt, že Rusko okrem tradičných nástrojov hospodárskeho a vojenského nátlaku na Baltské štáty, rozšírilo svoje pôsobenie o nástroje mäkkej moci za účelom legitimizovania svojich záujmov v post – sovietskom priestore ako výsledok existencie veľkej rusko-jazyčnej minority.

Cieľom state je predstaviť nástroje mäkkej moci na základe výskumu Joseph-a Nye-a. Článok je informatívny a predkladá finančnú, organizačnú, diplomatickú, ideologickú, legislatívnu a hospodársku analýzu, ponúkajúc tak náhľad do podstaty ruskej mäkkej moci a snažiac sa zároveň analyzovať skutočné záujmy Ruskej federácie v post – sovietskom priestore. Poukazuje na jej obmedzenosť v dôsledku jej zamerania takmer výhradne na rusko-jazyčnú menšinu. Jej pozitívom však môže byť konštruktívna kritika USA.

**Kľúčové slová:** mäkká moc, vplyv, Rusko, baltské štáty

This paper focuses on the latest researches that show apart from traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia has extended tools of influence in the Baltic States by soft power instruments to legitimate interests in the post-Soviet space as a result of the presence of large Russian-speaking minorities.

The aim of the paper is to present the soft power sources and instruments of

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Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik is a political scientist and archeologist, the author of several papers in the field of international relations and Russia's foreign policy. As a research grant winner, Dr. Kuczyńska-Zonik conducted research in Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Russia and Lithuania. Specializing in the history and contemporaneity of the socio-political relations in the post-Soviet space, in her research Dr. Kuczyńska-Zonik focuses on (a) politics and security in East-Central Europe, (b) nationalism (c) Russian diaspora, and (d) the Baltic States.

influence with factual backup from Joseph Nye. The paper is informative and provides financial, organisational, diplomatic, ideological, legal policy and economic analysis; providing an indication into the nature of Russia's soft power and to transpose what Russia's real intentions are to advance pressure on the post-Soviet space. The result of which; Russia's soft power is regarded as weak due to Russia's influence directed to a particular audience of Russian-speaking citizens only. The advantage of this influence maybe, leading the constructive opposition to the United States, amongst authoritarian regimes.

Key words: soft power, influence, Russia, Baltic States

JEL: F52; F54

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

It is said that Russia is a classic realist power, using hard power rather than relying on its power of attraction which was seen in Ukraine. Latest research shows that apart from traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia has extended tools of influence in the Baltic States. It has been enabled by means of soft power instruments in legitimate interests in the post-Soviet space as a result of the presence of large Russian-speaking diaspora.

The current situation of the Russian-speaking in the Baltic States has been formed by cultural, historical and political factors. The most important ones are associated with the Soviet period and the Baltic States' policy of neutralisation. Russia has influenced political, lingual, educational and social committees of Baltic Russians by discriminating and humiliating them. Russia has not accepted the loss the Baltic region's independence. Russia has formulated a new foreign policy towards the compatriots.

Only in the early eighties of the Twentieth Century the issue of compatriots appeared in Russia's political discourse. The so-called 'Russian card' was to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The protection of Russian diaspora after the collapse of the USSR was significant for Gorbachev, the compatriot issue was less important for Yeltsin, in the initial period of his presidential office. At that time, Gorbachev only signed bilateral agreements, including protection of Russian diaspora rights and freedoms in post-Soviet space. The situation changed after the civil war in the Republic of Moldova and the naturalization policy in the Baltic States. This was a result of Yeltsin engaging in support of Russian diaspora to protect their rights (Horska 2009). One of the first documents concerning the compatriot issue was Yeltsin's decree of 1994 (Diaspora Act 1994). Russia expressed support for compatriots returning to Motherland Russia. On returning to Russia they would be granted Russian citizenship their national identity would be protected by legal, political, informative, diplomatic,

economic and cultural instruments. In 1995, Yeltsin founded Council of Compatriots however, the idea of Russia's Compatriot Policy as constructive action for Russian-speaking diaspora appeared only in Vladimir Putin's presidential period. According to the CIS and the Baltic States, Putin managed to join hard and soft powers with the elements of Soviet style propaganda (Conley, Gerber 2011). The diaspora has become a convenient tool for policy implementation in the area of Russia's historic interests. Promoting a positive image of the State and articulating its interests in the International environment.

According to Joseph Nye (2004), soft power is about making people want what we want, by attracting people as opposed to forcing them. It is an ability to shape the preferences of others, persuade them and co-operate with them. This is a capacity to make the state's culture and ideology attractive to follow. Soft power allows shaping of international rules in accordance with state's interests and values. When state's actions can be supported by the international community, its soft power is growing. In democratic countries, politicians have to rely more heavily on the attractiveness and incentives. They depend on attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions and domestic and foreign policy regarded as legally valid and credible. In authoritarian states in contrast to the above, politicians may use coercion and threat.

There is a connection between hard and soft powers as they are both different aspects of the ability to succeed in influencing other people's behaviour. However, they are autonomous and independent. Paradoxically, the hard power may strengthen the effectiveness of soft power by creating myths of the State's invincibility that may attract others.

## 2 SOFT POWER SOURCES

According to Nye, the culture and political values and foreign policy are the main sources of soft power. For Russia, Russian language is the basic indicator in the Baltic States, where it is the mother tongue for 8% of the residents of Lithuania, 33,8% in Latvia and 29,6% in Estonia (The World Factbook 2015). It is said that Russia is a reminder of the tragic history in the Baltic States. Russian remains the most popular second language in Lithuania. A similar situation concerns Latvia and Estonia even more. Most of the older generations are fluent in it because of its obligation and ubiquity during the Soviet occupation. Nowadays, it is decreasing; many ethnic Lithuanians regard Russian language as a 'colonial relict' and only about 40% of children learn it. Today English, German, French and Spanish are the most popular foreign languages to teach. Table 1 explains this further:

Tab 1: The most popular foreign languages in the Baltic States

<i>Language/state</i>	<i>Lithuania %</i>	<i>Latvia %</i>	<i>Estonia %</i>
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Russian	<b>79</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>62</b>
English	26	34	41
Finnish/German	x	x	18
Polish	17	x	x

Source: European Commission, 2012.

In February 2012, a referendum in relation to the Russian language to be recognized as the second official language was held in Latvia. Since then, according to the Latvian Constitution, Latvia was a single language state. The referendum was attended by 70% of the citizens and almost 75% voted against the Russian language. The representatives of the Russian minority in Latvia who attended the referendum confirmed that the outcome didn't reflect the actual situation as more than 300,000 Russian residents (stateless in Latvia) didn't have the right to vote. The Russian Federation's delegation didn't have the observer status at the referendum, which the Russian government qualified as Latvian ignorance of International Law (Economist 2012). Russian's accuse the Baltic governances of anti-minority policy of education where the minorities' languages have been reduced as well. While there were bilingual system at all education levels during the Soviet time, now in almost all public school (similarly in private municipal schools in Estonia as well) subjects are taught in Baltic States' languages (Заренков 2013, Baltic Times 2015).

Private hotels and restaurants still have Russian menus and employed Russian-speakers to cater for numerous Russian tourists. However, statistics show that number of Russian tourists visiting Latvia declines year on year (BNN-news 2015a).

Culture also includes literature, education, academic exchanges, art, popular culture and mass entertainment. In the Baltic States, the Russian high culture (literature, art) and popular culture is well known and widely promoted by the government of the Russian Federation or Russian business subventions. There are Russian culture days, festivals, concerts, sporting events (Russian Language and Culture Festival in Vilnius, Russian Cultural Days in Latvia festival and Russia's best performances at the theatre festival Golden Mask in Latvia). Enjoying Russian music, literature and media, people claim that 'culture and politics should not be mixed'.

Democracy, human rights and peace are the most attractive political values for the international society. However, for Russian soft power the concept of 'русский мир' ('Russkij mir', 'Russian World') including anti-liberalism, an alternative to the Western idea, the idea of a multipolar world (especially in opposition to the USA dominance), tradition and conservatism are the principles of axiology. In recent years, Russia has put forward accusations against Estonia's glorifying Fascism and Nazism. The fight against falsification of the past has become the main postulate of ideology addressed to the Russian-speaking diaspora. The apogee took place in late April and



May 2007 in Tallinn, when the removal of the Bronze Soldier, Soviet WWII memorial, caused Estonian-Russian riots, in which a Russian resident suffered severe injuries and died (Liik 2007). For Estonians the Bronze Soldier was a sign of Soviet occupation and annexation ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But for Russians the monument was a commemoration of the victims of the Red Army fight against fascist ideology. In 2011, the conflict was revived when the Soviet Army soldier monument with the inscription ‘occupying Estonia since 1944’ appeared on a cemetery in Tallinn. Once more the Russian government and the Russian minority in Estonia were ruffled and offended. But it was only a pretext for Russia to present its own vision of history glorifying the victory over Nazi Germany. In fact, Russia wants to prevent and counteract the negative presentation of the Soviet Union. It is a method of putting international pressure on the Baltic States, as well.

Apart from values, the foreign policy is the third most important soft power source. It includes international or regional partnership, mediation, humanitarian aid, promotion of positive values and goods, cooperation with the international institutions in preventing conflicts. Russia initiates and develops cooperation and leads regional organizations. It supports the Russian-speaking minority, stimulates and sustains nostalgia for the Soviet Union past.

### **3 SOFT POWER INSTRUMENTS**


The level of soft power depends on society. That is why it is especially favorable to social purposes. Politicians perform by the public diplomacy, which is a form of government to people communication (Simons 2015). In case of Russia it is a hierarchical model of exchanging of information (Panova 2015). Using its political, cultural and economic agencies, in particular, television, the internet, the radio, language policy, visa and citizenship policy, private entities (companies, foundations, organizations, Orthodox Church) and mass culture Russia sends a message to the Baltic States’ societies about its attractiveness. In that way Russia tries to manage to increase its soft power. I will divide them into 7 groups of instruments:

#### **Informative**

Media is the most influential platform to present the values and interests. It is an instrument which Russia has already included in its foreign policy. Russian speaking media focuses on Russian diaspora which is an independent and isolated segment of the Baltic society. Russia uses the media not only to inform but more often, in negative way, to carry out information and propaganda campaigns against the Baltic States’ governments. It is detrimental to normal democratic development of the countries because it strengthens ethnic divisions of their residents.

In the last few years Russia’s methods of influence have expanded. Using new instruments it has tried to attract non-Russian-speaking population. A Russian media channel Sputnik prepared an offer for young people and plans to open an internet portal and radio as well, that would support two languages – Russian and Latvian. It has already entered Latvian media environment by programs on weekends on Autoradio. Sputnik is a part of the Russian state information agency Rossiya Segodnya which is led by journalist Dmitry Kiselev, who was included in the European sanction list for his propaganda activities. It offers media services in fourteen languages in 10 countries, including regions of Russia’s special interests. Sputnik expects success as a result of using alternative viewpoints. According to the Baltic Media Overview (Table 2), the percentage of Russian TV channels in the Baltic States has not changed for several years. Russian Pervij Baltiskij Kanal (PBK), which attracted significantly more viewers in Latvia and Estonia, is one of the most willingly viewed channel (Baltic Media Overview 2011, 2012). In Latvia two of the publications in Latvia’s top 5 were published in Russian: TV-Programma and MK Latvija (Daveluy 2011). But experts suppose that Russian media has little chance to develop in the Baltic States because they are seen as Kremlin anti-American propaganda tool by the Baltic audience. Experts predict that no Baltic-speaking journalists will want to work for the Russian media as well (BNN-news 2015b).

Table 2: TV Channels Daily Reach, %



Source: Baltic Media Overview 2011.

### Financial

It is an open secret that Russia financially support local NGOs who defend it policies in the Baltic States. According to Jemberga, Salu & Černiauskas (2015) there

are more than 40 organizations in the region that have received at least 1.5 million euros in the last three years (cash transactions and financing through Russia-friendly enterprises and individuals excluded). It is impossible to estimate accurately how much of their income is from Russian government funds because part of their recipients do not declare it in their annual reports. For example, in Lithuania law does not require NGOs to disclose their sponsors. Authors of the article mentioned filmmakers and researchers who supported and promoted Russian version of history or participants Tallinn riot in 2007, financed by Russian NGO in the Baltic States. The compatriot foundations also grant individuals (organizations' experts or protesters against Lithuania's support for Ukraine) and institutions for informational (Russian-speaking media), ideological (*World Without Nazism* for criticizing Nazism ideology in the Baltic States), scientific (conferences, roundtable discussion) or legal (translating the Baltics laws into Russian) activity.

Media investigations indicate that Russian parties in the Baltic States are supported by compatriots' funding. According to *Baltic News Network* Latvian Russians Union headed by MEP Tatyana Zdanok has received nearly 95 thousand euros from Latvian Human Rights Committee led by Zdanok and Compatriot Support and Legal Protection Foundation founded by Russian Foreign Ministry. However Zdanok denounced her party is granted by the Russia fund; she admitted that Latvian Human Rights Committee accepted money from the Russian fund because there is no way to receive money from Latvia's government (BNN-news 2015c). Moreover the mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, the head of the Centre Party, second-largest party in Estonia and supported by the Russian-speaking minority was recognized as a Russian agent of influence because of his ties to Putin (Braw 2014, Milne 2015, Bershidsky 2015). There are many other political organizations that speak for the Russian minority, too small and local to achieve electoral gains but with political or financial protection from Russia.

### Organizational

Russian government funded several bodies and agencies to oversee the Compatriot Policy, including the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture. They are 'soft power foundation' (Re.Baltica 2015) like: Rossotrudnichestvo, International Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots, International Congress of Compatriots, Compatriot Support and Legal Protection Foundation and embassies. Public diplomacy includes a system of Russophone centres of which there are more than a hundred in the Baltic States. In 2007 the Foreign Ministry founded a multifunctional institution, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, supported by both public and private funds (Presidential Decree 2007). They work in Šiauliai, Vilnius (Lithuania), Daugavpils, Riga (Latvia) and Tallin (Estonia). They support pro-Russian associations representing Russian-speaking diaspora that act in favour of

preserving and promoting Russian culture, language, values and ethnic identity. But NGO legislation in the Baltic States is a sensitive and a problematic issue. Russia uses its lack of proper regulations to act in a secretive way, not providing information on the origins of financial resources (BNN-news 2014) like Estonian Russian-speaking youth organization *Molodoie slovo*, recognized as GONGO which are government organized NGO. The Baltic governments should engage actively to protect their interests in the area of law.

Using institutions of research, diplomacy or democracy as a platform to articulate Russian foreign interests, is another new phenomenon. In 2004 the Valdai Club was founded and in 2008 the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation was created (Tafuro 2014). Their goal is to influence the public debate and the society by promoting democracy and human rights protection but in 'Russia's point of view'. According to the Latvian security service Normunds Mezviets they are used as agents of Russia's informational impact (Re.Baltica 2015).

## Diplomatic

Russia repeatedly accuses the Baltic States of human rights violation. In 1999 in according to Zdanok's disqualification from standing for election to the Latvian parliament and to municipal elections Russian State Duma condemned the Latvian Prosecution to human rights violation (GosDuma Act 1999). Russia appealed to international society to criticize the Latvian government for legal abuse (ECHR 2000, Лич 2006, НБ 2008)<sup>2</sup> as well as in the case of a pro-Kremlin Italian journalist and former MEP Giulietto Chiesa arrested in Estonia and ordered to leave the country (Nielsen 2015)<sup>3</sup>. However neither ECHR nor the UN Human Rights Council has found evidence of systematic abuse of human rights or ethnic discrimination (Conley, Gerber 2011). Interestingly though, and successfully for Russia, Amnesty International has criticized discriminatory policy of citizenship in the Baltic States. AI has paid attention to restricted language and education policy for the Russian diaspora. Another problem was the unfavourable economic situation of the Russian diaspora, caused by political (limited political rights) and social (lack of foreign language ability) factors. In 2009 report AI condemned the force use against demonstrations in April 2007 (Amnesty

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<sup>2</sup>Zdanok was ruled ineligible to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. Her exclusion was based on her former membership of the Communist Party of Latvia. She complained that her right to stand for election had been infringed as a result of her disqualification. In the case of *Ždanoka v. Latvia* no. 58278/00 The European Court of Human Rights adjudged that there has been no violation of human rights.

<sup>3</sup>Working as Moscow correspondent for the Italian newspapers for several years Chiesa was famous for justifying Russian activity in Georgia, demanding recognition of the independence of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia and supporting for Russian activity in eastern Ukraine.

International 2006, 2007). Although the statelessness of the Russian minority decreases thanks to effective Estonian government policy of assimilation, in February 2011 Russia criticized Estonian policy of discrimination at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Council. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov described the statelessness among Russian-speaking minority in Estonia as a 'shameful phenomenon' which 'demands greater attention' (News 2011).

In 2015 Lithuania's decision to ban RTR Planeta broadcast, accused of inciting hatred between Russian and Ukrainian nations, making calls for violence and violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity was precedential in UE (Lapėnienė 2015, Reuters 2014). Similarly Gazprom-owned NTV Mir was banned in Lithuania in 2014 for three months for showing false about the Soviet army in 1991. They influenced Russia to put media issue on the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe agenda. Dunja Mijatović, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media responded to governmental authorities that have taken measures to stop foreign propaganda, by banning or blocking radio and television signals or imposing other restrictions, such as ban on entry for Russian journalists or their eviction from governmental press centres in Ukraine (Richter 2015). She made it very clear to all OSCE participating states that censoring propaganda is not the way to counter it. Only a well-functioning open, diverse and dynamic media environment can effectively neutralize the effect of propaganda.


### Ideological

Anti-Nazism is an idea which Russia particularly focuses on. Since 2005, it has been submitting an anti-Nazism resolution against the holding of pro-Nazi demonstrations and the glorification of Nazism before the UN General Assembly. However, the motion did not receive support from the other member states. Lavrov has mentioned that Latvia and Estonia are frequently the site of parades in honour of Waffen-SS veterans, involving veterans from the Latvian Legion and the 20th Estonian SS Division (RT 2012).

Founded in 2010 International Human Rights Protection Movement, World without Nazism (*Международное правозащитное движение Мир без нацизма*) is another way to present Russian values and interests on the international forum. Starting as a number of international conferences (2009 in Berlin, 2010 in Riga), which the members of veteran organizations as well as youth and regional associations, including several dozen from the Baltic States took part in, the event was attended by over 360 members from 136 organizations of 28 countries from around the world (Table 3). The motto 'World without Nazism' refers to 'false assessment' of WWII heroic ideology of Nazism and the national minorities' cultural and religious rights and freedom restrictions. The idea of preventing the danger of ideological emptiness after the Soviet Union collapsed and protection from the harmful liberal policy of the West

countries was supported by the Russian minorities, extreme leftist and communist groups, youth and veteran organizations. On the one hand, the WWN principle is to prevent new threat of Nazi and fascist forces in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by the governments of the countries in the region. There is no doubt the WWN foundation was motivated by the Russian vision of the past, including the Third Reich responsibility for the WWII outbreak and the wrong accusation of the Soviet Union collaboration. The symbolic date of WWN establishment – June 22 is recognized by Russian government as the anniversary of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. On the other hand, for Russia, it is important to draw attention of the international community and institutions, including the Council of Europe and the UN, to the discrimination of national minorities especially in the Baltic States. Generally speaking it is one of the instruments of disinformation, propaganda and falsification of history. In the West it is seen as the espionage and sabotage organisation (Braw 2014). According to James Kirchick (2015), the pseudo-independent institution of WWN leads Russia to pursue its own policy to influence other countries. The idea of ‘World without Nazism’, like the ‘war against terrorism’ as the example of Russia's actions in Chechnya, is a way of convincing international public opinion to take radical action to protect the security, stability and peace in Europe.

Table 3: Members of International Human Rights Protection Movement, ‘World without Nazism’



Source: the Author, based on <http://worldwithoutnazism.org/>.

Ideologically Russia's government is supported by Russian Orthodox Church seen as a traditional element of Russian civilization and in post-Soviet space – the reconstruction and rebirth of the modern Russian state base, the symbol of national glory and victory. It is a component of religious, political and national identity of Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States. It is said that the Russian Orthodox Church's contribution to the consolidation of the compatriot community is highly

effective. In the Baltic States its influence has increased in recent years in very sensitive areas, especially among children and the youth.

### Legal policy

Russia uses the visa and citizenship policy as a soft power instrument, as well. The concept of this policy, however, has changed. Initially, during Putin's first presidency the category of compatriots was broadly recognized, while consciousness of 'Russianness' was the most significant indicator of Russian Community. Unexpectedly, the program encouraging Russian diaspora to return to Russia was not successful. It turned out that the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic States wanted to cultivate Russian identity and develop relationships with Russia, but did not decide to change their place of residency (Munoglu 2011). In 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev signed another repatriation program but addressed directly to the highly skilled and educated professionals to adopt new ideas or methods and modernize the Russian economy. Generally speaking Russian soft power in the area of visa and citizenship policy can be recognized as limited or ineffective. Residents of 'near abroad', including the Baltic States, mainly use facilities to travel to Russia for family or for business purposes. Thanks to the citizenship of the Russian Federation they also receive social assistance or opportunity to study in Russia. In the last few years more and more residents, including Latvian citizens, have managed to get Russian documents due to the economic advantages (Ruposters 2014). Due to an ability to travel freely across Russian borders and higher pensions for Russian citizens in the Baltic States, the situation could be a challenge for the Baltic governments. The more Russian citizens reside in the Baltic States, the more influential the Russian policy over the region is. But in according to economic crisis Russia was enforced to change their citizenship policy. In the beginning of 2015 Russian State Duma has developed the draft that provides for a half of paying pensions to Russian citizens living abroad more than 183 days in the last 12 months<sup>4</sup>. Russia plans to attract pensioners to stay in the country. Among them more than 20 thousand have lived in Latvia.

### Economic

Apart from economic instrument of hard power (pressure, embargo, sanctions) Russian-speaking strong lobbies and interest groups in the Baltic States are another factor of Russian soft power. In the 90s the process of transfer of the Russian elite from the business world to the political class began. The Russian businesses got involved in cooperation (business networks) and the promotion of Russian business culture (based

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<sup>4</sup>It concerns pensioners who have changed their citizenship or have taken a second one, Russia plans to stop paying pensions to citizens living abroad.



on emotional, fatalistic, pessimistic, inward facing, fortress mentality, direct , ‘dusha’ factors) increasing the effectiveness of the government policy of soft power (especially in the energy sector; Kuznetsov, Kuznetsova 2005). Using large state corporations and private firms such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Itera and Lukoil, by controlling pipelines, building new processing plants and overseeing the gas station business, Russia manages to develop its economic visibility.

#### 4 NATURE OF RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER

It is extremely hard to compare Russia’s and US or UE soft power, because there are distinctive differences (system, instrumental and objective factor) between them. It is hard to estimate the Russian soft power quality and importance too, using the West methods. Russia’s soft power sources are directed to Russian-speaking minorities to prevent culture from decreasing in contrast to Western one, directed to civil society in all states to promote and expand. US and EU countries use democratic methods and tools to influence international opinion. Their soft power depends not only on their governments, but also on independent entities. In that case soft power is more difficult to use than hard power, as many of its resources are out of state control and the effect largely depends on public acceptance. Companies, universities, churches, foundations can develop their own soft power, which is consistent or inconsistent with the official foreign policy. In case of Russia, the government is the main actor constructing the narrative for soft power, performed by highly institutionalized government agenda, foundations, non-governmental organizations, religious and cultural associations, political parties, business and lobbies (Table 4, 5).

Table 4: Russia’s soft power sources

<i>Soft power sources</i>	<i>Russia</i>
Culture	Russian language, literature, education, academic exchanges, art, popular culture and mass entertainment
Values	Anti-liberal, ‘sovereign democracy’, alternative to West ideas as liberal, democracy and freedom
Foreign policy	Strong authoritarian sovereign state, independent foreign policy instead of communication, lack of the respect the other states’ independence, lack of cooperation and partnership

Source: Author

Table 5: Russia's soft power instrument

<b>Soft power instruments</b>	<b>Russia</b>
Informational	Disinformation, media freedom restriction, state-owned media without alternative sources of information
Financial	By government or (GO)NGO
Organizational	Government organization
Diplomatic	Criticizing, accusation, propaganda rather than legal methods and cooperation
Ideological	Falsification, duplicity instead of legality, truth and objectivity
Legal policy	Visa and citizenship policy attractive for former Soviet Union residents
Economic	Promotion of Russian business culture

Source: the Author.

#### 4 RUSSIA UNPOWERED

According to the Centum Levada (2015) public opinion polls the level of Putin's popularity is still high which means that his authoritarian rule, paradoxically, may not decrease Russia's soft power. But as Nye admitted the problem for Russia is that it already has very little soft power with which to work (Nye 2014). Sergey Lavrov (2012) speaking at the 20<sup>th</sup> Jubilee Meeting of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in 2012, Moscow, admitted Russia was well behind other states in this respect. Heather A. Conley and Theodoer P. Gerber (2011) conducted a research which shows Russian soft power tools as ineffective or limited. It claims that Russian-speaking people are unadapted and unassimilated in the Baltic society as a result of the lack of language ability and unemployment while statelessness is of lesser importance. Respondents admitted they have no positive attitude to Russian government's minority protection policy or they see little influence on their situation.

Recognizing Russia's little soft power to work I estimate that it is sufficient to take a pressure to the post-Soviet space. According to the Baltic States Russia uses soft and hard power too. Soft power can be treated as a gentle and subtle step of new challenges, as in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine case. Propaganda, disinformation, promotion of Russian culture and language may precede hostilities. Russia is trying to

expand its offer, now it is addressed mainly to Russian-speaking community in the post-Soviet area, and focused on minimalizing the influence of USA and EU. Russia's favour is a strong, non-integrated community of Russian diaspora, representing an overwhelming majority in some regions of the Baltic States, like in Narva, Estonia they constitute 97%. The greatest ability to influence the community is offered by the media. The further development of the global information suggests that the relative importance of soft power will increase. By well-developed means of communication states will be able to solve problems effectively. The rapid transition in 90. led the Baltic media not only to social and democratic goals of providing citizens with quality information and contributing to the democratic processes within society, but also to the profit-seeking logic of semi-professionals, often without proper training, but very keen on consumerism.

The process of democratization including access to new alternative sources of information involves even young generation of the speakers of Russian, who feel themselves more EuroRussians, adopting Western ideals of liberty, than part of the Russian community (Симонян 2010). According to Agnia Grigas (2014) they do not approve the Russia's policy and see no need for any protection from Russia. In contrast members of Russian societies claimed that Russia's support is not sufficient (Корнышева 2011). It means that Russian community in the Baltic States is not consolidated but clearly divided. The one is obvious, based on anti-liberal values, the idea of protection from neoNazism, with limited popular culture expansion, inconsistency and incompatibility of foreign policy, Russia's soft power is being reduced.

In order to weaken Russia's influence in the Baltic States, the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should avoid hostile rhetoric and take advantage of the process of integration of the Russian-speaking minority in these countries. It includes legal and institutional support for independent Russian NGO, encouragement to participate in political, economic, social life, promotion of education and language skills to help adapt minorities in the Baltic States societies beyond ethnic divisions. The governments should also make greater efforts to alleviate the negative impact of the Russian propaganda. The Estonian state television have already planned to extend the program for a new Russian-language channels. USA has also announced assistance in the form of grants to Russian journalists working in the Baltic States. This journalism training program is for early and mid-career Russian-language journalists and other media professionals working on Russian periphery (Marcin 2015). Because of Russian propaganda and misinformation multiplies, the media in all three countries need the skills and tools to counter it with fact-based, credible news reporting. The program would also build a more mature, proactive 21st century media landscape in all three countries (United States Embassy in Vilnius 2015).

Although the tools of soft power are becoming more diverse, precise and

coordinated, it is unlikely that Russia will abandon its traditional instruments of influence. But in my point of view Russia's aggression and annexation of these countries is unlikely. Instead, Russia will more likely try to destabilize the Baltic region by misleading information and inciting social conflicts. Dualism of the Russian soft power activity includes two levels: subjective, concerning the action directed to both the diaspora and the international community, and objective, relying on the use of positive (incentives, support) and negative (disinformation and the devaluation of the Western system of values) elements. It seems that contrasting to the West methods most of the Russia's instruments of soft power are directed to particular audience (Russian diaspora). The public diplomacy tools focusing on the international opinion are usually recognized as a negative message and have little significance for the West public. Using diplomatic instruments like international organizations offered by democracy, Russia does not apply to democratic rules.

## 5 CONCLUSION

Soft power legitimizes the Russian feeling of the great past of the USSR, which is an instrument of building a historical, cultural and linguistic transnational community of 'русский мир'. The idea serves as a justification for Russia engagement in post-Soviet area, it is the reason for reconnecting the Soviet past with the current situation of Russian diaspora and it is a crucial instrument of articulating Russia's interests on the international forum (Laruelle 2015). In fact the idea of protecting the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States articulated by Russia in the international arena is a subtle form of discrediting the governments of the Baltic States. This phenomenon appeared in Vladimir Putin's policy as part of negative image construction of the Baltic States to affect their domestic policies. From the Russian point of view, it is favourable to maintain a divided nation, undermining the integration and adaptation of Russian-speaking minority.

Russia's soft power instruments have become more sophisticated and diverse, adapting to the needs of recipients. In the Baltic States a vast majority of the speakers of Russian are adults and mature. By implementing new instruments such as the Internet, scholarship programs for students, Russian Orthodox Church activities for children and adolescents, the current Russian soft power tools are directed to younger generations.

Unsuccessful the political (the fragmentation of political parties, party system instability), economic (free market, commercialization, economic ties during the Soviet Union) and ethnic (high proportion of Russian diaspora, especially in Latvia and Estonia) factors create favourable conditions for Russia to realize its interests in the Baltic States area. Despite the accession of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to NATO and EU, Russia continues its economic, energy, ethnic policies based on the 90s of XX century (Žiugžda 2015). To increase their effectiveness, Russia balances hard and soft

powers. A few years ago Russian military operations along the Baltic borders were seen as they had 'little significance' (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2011), today they are a potential threat to the governments of the Baltic States.

Smart power, which Nye defined as the ability to rationally use hard and soft power, is necessary to succeed in international politics. In case of Russia, it seems that the policy towards the 'near abroad' is dominated by the first one, though soft power, as an instrument accompanying the hard power is significant too. But it is unlikely that Russia will attract non-Russian-speaking community in the world of pluralistic ideas and beliefs. Its advantage may be, however, the constructive opposition to the United States, among authoritarian regimes. I do not suppose the encouragement by Russian values and culture in that case will be a permanent trend in the future.

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## **BOL PUTIN K ZÁPADU VŽDY PRIATEĽSKÝ? INTERPRETAČNÁ ŠTÚDIA PRVÝCH DVOCH FUNKČNÝCH OBDOBÍ PERZIDENTA VLADIMÍRA PUTINA VO SVETLE TEÓRIÍ REALIZMU**

### **WAS PUTIN EVER FRIENDLY TO THE WEST? AN EXPOSITORY STUDY OF THE FIRST TWO TERMS OF PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN, IN LIGHT OF THE THEORIES OF REALISM**

**Sumantra Maitra<sup>1</sup>**

Medzi mnohými západnými analytikmi je zaužívané vnímanie Vladimíra Putina ako priateľa Západu, ktorý sa z dôvodu príčinných a štrukturálnych dôvodov, ako vojna v Iraku, rozširovanie NATO, protiraketová obrana vo východnej Európe alebo ceny ropy, zmenil na revanšistického vládcu, ktorým je dnes. Táto esej toto vyvracia a dokazuje, že bol vždy presvedčeným realistom vo vzťahu k taktickému zblížovaniu so Západom, sledujúc primárne svoje vlastné záujmy. Štúdia podčiarkuje dôležitosť prvých dvoch funkčných období Putina v kontexte stanovenia jeho budúcich politík. Štúdia je má vysvetľujúci charakter a testuje teóriu realizmu na krokoch Ruska počas prvých dvoch vlád Putina, ktoré rozsiahlo korešpondujú s obdobím vlády G. W. Busha.

**Kľúčové slová:** Rusko, Putin, východná Európa, realizmus, NATO

It is common notion among a lot of Western analysts that Vladimir Putin was a friend of the West, and due to causal and structural reasons, like Iraq War, NATO expansion, East Europe missile defense and oil price index, he turned into a revanchist ruler that he is today. I argue, that was not the case, and this

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essay highlights that he was always a shrewd Realist, on a tactical alignment with the West, looking to chart his own course at his earliest convenience. The study of this time period, of Putin's first two terms, highlights the importance and suggests future policy course in dealing with him. This study is expository and tests the theory of Realism with Russian actions under the first two terms of Vladimir Putin, which broadly coincides with the George W Bush Administration.

Key words: Russia, Putin, Eastern Europe, Realism, NATO

JEL: F51, F52, F53

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The dawn of this century saw one of the most audacious terrorist attacks in the history of mankind, one that shattered the optimism of the post-cold war world, and had a direct impact on our everyday life. September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack was such an event, one that changed the course of history, or as some might say, restarting the course of history against the predictions of some American scholars of International Relations who predicted the demise of history as we know it. It changed the functioning world around us, affected international relations between nation states and powers considerably, atleast for the near foreseeable future. Nowhere were these changes more noticeable than the tumultuous roller coaster relations between United States of America (hereinafter US), and Russia, two former superpower Cold War foes, and still the two largest and preponderant military powers in the world. From the Russian gestures towards Washington right after 9/11, which almost bordered on an alliance formation, to the Russian tanks rolling into Georgia in the summer of 2008, the timeframe between 2001 and 2008 marked the return of Russia as a great power, a major international player, after decades of relatively reduced influence and decline in status post-Cold War. The new Russia was more economically stable due to burgeoning oil wealth and energy revenue, more authoritarian but considerably less free and democratic than even a decade back under Yeltsin, and possibly more revanchist. It is also not shy to show or use hard power and its renewed strength and confidence, as evident from the 2008 gas crisis with Ukraine resulting in a subsequent squeeze on Europe, South Ossetian war of 2008, renewed long range Bomber sorties over the Atlantic since 2007, a rigid non-negotiating stance to the European Ballistic missile defense shield. But to understand this re-invigorated Russia one needs to look at the first two terms under Vladimir Putin, when Russia changed gradually determined not to concede the proverbial single inch to its former Western rivals, mainly the United States.

Even before the terror attacks of September 11, Russian diplomats were warning of an “*arc of instability*” spreading from South Asia to the Balkans, which were on one hand a defence of Russian actions in the Caucasus and a call for a joint effort to root out Islamism. (Headley 2005) US – Russian relation had many contours and layers in the post-cold war world, and is arguably one of the most complicated

bilateral relationships. The optimism immediately after the Cold War, and the Atlanticist approach in Russia gave way to a more cautious Realism during the Balkan crisis. Relations with the West were the “*primary frame of reference*”, (Mankoff 2009) as Jeffrey Mankoff (2009) referred, which is a product of the Cold War mentality of bipolarity and zero sum game attitudes. Russian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War took two distinctly parallel trajectories, as a Western, Atlanticist, or rather a primarily European power, and an exceptional, uniquely positioned, Eurasian power with sphere of influence in the former Soviet Border States.

The Russian discourse on International Relations in the post Cold War era was, partly due to its diminished clout and partly due to its sense of victimhood, more or less centered on a Realist paradigm. The Post Cold War Russia, due to its comparatively diminished power and sway over international politics, never quite got over their strict sense of skepticism about the West, even at the height of its Atlanticist honeymoon, opening of Russian economy and Russian media, and co-operation with World Bank and IMF. Although it saw moments of optimism and co-operation during the Boris Yeltsin – Bill Clinton era, the traditional idea of Russia as an encircled, endangered and victimised nation remained deep seated in the psyche of the upper echelons of Russian society, enforced and exploited smartly by the Russian political class for domestic political gains. (Trenin 2006) During the Second Chechen War, and the now infamous Yeltsin warning to United States to not forget “*for a minute, for a second, for half a minute that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons*”, the American romanticism about Russian reforms received a major setback. (Laris 1999)

The rise of Vladimir Putin in 1999 was met by the West with some skepticism, partly due to the fact that he was a comparative unknown former intelligence agent and newcomer in traditionally hierarchical Russian politics, and partly because he was a protégé of Yeltsin. Little was known about him, other than the fact that he was a former KGB Second Directorate agent posted in East Germany. His rise to power was sudden and phenomenal, even though mired with controversy. (Anderson 2009) The situation in Russia was fluid, but with the Second Chechen War winding down administrations in Washington thought this to be a moment to have a relook at their ties with Russia. Vladimir Putin initially was also optimistic about doing business with US administration. As Lilia Shevtsova (2008) analyses, Putin ended a decade long chaotic experiment with democracy and freedom and capitalism, strengthening market vector, continuing pro-western engagement trying to integrate Russia in the Western community more. (Shevtsova 2008)

The September 11 attacks brought this relationship between the two largest nuclear powers to a more stable footing. Russia was one of the first countries in the World to support United States during the preparation stage ahead of the invasion of Afghanistan during the beginning of the “War on Terror”. Putin was apparently determined to do something which has eluded his previous predecessors, try to reinstate Russia as a Great power, and realized this to be a great opportunity. For that reason if it was needed that Russia was to agree to the primacy of United States and be

a part of NATO alliance, Russia was also agreed to that. *“In the crucial first stage of the Afghanistan operation, Russia de facto became an ally of the United States. In an effort to build a strong security relationship with Washington, Putin chose not to respond to George W. Bush's unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that Moscow had always regarded as a bedrock of strategic stability, and he tolerated a U.S. military presence in the former Soviet Central Asia and Georgia”* wrote Dmitri Trenin (2012).

It is arguable, though, how much Vladimir Putin was motivated to make Russia a primarily democratic Western power. He warned about the tyranny of Islamic terrorism, pointing out that Russia was itself a major victim in Chechnya and Caucasus region. In his own words, in a speech given during the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, in World Holocaust Forum titled *“Let My People Live!”* Putin pointed out, *“Today we must also realise that modern civilisation faces a new and no less terrible threat. Terrorists have taken over from the executioners in their black uniforms. The similarities between Nazism and terrorism are obvious: the same contempt for human life, the same hatred for different views and, most terrible of all, the same commitment to their fanatical goals. Today’s terrorists would not hesitate to exterminate all who do not share their aims or who do not meet the criteria they have set. It is my firm belief that we can preserve our civilisation only if we set aside our minor differences and close ranks against the common enemy as we did during the Second World War.”* (Putin, 2005)

Initially regarded as an energetic modernizer, Putin’s pro-Western line was measured, and broke down completely in 2007 in the now infamous Munich Conference presentation, where he accused the United States of being unilateral and not ready to respect the boundaries of any sovereign state in the World. Even during the post Sept 11 rapprochement there were always problems between West and Russia fundamentally on issues like Russian influence in the former Soviet states which it considered as its traditional sphere of influence. Moscow’s interpretation of the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> was different from Washington’s, as Russia viewed it as a chain of events, similar and linked to the global problems of militant Islamic Jihadism, similar to the Chechnya problem it is facing at home front, or Bosnia and Serbia crisis a decade earlier. Washington was however reluctant to tie these situations together. US unilateral and muscular policy in regards to secular Iraq also increased Russia’s unease, as Iraq was a major market for Russia, and it enhanced Russian desire to see the world as multipolar rather than hegemonic. The final nail in the coffin of rapprochement was the colour revolutions in the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine, which Russia saw as Western backed, and which increased their insecurity and fear of encirclement. *“The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states, going from one conflict to another without achieving a fully-fledged solution to any of*

*them...*” Putin declared in 2007 Munich Security Conference. By the end of the Munich Conference (Watson 2007), the rapprochement was nearly dead.

The study of this timeframe is extremely important, as it shows the reasons Russia stepped back from its rapprochement with United States. Even though there are still co-operations between the two countries when it comes to NATO operations in Afghanistan, space exploration flights and Somalian piracy, one can declare that the honeymoon period between the two countries post 9/11 is definitely over, even with the successive US administrations trying for a reset in relations (Bovt 2012). The return of Russia as a great power, and the subsequent frosty relation with the United States, which largely coincided with the first two terms of Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin, is often explained in two major narratives. One that it was never really a successful rapprochement, but rather a tactical and timely realignment from both sides, based completely on Realist principles, and eventually the mutual distrust between the two powers and the failure to find common ground led to its breakdown and demise. *“While it remained weak, Russia saw a special partnership with United States, as the effective route to power and influence in the World. With Russia’s pre 2009 energy fueled revival, Moscow once again found itself in a position to act autonomously on the international stage and less in need of a United States that never seemed to take Russia’s interests seriously anyway”*, explains Jeffrey Mankoff (2009). The second narrative details the Russian inclination to be a partner of the United States but being rebuffed constantly which led it to be more muscular and revanchist. *“What is striking, however, is that Washington, while focused intently on particular global issues -- from promoting the fledgling democracies of the Arab Spring to handing off Afghanistan to pivoting toward Asia -- thinks it can afford having no general strategic vision of relations with a country that, despite all its weaknesses and failings, can make a huge difference in the emerging global balance. Conventional wisdom in Washington declares that if there is no problem, there is no policy. This may have been just fine in the years of clear U.S. dominance in the world. It is hardly affordable now”* predicts Dmitri Trenin (2012) while trying to explain the reasons for Russian revanchism.

I try to argue otherwise, using the theoretical framework of Realism, and trying to portray that Putin was always a tactical Realist, aligning with the West, for his perception of Russian state interests.

Russian foreign policy in the post Cold War period underwent three broad shifts in paradigms. Each of these changes was related to some events in the tumultuous first decade after the fall of communism. As communism was swept away, and state structures crumbled, the strictly hierarchical, centralized and Soviet controlled order gave away to anarchy and corruption. The immediate period post communism period was quite dark and troublesome for Russians, extremely fluid for the new Russian authority, policy makers and elites, and often confusing for analysts across the globe. The post Soviet era gave rise to something of a conceptual vacuum, and Russian policy makers were not always ready to address that challenge. However with time, two specific discourses started to be seen among the policy makers and

government. In the early days of the post cold war, with the seeming victory of liberal democracies, the dominant discourse was by the liberal enthusiasts in Russia, which were mostly pro-western and wanted Russia to be a partner of the Global West. They regarded Russia to be a mainly Western-European power that sought more engagement and integration with the West. This became known as the Atlanticist school in Russian political circles (Sergunin 2000). The opposing to these liberal ideas came from the fragmented left and communists, the Ultra-Nationalist, and the Slavophiles. They started to have some effect on foreign policy decision making after the original Atlanticist euphoria died down and grim economic realities set in. In these conditions, a school of thought which believed Russia to be a unique power by nature, based on its unique geo-political position and exceptional sphere of influence, and broadly came to be known as the Eurasianist school.

Russia under Vladimir Putin, especially after 9/11 de-emphasized both these directional approaches. While agreeing to the reality that sometimes engagement and integration is needed with the West, it was more or less agreed that the ultimate decider of Russian destiny and foreign policy should be based on Russian national interest. To achieve that effect, both cooperation and confrontation was needed. Putin's pragmatic approach, coincided with the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, and formed the basis of a Realist and at times muscular foreign policy. The theoretical framework of Realism seemed to me a logical benchmark in assessing the actions of Russian State during the first two terms of Vladimir Putin, and a detailed explanation and analysis of Realism will be done in this chapter.

## **2 THE RE-EMERGENCE OF REALISM IN RUSSIA'S POST COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 2001**

From the Czarist Great Games in Afghanistan to confront the British Empire, to the formation of the Triple Entente with England and France to balance the Austro-Hungarian and German empires Russian foreign policy has historically maneuvered the logic of balance of power, although this was not always done quite successfully or efficiently. The Soviet Union also sought to use the balance of power mechanism, and aligned itself with NAZI Germany to neutralize a massive threat on its Eastern flank during Soviet invasion of Finland and clinically dissect Poland among both the nations, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. The Soviet one-sided declaration of war on Japan during the last days of the Second World War was also an effort to reap the benefits of power distribution after the war, which resulted in annexing the Southern Sakhalin and South Kuril Islands from Japanese sovereign control. The Cold War was in many ways a great balancing game with United States, where notwithstanding moments of extreme tension, and the use of proxy states during small regional wars, the world remained in a state of a "long peace", as John Lewis Gaddis noted. Elements of rapprochement and détente, and peace due to the "*ritualistically deplored fact that each of these superpowers is armed with a large nuclear arsenal*" (Mearsheimer 1990) appeared to strengthen the argument that both the Superpowers understood the limits of their hard power and took the prospects of a nuclear



showdown seriously enough to come to a tacit understanding, based on balance of power.

As previously noted, Russian Foreign Policy post cold war, underwent three key changes in terms of paradigm. The immediate post Cold war was an era of openness and liberalism, under the “Atlanticists” like Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev, and to some extent Yegor Gaidar. The immediate post Soviet leaders after Gorbachev, wanted to capitalize on the liberal momentum of Russian relations with the erstwhile foes, and went ahead with their idea of convergence of their interest with West. The Atlanticists believed unlike Gorbachev, that Russia and West are not two distinct identities, but rather, Russia is primarily a Eurocentric, if not completely European power, and the similarities between the two should be in plurality, democratic rule, free market economy, and individualism. Russia under President Yeltsin, often acted unilaterally with regard to military matters and cutting of missile warheads and supporting Western and international efforts against Iraq. *“Russia has from time immemorial been with Europe, and we must enter the European Institutions, the council of Europe and the common market, and we must also enter the political and economic unions...”* Yeltsin declared, in 1992.

“Boris Yeltsin's primary aim in foreign policy, like Mikhail Gorbachev's before him, was to create a non-threatening external environment that would be most conducive to his country's internal economic and political development. As in the early decades of Soviet rule, this concentration on domestic development, together with relative shortcomings in military strength, produced a foreign policy of accommodation, retrenchment, and risk-avoidance--at least, in Russia's relations with states beyond the borders of the former USSR.” (Ginsburg, ed 1993) Yeltsin assigned his task of remodeling Russia to a young Kozyrev, who was heavily influenced by Gorbachev and his “new thinking”, while working in the Departmental of International Organisation. (Donaldson 2000) “Kozyrev--not surprisingly--constructed a heavy reliance on Russian participation in international institutions. Determined to liberate Russia from the burdens of empire, the messianism, and the over-reliance on military instruments that had characterized both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods, Kozyrev developed foreign policy ideas centered on the promotion of human rights and the universal values of global economic, environmental, and nuclear security, realized through a community of democratic states. Since democracies do not attack other democracies, a democratic Russia would have nothing to fear from the West.”

Kozyrev, Yegor Gaidar and other liberals under Yeltsin believed that the road to the free market was the ideal way for Russia and that the liberal West would be the ideal partner. They were certain that Russia needs to lose the illusion of being the “bridge” between the East and West, between Europe and Asia, must avoid leading the Commonwealth of Independent Nations, not just because the addition of economic burden would slow market reforms, but also the peacekeeping roles in Russia's borders would restore the privileged status of the military like during Soviet times, and would therefore negate the growth of democracy. The idea of “Russia the conciliator, Russia

the unifier, Russia the harmonizer” should be effectively discarded. On the other hand the “pragmatic nationalists” or “Eurasianists” even during the time of Yeltsin was opposed to this role of “junior” partner of the West. For them, Eurasianism was not a rejection of the West, but an effective “restoration of balance”, and as a first piece of movement in the restoration of balance in post Soviet foreign policy, was the renewed interest in the “near abroad”.

However the domestic environment of Russia immediately after the Cold war was anarchic and chaotic without any central order, and myriad interest groups vied for power, and without strong centralized authority and institutions during the time of political and economic transition, and with massive structural flaws, Russian dream of being a part of the west slowly started to collapse. Another important factor was the scarcity of investment in Russia and the hardship faced by the people as the Yeltsin economics of “Shock Therapy”, even with all good intentions didn’t quite work as planned. The internal economy, stabilized with the loans from IMF and World Bank, but along with it came the cost of internal stagnation, collapsing Government sector, breakdown of social services, job losses, and massive poverty. The other factors which exacerbated Russian skepticism about a liberal foreign policy were Chechnya-Dagestan-Ingushetia problem and homegrown Islamist terror, NATO’s eastward expansion, beginning of the Yugoslavian civil war and growing confrontation with NATO. Between 1993 – 95 the anti-americanism among general public went up from 26 to 44 percent, and among elites from 27 to 53 percent (Tsygankov). President Yeltsin by April 1993 moved away from the "liberal Westernizing" idea and the convergence of "establishment" thinking around the "pragmatic nationalist" viewpoint with his *blizhnee zarubezh'e*, or "near abroad" foreign policy document. The document highlighted, the perceived earlier imbalance in Russian relationship with United States, and even while mentioning that there are grounds for common interests, it stressed that U.S.-Russian interests did not always coincide, and cited concern about "discriminatory restrictions in the commercial, economic, scientific and technological spheres."

With Yevgeni Primakov replacing Kozyrev, Russian foreign policy slowly started to shift back to its Realist roots. Russia started to forge renewed ties with Central Asian formerly Soviet republics with economic and security projects, and attempted strategic ties with China and India. In January 1996, Yevgeni Primakov started pursuing the "pragmatic nationalist" and "Eurasianist" viewpoints declaring that "Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond to that status" and "Russia doesn't have permanent enemies, but it does have permanent interests". The “permanent interests”, an apparent Realist theme, was explained in four tenets by Primakov:

- *“The creation of the best external conditions conducive to strengthening the territorial integrity of our state.*

- *The strengthening of centripetal tendencies in the territory of the former USSR. Naturally, this does not and cannot mean the rebirth of the Soviet Union in the form in which it used to exist. The sovereignty obtained by the republics is irreversible, but this does not negate the need for reintegration processes, first of all in the economic field.*
- *The stabilization of the international situation at the regional level. We have achieved great successes in the stabilization of the international situation at the global level, having jointly won--I want to put special emphasis on the point that there were no victors or vanquished here--jointly won the cold war. Now things depend on the settlement of regional, nationality-based, interethnic and interstate conflicts. Russian foreign policy will do everything possible to settle such conflicts, first of all in the CIS and in the Yugoslav crisis.*
- *The development of fruitful international relations that will prevent the creation of new hotbeds of tension, and especially the proliferation of means or weapons of mass destruction.”*

The opposition to westward leaning foreign policy was not uniform in content. It was divided between Eurasianists, Leftists, and Ultra-Nationalists, but one thing that was common among these three groups was the conviction that Russia should be more forceful in dealing with west and the foreign policy of Russia should be determined only by national interests. Russian military and security elites, or “Siloviki” as they are known, never ceased to think itself as a great power, with a unique place in history and a special sphere of influence in the former Soviet states. Primakov, for the first time in post Cold War, brought back some sense of pride in Russian foreign policy, and the elites were uniform in supporting him, or at least not criticizing him like Kozyrev. Under Kozyrev, Primakov and Putin, no policy maker or bureaucrat elites raised any questions or doubts about Russia’s role in the international arena, its fundamental identity as an autonomous great power, and its right to be consulted on a wide array of diplomatic and international issues, even when they do not necessarily affect Russian national interests in any direct way. However with its continued dependence on Western monetary assistance, which somehow didn’t solve the internal economic woes, and Primakov’s limited scope of maneuverability under the Presidency of Yeltsin, these strategies were not enough to get Russia back as a great power.

The Realist return was marked by a few events, which heightened certain assertive posturing that was largely absent in the first few years after Soviet Union’s breakup. First instance was the secession of trans-Dniestr from Moldova on grounds of Russian indigenous population. In fact, it is argued, that the Western inaction on Russia’s military actions in Moldova in 1992, actually undermined the Kozyrev and Atlanticist lobby, who were constantly arguing that Russia cannot afford to take such unilateral actions. And on the other hand, Russian administration learned that there can be latitude and wiggle room among the former Soviet republics, without any direct

scope of confrontation with the West. (Lynch 2010) In the Balkans, the Russian Realist diplomacy was seen early during the establishment of a contact group in mid June 1994, which simultaneously avoided NATO bombing threat in Sarajevo, and placed Russia as a middle-man in any negotiations between NATO and Serbia. This careful piece of diplomacy was a symbol of things to come during the more assertive show of force during the 1999 Pristina Airport crisis, where Russia, in one of the last acts of Yeltsin Government, placed 200 heavily armed paratroopers to capture and possess the airbase, ahead of NATO. Meanwhile NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1995, further undermined the Yeltsin government, and the Atlanticist lobby, as back in Russian political circles, as it was seen as an evidence of a spineless Russian appeasement to Western militarism, reshaping of the world, and “new world order”.

Indeed it was NATO, which provided the impetus and motivation for Russian Foreign policy establishment to embrace Realism. The NATO expansion in the east, in former East European communist ex-Warsaw Pact countries, starting with Poland provided considerable unease to Russian leadership. Russia, was however in no power to stop the expansion. The Russian leadership under Primakov, charted the Realist balancing route, and acquiesced to the inevitability of the move, but not before guaranteeing a NATO-Russia joint council, that for the first time, at least formally, allowed Russia to have a voice within NATO deliberations. It can also be understood that the ramification of this was also in the increasingly anti-western domestic populace. Russia continued to co-operate warily with NATO, like placing peacekeepers in Bosnia under NATO command. The unilateral action of NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999, without any UN mandate drew the loudest Russian protests against a “barbaric NATO colonialism” of the West, forcing Russia to look inward, and perhaps at the permanent demise of Atlanticist voices within Russian political circles, for the near foreseeable future. The Russian Government broke off NATO-Russian talks, airlifted paratroopers in Pristina almost provoking a firefight with the American and British forces, and started to look inward in a deeply traumatized and affected way, all the while wary of the rise of the Ultra-Nationalists and Communists. The realists pointed to the Kosovo crisis as evidence of the direct threat emanating from the NATO and growing European security concept, but resumed the dialogue with NATO after the end of the war because they knew that it is impossible to ignore this influential pole of the world power, at least at that point of time.

It should be remembered, that the Realist school transcended the ideology boundaries of different groups, and everyone in the foreign policy establishment, even the Atlanticists, slowly started to shift towards foreign policy realism, due to the situations around Russia, most of which were beyond their control. Added to that were the turbulent civil-military relations, unsatisfied domestic electorate, and last but not the least, threats of Ultra-Nationalist and Communist resurgence. Streaks of Realism were noticeable there even during the Kozyrev era, though it took serious proportions during Primakov’s spell as foreign minister. The Russian meddling during the Georgia-

Abkhaz crisis of 1992-93, meddling in Tajikistan's internal affairs, growing patrolling of Afghan border, and nuclear trade with Iran etc. continued in varied speed both under Kozyrev and Primakov. Both the Eurasianists and the Atlanticists believed that Russia needs to take more notice of its immediate border states and neighbourhood, namely the former Soviet republics. As early as 1992, Russian foreign policy establishment were aware that, "*A decisive component of Russia's new mission in the world is to ensure, with help from the world community, that the ex-Soviet area does not become a geostrategic hole radiating instability and war and ultimately endangering the very existence of humanity.*" (Vladislavlev 1992) The Russian national security concept, approved by Yeltsin in December 1997 (and revised in January 2000) also drew massively upon realist ideas.

As Allen Lynch (2010) observed, "*There was a decided shift in Russian policy in the course of 1993, away from the premises of liberal internationalism toward more realist, and frankly, more realistic, assessment of Russian interests and capabilities. This shift occurred early in the Kozyrev administration and, while it was certainly not Kozyrev's preference, the Foreign Minister helped Russian policy adapt to the frustration of its more utopian expectations about integration into the broader liberal world without jeopardizing Russia's links with that same world. 'Liberal' Russia discovered very early, as had the ill fated Provisional Government of 1917 and the Bolsheviks by 1921, that the structure of the international political system tended to undermine the transformative claims of ideology, whether it be liberal or communist.*"

Vladimir Putin's arrival as a Prime Minister in 1999 changed two things. On one hand Putin restarted the economic reforms that was stalled under Yeltsin, and controlled the burgeoning oligarchs by strengthening the military and security elites or the Siloviki, often by coercion against the tycoons. In foreign policy he went out of his way to support the United States and made a massive pro-western shift after 2001. This he did, at a time, when a considerable portion of Russian political sentiment was still not pro-American. In September 2001, 54 percent of Russians were still neutral, 28 percent wanted to go with the West and against the terrorists, and 20 percent were in favour of the Taliban. Eventually in the course of this dissertation with time, we would see how the pro-west shift died its untimely death in Russia, but during the initial days of Vladimir Putin, there were a lot of "creative borrowing" of ideas from both Atlanticist, and Eurasianist ideas. Putin's "Great Power Pragmatism" was more successful in dealing with security and economy; autonomy, prestige and identity, at the same time. Russia's "bandwagoning" in the "War on Terror" immediately got a great positive response from the West. Subsequently during the Moscow Theatre Hostage crisis and the Beslan School siege, involving actions by Chechen terrorists, the disproportionate and heavy handed response from Russia drew muted criticism from around the world, and support from US, Britain and the West. Rather, the "bandwagoning" with US and West, helped Russia to hijack the narrative and agenda of the global war on terror, and use it to strengthen the domestic security apparatus, crack down on internal dissent, and allocate massive budget to an ambitious

rearmament plan. The heavy handed response to the Chechen terrorists also bolstered Putin's image at home, as a no-nonsense strong leader, and took the ammunition from the ultranationalist and communist camps.

There were benefits too, with Oil and Gas exports and general trade, increasing due to proper regulations, structural reforms and institutional changes and policies, resulting in an unprecedented economic boom. Russia also signaled its renewed intention to join the World Trade Organizations. The social welfare programs improved, as a result of a strong economy, as did the general living conditions and wages of average Russians, after a decade of chaos post-Soviet experiments. And finally the pride and prestige of being recognized as a Great Power started to sink in again. With the benefit of hindsight, it now seems ironic that perhaps the best of praise of Vladimir Putin's pragmatic leadership and approach came from none other than George W. Bush, when he stated, right after meeting Putin for the first time; *"I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship."* The "special" relationship, and subsequent short-term rapprochement would not last however, as both the great powers would collide massively over during the course of the next eight years, due to clash of interests, while co-operating in some shared areas, and proving the validity of Putin's Realist balancing act (Wyatt 2001).

Under President Putin, Russian foreign policy experienced a revival and restoration of earlier prestige. Russia was back on the world stage as a partner in the global "war against terror", seeking legitimization of its new role of a revived and revanchist great power and projecting power through economic, and at times through political-military means. Relations with the West deteriorated, after a brief detente, as Russia increasingly started challenging agreements that were concluded in the 1990s when it was perceived weak. When Vladimir Putin came to power, relations with the West were already deteriorated extremely, after the war in Kosovo. Russia West face off in Pristina airport was a tense situation, the first in the post Cold war world where two largest nuclear powers faced each other. The 1998 - 1999 financial crash also limited Russia's maneuverability and international reach came to a new low. The question of Russian identity and foreign policy was still unanswered, and whether Russia would be Eurasian or Atlanticist was also not properly and conclusively determined.

One of the first acts of President Putin was to re-install both Tsarist and Soviet identities and national symbols. The Duma adopted the Tsarist double headed eagle as a state emblem, and the Soviet anthem was restored with new lyrics. The blend of Tsarist and Soviet symbols helped answer the question of Russia's search for a 'usable past' that could unite the nation. Putin appealed to both the Tsarist and Soviet pasts, seeking to reconcile white and red Russians by the political exploitation of nostalgia. (Gomart 2006) Putin referred favorably to the Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin, whose

thinking appears to have influenced the Russian President. Ilyin was an ardent anti-communist who left Russia after the revolution and wrote about how a post-communist Russia should be united and rejecting Western notions of individuality and political competition, led by an enlightened and strong leader with an extremely centralized political system. Russian foreign policy also underwent a sharp change under Putin. “Putin restored stability to the country by reining in forces of decentralization and competition, creating the ‘power vertical’, restoring control over the country by the Kremlin (increasingly staffed by veterans from the intelligence services) and its allied party United Russia, and recapturing state control over the commanding heights of the economy.” Putin’s Russia was in essence a completely Tsarist, centralized state, however with burgeoning oil wealth, and was dubbed as Russia inc. by scholars. Under this government system, political and economic elites became connected, and the Kremlin officials who manage the affairs of state also started to manage and largely control the state's major economic assets. The chairmen of the boards of most of Russia's strategic industries, including energy companies, were members of the presidential administration or holders of high government office and foreign policy decisions were influenced by commercial decisions which were in turn increasingly driven by political interests. The centralized hierarchy, became similar to Soviet system, only difference is this time it came with oligarchs and free market, with a highly interfering state capitalist authority. The domestic ‘power vertical’ slowly extended to foreign policy which was made by a narrow circle of people, especially the predominance of former intelligence officials in the Kremlin. That resulted in the increasingly confrontational rhetoric from Putin's second term, and the *Siloviki's* approach to the West closely started to resemble the Soviets. The West was viewed as the *glavnyi protivnik* (main enemy) out to weaken Russia and overthrow or destabilize the Government, Western antagonist out to ‘tear Russia . It also served the internal function of appealing for the Russian population's support during the succession process as Putin neared the end of his second term, Suggesting that Western governments and NGOs want to interfere with Russia's elections and its sovereign transition was part of a carefully managed process which was targeted to the domestic audience, and we will analyse some incidents and see how this transformation from pro-US Russia immediately after 9/11 to a completely antagonistic Russia during the end of Putin's second term, was a totally tactical move

### **3 9/11 AND PUTIN’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

“War on Terror” and alignment”

As noted previously, Russia had a major strategic shift in its foreign policy thinking during the Primakov era. The “balance of power” doctrine, which formed the bedrock of Soviet style Realism, made a comeback in Russian thought process during the late 1990s. As long as the Soviet Union existed, the concept of balance of power was relatively simple, as being the only two superpowers, facing off each other

provided with a binary and traditional view of balancing. With the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia faced an entire new and different set of realities, and the question of balancing became much more complicated and multidimensional. The intention of Primakov at the Sino-Russian Beijing summit of 1997 was a “creation of a multipolar world order” which was a revised concept of Bipolarity. According to that concept, if Russia could not counter balance USA on its own, it would seek to constrain Washington with any external help necessary, be it with China, Islamic World or even great powers in Western Europe which is opposed to US unipolarity and hegemonistic tendencies (Lo 2003). This idea was a revised concept, and moved away from the strategic concepts of nuclear parity and numerical arms equilibrium, as almost obsolete Russian nuclear arsenal and technological backwardness made nuclear parity unattainable, and moved to a more holistic strategic stability, a rough equality in international and geo-political reach and influence. This mindset carried on till the last days of Yeltsin administration, during the Kosovo war and Pristina airport crisis, and resulted in Yeltsin issuing a veiled threat to USA during his last official tour to Beijing.

Vladimir Putin was a more pragmatic leader, and compared to Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Gaidar, Kozyrev and Primakov, was a relative novice. His background was KGB and bureaucracy rather than political, and he carried no chip in his shoulder. One of the first challenges in his young Presidency was the second Chechen conflict, and he realized the threat facing Russia from Islamic terrorism. He rhetorically as well as intellectually engaged with Islamic terrorism, and in doing that, revived the idea of Russia being a “barrier” between the civilized west, and barbarians from the East, popular in 19<sup>th</sup> century. The massive evolution of threat perception had a great effect on traditional thinking and Russian geo-political concept. *“Even before Putin became Russia's President in early 2000, and long before the Twin Towers fell, he had invoked the idea of a war against global terrorism to justify Russia's war in Chechnya. The terrorism aspect, at least, was true. Chechen separatists, who renewed their centuries-old struggle for independence soon after the Soviet Union fell, had resorted to terrorism as early as 1995, when they seized a hospital in the Russian town of Budyonnovsk and held more than 1,500 people hostage. Then in 1999, a series of apartment bombings, also blamed on the Chechens, killed hundreds of people in Moscow and other Russian cities. Putin responded by launching Russia's second full-scale invasion of Chechnya in less than a decade. “He received carte blanche from the citizens of Russia,” says Mikhail Kasyanov, who was Russia's Finance Minister at the time. “They simply closed their eyes and let him do whatever he wanted as long as he saved them from this threat.”(Shuster 2011)*

The September 11 attacks in the US changed temporarily the basic principles of European Security in the face of a new challenge against perceived unipolar global order, and bolstered the creation of a new strategic framework between US and Russia. This was evident with Moscow’s unilateral support and enthusiasm for Bush’s war against Terror, and massive US military presence in Central Asia and intelligence and information exchanges related to Afghanistan. The mutual interests were a joint



working partnership in Afghanistan, and Russian co-operation in Central Asia and Caucasus. Russia needed US to support Russian entrance to G8, US Loan of \$20 billion to dismantle strategic weapons, and the American offer to support Russian accelerated membership of the World Trade Organisation. Other than the Global ramification of this rapprochement, which resulted in Russia having an equal partnership with the United States since the Cold war, it also helped in the regional levels like stability in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Caucasus.

Relations between Bush and Putin however didn't start out smoothly. Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security advisor, initially argued that "It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow as it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending." In a February 2001 interview in *Le Figaro*, Rice commented that "I believe Russia is a threat to the West in general and to our European allies in particular." In February 2001 arrest of FBI agent Robert Hanssen, resulted in the US ejecting 50 Russian diplomats: the largest number of expulsions since 1986. The Russians reacted by expelling an equivalent number of American officials. In July 2001, President Bush and President Putin met for the first time, when President Bush "looked into his soul", and found a man worthy of relationship with mutual respect. "'I found a man who realizes his future lies with the West, not the East, that we share common security concerns, primarily Islamic fundamentalism, that he understands missiles could affect him just as much as us. On the other hand he doesn't want to be diminished by America.'" President Bush said about Putin. Putin reciprocated by being equally warm and referred to President Bush as a "partner". But, it took another couple of months, and a devastating terror attack for Putin to grab the opportunity as a true Realist.

From the start of his presidency in January 2000, Putin advocated the idea of a joint and concerted campaign against terrorism with American and European leaders. He was one of the first world leaders to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and to warn of linkages between these camps, well-financed terrorist networks, and Islamic militant groups operating in Europe and Eurasia (Hill 2002). Russia also actively supported the Northern Alliance in its struggle with the Taliban in Afghanistan, declaring that "Radical Islam is a threat to the entire civilized world." In December 2000, Moscow joined Washington in supporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban and later appealed for sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban. "After the attacks on the United States, Putin went so far as to suggest he had been expecting a massive terrorist strike—it had only been a matter of time. The events of September 11 were a shock, but not a surprise. Putin's support for Bush was consistent with his efforts to draw world attention to the terrorist threat."

The September 11 attacks proved to be a breakthrough for Vladimir Putin. It gave him an opportunity to get into an immediate tactical alignment with the West, to offer support to the Americans, even when the Russian elites wanted a more careful, neutral stance, a "proof" that Russia was right all along in its assessment of Chechnya and Islamic terror. It is debatable how much Putin believes that "International

Islamism” and not domestic terrorism threatens Russian state, nor is it clear, as to how high the position of Islamic terrorism in the threat perception of Russia, and whether and how long it is likely to be retained. What is clear is that Russia, specifically Putin’s Russia, took this opportunity to legitimize the Chechen conflict, and the Russian military operations in the Caucasus. The routine and disproportionate violations of human rights were justified as “extreme measures against extreme threats”. Putin rejected the logic of advantage in American discomfiture, as he realized with his sense of strategic opportunism that there is more benefit and much more gain from supporting the Western coalition and war against terrorism. He understood that Western attitude towards Chechnya would be milder and if not pro-Russian, at least neutral. Most importantly, he realized that playing a constructive role would perhaps not help Russia advance its direct geo-political or strategic interest or influence, but would help Russia stage a grand comeback in the international stage as a responsible great power.

Putin was the first foreign head of state to phone Bush with condolences and express an unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist act, and pledging unending support. Russia still embroiled in the second Chechen war, saw 9/11 as powerful vindication of his warnings about the threat of militant Islam and terrorism, a point they wanted the World to know for ages. Putin singlehandedly decided to share intelligence and aid Washington’s campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, despite subtle opposition from some in the Russian military. Putin’s visit to the presidential ranch in Crawford, Texas in November 2001 symbolized the return of rapprochement in US - Russian relations, a temporary but much needed Détente, much different from the last days of Yeltsin administration, although it is debatable how much it was significant and meaningful for Moscow when it comes to strategic equations or specific rewards. The resulting US – Russia joint statement declared the Cold War to be officially over, and that neither country considers the other as a threat.

*“We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of September 11... We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today.... We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace, excluding no one, and respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.”*

In the context of the global war on terror, in December 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Moscow to report that the US would withdraw from the ABM treaty in six month’s time. Putin was surprisingly understanding of the situation, and stated that Russian security was in no way threatened by the unilateral development. As a result of this Russian acquiescence, In May 2002, US President Bush signed the Strategic Offensive Weapons Reduction Treaty in Moscow, under which each side promised to cut its strategic weapons from 6,000 warheads to 1,700-2,200 over 10 years. The nuclear balance and deterrence still lived in the strategic mindset of Russian Siloviki, as a critical component of national security, but what is more important in this

policy is not the deterrence factor, but the eagerness to maintain the highly particularized status and pride of Russia as a world power, perhaps not matching US but still above all other power, including UK, Germany, France and even China.

Some critics say that Putin's alignment with the West immediately after 9/11 was also due to the fact that Putin realized that Russia would not be capable to stop forthcoming US unilateral actions anyway. Putin's decision to support US troop deployment in central Asia is one notable example; he couldn't have prevented it at any cost. Putin understood when Uzbek president Islam Karimov told him that he would cooperate with the Americans regardless of Russian position. Other leaders of frontline central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also indicated that they are willing to welcome American military presence in their countries as a stabilizing factor, in the global war against Islamic extremism, which threatened to spread and threaten their existence too. *"He let the U.S. ship supplies through Russian territory and did not object to the U.S. setting up bases in Central Asia, where the local despots quickly caught on to the opportunity. Uzbek President Islam Karimov, for instance, allowed the U.S. to build a permanent base, perhaps hoping that his new alliance with the war on terrorism would help reduce U.S. scrutiny of alleged human-rights abuses in Uzbekistan."* However, whatever the exact case maybe, it is evident that even when he was a young President and an inexperienced leader, Vladimir Putin had the political acumen to understand the flow of the political wind. He was astute, pragmatic and Realist enough and attuned to the perceived need to "bandwagon" with USA, even if it meant opposing his entire military-Siloviki establishment if needed. He understood the political and strategic limitations of Russia, and realized that greater benefits lies siding with the West. He declared a full on conflict against terrorism, especially against Chechnya, and immediately got a full support of his domestic constituency, and muted response from the West, as a reciprocation of Putin's "help" in Global war on terror. The Chechen terrorism, which had its own unique identity, much different and customized than the global Al Qaeda Jihadi nexus, started to retaliate too, giving Putin even more justification to go all out against them, in the name of Global war on terror. Moscow bombings, Moscow theatre siege, and the Beslan school siege, shook the Russian nation, and the death of hundreds of school children shocked the World too. Putin warned Russians to be stronger against this fight against Islamic terrorism. *"As I have said on many occasions, we have faced crises, rebellions and terrorist acts many times. But what has happened now - the unprecedented crime committed by terrorists, inhuman in its cruelty - is not a challenge to the president, the Parliament or the government. This is a challenge to all of Russia, to all our people. This is an attack against all of us... . We cannot but see the evident: we are dealing not with separate acts of intimidation, not with individual forays of terrorists. We are dealing with the direct intervention of international terror against Russia, with total and full-scale war, which again and again is taking away the lives of our compatriots."* Putin said in his speech after Beslan.

Interestingly, an analysis from the think-tank Jamestown Foundation think tank, as early as in 2004, predicted that Putin's response would find favour among the military establishment of Russia. It stated that: *“Putin's approach will find extensive support within Russia's security establishments. Sergei Mironov, Speaker of the Russian Federation Council, believes that Russian citizens will now support increased security measures affecting their daily life, such as tightening security around transport and public gatherings. In itself, this would be a huge undertaking that would cost considerable sums of money to adequately support. ... .The cause of Chechen separatism has suffered a setback because it is now linked in the popular mind with horrific, ruthless acts of terrorism, passing into the uncharted area of targeting children. Putin remained largely silent during the crisis, and he now seeks to reaffirm his credentials as the one politician in Russia that can secure progress against terrorism, which is not necessarily synonymous with bringing peace to Chechnya. As international sympathy and support have been rapidly given to Russia, Putin will seek to capitalize on such evidence of international unity.”* (McDermott, 2004)

That is what exactly happened. The mighty Russian security establishment which was initially wary of Putin's support for Bush's Global war on Terror, now happily supported Putin's anti-terrorist measures, joining the global bandwagon, and taking advantage of an extremely maneuverable concept and ambiguous war to their local interests. By 2005, Moscow effectively suppressed the Chechen separatism, with a puppet, pro-Kremlin Government in place, and massive Human rights violations, torture and extra-judicial killings, as Kremlin backed Ramzan Kadyrov consolidated power. Putin achieved one of his biggest goals that he promised before coming to power, a solution to the Chechen problem, atleast for the short term.

#### **4 OIL AND ENERGY BOOM: RETURN OF GREAT POWER RUSSIA**

After the tumultuous political and economic experiments of the nineties, Vladimir Putin took the reins of Russia in 1999, when the economy was almost shattered, productivity was diminishing, and an intermittent and ongoing war, which was draining Russian resources. Russian economic thinking under Putin can be traced back to the Soviet times. Even though Russia was no longer communist, it was not a textbook free market economy either. Infact, capitalism and free market, which helped countries like Poland and Hungary to develop and converge towards a more pan-european growth rate, Russian growth rate and economy kept on plunging throughout the 1990s, partly because the institutions and economic fundamentals in Russia during the Tsarist and Soviet times were completely flawed (Sutela).

Putin's own economic thinking was hinted at in his Masters thesis (Kandidatskaya dissertation). Putin wrote about “Dual Track” planning, underlining that Russia was still in a transitional phase on its transition to a proper functioning market democracy, and there should be a certain amount of rationalized and stabilizing Government control. Centralized Government control should be a permanent fixture under this process, and Putin's work in the KGB gave him a basic idea of the hierarchical model KGB follows, leading him to believe that hierarchical state model is

also a proper economic model for Russia. Economic determinism was the pressing model for a Realist Russia and this was reflected in the RF Security Council document of May 2002, which states, "*Russia has to avoid being cornered by ideological notions of division between friends and foes. Economic benefits for Russia should become the main factor and criteria of foreign policy orientation.*" (Isakova 2005) Russia's goal was to use all opportunity of economic development to prepare Russia to face the potential security challenges, and in order to do that initial rapprochement with the West was not ruled out.


The 2000 to 2008 were the most successful years in Russian economy. Economic growth was around 7 percent, and national income was doubled. The total size of economy increased six times, from US \$ 221 Billion to US \$ 1348 Billion, and measured in Dollars Russian economy grew even faster than China. Russia benefited from the growth, as real consumption rose by an average of 15 percent annually, more than twice the size of the GDP. The federal budget surplus rose from 1.5 percent of GDP to 5.5 percent. Revenue surged in an amazing rate due to economic growth, tax reforms, and most importantly...oil export revenue taxation. Russia which had no central bank reserve during the mid-1990s had the third largest reserve after a decade, only after Japan and China. By 2007, official reserves covered all foreign debt, and the economy not only grew and continued growing, it actually stabilized.

Russia used this new found wealth and economic prowess to pursue a more active foreign policy in the geopolitical arena. Russia is along with Saudi Arabia the two biggest energy producers of the world, thus far. Energy provides over two third of Russian export revenue, and about half of fiscal revenue. Energy has been the center of Russian political economy since the early years of Putin's reign, when much of the power were taken from the hands of the oligarchs, by the state. (Gaddy, Ickes 2010) Much of Russian energy sector falls under resource nationalism, limiting the role of foreign actors, renationalizing oil sector as opposed to the free market 1990s and strengthening the direct role of the state. Russian oil reserves are 5.6 percent of the world, and the world's seventh largest. Taxes on oil and gas provide 37 percent of the Russian national budget. According to the World Bank and the IMF, each dollar increase in the price of oil augments the budget by about .35 percent of Russian GDP. Moscow's recent aggressive campaigns to renationalize energy companies at home, leverage foreign debts for extra-territorial control over energy assets, discourage rival energy projects, use strong arm tactics to coerce rival oil companies, buy out stakes of foreign companies like BP by Rosneft, and bypass pipelines seem to underscore the Kremlin's commitment to matching words with deeds for employing energy as strategic instrument of Realism, Mercantilism and Energy Imperialism. (Orban 2008)

The most interesting implication of Russia's oil power was the correlation with its assertive foreign policy. An "aggression index" based on 86 events in Russian foreign policy from January 2000 to September 2007 was compiled by American Enterprise Institute in a report, a paragraph of which is quoted below: "*We then*

assigned each event a value between one and five, with a higher number indicating a more aggressive event—aggressiveness being defined as actions harming Western interests. Import bans, diplomatic expulsions, and similar activities earned low-level values: a 1 or a 2. More clearly threatening acts, such as arms sales to terror-sponsoring states, military exercises, attempts to support separatist regions, and interruptions of energy supplies to neighbors, earned mid-range values such as 3 or 4. We found that as the price of oil rose, the aggressiveness index increased: that is, the more valuable oil became, the more hostile Russian foreign policy became. The reverse was also true: when oil prices dropped in 2001 and 2002, so did Russia’s aggression. The relationship proved strongest at the annual level: a \$1.48 increase in oil prices yearly correlated with an additional “point” increase in Russian aggression. Oil prices rose from \$17.37 a barrel in December 2001 to \$73.88 a barrel in September 2007; over that same period, the aggression index rose from 17 to 55. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive dataset available to analyze the effect of oil prices on Russian foreign policy; a few events missed here or there will not alter the bigger picture.”

The graph showing the correlation is here (Szrom, Brugato 2008):



Combined to this is the apparent dependence of the West, especially Europe on Russian gas and oil.

A graph from CFR showing European dependence is below:



Putin successfully used this new found oil and gas resources to influence European decision making procedure, especially during the buildup to the Iraq war, which we will discuss later. Of course, oil prices is not the sole determinant of Russian foreign policy, but perhaps it is not completely co-incidental, that Putin’s Munich conference speech came in 2007, a few months after 2006, when it had entirely paid off its International Monetary Fund obligations, which totaled \$16.8 billion in 1999. Russia no longer needed Western cash to keep its economy alive, on the contrary, Europe desperately needed Russian energy. The British House of Lords Report noted that the EU/Russia Energy Dialogue was essential for energy security and dependence of Europe. In fact, the most co-operative time between Russian Government and Washington was during July 2001 to February 2003, with only one aggressive action. “This pause corresponded with a fluctuation in global oil prices: they dropped from a high of \$30.35 a barrel in November 2000 to \$17.37 a barrel in December 2001. Oil prices did not hit \$30 a barrel again until February 2003.” Putin’s idea of a “European Great Power” has been based on playing main actors against each other, namely the trio of France – Germany – Italy against the EU Commission (and the West), and in a minor way, playing Germany against Poland, or any consumer of Russian gas against Ukraine. The main asset of this balancing was energy.

France and German alliance with Russia before the Iraq war was also an appeasement to the growing influence of Russian energy weapon, German chancellor Gerhard Fritz Kurt Schröder during the Iraq war, who allied with Russia and France to Veto the Iraq war proposal in the Security Council, later after retirement went on to work with Nord Stream submarine energy pipeline company in the board of directors. In 2003 Russian energy strategy document turned this “petro-confidence” into official foreign policy: “ensuring national security—that is the fundamental task of the energy policy.” After the forced re-nationalisation, close ties between the Kremlin and the energy industry have brought these policy goals within reach. We will see later in the chapters how Russia would use its energy resources as a weapon, during the Iraq war opposition to the United States, and to roll back NATO expansion by blackmailing Europe into subjugation. In the words of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated

that “it would be right to say that we view our role in global energy supply as a means for ensuring our foreign policy independence.”

Russia would repeatedly use this energy power as a persuasive, coercive diplomatic tool against European Union, by stopping the supply of oil and gas to Ukraine for show reasons like price of gas, and transit cost. Russia provides approximately a quarter of the natural gas consumed in the European Union; approximately 80% of those exports travel through pipelines across Ukrainian soil prior to arriving in the EU. But one can gather, this was Russian response to intimidate the colour revolutions, supported by United States which was happening in Georgia and Ukraine.

Russian oil and gas blackmail was repeatedly mentioned and protested by Western powers, European and American (Baev 2008). “It is necessary to say politely and with a friendly smile that we are free and we will do what we want, We will not be manipulated or blackmailed, and if you threaten that you will not deliver gas to us, well then, keep it.” said Vaclav Havel, former Czech President from 1993 until 2003. and playwright, who led the anti-Soviet revolution in 1989. Just after the colour revolutions in both Georgia and Ukraine, President Yushchenko of Ukraine and President Saakashvili of Georgia gave joint statements calling the World to boycott Russia. “Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko said eastern Europe's energy supply routes must diversify away from Russia and not succumb to "energy blackmail." Mikheil Saakashvili said Russia had turned into an "export monopolist of all energy supplies -- both its own and those of Central Asia" and accused Moscow of undermining the ideal of a common European energy market. The strongest words came from United States Vice President Dick Cheney, when he “accused Russia of using blackmail and intimidation in its energy policy towards Europe. In one of Washington's sharpest rebukes to Moscow, Mr Cheney said it was not acceptable for Russia to use its vast gas and energy supplies to bully its neighbours.

"Russia has a choice to make," Mr Cheney told Baltic leaders during a summit in Vilnius. "No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation."” But unfortunately Europe as well as America was unable to do anything in the face of Russian energy and gas arm twisting tactics. Countless numbers of warnings, op-eds and policy papers aside, the West, especially the United States of America was helpless in front of Russian Realism. Europe in the beginning of the decade from 2000 to 2003 was not even united in its opposition to Russia. “Russia has long tried to ‘divide and rule’ the West, often successfully. In the past, EU leaders such as Schröder, Silvio Berlusconi and Jaques Chirac happily discarded pre -agreed EU positions in their attempts to forge a special relationship with Russia. (Barysch 2007)” Since 1991, Russia has attempted to practice energy coercion on at least 60 different occasions, with over 40 of these incidents resulting in cut-offs of energy supplies against the Baltic and CIS countries. Moscow’s repeated and gratuitous resort to



the oil weapons towards the Baltic states clearly represents “the blatant use of strong-arm tactics in economic disputes.”

Russian leaders like Lavrov (as mentioned above) openly talked about the country’s energy power as the fulcrum for the nation’s revival and survival, as well as the basis for realizing competitive advantages in the near abroad and most importantly to what they perceive as a way of standing up to so called US unipolarity. High profile energy showdowns against Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Turkmenistan, clearly demonstrates that Moscow was not unwilling to use energy as a potent and lethal weapon to subjugate and coerce smaller powers in what it considered as Russian sphere of influence. Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, coupled with tightening energy resources globally adds to Russian hostility to foreign ownership of significant strategic reserves at home. Desire to take control of the geographic chokepoints to alternative international transit routes seem to compliment Moscow’s resource nationalism and its tightening strategic grip over Europe and Asia. Russia even proved, ominously if one may add, at potential economic, political, and reputational cost, that it is absolutely willing to use Energy as a weapon, by cutting of gas supplies to Europe, and choking Georgian oil, eventually leading to war in 2008.

## **5 THE IRAQ WAR OF 2003 AND THE DOWNTURN IN PUTIN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

### **Iraq Invasion 2003**

Russia’s behaviour during the buildup to the US led invasion of Iraq was a fascinating study in Realpolitik. Russia hoped to be in a strong Euro-Western bandwagon, after 9/11, which would have helped them fight their own Chechen problem and have a control of their own sphere of influence in the Post Soviet space in their immediate neighbourhood. However, with the majority of the Chechen war winding down, and newfound slow surging economy based on the consolidation of oil and gas resources and stabilization of internal economy gave Russia a new found confidence. Since 2002, the US had been in talks with East European countries over the possibility of setting up a European based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system to intercept long-range missiles which would apparently help to protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa. The whole posture of US Missile defence in East Europe riled Russia, as it was considered completely unilateral and against the principle of mutual understanding followed since the Cold War, and would make Russia’s nuclear weapons worthless. According to Russia, the act of installing ballistic missile defence system would be contrary to the commitment of Intermediate Range Nuclear forces treaty between US and the Soviets signed in 1987. Also, Russia’s idea of sweeping the human rights abuses in Chechnya completely under the rug, didn’t quite work out well, as there was still a lot of scrutiny of its record.

In 2003, with ever increasing belligerent rhetoric from the United States, Russia sought to ally itself with other European powers, in an effort to balance United

States. The idea stems from the mindset of Russia being a European power, rather than a Eurasian power, but behind the act was a strong realist idea of balancing, as Russia was increasingly feeling threatened by the unilateral tendencies of United States. The Russian interest in an alliance with United States in the post 9/11 scenario was fading fast. In the words of Dmitri Trenin (2012): *“After 9/11, Putin took the opportunity to offer the White House a deal. Russia was prepared to trade acceptance of U.S. global leadership for the United States' recognition of its role as a major ally, endowed with a special (that is, hegemonic) responsibility for the former Soviet space. That sweeping offer, obviously made from a position of weakness, was rejected by Washington, which was only prepared to discuss with Moscow the "rules of the road" in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Kremlin gave Westpolitik another try by joining the "coalition of the unwilling" at the time of the Iraq war. By joining the major European powers in opposing the U.S. invasion, Moscow hoped to enter the Western system through the European door and create a Russo-German-French axis to counterbalance Washington and London. Russia failed again. A new anti-American entente did not materialize; situational agreement with Moscow (and disagreement with Washington) could not overcome the fundamental character of transatlantic relations. Instead, transatlantic and European institutions continued to enlarge to the east, taking in the remaining former Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance countries and the Baltic states. With the entry of Poland and the Baltics into the EU, the EU'S overall approach became even more alarming for Moscow. At the same time, both the United States and Europe began supporting regime change from within and geopolitical reorientation in Russia's borderlands, most notably in Ukraine and Georgia, thus projecting their power of at traction beyond the former Soviet border into the CIS. The concept of "the near abroad," which Moscow used in the 1990S to justify its hegemony over the new states on Russia's periphery, was suddenly revived-only now there were two versions of it, one from the perspective of Moscow, the other from the perspective of Brussels, both" of which were claiming the same territory. From 2003 to 2005, for the first time since 1991, Moscow's relations with both parts of the West-the United States and Europe-soured at the same time.”*

Russia continued this effort to break up the Western alliance, and form an anti-US Hegemonic bloc. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, gave statements how Iraq war should be the last resort, and how force must be used only when all other resources and a settlement option was exhausted. “Russia, like many other members of the Security Council, believes the inspectors must continue their work in Iraq and establish whether or not Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. If such weapons are found, the inspectors must document their elimination” This constant reference to “other members of the security council” notably Germany and France was an attempt to break up the Western alliance. And to some extent it was successful too. French Foreign Minister De Villepin said US shouldn’t be impatient, Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan

told reporters the council should respect International Atomic Energy Agency and support their work, and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer warned that war on Iraq could fuel more terrorism.

In a final act of covert belligerence Russia actually passed the war plans and troop movement information of Pentagon, to Saddam Hussein via a Russian diplomat stationed in Baghdad. Although Russia officially dismissed the report, claiming it to be unsubstantiated and accusatory, word of Russian-Iraqi collaboration came as part of an analysis by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which looked at combat operations from an Iraqi perspective as a tool for shaping future U.S. operations. Pentagon claimed its report was based on thousands of Iraqi documents and postwar interviews with more than a dozen Iraqi officials. After the first US missiles landed on Iraq Putin didn't question the war goals, but rather just commented on how great a political error it was. He just called for national sovereignty to be respected and international laws to be

Contrary to public opinion, however, Russia never really wanted to defend Iraq. The only thing it wanted was to take opportunity to form a coalition, "coalition of the unwilling" at the cost of the internal bickering of the West. Russian Elite, while it obviously didn't support the Iraq war and was wary of a unilateral and belligerent United States, never for once wanted to leave the rapprochement with the United States. Leonid Slutski, the then deputy chairperson of the Duma (parliament) Committee for International Affairs, prudently declared, *"If Russia moved toward an anti-American tripartite alliance with France and Germany... this tactically favourable step would lead to a strategic defeat"*.(Volkov 2003) The pro-government newspaper Izvestia, which often acts as a mouth piece of the Government policies, also echoed the pragmatic Realist lines. On March 13<sup>th</sup> it came out with an editorial named the "Detachment of the honest broker" which stated the Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis has served its purpose, and would not help Russia anymore, and that the price of a confrontation with US is far too high. The limitations of an anti-US axis was evident, as Russia was skeptical that even with all its support, France and Germany, and the greater Europe would still not welcome Russia as a partner and ditch the United States. The op-ed continued with the passive pragmatic position stating that Russia still needs the United States steal market, as well as the support of World Bank. Russia skillfully managed to reach its objective to shame and show the United States as a solo aggressor, hell-bent on doing a grave error, and made sure that the error was done alone, bereft of a global legitimacy. That was the success of Russian realist diplomacy. As Izvestia succinctly pointed out, *"All this still does not mean supporting Bush's policy in Iraq. Just that he should commit his error alone, if it is an error. To stand in front of a racing steam locomotive, even as it moves towards an abyss, this is, at the very least, short-sighted. It was necessary to find the 'golden mean' and abstain totally from participating in the big brawl, with its completely unforeseeable consequences."*

On the other hand, this mild opposition and subsequent Iraq war gave Russia enough opportunity to reclaim its traditional Great power role and consolidate what it considers its sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Russian right

wingers led by Zhirinovskiy lobbied for sending massive military force to Middle East, and establishing pro-Russian regimes in Trans Caucasus. *“We should act worse than Americans. Ofcourse we are sorry for Iraq. But it is a great moment for Russia (to take the opportunity)...”* he said.

This pragmatic-Realism was starting to become of the centerstages of Russian Foreign policy again. Realism however gave way to blatant Realism and even power-projection seen during the colour revolutions of Eastern Europe, especially in Ukraine and Georgia, which forms the last phase of Putin’s first two term, and which would almost lead to a head on collision course with the West, namely United States of America.

## **6 EUROPE, NATO AND COLOUR REVOLUTIONS**

The last phase of Russian Realism would be noticed in the dealing with NATO and Europe a little bit of which were already touched upon during the Iraq war and Energy politics. Washington never considered Europe Russia rapprochement as a threat, especially post Cold War, as the idea behind it was that it could boost the workability of the NATO Russia Council. after September 11<sup>th</sup>, NATO General Secretary Lord Robertson clearly stated that Europe and Russia needs to work together, and a common conviction is needed for those countries which work together. US strongly backed this rapprochement, as a reward Russia’s support on the war on terror, and Putin’s initial silence on missile defence and withdrawal from ABM treaty. But since the Russia – Europe relationship was based on a number of factors including Russian perception of NATO and US power towards Russia, it was dependent on a lot of variables. What happened in reality was that Transatlantic and European institutions continued to approach eastward, and continually encroach upon what Russia viewed as its traditional Sphere of influence. The European enlargement and entry of Poland and the Baltic states in European Union and the Mutual assistance programs towards the former Communist east European countries were viewed with alarm in Russia. By the end of the first term of Vladimir Putin around 2004, with the massive human rights abuse in Russia, the West and US already lost hope of a blooming democracy in Russia, and it was strictly reduced to a business like dealing. But what changed that dynamics was the advent of Colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, United States and Europe started supporting the democratic change and transition in those border countries of Russia, which were always a part of the perceived sphere of influence. The relation with Europe and US soured at the same time, in the time frame of 2003 to 2005. *“The “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan made it clear that even the post-Soviet space-an area where Moscow was still dominant and felt more or less at ease -was starting to disintegrate. In late 2004 and early 2005, in the wake of the Beslan school hostage crisis and the Ukrainian election fiasco, the self-confidence of the Putin government hit an all-time low.”*

The NATO enlargement processes largely estranged Russia, and established a new dividing line which excluded Russia. Russia clearly felt left out from the economic and political developments as it was not directly associated. Meanwhile a

new form of people's movement started to appear where post-Soviet authorities were challenged by a combination and alliance of local political forces, civil society, common people and international actors, human rights groups and NGOs. Countries in the Post Soviet authoritarian scenario with a relatively liberal political environment had the civil society to develop and receive foreign assistance, and independent media to emerge, which in turn enabled the opposition to organize and mobilize. Three revolutions – the "rose revolution" in Georgia (November 2003-January 2004), the "orange revolution" in Ukraine (January 2005) and the "tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan (April 2005) changed radically the situation and geo-politics in the post Soviet Russian "sphere of influence" and changed the dynamics of Russia and Western relation. In all the cases substantial Western support for the civil society and Western backed NGOs were instrumental. The use of NGOs and transnational actors are not new, and it is absolutely explained by a Realist paradigm as an instrument of hard power. Robert Gilpin was the first to explain the rise of MNCs as a function of hegemonic stability, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye also warned in the 1970s that "*transnational relations may redistribute control from one state to another and benefit those governments at the centre of transnational networks to the disadvantage of those in the periphery.*"

## **6 CONCLUSION**

### **Impact of Realism on Putin's Policy towards US**

The central research question of this dissertation was to what extent did neo-Realism shape Putin's policy after 2011, which I tried to answer in the previous chapters. Now, an obvious question might arise, which was beyond the scope of the chapters, which I will try to answer here. If neo-realism did frame a successful reconciliation between Putin and Bush, why did the rapprochement flounder and fail after 2003? Did Putin overplay his hand, or Bush was too ideological? To answer the first question, we have to assume Putin was genuine about the rapprochement out of goodwill and not interest. The evidence I gathered thus far is not corroborating to that assertion. Many Realists indeed however saw Bush's Iraq war as being too ideological. Prominent Realist scholars advertised in the New York Times, and Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer wrote an article in Foreign Policy how Iraq was not a threat to the United States. I have also argued in my published paper in International Affairs Review that US foreign policy from 1987, regardless of a liberal or conservative administration was too ideological and busy promoting freedom, rather than acting solely based on realist interests. Vladimir Putin on the other hand was arguably never serious about any genuine rapprochement; rather, he just used the Realist principle of bandwagoning successfully.

The fact that the rapprochement failed is due to the fact that bandwagoning has limitations, and Iraq war was one such. Realists believe that bandwagoning stops at a certain level as one state realise that the other state is getting stronger geo-politically as

both the states are essentially rivals. We saw that in the Munich conference when Putin accused United States of using “hyper power” and “unrestrained use of force”, and “blatant disregard of international laws”.

It is hard in international relations, to mark a specific date or even a timeline for a significant change in foreign policy or theoretical framework, but if the end of the first post 9/11 rapprochement between United States and Russia is to be marked down, it would be the bellicose Munich Conference speech by Vladimir Putin. By 2007, Russian need for a tactical realignment with United States was met. Russia successfully lobbied for membership in World Trade Organisation, dealt with the Chechen rebel problem hijacking the Global war on terror agenda to cover up for Human rights abuses and suppressing internal dissent without a single proverbial finger pointed, got the economy on a strong footing as an Oil and Gas superpower. Russia’s limited goals of opposing the Iraq war with limited bandwagoning with European powers, and taking advantage of internal dissent and inter NATO rivalry without jeopardizing relations with United States was also successful. However the Colour Revolutions and Energy turmoil in European relations proved the deficiencies of Russian foreign policy in dealing with USA, which was untenable. Washington also moved its largest sea-based missile defense radar in the Pacific from Hawaii to the Aleutian Islands, not far from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula, and announced plans to install a radar system in the Czech Republic and a missile interception system in Poland, which it claimed is needed to protect itself against a potential missile threat from Iran. The Munich Conference of 2007 saw Vladimir Putin outline the new strategic and tactical foreign policy framework...which, although still based on the core Realist ideals and interest of the state of Russia, was far more cynical, accusatory, threatening and offensive. Putin blasted United States on the issue of Iraq and missile defence, stating that Russia would plan to deal with these “threats” asymmetrically and effectively (Walt 2012) (Maitra 2013).

Putin’s accusation was about Bush’s unilateralism, the use of “hyper power” disregarding any established laws of International Relations. "*The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states,*" he said, "*Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force - military force - in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible...*" Regarding missile defence Putin mentioned that the logic of establishing a missile defence in East Europe to deter Iran goes against the laws of ballistic. In a moment of unusual Cold War style bluster, he berated United States on NATO expansion accusing the NATO expansion of having nothing to do with modernizing alliances, but rather just eroding mutual trust with Russia, by moving military hardware closer to Russia’s border. He also mentioned that there was a clear misunderstanding of Global threats today as the greatest threat comes from Islamic terrorism. Putin mentioned the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India

and China as an upcoming bloc, with the potential of economically balancing the West. And finally, in what would be the most cryptic messages, he mentioned while talking about Kosovo, that unilaterally declaring independence is not a good thing, and if the World community is interested in accepting the independent status of Kosovo, then they must also be ready to grant accept independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Within months from the Munich Conference, Russia resumed long distance bomber patrols across the Atlantic. Just after the Shanghai Cooperation organization's Peace Mission 2007, Putin announced on 17 August 2007 the resumption on a permanent basis of long-distance patrol flights of The Russian Air Force Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers that had been suspended since 1992. *"In 1992, the Russian Federation unilaterally stopped sending its strategic aviation on long-range patrols. Unfortunately, not everyone has followed our example and other countries' strategic aviation continues patrols to this day. This creates certain problems for the Russian Federation in ensuring its security. In response to this situation, I have decided that Russia's strategic aviation will resume patrols on a permanent basis."* Russia also started naval sorties with carrier groups and submarine patrols, stopped since the Soviet times. *"The aim of the sorties is to ensure a naval presence in tactically important regions of the world ocean"* said Defence minister Anatoliy Serdyukov. Russia started to be increasingly assertive in dealing with its neighbours and meddling in their personal affairs, especially Ukraine and Georgia. Relation with Georgia in particularly deteriorated, over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which culminated in a brief war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, where Russian army routed the Georgians in five days and declared independence to breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russian post 9/11 honeymoon with USA seemed officially over with the Georgian war. However both George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin left power around the same time. The Georgian war was under the Presidency of Dmitri Medvedev, the protégé of Vladimir Putin, who positioned himself as a Prime Minister, and continued to take decisions. The new government under Barack Obama a year after the war started a "Reset" with President Medvedev, and the Reset process is still ongoing and fluid for us to delve into or comment. But the first post 9/11 rapprochement failed as we see, and after considering the evidence provided, this is my humble submission that we can attribute the failing of the rapprochement to the fact that Russia never really wanted a genuine rapprochement. It was always a tactical alignment from the part of Russia, a completely Realist mindset, where Russia was only interested in:

- a. Strengthening her position as a Great power.
- b. Taking care of internal dissent and Caucasus problem by exploiting the "War on Terror" template for its purposes.
- c. Use new found oil and gas wealth to its advantage to be a dominant power player in the energy market.

- d. When all else was achieved, to portray itself as a regional heavyweight, still capable of blocking US unipolarity.

Russia has consistently used a Realist framework, especially Structural and Offensive Realism in their foreign policy. Not all of the above objectives were met with complete success. US still remain the most dominant power in the World. And that was explained by Structural Realism too, the limitations of Russian power. *“Structural realism could be an interesting tool while explaining the structural post-Cold war limitations for the Russian foreign activity, despite Moscow’s ambitions and objections to the US hegemony. In fact, the structure of the international system as well as the new distribution of power within its frames after the fall of the USRR have considerably limited the Russian ability to influence the global affairs, restricting Moscow’s position to local, but certainly not global player. Thus, despite its great power rhetoric and demonstrations to prove its leading role in the international relations Russia is no longer the global superpower. Besides, structural realism underlines a tendency among the strongest players in the system to impose their rules over other subjects. It explains the Moscow’s efforts to participate in the global decision making mechanisms yet it is still truth that neither Russia’s political nor military and economic capacities compare the power of the U.S. as a leading subject in the system.”*

Russia ever since the Munich conference, continued with its Realist foreign policy, albeit a bit more aggressively. On one hand it opposed USA tooth and nail in Syria, vetoing thrice with China any intervention, where it has got significant military and business ties, on the other hand Russia stayed away from vetoing the Libya intervention, and allowed NATO to have a transition stop in Vladivostok. The Realism under Putin continued as Putin came to power for the third time in 2012. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Global Affairs wrote when Putin came to power in 2012, comparing his Realism with Medvedev, *“Where President-2010 sees opportunities and prospects; President-2012 discerns threats and reasons for concern...Medvedev proceeds from Russia’s domestic developments and looks for how events on the world arena could promote Russia’s growth. Putin, by contrast, starts with the global picture and draws conclusions on how external events can influence domestic processes.”*

Russia, never wanted, or acted as if it wanted a complete rapprochement; it took advantage of situations to gain the Great power status which they lost after Cold war. Only with the benefit of hindsight can we claim whether this Realism would continue in Russian foreign policy and dealing with United States. But that’s not within the scope of the discussion here.

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## PREZIDENTSKÁ DIPLOMACIE: SROVNÁNÍ TŘÍ BRAZILSKÝCH PREZIDENTŮ

### PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY: THREE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

*Irena Melounová<sup>1</sup>*

Role Brazílie na mezinárodní scéně roste od začátku nového milénia. V prezidentském politickém systému může hlava státu upravovat své zapojení do rozhodovacího procesu, a tak prezident F. H. Cardoso ukončil tradiční delegování zahraniční politiky výhradně Ministerstvu zahraničních věcí a představil nový fenomén prezidentské diplomacie. Odborníci však předpokládali, že po odchodu prezidenta Cardosa dojde k jeho úpadku. Komplexní analýza proaktivního zapojení posledních tří brazilských prezidentů do diplomacie ukazuje, že očekávání o vymizení prezidentské diplomacie se nenaplnila a že předchozí osobní zájem a zkušenost v dané oblasti mají rozhodující vliv na zahraničněpolitickou aktivitu prezidentů.

**Klíčová slova:** brazilští prezidenti, prezidentská diplomacie, analýza zahraniční politiky

Brazil's role on the international scene has been growing since the beginning of the new millennium. In the presidential political system, the head of state can adjust his/her own involvement in decision-making processes, and so President F. H. Cardoso ended the traditional delegation of foreign policy exclusively to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and introduced a new phenomenon of presidential diplomacy. Scholars expected its decline after his retirement. A complex analysis of last three Brazilian presidents' proactive engagement in diplomacy concludes that these expectations did not prove true and that the previous personal interest and experience in the field have a decisive influence on presidents' activity in foreign policy.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Brazil entered the new millennium as a self-confident member of a fancy club labelled BRICS and searched for international recognition as more than a regional power. The shift in labelling confirms Brazil's success: from a regional power (Lafer 2001, Viola 2005) it transformed into a middle power (Flemes 2007, Hurrell 2006) and then into an emerging global great power (White 2010). This shift occurred during the era of President Lula da Silva, who entered the office after President F. H. Cardoso had stabilized the Brazilian economy and finance in his two previous terms (1995 – 2002).

F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva were leaders of opposite political coalitions and their administrations serve as a great base for periodization and comparison of Brazilian Foreign Policy (Figueira 2009, Lima, Duarte 2013, Sousa 2009, Vilela Neiva 2011). Most of these comparative studies of recent Brazilian foreign policy focus on outcomes of the decision-making process. They analyse regional orientations (Cervo 2010, Villa 2005), partnerships with diverse world or regional players (Pino 2012, Oliveira 2005) and the country's emergence on the international scene (Arraes 2005, Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007, Viola 2005, Vizontini 2005).

The role of the individual in Brazilian foreign policy attracted the attention of scholars in the mid-1990's as a response to the unprecedented involvement of President F. H. Cardoso in foreign policy-making. Scholars dealt with the term "presidential diplomacy" (Preto 2006, p. 32) without any precise definition until 1999, when Sérgio Danese published his book *Diplomacia presidencial: História e Crítica* (Danese 1999).

The close connection of the presidential diplomacy to F. H. Cardoso led Santiso (2002, p. 399) to the conclusion that the presidential diplomacy was only an exceptional phenomenon that would disappear with Cardoso's successor. However, this study shows that this prediction did not prove to be true. On the contrary, Lula da Silva's engagement in the foreign policy decision-making process went far beyond Cardoso's (Barnabé 2009, Figueira 2009).

There are exogenous factors that can explain the increase in the president's participation in diplomacy. The necessity to travel to summits and international meetings, in general, grew over time. If participation is an expected necessity, presidents carry out their basic obligatory tasks. If it is an exogenous trend, then the results of the contemporary President Dilma Rousseff's involvement in this field should surpass both her predecessors. But when the first woman, Dilma Rousseff,



assumed the Presidency, it soon became clear that she focused more on domestic topics, and she tried to delegate foreign policy decision-making back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A revealing way to evaluate presidents' foreign policy contribution is by considering main directions and topics. A comprehensive content analysis of the speeches of F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva proved that the differences between them in terms of thematic and regional orientation resulted from their affiliation with opposite political parties (Vilela, Neiva 2011). Would there be such a big difference comparing Dilma Rousseff, affiliated to the same political party as Lula da Silva? Is it the president that introduces his/her own topics, and how much space would he/she be able to reserve for them?

The aim of this study is to answer these questions by comparing how the three last Brazilian presidents were able to directly affect foreign policy in several ways: organizing the close decision unit, managing it during critical situations, presenting their own initiatives and naming topics that are vital to them.

To do so, this paper analyses the role of the three Brazilian presidents and their diplomacy, first by defining key terms building upon the existing studies and then proposing an analytical framework which results from a combination of classical approaches to the analysis of individuals' and small groups' role in foreign policy decision-making. After considering the presidents' personalities, it investigates the organization of the bureaucratic environment and small decision units and their dynamics by using critical episode analysis. It continues with presidential international visits, then expands an existing content analysis (Vilela, Neiva 2011) and terminates with a short discourse analysis. All steps aim to examine and compare the three Brazilians presidents in five subsequent presidential mandates (two of both F. H. Cardoso and Lula da Silva and one of Dilma Rousseff).

## **2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

Presidential diplomacy is “the personal conduct of a foreign policy agenda, which exceeds the mere routine or the assignments *ex officio*, by the president, or, in the case of a parliamentary system, by the Chief of State and/or by the Chief of the Government” (Danese 1999, p. 51). In order to define more activity than the non-omissible level (Cason, Power 2009, Figueira 2009), a negative definition is useful: the presidential diplomacy stands in opposition to the institutionalized professional diplomacy, and includes a more pro-active attitude of presidents towards foreign policy issues, their direct participation in negotiations and international meetings and/or

decision making process during crises and critical situations (Albuquerque 1996, p. 10, Danese 1999, p. 63 – 64, Malamud 2004, p. 1, Barnabé 2009, ).

For this study, two fundamental observations are crucial: presidential diplomacy is an active personal engagement of the president and exceeds the *ex officio* obligations. For the purpose of analysing this phenomenon, both qualitative (personal commitment) and quantitative (exceeding the routine) methods are applied.

Initially, presidents' personalities are assessed through their (auto)biographies (Bourne 2007, Caldeira 2011, Chade, Indjov 2011, Cardoso 2007, Paraná 2008, Pinto 2011, Segueira 2011). To identify the personal application of the decision making in foreign policy, this part observes the family situation, education, professional career, ideology and political affiliation, leadership style, special events in presidents' lives and capacity, interest and knowledge of the foreign policy field (Danese 1999, p. 393 – 412, Cason, Power 2009, p. 126, Hermann 2001).

The individuals do not act alone in a vacuum, but within an institutional environment with their closest collaborators and advisors, so it is necessary to identify the most important bureaucratic institutions that usually partake in the decision-making process (Giaccaglia 2010, Figueira 2009, Cason, Power 2009, Spektor 2014) and within them delimit the small decision unit which decides in the critical situations. Examination of which institutions mainly participate in the quotidian foreign policy-making utilizes both official documents such as the Constitution and laws (retrieved from the portal of the Presidency, *Presidência*) and secondary literature (Preto 2006, Figueira 2009).

For the analysis of the small group, this paper combines methods of the decision unit framework (Hermann, 2001, p. 52), the critical episodes analysis (Malamud 2005) and case – survey study (Haney 1997). This part examines how the actors achieved decisions in the final authoritative decision unit, which is a group of those who in the case of mutual agreement have the power both to invest the government's sources into foreign political actions and to impede other governmental groups from threatening their position (Hermann 2001, p. 52). Three types of decision-making units differ in the number of people and in relations among them. A coalition is an authoritative group where different representatives of independent bodies relevant for the decision meet. The single group consists of individuals that are members of a particular group that as one unit chooses the orientation of the policy during mutual discussions of all its members. The predominant leader is one individual that can defeat any opposition and accept a decision for him/herself and the government (Hermann 2001).

In order to examine the dynamics of the decision-making process in small groups and “personal engagement patterns” that constitute the usual way how presidents intervene and act in the diplomatic field (Cason and Power 2009, p. 122), five short case studies analyse comparable critical episodes selected in compliance with two criteria: the actors considered the situation as critical, and the situation needed a quick reaction (Legler, Lean, Boniface 2007). Five case studies for each presidential mandate assess the evolution of the crises, decision-making process, action taken and the result. All crises occurred in Latin America and included reactions to domestic events inside sovereign countries, so Brazil had to balance between non-intervention in internal affairs and its own aspiration to be the region’s leader. Presidents had to react quickly either by engaging themselves personally in the negotiations or by delegating the achievement of the desired solution to ministers and/or other Brazilian representatives.

The cases of Paraguay 1996 and 1999, Venezuela 2002, Honduras 2009 and Paraguay 2012 represented an immediate threat to democracy as the Organization of American States (OAS) considered them as a coup d’etat or a credible risk of coup, because force was used to unseat the elected officials (in Paraguay in 1996, the force was used to threaten). Analysed data derive from memories of participants, official press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the President’s Office, newspapers and secondary literature (Lampreia 2008, Guimarães 2010, Amorim 2011, Couto, Soares 2013, Spektor 2014). The triangulation of data sources offers general remarks concerning how the actors participated in the decision-making process.

A widespread method to examine presidential diplomacy is to sum up foreign visits of the heads of state (Danese 1999, Almeida 2004, Figueira 2009). Growing numbers prove that presidents are more active than their usual (i.e. previous) level. The data for calculating the total number of presidential visits were collected from the official web pages of the Presidential office (Presidência) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The data concerning F. H. Cardoso come from secondary sources (Preto 2006, Almeida 2006).

In the next step, the analysis of the impact of presidents’ personalities considers topics introduced by presidents and builds upon a unique content analysis which compared thematic and regional preferences in F. H. Cardoso’s and Lula da Silva’s speeches (Vilela, Neiva 2011). It counts words belonging to pre-defined meaning categories using a pre-defined coding. Authors enabled repetition by handing over explicit rules of aggregating words to categories (Vilela, Neiva 2011, p. 72). The percentage shares show how much attention each category got among all analysed categories. Authors defined seven thematic categories: 1. Environment, 2. Peace and security, 3. Democracy and Human Rights, 4. Cooperation, 5. Institutions, 6. Social

inequality, 7. Economy. There are seven regional categories: 1. The Near and Middle East, 2. US and Canada, 3. Mexico and Central America, 4. Asia, 5. Europe, 6. Africa and 7. South America. The corpus contains 230 discourses of F. H. Cardoso, 749 Lula da Silva's speeches (as collected by Vilela and Neiva who kindly consented to use the corpus freely) and 190 by Dilma Rousseff, whose collection of speeches is based on texts published on the internet pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) and of the Presidential office (Presidência). The charter results from data collection at the portal of the Brazilian Presidency compared to secondary sources (Preto 2006, Souza 2009, Vilela, Neiva 2011).

Finally, to provide a deeper analysis of the presidential influence on Foreign Policy, the combination of social psychological and critical discourse analysis is applied to Brazilian representatives' speeches during the Opening Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations (MRE). The tradition of an inaugurating speech dates back to 1949 and used to be carried out until 1982 exclusively by Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 1982, President João Figueiredo delivered the opening discourse. The most important international forum represents a unique opportunity to present the countries' vision of the world, international relations, discuss current issues, present views on solutions to existing conflicts and project prevailing self-image or an official image.

### **3 PRESIDENTS' PERSONALITIES**

Surprisingly, although the three last Brazilian presidents belong to the same generation, they could not be more distant; each of them illustrates another core characteristic of diverse unequal Brazilian society. The main background differences among presidents rise from their regional and social-economic origins, as there are huge disparities among federal states.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso represents the conservative neoliberal wing. The internationally recognized sociologist and former Minister of Foreign Affairs was elected president thanks to the successful consolidation of Brazilian economy through Plano Real, which he had introduced as Minister of Finance. He gained strong professional authority, rational-legal authority in Weber's perspective. In the new democratic history of Brazil, he was the first re-elected president who respected constitutional rules during both terms.

Part of Cardoso's family comes from Rio de Janeiro in the south eastern region, which possesses the most developed industry and agriculture in the country. The traditional family obeyed the father who did his military service. F. H. Cardoso studied sociology at the prestigious University of Sao Paulo. He was convinced that Brazil could not grow until it would pay its social debt and improve the situation of its poor, unschooled inhabitants (Lampreia 2010). During the tough times of military junta, he lived in France and Chile, participated in conferences and various academic meetings, where he gained many new contacts.

Cardoso initiated his political career only during the democratic transition when he actively engaged in the Brazilian Democratic Movement, the only political party of permitted opposition. In 1982, he became a senator. Later, he founded the new Brazilian Social Democracy Party. His career continued to rise to ministerial posts in Itamar Franco's government. He established close ties to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his short mandate as its Chief in 1992. He was soon transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1995 he became President of Brazil.

Cardoso's presidential competitor and successor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is an outstanding example of a leader with charismatic authority. His authority arises from an exceptional charisma, absolute personal commitment and trust in his own leadership qualities (Fernandes 2012, p. 24). His personal leadership legitimized the political one. Lula da Silva's political legitimacy and credibility develop from an undeniable democratic commitment, syndicate movement, and origin in the poor state of Pernambuco (Anderson 2011, p. 35).

Lula da Silva was born to an indigent family in the north-eastern region known for heavy droughts. Memories of the everyday fight for a living had a strong influence. The family moved to the poor suburbs of Sao Paulo, where Lula da Silva, who had not finished elementary school, began to work in the metallurgical industry. Lula da Silva lost his first wife because of insufficient medical care. He participated with his brother in the metallurgical syndicate movement, and afterwards, he became a member. This was fundamental to his future political career. The shy Lula da Silva was forced to give public speeches. Through practice and the success of the strikes, he gained self-confidence (Paraná 2008). His leading role in unexpectedly huge strikes which paralysed metallurgic production caused him to be imprisoned for one month.

In 1980, Lula da Silva co-founded the Workers' Party and soon became its leader. Like Cardoso, he was so active in the creation of a new political party that they personified the parties (Cason, Power 2009). They ran presidential campaigns against each other as they represented the core parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum, around which other parties formed coalitions (Němec 2012). Lula da Silva

was nominated as a presidential candidate already for the elections in 1989 but did not succeed until 2002, when F. H. Cardoso terminated his second term and could not be re-elected for a third time.

Lula da Silva searched for inspiration and political cooperation abroad. His interest in international political events took shape already soon after the foundation of the Workers' Party when he met his Polish counterpart Lech Walesa (Paraná 2008, p. 29). He supported the establishment of the forum for left-wing parties of Latin America, which gathered for the first time in 1991 to resist the "imperialistic integration" together (Almeida 2003, p. 90). During the 1990s, he became a well-known left-oriented leader both in Brazil and abroad.

Dilma Rousseff combines some traits from both of her ancestors. The well-situated middle-class family with Bulgarian roots lived in the capital of Minas Gerais, a rich state in the south-eastern region. Already as a young teenager, she started to fight against the military regime. As a guerrilla member, she participated in fourteen days training in Uruguay (Amaral 2011, p. 36) and took part in several illegal actions until she was imprisoned for two and half years. Despite being tortured, she did not reveal any sensitive information.

After the release, she moved to the most southern Brazilian state, Rio Grande do Sul, where she finished her master's degree in economics and started to work for the local government. She spent the biggest part of her life serving in nominated positions which did not request any contact with foreign countries. During the democratic transition, she participated in the new Democratic Labour Party and its federal administration. Thanks to her abilities she became Minister of Energy and Mines in 2003, and later she was appointed the Chief of Staff by President Lula da Silva.

During her presidential candidacy, many pointed out that she had never run for an elected post and called Lula da Silva her creator (Aguiar 2010). The campaign managed to link her technocrat capabilities with the unprecedented fact that she was a woman candidate. She was portrayed as a "supermadre" – an image of a politically active woman who expands her mother's role in politics in areas such as health, education and welfare (Chaney 1979). Dilma Rousseff accepted this image of a caring mother who can complete unfulfilled tasks.

All three presidents participated in the opposition to the military regime and in the democratic transition: F. H. Cardoso actively engaged in the only official oppositional party, Lula da Silva was a successful leader of the oppositional syndicate movement, and Dilma Rousseff was a member of a guerrilla movement. Both Cardoso and Rousseff had previous experience from public administration. On the other hand, their careers differ; while Cardoso was elected senator, Rousseff was nominated to all

her posts thanks to her work performances. Lula da Silva did not have any administrative experience before assuming the presidency, but like F. H. Cardoso, he had outstanding ability in political negotiating. They differ in leadership and authority: F. H. Cardoso's recognition originates in his intellectual leadership (Actis 2013) and in his role in the Brazilian economy's consolidation. Lula da Silva stands out thanks to his charismatic leadership. The authority of Dilma Rousseff could be labelled as rational-legal in Weber's classification, based on the liberal-constitutional source of power.

#### **4 FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY**

The role of Brazilian presidents in diplomacy derives from the position as chief of executive power in the state. Compared to other South American countries, Brazil has a very clear and strict division of the independent legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive has been empowered by weakening the legislative power (Mainwaring 1997, p. 55). Moreover, among liberal democracies, there is no other nation which combines proportional representation, multipartism and a presidential system (Preto 2006, p. 15). Although there are usually many parties participating in the government coalition, the presidents need, at the same time, to manage cross-party coalitions to gain support for their proposals in the National Congress. These facts lead to the label of coalitional (minority) presidential system (Mainwaring 1997, p. 87–91, Němec 2012, p. 99–116).

The Brazilian constitution from 1988 defines the main duties of the president and of his consulting body, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The president is the only one personally responsible for the execution of policies (Art. 84 of the Constitution). Presidents used to be passive and almost inactive in foreign policy. They used to delegate tasks exclusively to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a consequence, highly professional career diplomats from traditional diplomatic elite families ruled the institution and decided the foreign orientation of Brazil. Foreign policy used to be considered as a state, not as a public policy (Oliveira 2005, p. 23, Figueira 2009, p. 14, Faria 2013). This means that foreign policy was not negotiated within the bargaining between political parties. The orientation of the state in its international relations was independent of the political parties in power, and had continuous national interest defined and defended by the professional Ministry, which also did not change under different administrations.

Beyond the Ministry, another important domestic actor is the political party, as long as there are no presidential candidates without affiliation to a political party (Giaccalia 2010, Cason, Power 2009, Němec 2012). This political influence is reflected

in the appointments of presidential advisors: some of them come from state institutions or academia, while others come from political parties. This is crucial when considering how decisions about the participants in a close decision unit occur. This choice reveals the essential traits of presidents' preferences and background ties and has a direct connection to the organizational model of the decision unit.

The so far unseen participation of Cardoso in foreign policy activities arose from a combination of various factors. Firstly, he was interested in international relations and had a significant international reputation as a well-known sociologist; secondly, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for a short period in 1992; and thirdly, external processes of the pluralization of actors weakened the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cason, Power, 2009). During his presidency, Cardoso transformed the executive power significantly, but most reforms were, nevertheless, finished only in the first Lula da Silva mandate.

When entering the presidential post in 1995, Cardoso chose career diplomat Luiz Felipe Lampreia as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. They had worked together in a department of planning in the transition government of José Sarney in the 1980s (Lampreia 2010). The main Presidential Office's foreign affairs advisor Gelson Fonseca Júnior, like other advisors, was a career diplomat (Almeida 2004, p. 177). In 2001, after Minister Lampreia wished to leave the post (Lampreia 2010), the president appointed the ambitious and experienced career diplomat Celso Lafer, who had served in the ministerial post already in 1992.

Minister Lampreia, when assuming the post, was assured that the Ministry counted on an active role for the new president. The president's neoliberal orientation on economic topics led him to pluralize the participation in international negotiations, and he broadened the domestic actors involved, primarily the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. This weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cason, Power 2009) might have been the president's calculated action due to the diplomatic staff's opposition to the president's national-developmental project (Vizentini 2005). President Cardoso also concentrated more power in the executive branch by passing "executive agreements". This procedure aimed to partly steer the legislative branch away from its participation in foreign policy decisions (Figueira 2010). During the Cardoso era, Brazil tried to intervene more actively in international relations and to strengthen its ties to the closest region first (integration in Mercosur). Then the country would connect to important global players (chiefly to the European Union) through its regional organization. This paradigmatic attitude towards the international environment gained the label "autonomy through integration" as compared to the historically dominant paradigm "autonomy through distance" (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007).



Lula da Silva's political party's entrance into public administration brought its complex reorganization, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The generous plan for elevating Brazil's role in the world required a vast extension of technical background, the opening of new embassies, admission of new staff, organizing of international summits and conferences in Brazil, and visits of state representatives abroad (Figueira 2009, p. 116 – 126). The Ministry was reformed during the two first years of the first Lula da Silva mandate according to the previous F. H. Cardoso plan and the long-term objectives and ideas of the Workers Party (PT 1994, p. 30). This expansion led to the growth of diplomatic representations abroad from 150 to 230 in total; in Latin America 15 new embassies were opened, in Asia 13, and in Africa 19 (Amorim 2010, p. 226). There were Brazilian embassies in 39 out of 53 African countries by the end of Lula da Silva's second term (Pino 2012, p. 191). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained back its lost glamour and importance and started to promote state or semi-state companies. The main foreign political trend of this era was universalism, vitally connected to the paradigm "autonomy through diversification" (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007, p. 1321 – 1324).

Lula da Silva's unprecedentedly nominated politically affiliated people as his advisors (Lima, Duarte 2013). This proves the president's intention to negotiate, combine and connect. The foreign policy "Troika" included the President, experienced diplomat Celso Amorim as Minister, and the President's special advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. It is remarkable that Minister Amorim, who had already occupied this post from 1993 to 1995, was the first foreign minister affiliated with a political party in the history of Brazilian diplomacy (he changed from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party to the Workers Party in 2009). The president's advisor Garcia was the main international relations theoretical ideologist in the Workers Party.

Dilma Rousseff inherited many features such as the basic orientation, guidelines, principles, and organization of the Ministry, and even advisors, from Lula da Silva. During her administration, there was a noticeable decline in the Ministry's budget. Dilma Rousseff tended to appoint to prominent posts experts without political affiliation. Both her first mandate's Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota and Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, were career diplomats. On the other hand, she retained the inherited presidential advisor M. A. Garcia. Minister Patriota claimed that he would protect the gains of the previous government and build on its solid base. The change at the ministerial post occurred after several misunderstandings between the president and the first minister. Dilma Rousseff normally did not intervene much in foreign policy negotiations, but she would act in crises and when she was not satisfied with the results. She "sacrificed" the minister after a conflict with Bolivia in which Brazilian diplomats and senators had organized a transfer of the Bolivian opposition leader Roger Pinto Molina to Brazil. The Minister officially resigned, and Dilma Rousseff

appointed a new one. This was the only case when the Minister of Foreign Affairs was recommended to resign during the five analysed mandates.

## **5 DECISION-MAKING DURING CRISES**

The presidents faced numerous crises which reveal differences among their approaches to management of the top team. In the second year of his first term, President Cardoso was confronted with an abrupt crisis in Paraguay in 1996. Although Paraguay's transition to democracy started in February 1989, seven years later, its democracy was still fragile. General Oviedo refused to leave his post as ordered by President Wasmosy, which led to an institutional crisis in April 1996. The general managed to persuade the president to let him become Minister of Defence. The involvement of the international community in the crisis was significant, as the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (acting according to resolution AG/RES 1080 adopted in Santiago de Chile in 1991) and a representative of the United States Department of State visited Paraguay. Foreign ministers of Mercosur (Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina) promptly travelled to Asuncion, too, and made it clear that a "coup under the table" would bring sanctions to the country. Before the crisis escalated, President Wasmosy had secretly visited his counterpart Cardoso in Brasília on the 20th of April. President Cardoso expressed full support to the official, democratically elected government (Santiso 2002, p. 407), as his staff advised him (Lampreia 2008). The President coordinated his steps with his advisors and accepted the decisions coming from the institutions, especially (and naturally) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Albuquerque 1997, Couto, Soares 2013).

Unfortunately, the temporary solution of the 1996 crisis did not last long. General Oviedo managed to remain in politics; however, it was for some time only behind the stage. When his political ally won the presidential elections, Oviedo was absolved from all accusations, but later he supposedly assassinated the Vice-President L. M. Argana. President Cardoso asked the Paraguayan President Cubas to resign and followed Minister Lampreia's advice to grant asylum for President Cubas. The Minister also strongly insisted on no weapon delivery to Paraguay. The crisis was solved in the end without the use of force. Meanwhile, President Cubas gained asylum in Brazil. Oviedo obtained asylum in Argentina and later flew to Brazil, which refused to extradite him to Paraguay to be judged for the assassination in 1999. Once again, Cardoso led the decision unit, and worked closely with the Brazilian ambassador to Paraguay and with Minister Lampreia.

Close to the end of Cardoso's second term, another problematic South American state attracted the attention of the whole region's community. The crisis in

Venezuela in 2002 manifested its depth already in April when the opposition movement removed President Hugo Chávez from power for several days. President F. H. Cardoso was clear about his attitude and instructed Minister Celso Lafer to expound the Brazilian point of view at the Rio Group meeting, calling upon the “democratic clause”. After multilateral threats to Venezuela, such as its possible isolation and suspension from the regional organizations, President Chávez came back to power within 48 hours. But this solution soon proved to be temporary.

Several months later, the conflict escalated again with strikes in the main Venezuelan petroleum company. Even though the escalation occurred during the Cardoso’s final term, it can serve as an outstanding example of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy activity. Both men considered the crisis as an immediate threat, with a possibility of civil war (Amorim 2011, p. 385). Lula da Silva started his engagement even before he officially entered office. He sent his closest foreign policy advisor Garcia to Venezuela. Garcia had an extremely unusual position of “special envoy of the elected president” and was probably the only conceivable person to travel to Venezuela because of his declared ideological closeness to President Chávez. The president’s active role was crucial: he visited three countries before even entering office (including the United States). Already during his second day in office, he spoke with Hugo Chávez. Based on this meeting, he assumed personal responsibility for founding a group of friends of Venezuela and tried facilitating and mediating with the Organisation of American States and other partners. The advisor, minister and president were in close touch (Amorim 2011). The president trusted his colleagues and there were no big discrepancies in what they were saying to the public. They acted as a unique compact decision unit with a strong role for its leader, the president. Garcia described the President’s role in foreign policy as a “rock star” who presents the results in the media, but who can and does indeed delegate the implementation of foreign policy to his comrades whom he can trust (Garcia 2010).

The proactive attitude of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy group emerged often, even during crises in countries that do not share borders with Brazil, such as during the Honduran coup d’état in June 2009, in which Brazil also played a significant role. President Zelaya was seized by the military and had to escape to Costa Rica. When he returned to the country in September, he lived in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Although Brazil announced that it had not helped the president to return, it did not accept any ultimatum from the interim Honduran president Micheletti. The Brazilian president, the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, and the ambassador in Honduras all clearly declared that they did not agree with the coup and would not accept the “de facto” government. To support it by acts, Brazil introduced visa for Hondurans and tried to facilitate and mediate negotiations of the crisis first within Unasul. Minister Amorim wanted to discuss it in the UN Security Council too. President Lula da Silva

also stated a request for a peaceful solution at the general opening of the General Assembly of the UN.

During Dilma Rousseff's first term, the domestic events in Paraguay once again demanded the attention of South American states. This case displays the relations of Brazil and Mercosur to Venezuela, which became a member after the previous temporary suspension of Paraguay's membership. The crisis started with the attempts at the impeachment of Paraguayan President F. Lugo and its successful conclusion. Dilma Rousseff received this news during the Rio+20 summit and because of its relevance, she had to participate in dealing with the issue.

Brazilian diplomacy had had information from its embassy about the complicated situation in Paraguay long before the conflict escalated, but did not believe it would go so far (Presidência). The two principal Brazilian representatives, Minister Patriota and advisor Garcia, offered different views and statements. The minister advised the president to negotiate the crisis within Unasul, which later turned out to be a worse option than possible negotiation within the longer-existing Mercosur. Solving the problem within Unasul meant that Bolivia and Venezuela participated in negotiations, which would not have happened within Mercosur. A leak of information revealed that Dilma Rousseff considered the minister's withdrawal. In the end, the most prominent victim from the Brazilian diplomacy was the Brazilian ambassador to Mercosur, S. P. Guimarães (former secretary-general in Lula da Silva's first term). This crisis demonstrated that the decision unit was indeed not acting as a unit, but three representatives were independent players in a loose coalition, classified as a coalition of autonomous actors according to Hermann's classification (2001).

Applying the result criterion, even if the solution was not achieved exclusively thanks to Brazilian diplomacy, Dilma Rousseff's attitude prevailed and differed from advisor Garcia's position. There were no sanctions adopted towards Paraguay, and Mercosur suspended only its political membership until the next elections. Rousseff's careful but irresolute considering of an appropriate reaction lasted a long time. It seemed that foreign policy was always in the shadow of internal affairs. The president returned to the ministry its previously lost independence, and only engaged when the relevance of the particular situation called for it. But she was able to uphold her attitude, strict supervision, and the requirement of results. In addition, she punished errors and mistakes. This was also the case of Minister Patriota, who had resigned in August 2013 after enabling the transfer of a persecuted Bolivian senator to Brazil from his refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in La Paz. He was the only minister to resign during the analysed period.

These five short case studies illustrate some differences in presidents' management styles of the decision units in crises. Both Cardoso and Lula da Silva listened to their staff's advice. Several protagonists from the Lula da Silva's era remained in Dilma Rousseff's term. At the top of the pyramid remained advisor Garcia and Minister Patriota, the vice-minister in Lula da Silva's second term. But the management of the closest cooperation changed significantly, as Dilma Rousseff maintained a certain distance from foreign policy and did not share the negotiation skills of her predecessors.


The studies display the preference for a multilateral or bilateral approach: all tried to solve situations on a multilateral basis but in different phases of the resolution. While Lula da Silva tried first to deal with issues bilaterally and only later multilaterally, both Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff preferred first to look for a solution within multilateral, regional forums.

## 6 INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL VISITS

The phenomenon of presidential diplomacy is mostly analysed by the criterion of the total sum of presidents' visits (Figueira 2009, p. 116 – 126, Cason, Power 2009, p. 122). These visits serve to present the country, to support international trade (Mapa 2012, p. 10) and to inaugurate new (development) projects (Pino 2012, p. 197 – 201).

This quantitative dimension shows how much the presidents participated in foreign policy. The growing participation of presidents cannot be accounted for only by their preferences; it also results from the wider trend of personal meetings and reunions (for instance, Barack Obama's comparison to his predecessors shows an unseen number of foreign visits in his first year in office, FP, 2012). Figure 1 registers clearly the exceptional participation of Lula da Silva.

Figure 1: Quantitative dimension of presidential diplomacy



In comparison to Lula da Silva, the two others were far less active. Dilma Rousseff visited fewer countries in the first year than her antecedent in any year of his two mandates. Figure 1 reveals that Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff received more visits in Brazil than they made trips abroad. This is not valid for F. H. Cardoso, who travelled slightly more abroad than he received visits in Brazil. The growing numbers of multilateral meetings may reflect a broader trend exogenous to the wish of the Presidents, but as they drop during the mandate of Dilma Rousseff, this also testifies to her disinterest in foreign policy and her bigger preferences towards domestic issues. Anyway, the total numbers during her mandate are only slightly higher than those of F. H. Cardoso. Another breaking point occurred in Lula da Silva's Presidency: he received significantly more visits than he made, which could reflect the growing importance of Brazil and its incentives to international partners. Dilma Rousseff welcomed more visits in Brazil.

The regional comparison offers a valuable insight. While Cardoso travelled to Latin American countries and to Europe, during both Lula da Silva's terms most representatives of these countries came to Brazil to different events and meetings. Curiously, in Lula da Silva's first term the biggest disparity between trips abroad and received visits is from Europe. This might reflect the awakening of the European leaders who realized with some delay that there was a new important international player (Saraiva 2012).

The next two figures show on which regions the presidents focused. Of course, the differences in absolute numbers are caused partly by the number of countries included in the respective region (e.g. North vs. Latin America). In Figure 2, which depicts the bilateral visits of Brazilian presidents abroad, Latin America is by far the most represented region, followed by Europe and Africa.


Figure 2: Bilateral visits abroad

The unprecedented numbers during both Lula da Silva’s terms depict his involvement in foreign policy. Most of his visits (70%) headed to the countries of the global south (Pino 2012, p. 191). African representatives started to visit Brazil more and almost reached the numbers of European representatives. The fall in the reception of foreign visits in Brazil during Rousseff’s term is also revealed.

Figure 3 displays foreign visits received by the Brazilian presidents. Again, both Lula da Silva’s terms show the enormous activity of the president. Comparison of Latin America and Europe shows that the second region played a significant role in

both Cardoso’s terms (especially in the first one, confirming the strong inspiration of the European integrational project) and also in Rousseff’s first term. The significant representation by African countries in Lula da Silva’s first term reflects declared interest in this region, and orientation towards the global South.

Figure 3: Bilateral visits received by Brazilian presidents




**7 CONTENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES**

The quantitative analysis focuses on the regional and thematic orientation of the three presidents. Figure 4 depicts the importance of the analysed regions in presidential speeches and illustrates the percentage of appearance of countries from respective regions in foreign policy speeches. South America and Europe prevail by far. The biggest difference appears in the comparison of F. H. Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff to Lula da Silva, who dedicated significantly less attention to European countries and slightly more to the African continent in his speeches, whereas Africa appeared far less in the speeches of both F. H. Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff.

Completing the previous analysis of foreign visits, Figure 4 also reveals that Lula da Silva paid more balanced attention to all regions than the other two presidents. He registered higher percentages in the least-mentioned regions and lower percentages in the most common ones. This fact proves the desire for universalism in and diversification of foreign policy in this period. Despite the declared continuity, Dilma Rousseff’s results in this analysis are surprisingly closer to F. H. Cardoso than to Lula da Silva.

Figure 4: Regions in presidential speeches




The quantitative analysis of the topic priorities represents an introductory step to qualitative discourse analysis. The definition of the thematic categories (Vilela, Neiva 2011) reflects the seven most important topics mentioned in presidential speeches. Obviously, the presidents reacted to international events that are independent of their choices and preferences. However, in the vast corpus, these exogenous influences might be of lower significance than the differences of attitudes among speakers. The most essential topic for all three presidents was (by far) the economy,



followed by social inequality and international institutions. The most surprising difference appears in two categories: on the one hand, democracy and human rights, and on the other, peace and security: F. H. Cardoso mentioned the first category twice as often as Lula da Silva or Dilma Rousseff. This, of course, partly derives from the still recent democratic transition, but it contrasts with expectations (Engstrom 2012) that human rights would be a big topic for Dilma Rousseff, who was tortured during the dictatorship. On the contrary, she spoke much more about peace and security than her predecessors. The environmental topic seems to be the least significant. Only Dilma Rousseff mentioned it more often than democracy and human rights, but this may be because of the Rio+20 Summit and the president's connection of environmental topics to the economy, development and natural resources.

Figure 5: Topics in presidential speeches



Even if presidents are not the only authors, and the speeches' contents do not depend exclusively on them, speeches always contain some personal traits, either non-intentionally or intentionally. This analysis focuses on the most important Brazilian representatives' speeches in front of the main international forum, the General Assembly of the United Nations. There is no particular rule concerning whether the president him/herself or the minister should open the session (Lampreia 1999). Brazilian representatives have utilized speeches to present their basic foreign policy orientations and to express main considerations about the contemporary (urgent) international agenda. All discourses also present the main internal changes in Brazil,

Brazilian commitments to the international community (connected to the desired permanent seat in the Security Council), and current international topics, threats and trends.

Comparing the three presidents by their personal participation, F. H. Cardoso spoke at this stage only once in 2001, after the 9/11 attacks. Lula da Silva orated three times in each mandate, in 2003, 2004, 2006, and in 2007, 2008 and 2009. He decided not to participate in 2010 due to his assistance in Dilma Rousseff's presidential campaign. In contrast, Dilma Rousseff participated in all four years during her first mandate.

These speeches constitute an occasion to express national interest to the international forum and stress the importance of the president's own country. Brazil has desired reform of the Security Council since 1988, and it declared interest in having one seat for the first time during Itamar Franco's presidency in 1994. All presidents make this requirement clear, but it appears only implicitly in F. H. Cardoso's speech, whereas all speeches of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff mentioned it explicitly. Presidents stressed the evolution of Brazil and its rising importance. Cardoso's speech and the first two speeches by Lula da Silva stated that the country would soon be prepared to fulfil its international commitments, and later that the country was already fulfilling them. In the last speech by Lula da Silva, Brazil appeared to be a country that can help others to achieve their commitments, particularly the Millennium Development Goals. Brazil has passed through a long and tough development process, and it feels ready to share its experience and knowledge. In all speeches, presidents consider Brazil to be a responsible player.

There is a remarkable disparity in the comparison of the content analysis results concerning the thematic and regional orientation with the discourse analysis of the UN presidential speeches. In particular, regions appear according to the urgency of events which occurred during the year of the speech and do not reflect intentional foreign policy orientation guidelines. On the contrary, the presidents stress the topics they consider important, and thus in this dimension there seems to be more space for choices in line with their preferences. For instance, an F. H. Cardoso speech selected topics reacting to the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. The president emphasized the fight against terrorism but warned against starting a conflict among civilizations or even religions. He broadened the topic by connecting it to development, globalization, and more responsible and just global markets. Cardoso's themes of reducing injustice, helping the least developed countries through the liberalization of international trade, and the liberalization of pharmaceutical products (and more precisely HIV antiretroviral drugs) continued with more dynamics in speeches given by Lula da Silva.

The second president managed to link up-to-date topics with long-lasting problems and included a huge variety of critical points and events in each speech. He also revealed the country's position and attitude towards ongoing crises, sometimes assertively stressed Brazil's proposed solution, and criticised developed countries for their acts or lack of political will to repair damage they had caused (e. g. concerning the environment and unfair international trade). The call for reform of the Security Council and for better global governance is also emphasised. Subjects such as hunger, poverty, environment, peace, the economy and international justice appear most frequently. Lula da Silva also assumed, as Brazil's representative, the role of protector and leader of developing countries. In the beginning, Brazil was part of this group, and its leader due to its geographical and economic dimensions, but towards the end of the second mandate, Lula da Silva presented Brazil as a model for other countries, worth being followed because of its successful development. Regional orientations correspond to the findings of the content analysis. Lula da Silva often mentioned historical linkages with Africa, contemporary cooperation with this continent and many organizations and forums Brazil took part in or even founded (e. g. IBAS or Unasul). Mentions about the situation in the Middle East are common as Brazil supports the creation of an independent Palestine. Lula da Silva often used this request for peace in the Middle East to support the image of his country as a peaceful harbour where the Jewish and Arab minorities live side by side.

Dilma Rousseff's shorter speeches generally did not cover so many topics as her forerunners. She paid more attention to few usually contemporary events and crises (e. g. economic crises, Rio 20+ Summit and environment, the U.S. spying on their allies). The themes were discussed in greater detail. She continued constructing the image of Brazil as leader of the global South and stressed the achievements of her predecessor as well as criticism of developed countries. In the continuity of the leftist discourse of her party and predecessor, she criticised protectionism, the insufficient fight against poverty and hunger, and the lack of dialog within the international community.

The personal messages that could be linked to the individual experience of the presidents reveal differences among them. Whereas F. H. Cardoso's sociological background appears indirectly in his speeches, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff directly speak about their personal experience. Lula da Silva uses it to strengthen his statements about the need for development, the fight against poverty and hunger, while Dilma Rousseff declared emotionally in her first speech that she was the first woman to open the General Discussion in 2010 and proclaimed the new millennium as a woman. It is Lula da Silva who uses more poetic and passionate language; he employs citations from the Bible and some Brazilian poets.

## 8 CONCLUSION

The article concludes that expectations about the decline of the presidential diplomacy of Cardoso's successor did not prove to be right, as President Lula da Silva's involvement reached its (temporary) peak in his second term. In a strong presidential political system, the presidents' personalities can significantly influence foreign policy decision-making. Previous interest in a matter can lead to higher involvement in an area, as both Presidents Cardoso and Lula da Silva demonstrate. In contrast, greater ties to domestic policies led Dilma Rousseff to reduce the extent of presidential diplomacy, but we can expect that Dilma Rousseff may expand her activities in her second term, as presidents usually do.

Within the same constitutional and regulatory environment, the presidents, as heads of the executive power and accountable for the government's decisions, can adjust relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their own cabinet according to their wish and political influence. The granting of essential posts is reflected in the cooperation among individuals in crises. As this analysis proved, the personal relations of presidents to ministers or their advisers influence the final decision. It was President Cardoso who significantly changed the situation and ended the long-lasting monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had known his minister for a long time, and this enabled the president to have a greater involvement in foreign policy-making. Whereas Lula da Silva and Cardoso chose their staff, Dilma Rousseff partly inherited them. Cardoso and Lula da Silva mostly worked closely with their friends, ministers and advisers, but it was notably different in Dilma Rousseff's administration, since she later even removed a minister after several disputes. The five short case studies also showed that Dilma Rousseff is reactive, while Cardoso and Lula da Silva were active and introduced their own initiatives.

The results of the qualitative analysis surprisingly draw a correspondence between Dilma Rousseff and Cardoso, but distance her from Lula da Silva, although they were nominated by the same political party. The differences in thematic and even regional orientations between Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva are striking, bearing in mind that she was so supported (and even, as some say, "chosen") by Lula da Silva, had a broad political coalition around their Workers Party and even inherited advisers and a minister. Dilma Rousseff's frequent mentioning of Europe, which likens her to Cardoso, might have been caused by exogenous factors, such as financial crises and complex criticism of Europe. Cardoso's and Lula da Silva's were oriented towards the whole international community, and they both had great negotiation skills and political influence, since they both founded "their" parties.

Conclusions drawn from the proposed framework are limited due to inability to obtain all necessary information. First of all, the differences between the first and second mandate are covered only partially in the solution of crises and in the quantitative analysis of international visits. The political background, (which means the strength of government coalitions and domestic political struggles) is missing, as is the influence of public opinion. Another possibility to extend the analysis would be leadership style analysis done with the help of modern software, but which still does not exist for The Portuguese language. Another possible extension could focus on President Cardoso's predecessor and Dilma Rousseff's second term.

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