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Obsah

Úvodník

  ČASOPIS MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY V ROKU 2013 DR. H. C. PROF. ING. ĽUDMILA LIPKOVÁ, CSc. ING. MARTIN GRANČAY, PHD. _____	5
---	---

Pôvodné vedecké články

 O SOCIÁLNO M DIALÓGU A MOŽNOSTIACH PREDĽŽENIA PRACOVNÉHO ŽIVOTA V EURÓPE DR. HAB. BOGUSŁAWA URBANIAK _____	8
--	---

 O PÔSO BENÍ RUSKEJ FEDERÁCIE AKO SVETOVEJ VELMOCI PRI VYTŤVÁRANÍ MULTIPOLARITY V SÚČASNÝCH MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOCH DOC. PHDR. FRANTIŠEK ŠKVRNDA, CSc. _____	26
---	----

 ČÍNSKA ROZVOJOVÁ POMOC V LATINSKOAMERICKOM REGIÓNE ING. MONIKA ERBENOVÁ _____	53
---	----

 OVPLYVNŤJÚ VÝDAVKY NA ZDRAVOTNÍCTVO HOSPODÁRSKY RAST? DÔKAZY Z VYBRANÝCH ÁZIJSKÝCH KRAJÍN DR. SEYED NEZAMUDDIN MAKIYAN MAHVASH MORADI, MA EZATOLLAH LOTFI, MA _____	73
---	----

 POSTAVENIE ETIKY NA MEDZINÁRODNÝCH FINANČNÝCH TRHOCH ING. JANA DRUTAROVSKÁ _____	85
--	----

Recenzie

 LAURA SHEPHERD: RODOVÁ POLITIKA, NÁSILIE A BEZPEČNOSŤ MGR. VERONIKA VALKOVIČOVÁ, MA _____	97
---	----

 KAROL R. SORBY: ARABSKÝ VÝCHOD (1918-1945) PROF. PHDR. EDUARD GOMBÁR, CSc. _____	101
--	-----

INFORMÁCIE O ČASOPISE MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY	103
INŠTRUKCIE PRE AUTOROV	105

Content

Editorial


  THE JOURNAL IN 2013 LUDMILA LIPKOVA MARTIN GRANCAJ	5
---	---

Original scientific papers

 TOPICS CONCERNING SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND THE EXTENSION OF WORKING LIFE IN EUROPE BOGUSLAWA URBANIAK	8
--	---

 ACTIONS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS A WORLD POWER IN CREATING MULTIPOLARITY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FRANTISEK SKVRNDA	26
--	----

 CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE REGION OF LATIN AMERICA MONIKA ERBENOVA	53
---	----

 DOES HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES SEYED NEZAMUDDIN MAKIYAN MAHVASH MORADI EZATOLLAH LOTFI	73
---	----

 THE STATUS OF ETHICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS JANA DRUTAROVSKA	85
--	----

Reviews

 LAURA SHEPHERD: GENDER, VIOLENCE AND SECURITY VERONIKA VALKOVICOVA	97
--	----

 KAROL R. SORBY: ARABIAN MIDDLE EAST (1918-1945) EDUARD GOMBAR	101
---	-----

ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	104
GUIDE FOR AUTHORS	106



ÚVODNÍK: ČASOPIS MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY V ROKU 2013 EDITORIAL: THE JOURNAL IN 2013

*Eudmila Lipková*¹ – *Martin Grančay*²

Vážení čitatelia,

Dear readers,

rok 2013 bol pre náš časopis rokom pokroku. S cieľom zvýšiť kvalitu publikovaných statí a zaradiť Medzinárodné vzťahy medzi najvýznamnejšie časopisy vo svojom odbore v strednej Európe rozhodol vydavateľ o kompletnej zmene zloženia redakčnej rady. Jej súčasných 23 členov pochádza zo 14 štátov sveta a zahŕňa najvýznamnejších európskych a v niektorých prípadoch aj svetových odborníkov na medzinárodnú ekonomiu, medzinárodné politické vzťahy, právo a diplomaciu. Časopis bol následne zaradený do viacerých významných citačných databáz ako EconPapers, Index Copernicus či Directory of Open Access Journals. Azda najvýznamnejším krokom bol podpis zmlúv s databázami EBSCO a ProQuest, čím sa dosah časopisu stal skutočne globálnym.

2013 was a year of changes for our Journal. With the aim to increase the quality of published articles and to gain the status of one of the most important journals in its field in Central Europe, the publisher decided to completely revamp the Journal's editorial board. Today, 14 nationalities are represented among the 23 editorial board members. The board includes regionally and in some cases also globally acclaimed experts on international economics, international political relations, international law and diplomacy. The Journal has been included in several scientific databases, such as EconPapers, Index Copernicus or the Directory of Open Access Journals. Probably the most important step for the Journal's future was signing of contracts with EBSCO and ProQuest databases which

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V roku 2013 publikoval časopis Medzinárodné vzťahy 35 vedeckých statí, z toho 11 v kategórii pôvodné vedecké články, 11 v kategórii diskusie a 13 prehľadov. Šesť z nich bolo v anglickom jazyku. Okrem statí boli publikované aj štyri ďalšie príspevky – dve recenzie, jeden úvodník a jedna informácia. Na príspevkoch sa podieľalo 40 rôznych autorov z 11 inštitúcií zo 6 štátov sveta. Do redakcie bolo v roku 2013 celkom zaslaných 52 statí. Z nich bolo 21 publikovaných, 7 bude publikovaných v roku 2014, 23 bolo zamietnutých a o jednej stati ešte nebolo rozhodnuté. Podiel zamietnutých statí dosiahol 44 %.

V roku 2014 plánujeme pokračovať v trende zvyšovania kvality publikovaných statí a nárastu počtu citácií časopisu. Aby sme dosiahli náš cieľ zaradiť Medzinárodné vzťahy do najvýznamnejších citačných databáz, už od tohto čísla môžete postrehnúť niekoľko zmien. Azda najviditeľnejšia je zmena úpravy časopisu. Rozhodli sme sa prispôbiť formátovaniu používanému najvýznamnejšími svetovými karentovanými časopismi a popri zmene písma prechádzame na zátvorkovú citačnú metódu meno-rok. V porovnaní s citovaním v poznámkach pod čiarou je táto metóda jednoduchšia pre autora aj prehľadnejšia pre čitateľa.

Zmeny sa dotknú aj obsahového hľadiska. Už od aktuálneho čísla znižujeme počet publikovaných článkov na maximálne 5 – 6 v čísle. To povedie k prísnejšej selekcii a k zvýšenému podielu zamietnutých článkov, aby

gives our Journal a truly global reach.

In 2013, the Journal of International Relations published 35 scientific papers – 11 original scientific articles, 11 discussion papers and 13 surveys. Six of these papers were published in English language. Along with the scientific papers, four other works were published – two book reviews, an editorial and an information. The papers were written by 40 authors from 11 institutions from 6 countries of the world. In 2013, the editorial board received 52 submissions. 21 of them were accepted and published, further 7 papers were accepted to be published in 2014, 23 papers were rejected and decision on one paper is still pending. The rejection rate reached 44 %.

In 2014 we will do our best to ensure we only publish high-quality research papers with a potential to be widely cited. To reach our goal of including the Journal of International Relations in the most important scientific databases, we have made several additional changes to the Journal. Perhaps the most visible one of them is the change in formatting. Adopting the practice used by leading journals, we have switched to the author-date citation system as opposed to the previously used footnote citation system. The new system is author- as well as reader-friendly.

Another important change is reduction in the number of published articles. From this issue onwards we will limit the number of papers published to 5-6 per issue. This will lead to higher

všetky publikované state mali iba tú najvyššiu kvalitu. V tejto súvislosti rušíme dlhoročne zaužívanú kategorizáciu publikovaných článkov na „pôvodné vedecké články“, „prehľady“ a „diskusie“ – po novom budú všetky označované jednotne ako vedecké state. V každom čísle tiež uverejníme recenziu významného vedeckého diela z oblasti medzinárodných vzťahov.

Veríme, že si uskutočnené zmeny nájdú Vašu priazeň. Ďakujeme Vám za dôveru časopisu Mezinárodné vzťahy a tešíme sa na úspešnú spoluprácu s Vami v roku 2014.

Redakcia

rejection rate, better selection of articles and their higher quality. We will also abandon the long-used division of papers into “original scientific papers”, “surveys” and “discussions” – from now on all papers will be published as original research papers. In each issue, we will publish a review of an important book from the field of international relations or international economics.

We would like to thank you for your continued support of our Journal and we hope you will welcome the changes. We are looking forward to a fruitful cooperation with you in 2014.

Editors



O SOCIÁLNO M DIALÓGU A MOŽNOSTIACH PREDĽŽENIA PRACOVNÉHO ŽIVOTA V EURÓPE

TOPICS CONCERNING SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND THE EXTENSION OF WORKING LIFE IN EUROPE

*Bogusława Urbaniak*¹

Ekonomické dôsledky starnutia populácie Európy vedú politikov k prijatiu zákonov na predĺženie pracovného života. Táto tendencia sa stretá s nesúhlasom verejnosti. Odbory, zamestnávateelia a vlády v jednotlivých európskych štátoch sa k tomuto problému stavajú rôzne. Predkladaný článok poukazuje na výsledky spoločenského dialógu v tejto oblasti, predovšetkým sa zaoberá rolou odborov v dvoch skupinách štátov s odlišnými pracovnoprávnymi vzťahmi. Článok testuje hypotézu, že v štátoch s rozdielnymi modelmi pracovnoprávných vzťahov hrajú odbory vo vzťahu k otázke predĺženia pracovného života odlišné úlohy.

Kľúčové slová: politika starnutia, pracovný trh, odbory, spoločenský dialóg

The economic impact of an ageing population in Europe forces policy makers to adapt legislation towards the extension of working life. This tendency is met with opposition from the public. Trade unions, employers and governments in European countries develop their own measures to address this problem. This article presents the outcomes of social dialogue in this area, with special attention given to the role of trade unions, acting in countries with two completely different models of labour relations (LR). The article tests the thesis that in countries with dissimilar LR models, trade unions also play different roles in shaping and stimulating social dialogue on the extension of working life.

Key words: ageing policy, labour market, trade unions, social dialogue

JEL: J21, J51, J83

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1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most important questions in making economic growth in Europe supportive of social inclusion concerns the sustainability of a high level of occupational activity among older employees. This area definitely needs the active involvement of trade unions, as well as their participation in the development of labour market policies focused on integration, specifically when each EU Member State is required to prepare its own annual action plan consistent with the objectives of the European employment strategy. This article analyses the employment policy solutions implemented by two countries which have different models of labour relations (LR), namely France and Norway. Norway is not an EU Member State, but as a member of the European Economic Area it must implement many solutions that EU members have incorporated into their legislation. It should be noted, however, that Norway also frequently introduces initiatives and solutions that EU countries find worthy of consideration.

Trade unions become active whenever the topic of stimulating occupational activity, among people aged 50 years and older, is put on the agenda for social dialogue in Europe. This article aims to analyse how trade unions contribute to increasing the occupational activity of older employees by using, as examples, two countries which have different LR models. The thesis to be tested is that the role of trade unions in giving shape to, and driving social dialogue, differs depending on the LR model. The analysis will be performed using the analytical and comparative method and the sample of countries that will be considered and compared consists of Norway and France. The discussion will be mainly based on documents prepared by the European Commission, and on the outcomes of one of the Peer Reviews of the Mutual Learning Programme, which was set up to exchange information and experiences on topics within the European employment strategy. The results of the author's research will be used to support activities aimed at increasing the effectiveness of social dialogue whilst also improving occupational activity among older employees.

2 THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY AND LABOUR MARKET CHALLENGES IN EU-27

An important objective of the European Year For Active Ageing And Solidarity Between Generations in 2012 was to make the EU an age-friendly area and generate, by 2020, conditions enabling: 1) the generation of jobs for older employees, 2) the implementation of a policy providing older people, a group particularly vulnerable to unemployment, with equal labour market opportunities, and 3) a flexible retirement policy, which is needed because the official retirement age will be nominally extended/equalised for men and women (European Commission 2012a).

In March 2010, the European Union announced its new strategy on development – *Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth*. After the failure of the Lisbon Strategy, this new approach seeks to stimulate development, based on knowledge, while also paying attention to environmental issues

and the greater availability of high(er)-quality jobs. This approach is expected to ensure economic, social and territorial cohesion as well as a high level of employment, especially as its target rate for the group aged between 20-64 years old has been set at 75% for 2020. The new strategy allows each Member State to have its own objectives within that framework and to adjust the target employment rate to suit its particular situation. This ‘customisation’ may be introduced following individual negotiations between a Member State and the European Union, during which the Community takes into account each country’s starting point and its unique characteristics. Poland has reduced its overall target from 75% to 71%. Other countries that also chose to pursue lower employment rates are Malta (62.9%), Italy (67-69%), Ireland (69-71%), Romania (70%), Slovakia (72%), and Lithuania (72.8%). However, some countries decided to raise the target required by the Strategy, for instance the Netherlands (80%) and Sweden (far above 80%) (European Commission 2013a). For these rates to be reached in this decade, these countries will have to strive to keep the oldest employees in the labour market, especially when demographic changes will increasingly reduce the inflow of younger people. Strong concerns also arise with the possible outflow of older employees, especially those choosing disability pensions, or the growing number of employees switching to various benefits, e.g. unemployment or social benefits. Although an increase in the mandatory retirement age should, theoretically, decrease the outflow of older employees, the problems they are likely to encounter in the workplace may make them more willing to seek benefits as a “substitute” for old-age pensions.

In order for the ambitious objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy to be achieved, cooperation between social partners and national governments is required. This task is quite complex because the economic crisis restricts the creation of new jobs (the unemployment rate for EU-28 was 11.0% in July 2013) (Eurostat 2013). The jobs which are available may not always be appropriate for those aged 50+ who, hypothetically, will have to work longer after the mandatory retirement age is raised. The attitudes of older people towards (meaningful) employment are also changing – 61% of respondents in the EU are of the opinion that those reaching retirement age and who are willing to work, should be allowed to do so.²

The document *Information on the Actions Undertaken in Poland – Implementation of the Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing*³ which the Polish Ministry of

² However, as many as seven out of ten people aged 15 years and older indicate that the further occupational activity of people aged 55+ is impeded by the negative attitudes of employers. This opinion was expressed most frequently in Hungary (88%) and Greece (87%); 69% of such responses in Poland placed the country at the EU average. According to the respondents, the friendliest countries to people aged 55+ were employers in Scandinavia: Norway – 50%, Denmark and Sweden – 57% each (European Commission 2012b, p. 50).

³ In April 2002, UN Member States adopted the *International Plan of Action on Ageing* at a conference in Madrid, thus committing themselves to taking action within three priority

Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) prepared for a meeting in Vienna⁴, in September 2012, shows that Poland does not have a special action plan for older people. It stresses that every older individual “with their wealth of experience, and necessities, including their entire emotional, spiritual and physical sphere is treated as a legitimate and rightful member of society” (UNECE 2012). Such wording reflects a tendency to view those problems specific to older people through the prism of their capabilities and skills. Polish law does not treat old age as a dysfunction. It strongly accentuates the equal treatment of all its citizens (including the elderly) and provides appropriate anti-discriminatory measures for its enforcement. Older citizens and their organizations can influence the development of laws, and the practical solutions that affect them, by presenting their concerns through social dialogue and consultations. This allows the active ageing policy to be extended also to employment issues.

Evolving opinions on whether retired employees should stay in employment require trade unions to represent the interests of employees of all ages, including those aged 50 and above.

3 DATA AND METHODS

The effectiveness of social dialogue on the extension of working life, and the importance of the trade unions in that process is difficult to estimate for the lack of clearly defined measures. Quite naturally, the multitude of variables makes all evaluations approximations. One way to handle the problem is to compare some characteristic aspects of the actions that social partners, mainly trade unions, take in the different models of labour relations established in European countries. In this comparison, the position of pan-European trade union organisations such as the ETUC must also be considered, because their policies have an effect on the actions of trade unions in particular countries. However, attention should be focused on the involvement of trade unions in activities at company, industry and national levels as these are aimed at supporting the longer occupational activity of older employees. The practical and institutional solutions that countries develop in this area differ depending on their model of labour relations. This means that the solutions determined by the centralised northern model are not comparable with those stemming from the decentralised southern model. This raises the question as to which solutions concerning the extension of working life are more effective, and whether, for instance, the

directions: older persons and development, advancing health and well-being into old age, ensuring enabling and supportive environments (Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej 2013).

⁴ The second regional conference of ministers will be a review of the countries’ achievements in fulfilling the *International Plan of Action on Ageing*. The conference will make an evaluation of the achievements and will define problems and challenges relating to the active participation of older people in the life of society. It is expected that the conference will publish a list of priorities for action for the next five years, making the pursuit of a higher quality of life for all society members as achievable as possible (Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej 2013).

solutions of the northern model set a good example for countries with different LR models.

As the importance of the trade unions is generally decreasing today (one proof of this is the falling rate of unionisation), it is worth investigating whether the trade unions as a labour market player still have a significant influence on the introduction of policies aimed at extending the occupational activity of ageing populations. Their actual role in this area can be measured by comparing the solutions that countries with different LR models have adopted in order to encourage the employment of older employees.

The discussion presented below is based on the *Europe 2020 Strategy* and the *European Employment Strategy (EES)* both of which are obligatory for France as an EU Member State. Norway is not an EU country, but having entered the European Economic Area (EEA) that joins all EU Member States plus two other non-EU countries – Liechtenstein and Iceland – it has introduced most EU laws. Norway has ratified the Schengen Agreement introducing joint external border controls with the non-Schengen states and eliminating border controls within the Schengen Area. Economic cooperation between the Community and Norway is quite close and the country participates in many EU projects. In the opinion of the EU Member States, the institutional elements of Norway's employment policy are examples of good practice. Proof of the EU's inclusive approach to Norway is that the country was invited to participate in the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP). According to art. 149 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Programme is "an important tool for the open method of coordination in the field of EU employment policy" (European Commission 2013c). One component of the MLP is a forum where representatives of the EU governments, supported by independent academic experts, can exchange information and lessons learnt during the implementation of the EES. The meetings are hosted by those countries whose governments wish to present some effective policy or practice to a group of peer countries. One of the meetings was held in May 2012 on the initiative of the Ministry for Labour in Norway. Its subject was *Extending Working Life: The tripartite cooperation and the role of the Centre for Senior Policy*. The meeting confirmed Norway's active involvement in the implementation of the EES, as well as stressing the significance of Norwegian solutions, and their applicability to Member States, as examples of good practice.

This article is based upon data and documents prepared and inspired by the European Commission and the ETUC, as well as on seminar proceedings from the Oslo meeting held under the Mutual Learning Programme (European Commission 2012c).

4 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN ALLEVIATING THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE LABOUR MARKET

From 2008 until 2010, European social dialogue was dominated by problems caused by the economic crisis. The nature of these problems required strong involvement of social partners to protect those employees threatened by rising unemployment. The benefits of social dialogue and government initiatives enabled many companies to cope successfully with the recession and made the employment cuts less painful. The introduction of flexible working time allowed the working hours of full-time employees to be reduced (internal flexibility) and thus forced dismissals were avoided (external flexibility), as well as an increase in unemployment. It is recognised, however, that social dialogue does not have the same integrating and soothing effects in all countries. There have been many cases of social unrest, stirred up by people who are dissatisfied with the reforms affecting the social security systems, pension systems or wage policies. These reforms allow budget deficits to be reduced, but trade unions view them as being too drastic. The *Industrial Relations in Europe 2010* report (European Commission 2011, p.7) indicated that although the long-term reforms and future-oriented responses to the crisis were generally accepted as necessary, particular solutions met with resistance from the trade unions whose opinion differed on the sources of the crisis from those of employers' representatives and the government.

A new direction in European social dialogue are the subsector autonomous framework agreements, which redefine the labour market by making it a friendly place that will allow for the integration of all employees regardless of their individual characteristics. In 2010, the fourth agreement of this type was ratified. It was presented at a summit on growth and employment by representatives from various Member States. Its purpose is to maximise the potential of the European labour force, to improve the quality of jobs, and to increase employment rates in ageing populations. The participants at the summit stressed the importance of trying to create inclusive labour markets (i.e. labour markets which are open to all, with surmountable entry barriers, that allow people to stay in the labour market and retain their jobs in spite of re-occurring threats, as well as providing them with opportunities to integrate with other market participants) since these are a key element in the collective responsibility of employers, employees and their representatives. The bodies responsible for implementing the agreement are national representations of employers' and employees' organizations. One of the tasks that has been assigned to the committee responsible for subsector social dialogue requires the preparation of annual status reports (European Commission 2011, p.10). Autonomous framework agreements aim at supporting the implementation of the *Europe 2020 Strategy*. Its objective is inclusive growth through stronger coordination between employment and social policy.

5 TRADE UNIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The problems in the labour market, brought about by the economic crisis, have somewhat overshadowed those caused by the ageing labour force. But in the coming years, active ageing will not disappear from the agenda. The desired changes are determined at EU level by European social partners. In this process, labour is represented by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), an organization founded in 1973 to promote the interests of working people, and to represent them in EU institutions. Its members are 85 national confederations of trade unions from 36 European countries, and 10 European federations of trade unions (ETUC 2013b). The ETUC is recognised by the European Union, the Council of Europe and the EFTA, as the only representative of the European Industry Federations.⁵ One member of the ETUC is the European Federation of Retired and Older People (FERPA). It works “with the ETUC, especially on social security and social protection, with a particular focus on pensions” (FERPA 2013).

The ETUC’s website provides a list of its activities. These range from social dialogue and industrial relations, European governance, youth and employment to social policies and social Europe, etc. The ETUC generally emphasises the importance of social dialogue as a means for promoting a culture of forward-looking age management within companies, both in terms of young people entering and older people leaving the labour market (ETUC 2005).

As far as raising the statutory retirement age is concerned, the ETUC’s position is more specific; its Executive Committee clearly stated at a meeting in December 2012 that the ETUC „rejects any automatic mechanism to increase the statutory retirement age or set a uniform retirement age for all Member States.” (ETUC 2013a). This attitude encourages trade unions – especially in European countries – to oppose any changes in legislation concerning retirement age, thus making national dialogue on these issues more difficult to conduct.

The effectiveness of trade unions in shaping the labour market position of older employees largely depends on the type and model of social dialogue in the country. In broad terms, five types or models of social dialogue exist (see table 1). Only one of them, the western model, does not occur in Europe. It is similar to the model used in the USA. In France and Norway the models of labour relations, and the role of social dialogue, differ; the situation in their labour markets is also different. Interestingly, however, national LR models, which until recently have clearly differed in their treatment of work, remuneration and employment issues, are becoming increasingly alike. Collective bargaining is steadily becoming decentralised, usually to company level, employee participation in the workplace is increasing while union

⁵ They include a number of sectors and sub-sectors, for example ETF-European Transport Workers’ Federation representing three sectors: transport, fishing, tourism and eight sub-sectors.

membership is shrinking. Employers' organizations are growing in power and the coverage of collective agreements is widening.

At the same time, the importance of government as a force in labour relations seems to be diminishing (European Commission 2011, p. 17 and 29).

Table 1: Models of labour relations and the role of social dialogue
(selected characteristics)

<i>Model</i>	<i>North</i>	<i>Centre-West</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>Centre-East</i>
<i>Country where used (examples)</i>	Sweden, Norway	Germany, Austria	France, Spain	-	Czech Rep., Poland
<i>Industrial relations regime</i>	organised corporatism	social partnership	polarised / state centred	liberal pluralism	segmented / state centred
<i>Prevailing level of bargaining</i>	sectoral	sectoral	variable	company	company
<i>Bargaining style</i>	integrative	integrative	confrontation	confrontation	acquiescent
<i>The role of social partners</i>	institutionalised	institutionalised	unequal / politicised	case dependent	unequal / politicised
<i>State's role in labour relations</i>	limited (mediator)	„shadow of hierarchy”	frequent interventions	non-intervention	organizer of transitions
<i>Employee representations</i>	union based / high coverage	dual system / high coverage	variable ^a	union based / small coverage	union based / small coverage

Notes: ^a France – both trade unions and joint representations of employees and employers acting within particular areas of interest; Spain – a dual system with both employee councils and trade unions. In some countries, e.g. Poland, a dual system based on trade unions and employee councils.

Source: Voss (2009, p. 21) as quoted in Miller (2011, p. 7). Additions made by the author of the paper.


The global changes affecting labour markets have also reduced unionisation rates in both OECD countries and the EU-27 (figure 1)⁶. Only 18.1% of all employees in the OECD countries in 2010, and 23% in the EU Member States in 2009 were unionised. The unionisation rate in France, which is the lowest and has also been quite stable for many years, is considerably different from those found in other countries. The highest unionisation rates in Europe amounting to 70% can be found in four countries in Northern Europe – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Poland had 47

⁶Along with declining union membership in the EU countries, the gap between the 1999-2009 unionization rates in Sweden and France, which respectively have the highest and the lowest rates, decreased by 12.1 percent. However, the only reason for this was falling union membership in Sweden.

active trade unions in 2008. A similar dispersion of trade unions can be seen in France (67 organizations), Slovenia (50) and Hungary (48).

Without going into the causes for this, let us take a look at France. Its rate of trade union coverage is very low (only 8%), yet its union movement is far from weak. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is the ubiquity of collective labour agreements; the working and employment conditions for almost all its employees are in fact determined by the trade unions (figure 2). The second reason is that the trade unions are very powerful. They can stage massive strikes and demonstrations, but this confrontational stance towards employers and the government does not prevent them from taking part in collective bargaining preceding the conclusion of collective agreements.

Figure 1: Changes in unionization rates in the selected OECD countries, years 1999-2010 (%)




Source: Developed by the author based on OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (2012) and ETUI (2013).

In 2009 the working and employment conditions of two-thirds of all employees in EU-27 (66%) were generally regulated through collective bargaining. The data from 2010, however, show a clear fall in collective bargaining coverage to 62%. Although the data on collective agreement coverage in individual countries must be treated with great caution, they still allow certain classifications to be made. The group of ten countries with the highest rates of collective agreement coverage in EU-27 can be divided into two subgroups. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have high coverage rates and unionisation rates. A representative of the other subgroup is France, where the rate of collective agreement coverage is high, unlike the rate of unionisation.

As Fulton (2013) observed, the economic crisis has changed the levels of collective bargaining, strengthening the trend towards decentralisation. For example, Romania has given up negotiating solutions at national level.

Figure 2: The collective labour agreement coverage in EU-27, Croatia and Norway (2010 data; %)



Source: Developed by the author based on Fulton (2013).

Increasing awareness and building trust are essential for helping social partners solve the problems caused by demographic ageing. Social trust takes a long time to shape, but its ultimate importance for the creation of social capital, which drives economic growth in modern democracies, cannot be overestimated.

According to an EES survey conducted in 2008, only 19% of Polish respondents aged 16 and above trust other people. The French rate was even lower, 18%, and in Portugal and Bulgaria only 14% of the respondents trusted other people. In Norway, where social partners collaborate successfully, the rate was almost three times as high as in Poland - 62% (the highest was in Denmark – 68%). Only 13% of Poles believe that those people who try to help others have good intentions. This rate, again, is 3.5 times lower than in Norway (45%) (Czapiński and Panek 2012, p. 302).

6 SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN SOCIAL PARTNERS IN NORWAY AS A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR EU MEMBERS TO FOLLOW

Generally, social partners differ considerably in their involvement in shaping ageing policy in EU Member States (European Commission 2013a, p. 189). A case in point is Norway and France. The main difference between them lies in the levels of collective bargaining – in France the process is more decentralised and takes place at industry and company levels, while in Norway it is rather centralised and assigned to national and industry levels. It is difficult to decide which of these approaches is more effective.

The success of the active ageing policy in Norway (in 2010 the Norwegian employment rate for those aged between 55-64 was 68.6%, over two times higher than in Poland) can be attributed to the interaction of many factors – the positive state of the economy that increases demand for more and more new jobs, a low (total) level of unemployment (3.2% in January 2012), and a pension system that encourages people to continue being in employment even after retirement. The measures that the government adopts to increase employment in the older age groups include changes in the law, financial incentives for employers and employees, as well as the launching and financing of various campaigns aimed at informing society and raising its awareness. The government also delivers or funds different forms of guidance and consulting activities addressing the needs of major stakeholders, such as social partners, individual employers, managers and older employees. Considerable attention is given to social dialogue and collective bargaining for the employment of older people.

As far as employment for the older age groups is concerned, a special role is played by the Norwegian Centre for Senior Policy (CSP – developed based on Midsundstad 2012), which was established to make society more sensitive to the impact of demographic changes and to accentuate the importance of older employees. In fulfilling its statutory goals and to develop active ageing strategies in the workplace, the CSP conducts surveys, collects and disseminates good practices, and enters into direct cooperation with employers and employees. The CSP is founded on the social partners' mutual belief that it will be very difficult to make the labour market generate more jobs for older employees without collaborative efforts supported by governmental measures.

The CSP was instituted in 1969 as a tripartite structure. Its members represented the Ministry of Social Policy, the largest organization of employers in Norway (NHO) and the largest trade union (NTUC). The Joint Committee for the Preparation for Retirement was established as the body responsible for encouraging people to plan their lives as retirees. In the early 1990s, the scope of the Committee's tasks was considerably extended. The main focus was senior policy (as an element of personnel policy in organizations) consisting of guidance on HRM tools and instruments appropriate for older employees and the management of age-diverse human resources. What is important about the Committee's activities is that it addresses the current phase of the employees' lives by adjusting its proposals accordingly. As a result, the main feature of senior policy in companies is its focus on the latter stages of human life. In this way, the CSP has initiated a campaign for age management in organizations. The CSP conducts research activities and implements practical projects with a view to encouraging employers to offer career development paths to their middle-aged and older workforce, and to treat the latter as a resource rather than an economically passive group of people that only wait for their pensions.

Today's CSP is a centre that promotes and develops policies for older employees in order to strengthen their position in the labour market. It plays an

important role as an institution by raising public awareness and defining good standards of cooperation into which social partners enter at local and on-site levels to ensure people's employability in the long-term perspective. The CSP also dispels many myths about the productivity and competency of older employees.

One of the most important factors behind the CSP's success is its strong commitment to publicizing and disseminating "good" practices, such as those showing that disease does not mean older employees are absent from work more often than other employees, that they have significant capacity for continued learning, that they are reliable and dedicated, that they can use their experience to give advice and guide their younger colleagues. The CSP also organizes and maintains networks of advisors.

Most activities that the CSP has undertaken in this decade are consistent with the provisions of the tripartite *More Inclusive Working* agreement, which was established on 3 October 2001. The agreement was subsequently renewed and its present edition expired in 2013. The activities covered by the agreement included, for instance, the National Initiative for Senior Workers in Working Life and a "Win-Win" information campaign.

The purpose of the agreement is to prevent and reduce sick absenteeism, to increase the effectiveness of job creation measures, to improve the workplace environment, and to reduce exclusion from the labour market. The slogan that guides social partners in Norway today is "inclusive labour market", i.e. one open to all, based on the same rules.

7 THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY IN FRANCE

The largest trade union in France is the leftist General Confederation of Labour (CGT). However, its importance is relatively low compared with the percentage of trade union members it represents (23%). The second largest trade union – the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (CFDT) – has almost the same level of membership at 22.7% (European Commission 2011, p. 21). The great dispersion of trade unions and limited union membership impede the resolution of conflicts with employers and the government.

Collective bargaining is increasingly used in France as a means of alleviating the adverse effect of the economic crisis on the labour market. One of the subjects discussed by the trade unions, employers and the government is the predicament of older employees during the crisis. The talks that the French social partners held between 2009 and 2010 aimed at making social dialogue more effective in certain aspects, such as the exchange of information, consultations, the rights and powers of the dialogue participants, as well as which parity rules should regulate the appointment of the trade union representatives and employers to joint institutions. With reference to the laws requiring companies to extend collective labour agreements to older employees or to prepare pertinent action plans (coming into effect in 2008), the agenda for talks was modified accordingly. In May 2009, negotiations for a national

intersectoral collective agreement began. The social partners to the agreement deemed what main lines of action were necessary to “lessen the impact of the economic crisis on employment as much as possible”. The agreement was concluded in July 2009 and then signed by all the major social partners in France, excluding one of the two largest trade unions. The main provisions of the agreement aimed at increasing employment opportunities by promoting shorter working time (e.g. for new employees, mainly in the service sector) and higher occupational mobility through various types of training (this involved establishment of training funds and development of more stable career paths for part-time employees).

In the course of the talks, the partners tried to work out solutions by strengthening the ties between the dismissed employees and their employers (for instance, by regulating the temporary „exchange” of employees between employers) and helping older employees (likewise young people and the long-term unemployed) to stay in employment or to find new jobs.

In addition to the meetings with the social partners, held in February and July 2009, the government formed a tripartite committee for monitoring the economic crisis. In the meantime, in April 2009, a social investment fund was started to coordinate the training and retraining of employees affected by the crisis. The social partners accepted the government’s proposal that the action plan for the promotion of employment should be extended to a training programme. A subsector agreement on managing the impact of the crisis on employment was also reached. The government offered public aid to employers, enhanced the social security system and initiated public projects to modernise infrastructure. These lines of action were accepted by the employers’ organisations, but the trade unions objected to them and staged national demonstrations between March and June 2009. One of their demands was that the government should take measures to increase the purchasing power of the euro, and that tax privileges for the rich should be withdrawn.

Once the preparations for intervention in the labour market were complete, the French government, in 2010, decided to launch a pension system reform that, in addition to other changes, extended the period of working life. Accompanied by protests from the trade unions, a reform raising the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 62 came into force in October 2010. It also made provision for a gradual rise in age, requiring an individual to reach the age of 65-67 in order to be eligible for a publicly-funded pension (the process has now been stretched to 2018). Another new solution was the change in the number of pensionable years. Their number is set to increase steadily following the extension of life expectancy in older age, from 40.5 to 41 years in 2012 and 41.5 in 2020. As far as the promotion of employment in older age groups is concerned, two solutions appear to be particularly important. One offers publicly funded aid to employers that have employees aged 55+. The other solution allows training budgets (which are mandatory for employers delivering training programmes) to be used to fund the costs of mentoring programmes for young people.

The core of the reform is that it extends collective bargaining to senior policy in companies. *Décret n° 2009-560 du 20 mai 2009* requires public and private organisations, employing at least 50 people, to sign collective agreements (where trade unions are not present, employers are responsible for proposing action plans) regulating the employment of older people, and to set targets indicating the numbers of older employees to be retained and recruited. The company collective agreements must be reviewed every three years. Organisations that fail to prepare appropriate measures are subject to a financial penalty of 1% of the wage bill (Kryńska and Szukalski 2013, p.130). Although the French government (formed after socialist Francois Hollande won the presidential elections) reduced the retirement age for some employees from 62 to 60 years of age, the change did not question the whole logic of the pension reform of 2010. The modifications affect people who started work at the age of 18 or 19. Those who started employment when they were 14 or 15 years old are allowed to retire at the age of 58. Employees with 41.5 pensionable years are able to retire with a full pension at the age of 60. Those who fall short of the full number of pensionable years are allowed to retire with a reduced pension.

Another instrument to stimulate the employment of senior employees is the *Contrat de génération* (generational contract) introduced in 2013 (Kryńska and Szukalski 2013, p.130) to boost the employment of youth and seniors as quickly as possible. Whether it will be successful depends on the support of the trade unions.

An interesting solution can be found in the agreement signed by the social partners in the French metallurgic industry. Its main purpose is to prevent job loss during the economic recession, and to use the time as an opportunity for improving employees' qualifications. Following the forced cuts in working hours, employees, in their free time, participate in various types of training.

A review of the individual on-site agreements reveals a whole range of strategies – from those protecting against the risk of working-time cuts (i.e. rather than sending employees home, their spells off work are added up as additional vacations in the future, etc.) through to measures reducing working time whilst also allowing employees to keep their rights to remuneration (e.g. “a social crisis fund” at Renault) as well as the utilisation of unplanned free time for training. Under the terms of the last strategy, an employee may be paid a percentage of his/her regular wage for the time he/she spends at home (“a transfer home”) because of the shorter working period. One workday per week is free from regular duties and then training is provided.

Another topic that the social partners in France discussed was making employees' mental health problems, specifically stress in the workplace, part of collective bargaining. France has the shortest working week in EU-27, and this restricts the possibility of increasing the flexibility of working time in the internal labour market. Moreover, employees are exposed to enormous pressures during this comparatively short working week (only 35 hours). Problems such as these attracted a lot of attention after 23 employees from France Télécom committed suicide, not to

mention another 13 attempted suicides, between 2008 and 2009 as a result of psychological harassment in the workplace. Workplace harassment and abuse were addressed in the subsector agreement signed in 2010. The *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* party (UMP) proposed that from the start of 2012 the length of the working week should be determined at sector/subsector level or at company level based on the negotiations conducted by trade unions and employers. However, the social partners rejected this proposal.

8 CONCLUSIONS

The reason why European countries have launched employment policy reforms is to keep older workers in employment. The long-term retention of these workers in the labour market would not be possible without social dialogue.

The following developments can be observed within senior policy today:

- a gradual rise in the mandatory retirement age – Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, Romania, and Poland;
- the limited availability of early retirement; some countries have already cancelled this option (e.g. Austria, Denmark), while others have tightened up the eligibility criteria (Cyprus, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland);
- stronger incentives to encourage the extension of working life for both older employees (Poland, Norway, and Italy) and employers (Poland, France);
- limited increases in pension-related expenditure; there is a strong tendency to make the public pension system less generous and financially more sustainable. In some countries, such as Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania, the public pension systems have been tightened up because of the economic crisis.

The European tendency to raise the statutory retirement age has become a fact. While opposing it, the trade unions also take action to support older employees. In France and Norway, the trade unions are active in this area at all three levels: country, industry and company. The predicted deficit of human resources resulting from changes in demography is not the only reason why employment at older age should be promoted. Another factor is the high, public expenditure on older citizens, the bulk of which is consumed by their pensions. Trade unions stress that the extended working life policy must be accompanied by measures securing decent working conditions and the protection of employees against overwork.

This article set out to determine how trade unions contribute to the increasing occupational activity of older employees by analysing the case of countries with different LR models. This approach enabled various forms of engagement by the trade

unions, for the improvement of the position of older employees in the labour market, to be discussed. The thesis tested in the article has proven how trade unions in countries with different LR models (in this case France and Norway), differ in the way in which they shape and stimulate social dialogue on the extension of labour activity. The trade unions' contribution to the extension of working life is positive in both models, regardless of whether social dialogue is a tri-partite activity conducted at national level (Norway) or whether it involves two partners operating at company level in a strong regulatory environment imposed by the state (France). The effectiveness of social dialogue on the extension of working life is also significantly determined by the coverage of the collective labour agreement, which is substantial in both France and Norway. The findings of the author's research may help advance domestic senior policy in the area of employment in Poland and other European countries since it uses social dialogue as a tool for making the adopted solutions more effective.

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**O PÔSOBNÍ RUSKEJ FEDERÁCIE AKO SVETOVEJ VEĽMOCI
PRI VYTŤVÁRANÍ MULTIPOLARITY
V SÚČASNÝCH MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOCH**
**ACTIONS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS A WORLD POWER IN
CREATING MULTIPOLARITY IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

*František Škvrnda*¹

V medzinárodných vzťahoch na začiatku 21. storočia sú USA naďalej jediná superveľmoc, ale postupne sa v nich vytvára multipolarita moci. Za ďalšie svetové veľmoci sa v súčasnosti spravidla považujú ČĽR, EÚ a RF. V predkladanom článku objasňujeme chápanie svetovej veľmoci a multipolarity v súčasnej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov. Načrtávame prístupy k periodizácii vývoja zahraničnej politiky a medzinárodných vzťahov RF a jej typologických personálnych súvislostí, s dôrazom na pôsobenie Vladimíra Putina. Zdôrazňujeme vybrané historicko-sociologické, geopolitické, kultúrne a informačné aspekty a súvislosti pôsobenia RF ako svetovej veľmoci v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch.²

Kľúčové slová: medzinárodné vzťahy, multipolarita, Vladimír Putin, Ruská federácia, svetová veľmoc.

Although United States is the only clear superpower in contemporary international relations, multipolarity of power in world politics is being gradually created. Theorists now generally consider People's Republic of China, the EU and Russia as other world powers. This paper explains the terms world power and multipolarity through the lens of contemporary theory of international relations. It sketches the development of Russia's foreign policy and international relations, as well as its personal elements with an

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Autor v minulosti pôsobil vo vojsku, bezpečnostnom sektore a na ministerstve zahraničných vecí. Na Fakulte medzinárodných vzťahov pracuje od roku 2002. Od roku 2007 je členom Katedry medzinárodných politických vzťahov. K hlavným oblastiam jeho vedeckého záujmu patrí teória svetovej politiky, teória medzinárodnej bezpečnosti a sociológia bezpečnosti s dôrazom na súčasnosť. Hlásia sa ku kritickým teóriám a marxizmu.

² Stať bola spracovaná v rámci projektu VEGA č. 1/0827/12 Vytváranie multipolarity v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch.

emphasis on actions of Vladimir Putin. The paper underlines selected historical-sociological, geopolitical, cultural and information aspects of Russia's actions as world power in contemporary international relations.

Key words: international relations, multipolarity, Vladimir Putin, Russian federation, world power.

JEL: F50, Z01

1 Úvod

Ruská federácia (ďalej len RF) je rozlohou najväčší štát – federácia na svete a má aj ďalšie vojenské, ekonomické, politické a kultúrne atribúty, na základe ktorých sa na začiatku 21. storočia zaraďuje medzi svetové veľmoci. RF sa spolu s Čínskou ľudovou republikou (ďalej len ČĽR), Európskou úniou (ďalej len EÚ) a Spojenými štátmi americkými (ďalej len USA) považuje za aktéra, ktorý sa podieľa na vytváraní mocenskej multipolarity. Tento pohľad na RF spočiatku prezentovali nezápadní autori a predstavitelia kritických teórií v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch (Amin 2006, s. 49 – 68; Hiro 2010, s. 87 – 116; Polikanov 2012, s. 80 – 106). V duchu tradičnej anglosaskej teórie medzinárodných vzťahov uvádza RF ako svetovú veľmoc medzi prvými Mankoff (2009).³ Gat poukazuje v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch na „koniec konca histórie (vo fukuyamovskom chápaní – poznámka autora)“ (Gat 2007, s. 59) a nový nástup autoritárskych veľmocí v týchto podmienkach.

Okrem vyššie uvedených štyroch aktérov časť autorov medzi potenciálne svetové veľmoci zaraďuje v súvislosti so zvýšenou váhou, ktorá sa prisudzuje pôsobeniu skupiny štátov označených za BRIC, novšie už za BRICS, aj Indiu (Amin 2006, s. 69 – 83; Hiro 2010, s. 187 – 206; Pardesi a Ganguly 2012, s. 131 – 160; Vardaran, 2010, s. 154 – 170). Výnimočne, a viac v ekonomickom ako politickom rozmere, sa spomína v tejto súvislosti tiež Brazília (Brainard a Martinez-Diaz 2009). V tomto kontexte sa už dávnejšie uvádza aj Japonsko (Drifte 1998; Gibney 1996), ktoré sa však medzi svetové veľmoci v politickej oblasti od konca druhej svetovej vojny nezaraduje.

V stati sa zaoberáme vybranými teoretickými aspektmi skúmania zahraničnej politiky a medzinárodných vzťahov Ruskej federácie na začiatku 21. storočia v kontexte vytvárania multipolarity vo svetovej politike. Naším cieľom je objasniť vymedzenie a východiskovú charakteristiku aspektov, ktoré súvisia s vytváraním multipolarity v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch a skúmať vybrané aspekty pôsobenia RF ako svetovej veľmoci v týchto procesoch. Po načrtnutí prístupov k periodizácii vývoja zahraničnej politiky a medzinárodných vzťahov RF venujeme pozornosť jej typologickým personálnym súvislostiam s dôrazom na pôsobenie V. Putina a zameriavame sa na poukázanie vybraných historicko-sociologických,

³ Publikácia vyšla v edičnom programe Výboru pre zahraničnú politiku (Council on Foreign Relations Books).

geopolitických, kultúrnych a informačných aspektov a súvislostí pôsobenia RF ako svetovej veľmoci v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch. Na tomto základe chceme podať jeden z možných pohľadov na pôsobenie RF ako svetovej veľmoci pri vytváraní multipolarity v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch. V našom pohľade abstrahujeme od vnútornej dimenzie politiky RF, ktorá je pri skúmaní jej medzinárodných vzťahov v západnej produkcii často hypertrofovaná, „preekonomizovaná“ a silne kritizovaná (Lucas 2009; Goldman 2008; Olikier 2009⁴).

2 O CHÁPANÍ SVETOVEJ VEĽMOCI A VYTVÁRANIA MULTIPOLARITY V SÚČASNEJ TEÓRII MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOV

Pojem veľmoc patrí k ústredným kategóriám teórie medzinárodných vzťahov (Griffiths, O'Callaghan a Roach 2008, s. 134 – 135). Podrobnejšie súčasnú koncepciu pôsobenia veľmocí charakterizujú Barnett (2009), Braumoeller (2013) a Grygiel (2006). Teória medzinárodných vzťahov, ktorá vznikla ako súčasť politických vied s anglosaskou orientáciou (tá sa v nej prejavuje až do súčasnosti) pri chápaní veľmocí zdôrazňovala silu štátu, danú najmä vojenskou dimenziou (ozbrojenými silami). V druhej polovici 20. storočia sa v dôsledku rastu vojenskej sily veľmocí spojenej s raketovojadrovými zbraňami začal používať aj pojem supervelmoc (Griffiths, O'Callaghan a Roach 2008, s. 395 – 396).

Napriek tomu, že vo všeobecnosti sa dodnes vychádza z toho, že základným, východiskovým prvkom charakteristiky veľmoci je vojenská sila (potenciál, kapacita), úzko spojená s ekonomickými parametrami a politickým vplyvom, všeobecne prijaté chápanie kritérií vymedzenia veľmocí v teórii medzinárodných vzťahov sa nevytvorilo. Používajú sa viaceré kritériá, pravidla v určitom komplexe, pričom prevažujú kvantitatívne (merateľné) parametre ako je veľkosť, početnosť, sily, resp. potenciály a pod., určujúce predovšetkým bohatstvo a moc štátu, ktoré podmieňujú jeho pozíciu a rolu v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Zohľadňujú sa pritom aj prístupy k distribúcii bohatstva a moci a na nich založené sociálne, kultúrne a ďalšie procesy, ktoré štáty používajú, popr. preferujú v medzinárodných vzťahoch.

V rozvíjajúcej sa terminológii medzinárodných vzťahov vzniklo „dvojúrovňové“ chápanie veľmocí. Vedľa veľmocí svetového (globálneho) rozmeru sa vymedzujú aj regionálne veľmoci (Buzan a Wæver 2003; Flesmes 2010).

Popri chápaní veľmocí v teórii medzinárodných vzťahov existuje aj širší sociologicko-politológický pohľad na tento fenomén, ktorý zvyrazňuje iné prvky ako silu. Neumann (2008, s. 130 – 136) poukazuje na dve tradičné koncepcie veľmocí – weberiánsku a durkheimovskú, založené na kultúrnych a morálnych prvkoch, spojených s uznaním a prestížou, ku ktorým považuje za potrebné doplniť tretiu – foucaultovskú – zameranú na otázky vládnutia a jeho spôsobov.

⁴ Publikácia Olikier, 2009 bola sponzorovaná vojenským letectvom USA (United States Air Force).

Skúmanie pôsobenia veľmocí (superveľmocí) súvisí s fenoménom usporiadania medzinárodných vzťahov, príp. svetovým poriadkom (Bisley 2012; Legro 2007). V podmienkach medzinárodných vzťahov, ktoré vznikli po rozpade bipolarity a sú podmienené aj pôsobením globalizácie, sa vytvorilo aj ich nové usporiadanie.

Reflexia zmien v medzinárodných vzťahoch sa premieta v prvom rade do pomenovania (spresňovania) charakteru, podoby a pod. aktuálneho (dosiahnutého) stupňa vývoja – obdobia, éry, etapy, epochy a pod., v ktorom sa nachádzajú. Na jeho označenie sa v súčasnosti používa viacero názvov, popr. prívlastkov, ktoré sa často spájajú s predponou post-. Podľa Kellera pomenovania súčasnej spoločnosti pomocou slovíčka post- „zakrývajú neistotu ohľadne toho, čo sa skrýva v obale“ (Keller 2011, s. 11). V súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch navyše vzniká špecifická otázka, či sa v nich neutvára kvalitatívne nové usporiadanie, resp. neprechádza do nového štádia, čo súvisí najmä s ich označovaním za postvestfálske.

Vymedzenie novej – postvestfálskej – éry (epochy, obdobia) medzinárodných vzťahov evokuje potrebu zmeny pohľadu na ne v širšom kontexte, ako je len mocenské usporiadanie, lebo sa dotýka ústrednej otázky teórie medzinárodných vzťahov – pôsobenia národných štátov. Postvestfálske podmienky v medzinárodných vzťahoch sa vo všeobecnosti označujú za ich novú éru, nový spôsob vládnutia v nich, ktorý vedie až k postvestfálskemu optimizmu (Baxi 2010, s. 11).

Stretávame sa s dvomi základnými charakteristikami postvestfálskych podmienok svetovej politiky (McGrew 2011, s. 23). V prvej – užšej – ide o postvestfálsky poriadok, kde sa zvyrazňuje predovšetkým právny popr. politický pohľad (McGrew 2011, s. 24; Baxi 2010, s. 11). V druhej – širšej – ide o postvestfálsky svet, prezentovaný spravidla v sociálno-filozofickom, popr. historicko-sociologickom pohľade (Mines 2005, s. 649 – 662; Newman 2009, s. 421 – 443), kde sa prezentujú aj idey kritických teórií (Fraser 2009, s. 76 – 99). Postvestfálske podmienky sa zatiaľ charakterizujú voľne na základe rozličných javov, procesov, udalostí, indikátorov a pod. Ide napr. o bezpečnostnú oblasť (Newman 2009, s. 421 – 443; Sperling 2013), vývoj na Kosove (Marks 2000), otázky občianstva a suverenity (Linklater 1996, s. 77 – 103), globalizáciu a dôsledky udalostí z 11. septembra 2001 (Falk 2002, s. 311 – 352), transnacionalizáciu (Fraser 2009, s. 76 – 99) a i.

Zmeny podoby moci v podmienkach novovznikajúceho usporiadania svetovej politiky, ktoré sa prejavili v „reálpolitike“ USA ako jedinej superveľmoci (Kucharčík 2010), sa výrazne premietli aj do teoretickej reflexie týchto procesov a viedli k mnohostrannej diskusii o novom svetovom poriadku (Freedman a Karsh 1993; Chossudovsky 2003; Kagan 2004; Slaughter 2005; Engdahl 2012; Coggan 2013). Diskusia pretrváva až do súčasnosti a sprevádzajú ju aj rôzne konšpirologické teórie (Dice 2010; Marrs 2011; Rivera 2010), dopĺňané niekedy náboženskými príp. mystickými pohľadmi (Bishop 2013; Quarterman 2011; Smith 2011). Diskusie na túto tému v teórii medzinárodných vzťahov podnietili aj viaceré vystúpenia prezidenta USA

G. Busha st., najmä pasáž o novom svetovom poriadku v Správe o stave Únie, ktorú predniesol 29. januára 1991 (Bush 1991).

Od začiatku 21. storočia, do istej miery aj pod vplyvom kontroverzných výsledkov zahraničnej politiky USA na čele s G. Bushom ml. a oslabovania ich pozície vo svetovej politike sa do popredia skúmania moci (centrá moci) v usporiadaní sveta dostáva téma multipolarity. Vznikajúcu multipolaritu niektorí autori označujú za novú (Geeraerts 2011).

Odlišnosť vytvárajúcej sa multipolarity od jej podoby známej z minulosti, ktorý sa často charakterizuje ako európsky koncert, spočíva predovšetkým v tom, že v nej bude minimálne jedno „nezápadné“ centrum moci – ČĽR. Špecifickú otázku v tejto súvislosti, ktorá je významná aj z hľadiska nášho výskumu, predstavuje, či RF sa bude považovať za západného alebo „nezápadného“ aktéra, čím sa však vzhľadom na zameranie state nebudeme zaoberať.

V súčasnej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov sa reflektuje špecifické, výnimočné postavenie USA vo svetovej politike, ale vzniká opäť problém jeho pomenovania, popr. spájania s prívlastkami či prídavnými menami. Jadro problému spočíva v tom, že pozíciu USA mnoho autorov už neoznačuje za hegemonnu, ale stále sa rešpektuje skutočnosť, že už vyše 20 rokov sú jedinou supervelmocou vo svete a že tento ich status ešte nejaký čas potrvá.

Pri analýze zmeny postavenia USA v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch sa v posledných rokoch vytvorilo viacero koncepcií, ktoré sa dajú zaradiť do dvoch skupín. V prvej skupine koncepcií sa postavenie USA spája s tým, že nebudú síce hegemonom medzinárodných vzťahov, ale zostanú „vodcom“ sveta. Ide najmä o „nepolárny svet“ Haassa (2008), postamerický svet Zakariu (2011), popr. postzápadný poriadok (Serfaty, 2012). Tieto koncepcie vyúsťujú do poukazovania na ťažkosti a nebezpečenstvá pre svet v prípade, že v ňom nebude „vodcovstvo“ USA (Bacevich 2008; Brooks a Wohlforth 2008; Kupchan 2012⁵; Zemenides 2011). Druhú skupinu koncepcií (neraz kritického charakteru) predstavujú tie, ktoré zvyrazňujú procesy zmien v usporiadaní medzinárodných vzťahov smerom k multipolarite, kde si USA zachovávajú status jedinej supervelmoci, ale budú už len jedným z centier moci vo svete (Brutenc 2009).

Ďalšou otázkou, na ktorú sa zatiaľ hľadá v teórii medzinárodných vzťahov adekvátna odpoveď, je či má EÚ ako aktér medzinárodných vzťahov tiež pozíciu svetovej veľmoci a stane sa jedným z centier moci vo svete. Všetci aktéri, ktorí zatiaľ mali takýto status boli národné štáty, ale EÚ takýmto aktérom nie je. Najväčšie (najsilnejšie) štáty EÚ – Francúzsko, Nemecko a Veľká Británia – sa však v tomto prístupe už tiež nepovažujú za svetové veľmoci, aj keď v súčasných medzinárodných

⁵ Publikácia Kupchana (2012) tiež vyšla v edičnom programe kníh Výboru pre zahraničnú politiku.

vzťahoch stále vystupujú relatívne samostatne a majú spravidla aj väčší vplyv na svetové dianie ako ďalšie veľké (silné) štáty.

V 21. storočí sa pri hľadaní odpovedí na otázky o usporiadaní sveta prezentujú aj pohľady na medzinárodné vzťahy odlišné od tých, ktoré sa vytvorili v západnom sociálnom myslení. Po workshope na výročnej konferencii Združenia medzinárodných štúdií (International Studies Association) v Montreali v marci 2004, ktorý sa venoval geokultúrnym epistemológiám a medzinárodným vzťahom, sa vytvoril projekt edície *Worlding Beyond the West*. V jeho rámci vyšli už tri publikácie, z ktorých dve sa venujú nezápadným teóriám (Tickner a Wæver 2009; Tickner a Blaney 2012) a tretia francúzskemu pohľadu na teóriu medzinárodných vzťahov (Breitenbauch 2013). V posledných rokoch aj ďalší autori venujú pozornosť skúmaniu medzinárodných vzťahov z „nezápadného“ pohľadu (Acharya a Buzan 2010; Shilliam 2011).

Patrí k nim aj Ling, autorka čínskeho pôvodu pôsobiaca v USA. Vychádza z aplikácie špecifických prvkov čínskej filozofie – princípu tao a dialektiky jin-jang na súčasné medzinárodné vzťahy (Ling 2013). V publikácii prezentuje netradičné (nezaužívané) pojmy, ktoré možno voľne preložiť ako „viacsvetovosť“ či pluralita svetov (*multiple worlds*) a „svetovosť“ či „svetopohľad“ (*worldism*). *Worldism* vychádza z Marxových kritických záverov o protirečeniach kapitalizmu, aplikuje ich v podmienkach neokoloniálneho a postkoloniálneho dedičstva (Agathangelou a Ling 2009, s. 4) a má prispieť k dosiahnutiu menej násilnej, viac globálnej a trvalo udržateľnej svetovej politiky.

Špecifickú časť nezápadných pohľadov na medzinárodné vzťahy predstavuje aj sovietska a od začiatku 90. rokov minulého storočia už prevažne ruská⁶ teória medzinárodných vzťahov, ktorá začala vznikať po druhej svetovej vojne. V 50. – 60. rokoch minulého storočia sa sformovala predovšetkým na základe marxizmu, resp. marxizmu-leninizmu.

Novikov (Novikov 1996, s. 231 – 244) uvádza dve obdobia vývoja teórie medzinárodných vzťahov v bývalom ZSSR:

- od začiatku studenej vojny do začiatku „perestrojky“,
- po vzniku nového politického myslenia.

Sovietska teória medzinárodných vzťahov porovnateľná so západným chápaním tejto disciplíny sa začala rozvíjať od polovice 50. rokov najmä v činnosti vedeckovýskumných inštitúcií. V prvom rade išlo o IMEMO⁷ Akadémie vied ZSSR, ktorý bol založený v roku 1956 (Čerkasov 2004). Vzhľadom na charakter IMEMO bola veľká časť jeho teoretickej produkcie venovaná ekonomickým otázkam.

⁶ V príspevku abstrahujeme od bieloruskej a ukrajinskej produkcie v tejto oblasti v uplynulých zhruba 20-tich rokoch, ktorá nadväzuje tiež na ruskojazyčné tradície sovietskej teórie medzinárodných vzťahov.

⁷ Skratka IMEMO znamená Inštitút medzinárodnej ekonomiky a medzinárodných vzťahov (po rusky Institut meždunarodnoj ekonomiky i meždunarodnyh otnošenij).

Druhou významnou inštitúciou, ktorá sa v ZSSR začala venovať teórii medzinárodných vzťahov, bolo MGIMO⁸, ktoré vzniklo ešte skôr ako IMEMO – v roku 1944. Táto vysoká škola sa vytvorila odčlenením Medzinárodnej fakulty od Lomonosovovej moskovskej štátnej univerzity.

O vznik a rozvoj sovietskej teórie medzinárodných vzťahov sa na konci 60. rokov zaslúžili dve skupiny odborníkov. Prvá bola na IMEMO pod vedením V. Gantmana a druhá, ktorú viedol D. Jermolenko, na MGIMO. V 70. rokoch vzniklo na MGIMO Vedeckovýskumné laboratórium systémovej analýzy medzinárodných vzťahov na čele s V. Tichomirovom (Čerkasov 2004).

V 90. rokoch ruská teória medzinárodných vzťahov opustila „staré“, „úzke“ chápanie marxistickej (marxisticko-leninskej) paradigmy, ale zostali v nej viaceré jej teoretické a metodologické postuláty, ktoré ju odlišujú od západného – realisticko-liberálneho paradigmatického – chápania tejto vedy. V súčasnosti sa však aj v RF teória medzinárodných vzťahov považuje za multiparadigmálnu, pluralitnú vedu, ktorá sa interdisciplinárne vyjadruje k ich politickým, ekonomickým, sociálnym, kultúrnym a i. aspektom.

Vznikli mnohé nové rozsiahle publikácie venované teórii medzinárodných vzťahov (Cygankov 2003) a ich histórii v rôznych obdobiach od čias Vestfálskeho mieru (Bogaturov 2000; Medjakov 2007) i súčasnosti (Torkunov 1999; Goročov 2010). Skúmajú sa aj geopolitické (Dugin a Savin 2012; Trubnikova 2005), sociologické (Cygankov a Cygankov 2006; Dugin 2013) a ďalšie aspekty a stránky medzinárodných vzťahov. Pomerne veľká pozornosť sa v súčasnej ruskej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov venuje téme svetovej politiky (Lebedeva 2007; Kortunov 2010; Torkunov 2004).

Poukazuje sa aj na rozvíjanie špecificky ruského pohľadu na medzinárodné vzťahy (Cygankov a Cygankov 2005). V uvedených zdrojoch, predovšetkým v tých, ktoré boli vytvorené v druhej polovici prvého desaťročia 21. storočia, sa zvyrazňuje vytváranie multipolarity v medzinárodných vzťahoch a pôsobenie RF ako svetovej veľmoci v nej.

Úsilie RF o vytvorenie multipolarity moci v usporiadaní medzinárodných vzťahov možno označiť aj za kľúčovú líniu v ruskej zahraničnej politike. Už v decembri 1998 pri návšteve Nového Dillí J. Primakov navrhol vytvorenie strategického trojuholníka Rusko – Čína – India (označovaného aj ako os Moskva – Peking – Nové Dillí). V ruskej tlači sa táto iniciatíva označovala za Primakovov trojuholník. Teda už roky pred vytvorením akronymu BRIC vo Svetovej banke ruská diplomacia uvažovala o posilnení spolupráce najväčších nezápadných aktérov svetovej politiky. Téma je skúmaná aj v súčasnej ruskej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov (Portyakov 2013).

⁸ Skratka MGIMO znamená Moskovský štátny inštitút medzinárodných vzťahov (po rusky Moskovskij gosudrastrovennyj institut meždunarodnyh otnošenij).

Chápanie multipolarity v ruskej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov charakterizujú viacerí autori (Bažanov a Bažanova 2010; Martynov 2009; Primakov 2009, s. 13 – 18). Vízia multipolarity je zvýraznená aj v Stratégii národnej bezpečnosti Ruskej federácie do roku 2020 schválenej Výnosom Prezidenta Ruskej federácie č. 537 z 12. mája 2009, kde sa RF charakterizuje ako kľúčový subjekt formujúcich sa multipolárnych medzinárodných vzťahov (Stratégia 2009, s. 47).

3 O VÝCHODISKÁCH A VYBRANÝCH SÚVISLOSTIACH SKÚMANIA ZAHRANIČNEJ POLITIKY RUSKEJ FEDERÁCIE NA ZAČIATKU 21. STOROČIA

Vo svetovej politike pôsobí RF ako samostatný aktér od prelomu rokov 1991 a 1992 aj keď rôzne spravidla neformálne vonkajšie, zahraničné styky mala už v čase existencie Ruskej sovietskej federatívnej socialistickej republiky (ďalej len RSFSR) v rámci ZSSR. Medzinárodné spoločenstvo uznalo RF za pokračovateľku ZSSR a nie iba za jeho „obyčajnú“ nástupkyňu, čo bolo dôležité z hľadiska nároku na miesto stáleho člena BR OSN, ako aj vlastníctva jadrových zbraní. Moskva si získaním týchto atribútov svetovej veľmoci v systéme medzinárodných vzťahov vytvorených po druhej svetovej vojne naďalej udržala výnimočné postavenie v nich. K tomuto postaveniu patrilo aj pokračovanie v multilaterálnych a s USA aj bilaterálnych rokovaniach v otázkach odzbrojenia v strategickej a jadrovej oblasti. Dané okolnosti RF zaradili medzi rozhodujúcich aktérov svetovej bezpečnosti.

ZSSR nezanikol v dôsledku porážky vo vojne alebo po sociálnej či politickej revolúcii, či inej kataklizme, ale relatívne pokojne sa rozpadol. Rozpad ZSSR sa v ruských teoretických, mediálnych a politických prameňoch pomenúva viacerými neraz aj expresívnymi názvami ako sú kríza, rozklad, koniec, zánik, smrť a i. V západnej literatúre sa tento proces označuje tiež rôzne najmä ako kolaps či úpadok a zdôvodňuje sa viacerými príčinami, ktoré majú rôzne staré historické korene.

Najčastejšie sa spájajú s nástupom M. Gorbačova na čelo sovietskeho štátu a KSSZ. Podľa R. Sakwu došlo ku kríze ZSSR vedúcej k jej rozpadu od roku 1985 (Sakwa 1999, s. 410 – 481.) Podobne aj Bisley skúma rozpad ZSSR s dôrazom na vývoj od roku 1985 (Bisley 2004). Thompson (Thompson 2012, s. 293 – 316) ho vymedzuje od roku 1983.

Časť autorov zachádza aj do vzdialenejšej minulosti – najmä do obdobia stagnácie – obdobia rokov 1964 – 1982, keď bol na čele ZSSR a KSSZ L. Brežnev (Valovoj 1991). Ojedinele (Buzgalin a Kolganov 2003) sa príčiny zániku ZSSR vidia už v čase, keď bol na jeho čele J. Stalin.

V užšom pohľade skutočný rozpad prebehol vlastne v dôsledku viacerých navzájom súvisiacich politických a právnych krokov uskutočnených bez koncepcie a neraz chaoticky v historicky krátkom čase. Boli to len necelé štyri mesiace – od neúspešného pokusu o štátny prevrat v auguste do začiatku decembra 1991 (podpisu Bielovežských dohôd). Napriek tejto rýchlosti sa neočakávaný rozpad ZSSR zrejme kvôli pomerne pokojnému (nenásilnému) spôsobu, akým k nemu došlo, nepremietol

dramaticky do zvýšenia nestability svetovej politiky a bezpečnosti, hoci ich podobu a usporiadanie výrazne zmenil.

Rozpad supervelmoci – ZSSR – predstavuje vo svetovej politike 20. storočia ojedinelú záležitosť, ku ktorej došlo v dôsledku viacerých navzájom sa prelínajúcich príčin spojených s vnútornými i vonkajšími faktormi ekonomického, politického, sociálneho a kultúrneho charakteru. V RF neexistuje jednotné hodnotenie týchto udalostí, ale najmä v ľavicových (Naumov 2006) a konzervatívnych intelektuálnych kruhoch (Dugin 2014) je výrazná tendencia hodnotiť tieto udalosti ako jednu z najväčších národných tragédií 20. storočia, pričom nechýbajú ani konšpirologické teórie ich zdôvodnenia (Ševjakin 2004).

Po mimoriadne protirečivom vývoji v rokoch 1991 – 1999 spojenom s administratívou prezidenta B. Jeľcina, ktoré sa v Bezpečnostnej stratégii z roku 2009 charakterizovalo tak, že Rusko „prekonalo následky systémovej politickej a sociálno-ekonomickej krízy konca 20. storočia – zastavilo pád úrovne a kvality života ruských občanov, vydržalo nápor nacionalizmu, separatizmu a medzinárodného terorizmu, odvrátilo diskreditáciu ústavného poriadku, zachovalo suverenitu a teritoriálnu celistvosť, obnovilo možnosti narastania svojej konkurencieschopnosti a udržiavania národných záujmov“ (Stratégia 2009, s. 47) došlo k sformovaniu „... predpokladov pre rozvoj a premenu Ruskej federácie na jednu z vedúcich veľmocí...“ (Stratégia 2009, s. 47).

Vzhľadom na špecifický spôsob zmeny postavenia RF v medzinárodných vzťahoch a jeho vývoj vzniklo pre teóriu medzinárodných vzťahov množstvo otázok, akým spôsobom a v akom rámci tento fenomén skúmať. V nadväznosti na načrtnutie periodizácie vývoja medzinárodných vzťahov a zahraničnej politiky RF poukážeme v nich na vybrané, vzájomne sa však prelínajúce aspekty, medzi ktoré sme zaradili:

- stručnú typologickú charakteristiku predstaviteľov štátu, ktorí sa bezprostredne podieľajú na formovaní a realizácii medzinárodných vzťahov a zahraničnej politiky RF;
- historicko-sociologické aspekty spojené s kontinuitou a diskontinuitou RF ako aktéra medzinárodných vzťahov;
- geopolitické aspekty spojené s územím RF a so súčasnými názormi na ich význam a možnosti využitia v medzinárodných vzťahoch;
- kultúrne a informačné aspekty spojené s obrazom Ruska a jeho identitou v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch.

Pre krátkosť historického času, v ktorom dochádza k zmenám nielen vo vnútri RF a jej pôsobenia v medzinárodných vzťahoch, ale aj k vzniku viacerých nových procesov a zmenám v starých dlhodobo prebiehajúcich procesoch sa na periodizáciu vývoja medzinárodných vzťahov a zahraničnej politiky RF nedá odpovedať jednoznačným, všeobecne prijateľným spôsobom.

Hypoteticky a aj ako podnet k diskusii vyčleníme v doterajšom vývoji medzinárodných vzťahov a zahraničnej politiky RF tri základné etapy, ktoré mali strednodobé trvanie (cca 7 – 10 rokov):

- etapa hľadania nového smerovania zahraničnej politiky, ktoré bolo spojené vzhľadom na zložitú vnútornú, predovšetkým sociálno-ekonomickú, ale aj politickú situáciu s oslabovaním a úpadkom RF vyúsťujúcim do štátneho bankrotu v auguste 1998;
- etapa konsolidácie a upevňovania mocenského potenciálu RF, ktoré trvalo zhruba do začiatku druhej polovice prvého desaťročia 21. storočia, keď za jeho možný medzník označíme prejav V. Putina na 43. mníchovskej bezpečnostnej konferencii vo februári 2007;
- etapa úsilia RF o návrat na svetovú politickú scénu v pozícii svetovej veľmoci, ktoré bolo zatiaľ zavŕšené úspechmi iniciatívy ruskej diplomacie pri riešení sýrskej krízy.

Medzinárodné vzťahy aj zahraničnú politiku, možno iným spôsobom – prehľadnejšie a precíznejšie, ale veľmi formálne rozčleniť v nadväznosti na vnútropolitický vývoj v RF, daný najmä zmenami v obsadení pozície prezidenta RF, do piatich období. Ide o obdobia:

- prechodné – od rozpadu ZSSR – vzniku RF v decembri 1991 do prijatia Ústavy RF v referende 12. decembra 1993⁹, v ktorej sa posilnili právomoci prezidenta;
- jelcinovské – od prijatia Ústavy RF do ukončenia pôsobenia B. Jelcina vo funkcii prezidenta RF¹⁰ na konci roku 1999;
- prvé putinovské – od nástupu V. Putina do funkcie dočasného prezidenta z titulu predsedu vlády 31. decembra 1999 do ukončenia jej vykonávania v máji 2008;
- medvedevovské – v čase výkonu funkcie ruského prezidenta D. Medvedevom – od mája 2008 do mája 2012;
- druhé putinovské – začalo v máji 2012, keď sa V. Putin znovu stal prezidentom RF na základe výsledkov volieb v marci.

Existuje aj jednoduchšie ale ucelenejšie členenie doterajšieho politického vývoja RF (i v oblasti zahraničnej politiky), ktoré vychádza z tohto náčrtu a má len dve

⁹ Do platnosti vstúpila 25. decembra 1993.

¹⁰ B. Jelcin stál formálne už na čele RSFSR od 29. mája 1990 ako predseda jej Najvyššieho sovietu. Za prvého prezidenta RSFSR ho zvolili 12. júna a funkciu začal vykonávať 10. júla 1991. Po vzniku samostatnej RF pokračoval vo výkone funkcie prezidenta. Za prezidenta RF bol na základe Ústavy RF zvolený v druhom kole prezidentských volieb 3. júla 1996 (prvé kolo sa konalo 16. júna). Abdikoval 31. decembra 1999.

základné etapy. Thompson (Thompson 2012) ich označuje za éry. Členenie sa často používa aj mediálnopoliticky na zvýraznenie vplyvu V. Putina a s ním spojenej mocenskopolitickej elity pre pôsobenie RF v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Ide o éry:

- jeľcinovskú (Holzer a Kachyňková 2005; Thompson 2012, s. 319 – 344) – v rokoch 1991 až 1999, keď stál na čele RF B. Jeľcin;
- putinovskú (Thompson 2012, s. 347 – 374) – od nástupu V. Putina na funkciu ruského prezidenta, vrátane času, keď bol predsedom vlády – od roku 2000 do súčasnosti.

Prvý výnos V. Putina po tom, ako prevzal dočasne funkciu prezidenta RF bol „O zárukách pre prezidenta RF, ktorý ukončil vykonávanie svojich právomocí a členov jeho rodiny“ č. 1763 z 31. decembra 1999 (Prezident 1999). Výnos mal kvôli bodu d) časti 1, kde sa uvádzajú podrobnosti imunity, značne kontroverzný charakter a dodnes slúži na rôzne úvahy, prečo B. Jeľcin už v auguste 1999 začal hovoriť o V. Putinovi ako svojom nástupcovi. Nástup V. Putina na funkciu ruského prezidenta¹¹ v dôsledku neočakávaného odstúpenia B. Jeľcina viedol k pomerne dlhotrvajúcim mediálnym a politickým dohadom.

Po kontroverznom správaní už dobre známeho B. Jeľcina sa objavil pre zahraničie relatívne neznámy politik, pri ktorého charakteristike sa doteraz zdôrazňuje jeho minulosť príslušníka spravodajských služieb (Hill a Gaddy 2013; Roxburgh 2013). Nového ruského prezidenta začali charakterizovať pre jeho vystupovanie pred médiami ako „sfingu“ (Běloševský 2004, s. 4 – 5) a doteraz je predmetom zvýšeného mediálneho záujmu. Legvold uvádza, že V. Putin je „pre západný pohľad na Rusko typickým Rohrschachovym testom: niečo medzi bezemocionálnym stvorením s oceľovým pohľadom z noviel Johna le Carré a personifikáciou rozbitých nádejí ruskej liberálnej demokracie, pohodlne usadenou v objatí Západu“ (Legvold 2013).

Medzník obratu pri hodnotení V. Putina v médiách i politike predstavuje spomínaný prejav v Mníchove (Putin 2007), kde kritizoval politiku USA. Niektoré názory považujú prejav takmer za začiatok novej studenej vojny (Lucas 2009). V. Putin sa od tohto obdobia začal zaraďovať do línie pokračovateľov sovietskej zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky po V. Leninovi (Fedor 2011; Fortescue 2010).

Nové kolo medializácie V. Putina vyvolalo jeho opätovné zvolenie za prezidenta RF v roku 2012. V súvislosti so 60. výročím narodenia V. Putina Reitschuster (2012) napísal o šiestich veľkých mýtoch o ňom. Prvý je o tom, že dal Rusku poriadok a stabilitu, druhý o nostalgii po ZSSR, ktorá mu zabezpečuje sympatie časti európskej ľavice, tretí o modernizátorovi, štvrtý, o národnom vodcovi, ktorý zdvihol Rusko z kolien, piaty o vysporiadaní sa s oligarchami a šiesty o tom, že sa v dlhodobom výhľade snaží o demokraciu, na ktorú Rusko podľa neho ešte nedozrelo.

¹¹ Dočasne, z titulu zastávania funkcie predsedu vlády 31. 12. 1999 a oficiálne po inaugurácii 7. mája 2000 na základe výsledkov prezidentských volieb konaných 26. marca 2000.

Aron (2013) uvádza, že vraj mnoho v ruskej zahraničnej politike vychádza z údajného konsenzu (prijatého naprieč celým spektrom ruských politikov od liberálnych „zapadnikov“ až po ľavicu a nacionalistov) už zo začiatku 90. rokov. Stojí vraj na troch pilieroch. Rusko musí zostať a) jadrovou superveľmocou, b) veľmocou v celej šírke svojich medzinárodných aktivít a c) hegemónom (politickým, vojenským a ekonomickým) vo svojom regióne. Poukazuje aj na to, že V. Putin po nástupe do funkcie prezidenta už v roku 2000 postavil nový „všezahrňujúci“ cieľ – obnoviť ekonomické, politické a vojenské (strategické) atribúty, ktoré sa zo zahraničnej politiky Moskvy stratili začiatkom 90. rokov. Vidí aj zásadný rozdiel medzi zahraničnopolitickým kurzom „jelcinovskej“ a „putinovskej“ éry.

„Putinovskú“ doktrínu charakterizujú aj Adomanis (2013) a Larison (2013). Zdôrazňujú, že spôsob, akým V. Putin vykonáva funkciu prezidenta RF po návrate do nej, môže viesť k nárastu napätia vo vzťahoch medzi Moskvou a Washingtonom.

Z hľadiska predstaviteľov štátu je ústrednou postavou ruskej politiky prezident, ktorý má špecifické postavenie a kompetencie aj v oblasti zahraničnej politiky. Podľa Výnosu prezidenta RF č. 724 Otázky systému a štruktúry federálnych orgánov výkonnej moci z 12. mája 2008 ministerstvo zahraničných vecí patrí k orgánom, ktorých činnosť prezident bezprostredne riadi (Prezident 2008).

V zložitej sieti vysokej politiky RF, v ktorej má nezastupiteľné miesto aj zahraničná politika a teda i minister zahraničných vecí, existujú tiež možnosti jej ovplyvňovania predsedom vlády¹². Vplyvnú pozíciu má aj predseda Bezpečnostnej rady. Oproti minulosti však poklesol dosah ministra obrany na túto oblasť a menej výrazné je aj pôsobenie spravodajskej služby – Služby zahraničnej rozvedky RF, ktoré sa nedajú porovnať s vplyvom, aký majú podobné orgány v USA.

Príkladom prepojenia pôsobenia na dvoch najvyšších exekutívnych funkciách – prezidenta a predsedu vlády RF – je práve V. Putin, ktorý ich vykonáva nepretržite už vyše 14 rokov, čo tiež umožňuje uvažovať o „putinovskej“ ére vo vývoji RF, jej zahraničnej politike a medzinárodných vzťahoch. Nasledujúce prezidentské voľby by sa mali uskutočniť v roku 2018.

V období od vzniku RF až do 25. decembra 1993 existovala v nej aj funkcia viceprezidenta. Zastával ju A. Ruckoj od 10. júla 1991 (spočiatku ako viceprezident RSFSR) do 4. októbra 1993, keď bol uväznený na základe obvinení z organizovania masových neporiadkov 3. a 4. októbra pri udalostiach, ktoré viedli k rozohnaniu Zjazdu ľudových poslancov a Najvyššieho soviету RF, mediálne označovaných ako Októbrový puč alebo Jelcinov prevrat a boli vyvrcholením ústavnej krízy trvajúcej v RF už od roku 1992 (Chasbulatov 1994; Ostrovskij 2008). V Ústave RF z roku 1993 táto funkcia už nebola zriadená.

Na dokreslenie vývoja na dvoch najvyšších súčasných exekutívnych funkciách RF uvedieme, že po jej vytvorení bol prezident B. Jelcin formálne aj na čele vlády do

¹² Príkladom je pôsobenie J. Primakova .

15. júna 1992. Predsedom vlády (povereným, ale neschváleným Štátnou dumou) sa 15. júna 1992 stal J. Gajdar, ktorý túto funkciu vykonával do 14. decembra 1992, keď za predsedu vlády po schválení Štátnou dumou vymenovali V. Černomyrdina, ktorý ju zastával do 23. marca 1998 (čo je v doterajšej histórii RF najdlhšie).

Do konca jel'cinovskej éry potom dochádzalo k rýchlej a neraz prekvapujúcej výmene predsedov vlád. S. Kirijenko bol vo funkcii od 23. marca 1998 do 23. augusta 1998. Funkciou bol 23. augusta 1998 znovu poverený V. Černomyrdin, ale tentokrát ho neschválila Štátna дума, ktorá 11. septembra 1998 v tejto pozícii potvrdila J. Primakova. Ten zastával post do 12. mája 1999, keď bol vymenovaný S. Stepašin, ktorý na ňom zotrval do 9. augusta 1999, keď bol V. Putin ustanovený za prvého podpredsedu vlády a poverený jej vedením. 16. augusta V. Putina Štátna дума schválila za predsedu vlády.

Po nástupe V. Putina do funkcie ruského prezidenta proces pomerne častého striedania premiérov pokračoval až do roku 2008. V. Putin úrad premiéra formálne zastával až do 7. mája 2000, ale od 31. decembra 1999 ho fakticky vykonával prvý podpredseda vlády M. Kasjanov, ktorý bol 7. mája 2000 do tejto funkcie aj menovaný. Od 24. februára do 5. marca 2004 funkciu z poverenia vykonával V. Christenko. 5. marca 2004 bol za ruského premiéra menovaný M. Fradkov, ktorý post zastával do 14. septembra 2007. V. Zubkov bol za predsedu vlády RF ustanovený 14. septembra 2007 a v tejto pozícii zotrval do 7. mája 2008, keď sa premiérom znovu stal V. Putin, ktorého vymenil 8. mája 2012 D. Medvedev (od 7. do 8. mája 2012 – v čase striedania funkcií – bol povereným premiérom znovu V. Zubkov).

Ak by sme teda spočítali všetky osoby, ktoré formálne zastávali post premiéra RF (aj bez schválenia Štátnou dumou) je ich dosiaľ dvanásť, pričom dvaja (V. Černomyrdin a V. Putin) ho zastávali opakovane. Ak by sme to zobrali „čisto časovoštatisticky“, je priemerný čas zotrvania v tejto funkcii menej ako 2 roky.

Veľkú stabilitu má v RF post ministra zahraničných vecí, ktorý dosiaľ zastávali len štyri osoby – dlhoroční profesionálni diplomati, resp. odborníci pôsobiaci v oblasti zahraničnej politiky, ktorí túto dráhu začínali ešte v časoch ZSSR. Išlo o Andreja Kozyreva (na funkciu ministra zahraničných vecí nastúpil ešte v RSFSR 11. októbra 1990 a vykonával ju do 5. januára 1996), J. Primakova¹³ (od 10. januára 1996 do 11. septembra 1998), I. Ivanova (od 11. septembra 1998 do 9. marca 2004) a S. Lavrova (od 9. marca 2004), ktorý je po A. Gromykovi druhým ministrom najdlhšie zastávajúcim túto funkciu v ruských (i sovietskych) dejinách po roku 1917.

RF sa formálne právne, politicky i ideologicky síce rozišla so ZSSR, ale sociálno-ekonomicky, kultúrne i v rôznych oblastiach každodenného života v nej pokračovali procesy z minulosti, ktoré sa nedali zmeniť zo dňa na deň novými právnymi normami, politickými aktivitami či mediálnymi vyhláseniami. Aj v zahraničnej politike sa muselo nadväzovať na sovietsku minulosť. Z tohto pohľadu

¹³ Mel'nikova (2014) označuje J. Primakova za „patriarchu ruskej diplomacie“.

je nepreskúmaná téma historicko-sociologických aspektov spojených s kontinuitou a diskontinuitou RF ako aktéra medzinárodných vzťahov.

Vznik a zánik ZSSR zásadným spôsobom ovplyvnil dianie vo svetovej politike a z hľadiska usporiadania medzinárodných vzťahov mal kvalitatívne dopady. Pôsobenie ZSSR v medzinárodnej politike možno označiť za jeden z fenoménov, ktorý sa veľkou mierou pričínil o to, že predchádzajúce storočie sa niekedy obrazne označuje za krátke 20. storočie. Hobsbawm koniec krátkeho 20. storočia spája práve s rokom rozpadu ZSSR (Hobsbawm 2010).

Sovietske Rusko sa štátoprávne, administratívne i územne pretransformovalo do podoby ZSSR od 7. novembra 1917 do 30. decembra 1922.¹⁴ ZSSR sa po svojom vzniku stal nástupcom medzinárodných vzťahov Ruska – cárskeho i sovietskeho, aj keď diplomatické vzťahy s ním najmä západné štáty nadväzovali neskôr.

K štátoprávnym, politickým a územným zmenám usporiadania ZSSR dochádzalo aj po roku 1922. Vonkajšie hranice ZSSR sa do konečnej podoby upravili až v roku 1945 na základe výsledkov mierových rokovaní po druhej svetovej vojne.

Nová veľmoc, neskôr superveľmoc – ZSSR (ako prvý socialistický štát na svete) – predstavovala z historicko-sociologického chápania medzinárodných vzťahov nový typ aktéra v nich, ktorý bol daný politickým a ekonomickým charakterom štátu a nimi podmienenými sociálnymi, kultúrnymi a ďalšími aspektmi jeho fungovania. Po počiatočnom prehliadaní sa v predvečer druhej svetovej vojny v angloamerickej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov (aj širšie v ďalších spoločenských vedách) začala venovať ZSSR pozornosť, ktorá však bola okrem malých výnimiek výrazne kriticky orientovaná. Prejavovalo sa to najmä v jeho označovaní za tzv. totalitný štát, v hypertrofovanom poukazovaní na stalinizmus atď. Toto zameranie skúmania ZSSR dostalo neskôr pomenovanie „kremlológia“ (d'Agostino 1989; Cockburn 1990), resp. „sovietológia“ (Solomon 1993).

Rusko prinajmenšom od začiatku 19. storočia (napoleonských vojen) predstavuje jedno z najvýznamnejších centier moci (Neumann 2008) nielen v Európe, ale aj vo svete. Nikdy však nedosiahlo pozíciu hegemóna medzinárodných vzťahov. Aj v podmienkach bipolarity bol ZSSR len jednou z dvoch superveľmocí na čele proti sebe stojacich blokov.

Oficiálny názov Ruska v rokoch 1721 – 1917 bol Ruská ríša. Imperiálne ambície sa však pripisujú aj ZSSR (Boterbloem 2013, s. 173 – 287) i dnešnej RF, najmä v Putinovej ére (Boterbloem 2013, s. 288 – 296).

¹⁴ Pôvodný ZSSR vyhlásili štyri republiky – RSFSR, Ukrajinská a Bieloruská SSR a Zakaukazská sovietska federatívna socialistická republika. Podľa niektorých sovietskych právnych názorov bol jeden zo základných problémov platnosti Bielovežskej dohody, na základe ktorej sa rozpadol ZSSR v tom, že na jej podpísaní sa nezúčastnili všetky republiky ZSSR, resp. aspoň tie, ktoré ho formálne zakladali.

Bisley označil sovietsku „vojenskú mašinériu“ za najväčšiu silu, akú kedy v dejinách mal k dispozícii politický aktér (Bisley 2004, s. 1). Vojenský potenciál RF je síce nižší, ako bol potenciál ZSSR a v niektorých ukazovateľoch ho už nemožno porovnávať ani s potenciálom USA (najmä vo vojensko-námornej oblasti, kde USA majú mimoriadne veľkú prevahu). Stále však predstavuje na základe svojho vojenského potenciálu druhú najväčšiu mocnosť na svete a RF zostala aj po strate statusu supervelmoci jediným štátom na svete schopným vojensky súperiť s USA.

Ďalší špecifický moment pohľadu na Rusko, ktorý sa po vytvorení RF oživil, predstavuje koncepcia Heartlandu, s ktorou prišiel v geopolitike Mackinder. Označoval ním veľké územie, ktorého väčšina sa rozprestiera na území súčasnej RF. Pôvodnú Mackinderovu ideu (1904) možno zjednodušene vyložiť tak, že kto ovláda východnú Európu, ovláda Heartland, kto ovláda Heartland, ovláda Svetový ostrov (v podstate ide najmä o spojené kontinenty Európy a Ázie), kto ovláda Svetový ostrov, ovláda svet. Okrem mocenského (vojenského) významu, ktorý sa v rôznych koncepciách geopolitiky vysvetľuje odlišne, ide však aj o hodnotu Heartlandu z hľadiska množstva zásob nerastných surovín (to sa zistilo neskôr, ako vznikla Mackinderova koncepcia).

Napriek značným zmenám, ktoré vo svojom prístupe ku „geografickému strediu (jadru) dejín“ Mackinder uskutočnil (2009 [1919]), sa s mocenským pohľadom na Heartland v modifikovanej podobe v anglosaskej geopolitike ešte stále pracuje. Ďalšie Mackinderove idey, v ktorých už uvažuje o novej úlohe USA vo svetovej politike a možnej bipolarite (Mackinder 1943), sa považujú aj za jedno z východísk politickej koncepcie atlantizmu a možno ich vnímať aj ako teoretický zdroj pretrvávajúcej snahy Západu zasahovať do vývoja v RF, popr. ovplyvňovať ho v súlade so svojimi záujmami.

Na druhej strane „boom“ geopolitiky nastal na konci 20. storočia aj v Rusku. Typickým predstaviteľom tejto vlny je Dugin (2011a). Zároveň je kritikom atlantizmu, ako hrozby pre Rusko, ktorá v širšom teoretickom rámci vychádza z upravenej Mackinderovej koncepcie geopolitiky. Dugin (2004) a ďalší ruskí autori (Orlova 1998; Savickij 1997) rozvíjajú aj ideu eurázijstva. Ruské chápanie geopolitiky (Horemuž 2010, s. 125) a eurázijstva sa tiež vytvárajú na predpoklade, že Rusko má vo svetovej politike špecifické (nenahraditeľné) veľmocenské postavenie, na základe ktorého sa nachádza nielen obrazne, ale aj reálne v centre jeho diania.

Idea eurázijstva sa v súčasnosti aj prakticky uplatňuje v integračných procesoch po vytvorení Jednotného ekonomického priestoru Ruska, Bieloruska a Kazachstanu 1. januára 2012 (Butakov 2011; Putin 2011; Vinokurov 2013). Podľa Dugina, bude „vzťah USA k Eurázijskému zväzu pri ktorejkoľvek administratívnej radikálnej a otvorene nepriateľskej. Vytvorenie Eurázijského zväzu otvorene protirečí prijatej stratégii národnej bezpečnosti USA“ (Dugin 2011b).

Pri charakteristike súčasnej zahraničnej politiky a medzinárodných vzťahov RF treba vziať do úvahy aj nesmiernu zložitosť vývoja na jej (meniacom sa) území

(v regióne). Zvýrazníme aj dve ďalšie okolnosti – nazveme ich tiež geopolitickými – ktoré sa pri charakteristike Ruska v súčasnosti často prehliadajú a nedoceňujú.

Prvá spočíva v tom, že RF je obzvlášť komplikovaným štátnym útvarom – federáciou, v prvom rade z hľadiska počtu subjektov, ktoré ju tvoria, ale aj ich rozdielnosti. V roku 2013 tvorilo RF 83 subjektov – 21 republík, 9 krajov, 46 oblastí, 2 mestá federálneho významu (Moskva a Sankt-Peterburg), 1 autonómna oblasť a 4 autonómne okruhy. Táto zložitosť usporiadania štátu je znásobovaná pestrosťou etnického a čiastočne aj konfesijného zloženia spoločnosti. Komplikovanejšiu sociálnu – etnicko-konfesijnú – štruktúru a administratívne usporiadanie z veľkých štátov má už asi len India.

Druhá je spojená s tým, že štátne útvary, ktoré sa nachádzali na území Ruska, boli v histórii viackrát mimoriadne ťažko zasiahnuté veľkými ozbrojenými konfliktmi. V 20. storočí to boli najmä obe svetové vojny, ale aj zahraničná intervencia a občianska vojna zakrátko po vzniku sovietskeho štátu. Žiadne iné územie veľkého štátu nebolo v 20. storočí tak silno poškodené rôznymi vojnovými udalosťami ako značná časť územia európskej časti ZSSR (v súčasnosti ide o regióny, ktoré sú súčasťou nielen RF, ale aj Ukrajiny a Bieloruska). Na viacerých miestach na tomto území sa v rokoch 1914 – 1944 opakovane bojovalo tri i viac krát, a to aj dlhší čas, čo zapríčinilo obrovské škody na jej infraštruktúre.

Vo vzťahu k RF a jeho zahraničnej politike sa stretávame s viacerými zvláštnosťami aj v oblasti kultúrnej, popr. informačnej dimenzie medzinárodných vzťahov, ktorý súvisí s vytváraním obrazov o nej (Primakov 2013), ako aj s fenoménom jej identity – národnej i civilizačnej (Zevaljev 2009) v nich. Pohľad na postavenie Ruska v dejinách medzinárodných vzťahoch a jeho zmeny možno vidieť aj v dichotómii rusofóbie a rusofilstva.

Rusofóbia sa rozvinula sa najmä počas studenej vojny a rôznym spôsobom sa využívala proti ZSSR. Korene rusofóbie, ktorá je zvláštnym prípadom xenofóbie, sú však v Európe staršie. Siahajú do čias porážky napoleonských vojsk po vpáde do Ruska. Rusfóbia zosilnela po rokoch 1848 – 1849 a v Anglicku po Krymskej vojne (1853 – 1856). Podľa Kiseleva (2008) tvorcom pojmu je ruský básnik a diplomat F. Tutčev.

Na začiatku 21. storočia sa s prejavmi rusofóbie naďalej stretáme nielen v časti médií, politických kruhov a mimovládnych organizácií, ale aj v zahraničnej politike Washingtonu a ďalších najmä západných štátov (Steele 2006; Tsygankov 2009). Špecificky sa rusofóbia prejavuje v niektorých štátoch bývalého ZSSR, popr. východného bloku a podľa niektorých ruských autorov predstavuje významnú súčasť súčasnej informačnej vojny proti Rusku (Panarin 2012; Tkačenko 2011).

V súvislosti s kultúrnymi odlišnosťami Ruska sa poukazuje aj na to, že najrozšírenejším náboženstvom v štáte je pravoslávie – východná vetva kresťanstva. S. Huntington na tomto základe Rusko (a ďalšie krajiny s východným kresťanstvom) vyčleňuje zo Západu, ktorý sa podľa neho „v súčasnosti všeobecne používa na

označenie toho, čo sa prv nazývalo západným kresťanstvom“ (Huntington 2001, s. 39). Podrobnejšiu charakteristiku pravoslávnej civilizácie nepodáva, ale má na ňu kritický pohľad (Huntington 2001, s. 152).

Opačný vzťah k Rusku ako v rusofóbií sa prejavuje v rusofilstve (Chelemendik 2008). F. Tutčev videl ako protipól rusofóbie panslavizmus (Lipič 2008). Rusofilstvo popr. panslavizmus sa v súčasnosti považujú predovšetkým za kultúrny fenomén a s ich pôsobením v medzinárodných vzťahoch sa stretávame len okrajovo a ojedinele.

V septembri 2004 vzniklo fórum – Medzinárodný diskusný klub „Valdaj“¹⁵, ktorého cieľom je zlepšenie pohľadu zahraničia na Rusko. Na zasadnutiach klubu sa stretávajú s predstaviteľmi ruských politických, hospodárskych, akademických a kultúrnych kruhov zahraniční odborníci, ktorí sa zaoberajú otázkami vnútornej a zahraničnej politiky RF a majú k Rusku a jeho kultúre pozitívny vzťah.

4 ZÁVER

Po politických a sociálno-ekonomických turbulenciách v prvom desaťročí existencie RF sa v 21. storočí v jej zahraničnej politike postupne začalo prejavovať viacero tendencií svedčiacich o jej úsilí podieľať sa na vytváraní multipolárneho sveta. Koncepcia multipolárneho sveta je ako jedna z prednostných teoretických tém špecificky rozpracovávaná aj v súčasnej ruskej teórii medzinárodných vzťahov. Táto koncepcia tvorí aj jednu z línií praktickej realizácie zahraničnej politiky RF, o čom svedčí aj Stratégia národnej bezpečnosti Ruskej federácie do roku 2020 schválená prezidentom RF v máji 2009.

Objasnenie pozície a roly RF ako aktéra so statusom svetovej veľmoci v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch si vyžaduje odpovedať na rôzne aktuálne otázky, ktoré majú viaceré teoretické i metodologické aspekty. Skúmanie vybraných historicko-sociologických, geopolitických, kultúrnych a informačných aspektov a súvislostí pôsobenia RF v kontexte jej vývoja považujeme za príspevok k jej poznaniu ako svetovej veľmoci, ktorá vyvíja úsilie o vytváranie multipolarity v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch.

Obsah i metódy uplatnené v príspevkoch predstavujú jeden z možných pohľadov na pôsobenie RF pri vytváraní multipolarity v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch. Vplyv zahraničnej politiky RF, ktorá sa opiera o jej potenciál a využíva aj tradície získané v minulosti, v posledných rokoch vo svetovej politike vzrástol. Jednou z otázok, na ktorú sa musí v budúcnosti v tejto súvislosti odpovedať, je, či RF predstavuje v súčasných medzinárodných vzťahoch „nezápadného“ aktéra a aké sú možnosti a limity jej pôsobenia v tomto kontexte. Zvláštnu pozornosť si zaslúžia procesy súvisiace so zmenami, ktoré nastali po druhom nástupe V. Putina – osobnosti najdlhšie stojacej na čele svetovej veľmoci v súčasnej svetovej politike – a s ním spojenej politickej elity do funkcie ruského prezidenta. V ďalšom skúmaní RF ako

¹⁵ Oficiálna stránka klubu – Valdai Discussion Club pozri <http://valdaiclub.com/>.

aktéra medzinárodných vzťahov považujeme za potrebné zvýrazniť aj ďalšie dva okruhy problémov historicko-sociologického, politologického, ale aj sociálno-ekonomického charakteru.

Prvý predstavuje rozpad ZSSR, jeho príčiny a dôsledky ako aj pretrvávajúci vplyv niektorých minulých procesov na dianie v súčasnom postsovietskom priestore. Prevažne ide o ekonomické procesy, spojené napr. so surovinovou závislosťou a pod., ale aj určité sociálne a kultúrne fenomény. Niektoré štáty, ktoré vznikli na území bývalého ZSSR sa stále obávajú využitia až zneužitia tohto stavu, popr. obviňujú Moskvu na tomto základe zo snahy naďalej zasahovať do ich vnútorných záležitostí. Tento moment využíva vo svojom pôsobení NATO proti ktorému má aj ruská zahraničná politika rôzne výhrady.

Druhým je snaha časti štátov bývalého ZSSR spolupracovať, popr. sa rôznym spôsobom integrovať. V procese rozpadu ZSSR vzniklo Spoločenstvo nezávislých štátov (SNŠ). Neskôr sa vytvorili v postsovietskom priestore ďalšie medzinárodné organizácie popr. integračné zoskupenia rôzneho charakteru, ktorých členmi sú len štáty, ktoré vznikli po rozpade ZSSR, alebo tvoria väčšinu ich členských štátov.

Prínos nášho skúmania vidíme v tom, že ďalšie skúmanie historicko-sociologických, geopolitických a kultúrnych aspektov a súvislostí pôsobenia RF umožní odpovedať na otázky, ktoré vznikajú a dostávajú sa do popredia v jej vzťahoch s ďalšími aktérmi v pozícii svetových veľmocí – USA, EÚ a ČLR v druhom desaťročí 21. storočia, keď sú stále ovplyvnené aj pôsobiacou globálnou krízou. Zdôrazníme, že RF predstavuje plnohodnotného aktéra súčasných medzinárodných vzťahov, ktorý vzhľadom na tendenciu k pragmatizmu a vypočítateľnosti vo svojom pôsobení sa nenahraditeľným spôsobom podieľa na vytváraní multipolarity vo svetovej politike. Prispieva aj k tomu, že problémy vo svetovej politike sa môžu začať riešiť aj iným spôsobom, než je ten, ktorý sa uplatňoval zhruba posledné štvrtstoročie.

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ČÍNSKA ROZVOJOVÁ POMOC V LATINSKOAMERICKOM REGIÓNE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE REGION OF LATIN AMERICA

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Rozvojová pomoc je jedním z nástrojů, kterým se rozvinutý svět snaží podpořit rozvoj v méně rozvinutých zemích. Mezi její poskytovatele se však v souvislosti se svým ekonomickým vzestupem začínají řadit také země BRIC. Tento článek je věnován principům čínské rozvojové pomoci a jejím praktikám v latinsko-americkém regionu. Čína v tomto regionu není tradičním partnerem, ale své postavení si v průběhu času stále upevňuje. Hlavním motivem pro čínské aktivity v tomto ohledu je zejména surovinový potenciál daných zemí a velikost těchto trhů související s možnou poptávkou po čínském zboží. Je důležité si uvědomit, že Čína uplatňuje pro tuto oblast aktivit zcela jiná pravidla, než je tomu v zemích OECD. Důležitým prvkem spolupráce mezi Čínou a zeměmi Latinské Ameriky jsou tudíž také čínské úvěry čerpané pro realizaci rozvojových projektů.²
Klíčové slová: rozvojová pomoc Číny, Latinská Amerika, spolupráce, úvěry.

Development assistance is a tool, which is used (among other tools) by the developed world to support economic development in less developed countries. Nowadays, new players have been appearing among the donors – the BRIC countries. This paper is dedicated to principles of the Chinese development assistance and its practices in the region of Latin America. China is not a traditional donor but its position is gradually becoming stronger. The main motivation for Chinese activities in providing development assistance within the given region are mainly Latin American

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reserves of raw materials and the size of its market and thus potential demand for Chinese goods. It is important to acknowledge that China has a completely different set of rules compared to traditional OECD donors, including loans provided for the realization of development projects as a part of development assistance.

Key words: Chinese development assistance, Latin America, cooperation, loans.

JEL: F34, F35, F63

1 INTRODUCTION

Development assistance is one of the tools for supporting and accelerating development in countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. The People's Republic of China³ itself used to be, until recently, one of its major recipients, this however has been changing with progress in its development and economic growth. China is now starting to belong to providers of development assistance. Motives for its providing may be diverse, both economic and political.

The topic of this paper is the Chinese development assistance in the region of Latin America. Latin America is not a homogeneous group of countries. It consists of relatively developed countries as well as some of the poorest countries in the world, countries based on democratic ideas as well as authoritarian regimes, countries rich in natural resources as well as economies based on agriculture. Historical ties between China and Latin American countries have not been very strong. Nowadays however – with an increasing globalization and interconnection of individual economies – the two different worlds (China and Latin America) meet more and more at the international field, trying to benefit from comparative advantages of each other.

The aim of this work is to analyze principles and practices of the Chinese development assistance provided to the Latin American region. The Sino-Latin American relationship is analyzed in terms of development assistance. Also, the relationship of China as a new donor and USA as a traditional one is analyzed, areas in which the Chinese development assistance is provided, the Chinese institutional organization for providing the assistance and a role of Chinese favourable loans in the region of Latin America.

The paper is divided into several parts. The first section provides an analysis of the relations between China and Latin American countries in relation to the provision of development assistance. Chinese international activities are based on a set of principles that have their roots in the time of totalitarian era, but are valid and applicable even today.

The Latin American regions have been historically very strongly tied to the United States of America.⁴ It was (and still is) a major trading partner of most countries

³ Hereinafter PRC or China.

⁴ Hereinafter USA or U.S.

and the most important investor in the region. It is also the main player in the field of providing development assistance to Latin American countries. U.S. development assistance is often tied to political conditions and receivers are expected to fulfil political requirements. China, on the other hand, does not seek such political changes on the recipients' side. China rather calls, in most cases, for economic benefits and profit. This issue is described in the second section.

In the next parts of the paper the author attempts to map the areas where Chinese development assistance is concentrated within Latin America and estimates its volume. The difficulty of this task lies in the fact that the PRC does not share data with international institutions, which are necessary to make a more detailed analysis. Additionally, there is a different classification of the development assistance as accounted for by China and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is the leading international organization providing development assistance.

The following section describes the part of Chinese institutional and governmental organization which focuses on providing the development assistance. This is the basis for the final section of the paper in which the author focuses on the issue of providing favorable loans to Latin American countries. This section is devoted not only to the whole mechanism, but also to the question of what actually can and cannot be considered development assistance.

Information used in the paper was gained from a variety of specialized papers and publications; the author also works with data obtained from Chinese government and state owned institutions.

2 RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRC AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF PROVIDING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

China and Latin American countries do not share a great deal of history. Due to the strong influence of the USA in South America and the necessity of China to concentrate on internal social and development issues between the 50s and 80s, each region developed independently without significant cooperation and mutual dialogue. The USA has been the key player in the region of Latin America, which is based on the historical context of policies applied during the 20th century (e.g. Monroe's doctrine) (Choo 2009, p. 74).

The cooperation between China and Latin America gained significance during the 90s. The reason behind the relationship growth between the two parties was, above all, shared experience with Western developed countries from a colonial period and from the second half of the 20th century, when the world was split into two main centres of power. It was also an aspiration to obtain independence and sceptic look on liberal democratic processes and strategies. China used to promote the shift from bipolar towards a multipolar world order, in which countries are not concentrated into power blocks. Nowadays China tries to position itself as an advocate of multilateral

negotiations, which supports a peaceful solution of eventual conflicts (Choo 2009, p. 74).

Due to its political and economic interests, China aims at presenting itself as a developing country, which brings it closer to Latin American countries, since they often face similar issues. This policy started as a result of the embargo and discontinuation of cooperation with the developed world after the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Cooperation with developing countries proved to be an opportunity to support further economic growth and development.

In terms of international cooperation, China applies principles stemming from the so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence“. Those include the following (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000):

- a) Mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity
- b) Mutual non-aggression
- c) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- d) Equality and mutual benefit
- e) Peaceful co-existence.

Although these principles were adopted in 1954, they still remain relevant. Not only were they accepted as principles for cooperation by a number of developing countries, but they have been referenced many times by Chinese government representatives. Particularly the principles of sovereignty of partner countries, non-interference and mutual benefit from international activities significantly affect negotiations on development assistance.

The need to respect national sovereignty is tied to China's claim to its state recognition and thus denial of sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan). This is the prerequisite for providing Chinese development assistance. In the case of Latin America it applies even more given the fact that out of twenty-two countries holding diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, twelve are in Latin America (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China 2012).

An example showing the importance of accepting national sovereignty of China could be the situation when Costa Rica terminated its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2007 and strengthened its recognition of the PRC. Subsequent international transactions and the amount of resources coming to Costa Rica from Chinese development projects was unparalleled. China bought bonds from Costa Rica worth 300 million USD and invested 74 million USD in the construction of a football stadium in Costa Rica's capital. Very soon afterwards in 2012, a free trade area was established between the two countries (Hilton 2013, p. 2). Similarly, the Dominican Republic terminated its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and recognized China in 2004 to obtain development assistance worth 122 million USD during the following six years (Jubany and Poon 2006, p. 3). When compared to the development assistance coming to Latin American countries from Taiwan (at the level of 9 million USD) it is

clear, that the political decision made by the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica or other development countries in this regard is rather a matter of an economical benefit than a decision based on philosophical and political ideals.

Non-interference with each other's internal affairs shows expectations to leave internal affairs and economical, political and social issues to the government administering the country. China insists upon that other countries do not comment on matters related to Chinese internal situation. China does not have political requirements for providing its development assistance to other developing countries either. In fact, China has always avoided placing any political actions as a condition to providing the development assistance. This approach is convenient to some Latin American countries, which tend to be sympathetic to totalitarian and authoritative regimes, where violations of human rights and freedom happen. That is often a subject of criticism from traditional Western donors, which often condition their development assistance with the implementation of democratic reforms.

The principle of mutual benefit (held already in Chinese philosophical foundations and a win-win principle) therefore upholds China's claim, which is a prerequisite for providing Chinese development assistance and investments. Development assistance provided to Latin American countries is mostly offset with benefits provided to China in the form of securing natural resources, participation of Chinese companies in government projects, sales of Chinese products and machinery etc. The declared principle of mutual benefit allows China to enter into mutually beneficial contracts, which are often criticized by Western donors because of the benefit brought not only to the recipient country, but also to the provider of the development assistance.

China has three main motives for providing development assistance. First, the assistance is driven by economic reasons, such as ensuring natural resources security, securing markets for Chinese exports and labor force utilization.

Second, there are political notions. However, these do not play a key role anymore. They used to be of the highest level of importance when China's position in the world economy was not so stable and sovereign due to Taiwan's political activities. However, they still remain important during the development assistance negotiations. These include a request to recognize the One China Policy, ensuring security and stability (Lengauer 2011, p. 45) and Chinese interests within international organizations and institutions (Roberge 2009).

The third group of motives is connected with China's recent efforts to act as a world power with its unique cultural heritage. It can include development and improvement of China's image and its credibility, promotion of Chinese cultural principles (Lengauer 2011, p. 46) or the attempt to change the world order (Chin and Thakur 2010, p. 134).

After periods when China paid attention to international activities within other regions, a lot changed at the beginning of the 21st century. A very important moment

came when the Chinese president Hu Jintao visited a number of Latin American countries in November 2004. Cuba was the very first Latin American country which became a Chinese partner within the international economic system, thanks to its political system and mainly due to the fact that Cuba was the very first country to recognize the sovereignty of the PRC (Sangmeister 20113, p. 1).

The principles for providing development assistance to Latin American countries (as well as the principles for the rest of China's international activities) are described in a single document – China's policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean region. Besides others, it contains all officially expressed principles of the foreign cooperation of China mentioned above (Chinese Government's Official Web Portal 2012):

- a) To promote mutual respect and mutual trust and expand common ground. Based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China and Latin America and the Caribbean will treat each other as equals and respect each other.
- b) To deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results.
- c) To develop and intensify exchanges. To increase the intensity of cooperation in the fields of development, research, culture and migration of labor force.
- d) One China principle is the political basis for establishment and development of relations between China and Latin America. The Chinese government appreciates commitment of an overwhelming majority of countries in the region to recognize the One China policy and the abolition of their official ties or contacts with Taiwan.

This document explicitly says that the Chinese government will continue to provide economic and technological assistance to Latin American countries without any political requirements, based on its financial possibilities and the level of economic and social development. The Chinese government shall increase assistance to the region gradually, so that it meets the needs of corresponding countries. China should continue to provide humanitarian assistance, medical equipment where needed and accept students from Latin American countries.

3 TRILATERAL COOPERATION: CHINA – USA – LATIN AMERICA

The USA is a traditional provider of development assistance to the region of Latin America. Its position in this region is strong, based on historical roots and on its geographical position. In the context of increasing globalization, this provides the basis for political, economic, social, diplomatic and security cooperation (Wanner 2009, p. 4).

Due to the ample Sino-American relations China does not try to build position and image of an emerging leader in the region – it does not try to compete with the

USA. China acts only as a player of the world economy, which is interested in the development of other world regions and, because of its principles, it uses its activities connected with providing development assistance also for its own development. The Sino-American relationship in this regard does not look like the relationship of two competitors (Hilton 2013, p. 4).⁵ China even publicly acknowledges that Latin American region belongs to the U.S. sphere of influence. The reason for this unusual humility may be the Chinese expectations that the USA will vice versa recognize Asia as an area of Chinese influence (Ellis 2012, p. 3).

The issues connected with the southern part of the American continent were not discussed very often in the previous years due to other international political (e.g. terrorism or U.S. economic activities in Asia) and domestic economic issues related to the crisis. Recently, Latin America has been getting into the centre of interest of the US (Haibin 2013). The question therefore is whether the Sino-US relations – with regards to their activities and interests in Latin America – will remain at the same cooperative level or whether the two countries will become competitors exactly as they have become in many other areas.

Cooperation of the PRC and USA concerning their activities in Latin America has been coordinated at joint congresses and summits since 2006. The first of such events took place in 2006 in China, when the first U.S. Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs visited his Chinese counterpart, the Head of Latin American Affairs Department at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ellis 2012, p. 1).

The issue of development and the whole picture of the two collaborating centres in providing the development assistance to countries in Latin America should be seen also (and mainly) from the perspective of Latin American countries. There are several factors that seem to be neglected. The first is the nature of the partnership with both donors, regardless of whether it is bilateral or trilateral. It seems that there is not too much emphasis put on what should be the main purpose of providing the development assistance: to contribute to the development of the recipient countries. Another critic question of the US-China discussion regarding their development activities within the given region is, whether the Latin American region should be perceived as one unit. The continent behaves like a relatively diverse group of countries, which should be treated with an individual approach rather than a homogeneous group of states. Finally, there is a question of whether China's cooperation with the United States is sufficient and whether it achieves reasonable efficiency, taking into account the presence of other key players, such as European countries, Russia or India.

There are many differences between development assistance provided to the region from USA and China. Besides different amounts, classification and orientation

⁵ That is a big difference compared to the relationship between China and European donors in Africa.

of the development assistance, there are great differences in the approaches and requests made to provide the assistance. The Chinese approach was described above. To obtain any kind of assistance from the U.S. it requires compliance to a number of restrictions and requirements, including human rights issue, protecting the environment, promising not to send U.S. military personnel to the International Criminal Court, not assisting current or former terrorists, and not using U.S.-provided equipment for anything other than its given purpose (Johnson 2005, p. 5). Many decisions already made can in case of the USA also be changed quite quickly, because they all depend on legislative approval and can be changed if the mood or political situation in the U.S. Congress or another important institutions changes.

4 AREAS OF PROVIDING CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, REALIZED PROJECTS

China focuses its attention on development assistance in particular fields, which may, at a given moment or in the future, bring benefits for China itself. As we can see in Table 1, it focuses mainly on the mining and manufacturing sectors in Latin America. China is a country that builds its economic development on international trade with goods and to sustain its economic growth it needs more sources of raw materials and it requires more energy for its growing production. On the other hand, Latin American countries are abundant with raw materials. Hence, both parties behave like partners based on the simple economic principle of supply and demand.

The second branch of the Chinese interest in the field of development projects is infrastructure. Compared to for example African countries the Latin American region is in this respect much more developed and there is no need to invest so much in this area. Therefore China's development assistance in Latin America does not reach such significance, as it does in Africa.

Humanitarian projects are maybe not on the top of the statistics but they remain a very significant part of the development assistance and they play an important role for improving the Chinese image in the region. In the past China did not focus very much on global health issues. This changed at the beginning of the 21st century when China itself experienced several disastrous infection crises including SARS.⁶ Since then, China pays much greater attention to humanitarian issues. Chinese humanitarian projects include propagating Chinese traditional medicine, training for local medical staff or providing free medical equipment. China has also actively participated in humanitarian assistance projects connected to the effects of devastating earthquakes. For example, China provided assistance of 1.1 million USD and disaster relief supplies with a value of 2 million USD to Chile after the earthquake of 2010 (Bliss 2010, p. 15, 21). Another country, which had the chance to gain Chinese humanitarian assistance, was Haiti. This case is particularly specific, because Haiti

⁶ Severe acute respiratory syndrome.

does not recognize sovereignty of the PRC. Nevertheless, the PRC immediately sent a 60-member rescue team and more than 10 tons of disaster relief supplies with a value of 1.76 million USD to Haiti (Boynton 2012, p. 7).

It is also interesting to focus on the Chinese military assistance to the Latin American region. It is clear that Chinese military leaders are well aware of U.S. dominance in the region. At present China's military cooperation with some Latin American countries is growing, but these activities represent only a small portion of mutual economic interchange.

Table 1: Chinese development assistance by Area and continent (million USD)

	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Asia</i>
Mining/Manufacturing	18,585	9,432	4,788
Infrastructure/Public projects	7,535	17,865	6,548
Humanitarian projects	32	802	159
Military projects	0	4	170
Technical assistance	1	10	3
Others	608	5,024	2,276

Source: own elaboration based on NYU Wagner School (2008).

The goal of Chinese development projects is – besides the mutually beneficial cooperation – increased visibility in the region. Development projects are thus often used as marketing tools to increase China's own popularity in the region. We can often encounter projects that guarantee improving China's image – construction of roads, building railways, sports arenas, stadiums, etc. Compared to projects of traditional donors in Latin America, i.e. USA, such projects are perceived by the local governments as those, that provide visible and tangible results and generally enjoy public support (Brandt and Adams 2012, p. 13).

5 VOLUME OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

It is difficult to quantify China's development assistance since the PRC does not provide its data to OECD, which is currently the leading institution that keeps statistics on this subject. The Chinese government itself does not publish statistics either. All estimates made within the framework of different research projects were carried out as a list of Chinese development projects published by the Chinese government or registered by recipient countries themselves.

Another difficulty in quantifying the Chinese development assistance is caused by the fact, that the Chinese classification of development assistance is in many aspects different from the one used by the Western world, respectively by OECD countries. There is thus a need to look at the Chinese development assistance differently than at the aid of traditional donors.

One of the institutions that have attempted to estimate the volume of Chinese development assistance was the NYU Wagner School. The results from 2002-2007 are listed below in Table 2.


Table 2: Chinese development assistance by continent 2002-2007 (million USD)

	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Asia</i>
2002	4	10	36
2003	1	838	644
2004	7000	2292	1193
2005	2931	2953	4221
2006	16425	9088	2004
2007	401	17962	6735

Source: own elaboration based on NYU Wagner School (2008).

Development assistance to Latin America makes up a relatively small portion of the total development assistance of China - the estimated volume in 2008 was between 10% (Wanner 2009, p. 4) and 20% (Lum 2009, p. 9). The distribution of Chinese development assistance according to the amount of development projects is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Completed Chinese development projects (% of China's total development projects completed in 1996 - 2005)



Source: Dreher and Fuchs (2011, p. 40).

6 CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE


The Chinese framework for providing development assistance is relatively unclear compared to the developed world. The State Council of the PRC has the authority to decide on strategies for international relations, including the development assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) acts as an intermediary between China and the recipient countries of Chinese development assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also plays an advisory role in making the project agreements with the recipient countries and sends its representatives to international conferences dealing with international development policy. The State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs act as the governing bodies responsible for setting up rules and policies for Chinese international development cooperation. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible for the allocation of resources to subordinate bodies involved in economic and development cooperation. These include in particular the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) and the China Development Bank (CDB).

The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for all international capital transactions with a grant element. The Ministry of Commerce has created a number of subordinate institutions, which are responsible for carrying out the Chinese foreign development policy. They include the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation which was given authority to manage, implement and evaluate Chinese development projects at the operational level. The department for Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation then manages and oversees Chinese companies involved in projects in Latin America. The America and Oceania Affairs Division has a purely advisory role in the field of Chinese development assistance in Latin America.

Two Chinese banks are responsible for providing loans. The first, Chinese Eximbank provides subsidized loans for development projects and low-interest loans for those developing countries that buy Chinese products and technologies. The Eximbank receives interest subsidies from the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Commerce. The second institution is the China Development Bank (Sangmeister 2011, p. 3). Its role in providing loans to developing countries is described in the final part of this paper. Both banks were created in the reform period in 1994 as the main tools of government banking, finance, development and investment policies (Bräutingam 2009, p. 79).

For better clarity of the institutional organization, see Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Chinese institutional framework for providing development assistance



Source: own elaboration based on data from (1) Chinese Government's Official Web Portal (2012) and (2) Sangmeister (2011, p. 3).

Based on the principle of mutual benefit, China as a provider of the development assistance requires gaining some benefit or profit. This is relatively often criticized by international organizations and traditional providers of development assistance, because development assistance is generally understood as aid to the developing countries for humanitarian or development purposes (Sangmeister 2011, p. 2). Therefore a question arises whether a project which is beneficial not only to the receiving side, but also to the provider itself, should be called “development aid” and whether it is “aid” or “assistance” when it brings benefits to both parties. If we look at the whole issue from China’s point of view, we have to admit that such behaviour is not unreasonable. China considers itself as a developing country and based on the statistics of the Western world this is a correct view. Not long ago it had been mentioned only as a net recipient of development assistance; now it has become a donor too. In such context, it seems rather pointless to criticize China for requiring something back for its resources. It is rather a philosophical question concerning more the naming convention of Chinese activities in the developing countries than their nature itself.

7 CHINESE LOANS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Most Chinese international loans come from both Chinese financial institutions mentioned above – Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) and China Development Bank (CDB). In 2010 these two banks provided in total more resources in the form of loans than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of the USA combined. The total sum of loans provided by China was 75 billion USD (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012, p. 1).

Table 3: Chinese loans provided to the Latin America region

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Amount (Billion USD)</i>				<i>Total amount (Billion USD)</i>	<i>Total number of projects</i>
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>		
Venezuela	1,0	21,5	9,5	4,5	44,5	10
Brazil	10,3	1,2	0,4		12,1	5
Argentina		10,4	1,4		11,8	4
Ecuador	1,0	3,3	3,0	2,1	9,3	8
Bahamas			2,5		2,5	3
Peru	0,1		0,2	0,1	2,3	4
Mexico	1,0				1,0	1
Jamaica	0,1	0,4	0,1		0,7	6
Bolivia	0,1	0,3	0,3		0,7	3
Costa Rica					0,3	1
Chile			0,2		0,2	1
Guayana				0,1	0,1	1
Colombia	0,8				0,1	1
Uruguay					0,0	1

Source: own elaboration based on data from Inter-American Dialogue (2013).

Also in this case, China makes no political requests, but asks for economic benefits. Several countries in the Latin American region appreciate such an approach (e.g. Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador). These countries prefer the Chinese approach that does not require political compromises or reforms, and which is based almost exclusively on economic decisions. Those countries received 91% of all Chinese loans designated for Latin America between 2005 and 2011. On the other hand, traditional U.S. allies prefer using the opportunity to receive loans from the leader of the continent. This group includes countries such as Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico. It is evident that the nature of regimes which are active within the Latin American region is crucial for making the decision about which of the two big partners to take advantage of. State regimes based on democratic principles do not have problems with requirements imposed by the Western donors. On the other hand, countries that would have to change the nature of their political regimes dramatically or implement significant reforms prefer development cooperation with China and other non-Western donors.

An overview of Chinese loans provided to the region is presented in Table 3.

The PRC allows the loans provided to be compensated by purchasing Chinese goods, implementing development projects by Chinese companies or concessionary purchasing of raw materials.

The first case, i.e. purchasing Chinese products to partially offset debt, can be illustrated by the example of Argentina, which received a loan in the amount of 3 billion USD from CDB in 2010. This loan is conditioned by Argentine demand for Chinese trains in the future (Hilton 2013, p. 3).

Another option for China to benefit from foreign aid is to implement the project in question by Chinese companies. An example could be a loan in the amount of 1.68 billion USD provided by CDB to Brazil to construct a hydroelectric plant in the Amazon. The project should be implemented by the Chinese company Sinohydro Corp (Gill and Sanderson 2011).

Since 2006, most of the Chinese loans in the Latin American region were provided to enable more Chinese companies to gain access to the mining sector or to secure cheaper purchases of raw materials. 91% of these loans were provided to four countries – Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. CDB or Eximbank provided the loan and required getting a given quantity of raw materials, such as oil, for every day of drawing the loan. China would pay the market price for it. The money would not go to the country exporting the raw materials, but straight to the Chinese bank (CDB/Eximbank), which deletes part of the debt. Such an obligation of the borrower thus guarantees China a smooth import of raw materials needed for its further development – for example, oil obtained through these activities makes up half of China's total annual oil imports (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012, p. 14).

China is often criticized for such practices by traditional donors. It should be noted, however, that this strategy was not born in China, but in Japan in the 1970s. At that time, Japan used the same tactics in lending to China. Likewise, it was Japan focusing on infrastructure projects in addition to the mining sector (Lum 2009, p. 6). This method of loan repayment is also a kind of guarantee for the provider of the loan. This allows China to lend even to less solvent countries for which it would be complicated to obtain a loan from developed countries and international organizations.

Another substantial question for examination of the Chinese development assistance is whether loans provided by the China Development Bank carry elements of the development assistance. This could be expected due to the designation of the bank as “development”, but taking into consideration the fact that interests of these loans are often higher than the interests of Western banks and institutions and international organizations, this conclusion seems to be inaccurate.

The OECD covers most of the traditional donors in the Latin American region by its Development Co-operation Directorate – Development Assistance Committee (DCD-DAC). Its approach and understanding of development assistance is in many aspects different from China's.

According to the OECD, a loan is considered development assistance if (1) it is received by a public entity; (2) its main goal is to contribute to the economic development; and (3) there is a grant element, usually at least 25 % of the provided loan. China does not make many differences between development loans and foreign investments. There is no general definition within the Chinese legislation. The loan is usually understood as a kind of development assistance if its interest rate is below market rates or if it is provided in a situation when no other international institution can or wants to provide it. It does not have to contain any grant elements (Vieiro 2012).

Providing loans from the OECD point of view is not an instrument of competition between providers, and it tries to help (at least officially) beneficiaries of the loan only (it should not come with any tangible benefits for donors). Upon closer examination one can find out that loans provided by the CDB have a higher interest rate than those offered by Western institutions (e.g. the IBRD or World Bank), which is surprising at first sight. However, it can be explained by the high level of credit risk due to political and economic conditions in the recipient countries. Countries that receive a loan from the CDB often cannot get it from international financial institutions and therefore are willing to pay higher interest rates to Chinese banks.

The IBRD also provides its preferential loans at low interest rates in the form of official development assistance. That is not the case with the CDB – the borrower always has to repay the whole borrowed amount including a relatively high interest.

Chinese Eximbank takes over the role of providing cheap loans. The Eximbank increases the amount of financial resources in the financial market of the recipient country through issuance of bonds. It receives a subsidy for the concessionary loans from the Ministry of Finance. The PRC counts these loans as a part of its development assistance, which is in contrast with the philosophy and practices of the OECD, that strictly prohibit including export credits in development assistance (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012, p. 12). If we focus on Eximbank's rules for lending, we find out that all of the above aspects are very openly communicated to potential applicants for obtaining credit. Loans are granted for medium and long-term projects, which should have two objectives: (1) promoting economic development and improving living standards in developing countries and (2) increasing economic cooperation among developing countries and China. The loan is used primarily for the purchase of mechanical and electronic products, complete sets of equipment, high-tech products, services and materials from China.

Infrastructure, energy, transport and telecommunications are identified as the main areas for developing projects (almost 90% loans provided by Chinese banks are connected to such projects – Hilton 2013, p. 3). The projects should bring economic benefits and be the starting point for building new job opportunities in the recipient country. Chinese companies should be selected as suppliers of equipment or services, or as production partners. At least 50% of the contracted goods and services needed to

implement the projects should come from China. Also, the loans should not be lower than 20 million RMB (approximately 3.2 million USD) (China Exim Bank 2013).

8 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has analysed the principles and practices of Chinese development assistance provided to Latin America. The author's aim was to contribute to the discussion regarding Chinese international activities in developing countries. China's share in international trade and foreign direct investment is often discussed, but the engagement of China in providing development assistance is often being disregarded although it is becoming clear that China will play more and more of a significant role in this regard.

Within the last two decades, China has shifted from being a recipient of the development assistance to becoming its provider. The reasons for providing this assistance, however, are often of a different nature than those of Western countries. China applies rules for providing the development assistance, which come from China's general principles for international cooperation with foreign countries. The principles of Peaceful Co-Existence that are the basic set of rules for China's international activities are considered by the Chinese government as the backbone of its foreign development programs. This document develops the requirements that are put on the recipient countries as well as expectations of China as the donor. Latin American countries have until recently relatively widely supported Taiwan in the China-Taiwan dispute on state sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and mainland areas. Nowadays this political issue is not as strong as it used to be, but recognition of the One China Policy is still crucial for obtaining resources from the budget of Chinese development assistance.

China often regards itself as a progressively developing country applying practices that lead to economic growth and development. According to its principles, it does not put any politically motivated requirements, but considers it necessary to get some economic benefits for its provided development assistance. This could mean benefits in form of helping the Chinese political intentions finding solutions for raw material issues or involving Chinese private companies in the development projects. This approach is in many respects different from the perspective of traditional donors. For Latin America, such a traditional partner is the USA, which has had strong historical ties to the region as well as an advantage arising from its geographical position. So far, the Chinese side pointed out that the Latin American region has always been traditionally influenced by the USA and their position is quite strong within this region. Until now the ways of the USA as the traditional donor in the region, and the PRC as the new donor have not crossed significantly in the field of providing development assistance – this is mainly thanks to the nature of Chinese development assistance, to its economic orientation and character of requirements. In this regard, two questions arise. First, whether such a relationship would persist in the

next period, and second, whether the situation of two collaborating centres is more beneficial to the recipient countries than a potential competition between the two main donors resulting in lower interest rates and looser conditions for providing the aid.

The classification of Chinese development assistance is in many ways different from what is applied by the OECD and other international institutions and authorities. The Chinese government does not publish comprehensive data necessary for evaluating the volume and direction of development assistance. This topic will be a subject of further research activities of the author. The aim for the future is to gain as much relevant information and data relating to the Chinese development projects and provided funds as possible, so that such information could be further analysed. At this point the obtained data clearly shows that most Chinese development projects in Latin America are focused and implemented within the mining sector and infrastructure. Both areas are clearly connected with each other and their development in the region will also contribute to further Chinese investment and business activities.

There are several crucial governmental institutions in China which decide about providing Chinese development assistance: the State Council of the PRC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce, as well as the two major financial institutions which focus on providing the development assistance: the Export Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) and the China Development Bank (CDB). China perceives providing the development assistance as a help of one country to another country, i.e. a help of one government to another one. Therefore it has been providing the development assistance exclusively through the channels mentioned above.

One of the forms of the Chinese development assistance is to provide preferential loans with low or zero interest. This brings China additional advantageous transactions in the form of purchase/procurement of raw materials, exports of Chinese goods or the implementation of development projects by Chinese companies. China is often criticised for immorality of such behaviour and practises and for taking the benefits only for itself. China is often blamed on the fact that instead of helping developing countries it causes their further plundering and impoverishment. When judging this, one should take in consideration two important aspects. First, China is a developing country itself and it is therefore not too surprising that it expects to gain some benefits for a given amount of money. Second, it must be noted that the Chinese development assistance is the last possible option for implementing development projects for many countries. Moreover, it is not China, but the recipient countries who decide to accept Chinese conditions.

The answer to the question of whether the above described transactions and projects can be considered development assistance depends largely on the observer's point of view. However, it is clear that these activities contribute to general economic development in the recipient countries. With increasing globalization and the dynamic economic development of the PRC we can expect that China will become more and

more visible in the field of development projects in developing countries. Therefore, already today the attention should be paid to China as a donor. International organizations should work on unifying the donors' activities to increase the benefits of development assistance provided.

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OVPLYVNÚJÚ VÝDAVKY NA ZDRAVOTNÍCTVO HOSPODÁRSKY RAST? DÔKAZY Z VYBRANÝCH ÁZIJSKÝCH KRAJÍN

DOES HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES

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Výsledky výskumov dlhodobo poukazujú na fakt, že existuje silná pozitívna korelácia medzi výdavkami na zdravotníctvo a hrubým domácim produktom. Predkladaný článok skúma vzťah medzi hospodárskym rastom a výdavkami na zdravotníctvo v 23 vybraných ázijských štátoch. Používa panelovú analýzu dát za roky 1996-2009 a tvorí model metódou GLS. Výsledky výskumu potvrdzujú existenciu silnej pozitívnej korelácie medzi hospodárskym rastom a výdavkami na zdravotníctvo. Grangerov test kauzality ukazuje, že z krátkodobého hľadiska je vzťah obojsmerný, kým z dlhodobého hľadiska prebieha kauzalita jednosmerne od výdavkov na zdravotníctvo k hospodárskemu rastu.

Kľúčové slová: výdavky na zdravotníctvo, hospodársky rast, GLS, panelový ECM model.

A strong and positive correlation between health care expenditure and GDP has been the consistent finding of research. Based on this concept about the role of health in the economy, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure. We use panel data analysis of 23 selected Asian countries over the period of 1996-2009. We develop a framework by employing a series of respective tests and estimate the model using GLS approach. The results confirm presence of a positive

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and significant relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure. The Granger causality test also indicates the existence of bidirectional causality between health care expenditure and economic growth in the short-run and unidirectional causality from health care expenditure to GDP in the long-run.

Key words: health care expenditure, economic growth; GLS, panel-type ECM model.

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1 INTRODUCTION

From the early 1990s up to now the relationship between health care expenditure and GDP has become an interesting subject of research in the field of health economy. This is attributed to a rapid rise in the share of health care expenditures in GDP which has been a source of concern for developed countries (Mehrara et al. 2010). For instance, this ratio accounted for 4% of US GDP in the 1930s, later it increased to 13.1% during 1990s and reached 14.5% during 2000s (Tang and Zhang 2007, Warshawsky 1999). However, far less attention has been paid to this subject in developing countries. For policy makers, it is crucial to know the effect of health care expenditure on national income – this helps them to plan health reforms and efficiently allocate resources (Sulku and Caner 2011). Consequently, the necessity of investigating this relationship becomes obvious.

Human capital as a source of growth warrants a closer look at how change in population's state of health influences economic growth and thus total welfare (Zon and Muysken 2001). The concept of human capital as an important component of development is usually defined broadly by including education, health, training, migration and other investments that enhance an individual's productivity in the equation (Akram et al. 2008). Literature mostly focuses on health as the key element which directly influences economic growth. This paper pays attention to analyzing the relationship between health care expenditure and GDP, while ignoring the role of other factors.

The state of health in a country affects its economic growth. Health is an engine of economic growth (Barro 1996). Wang (2011) found that when health of general population improves, the country can produce more output with any given combination of skills, physical capital and technological knowledge; consequently, improved health status of a nation creates an outward shift in the labor supply and increases productivity of labor (Rahman 2011); thus, a rise in GDP is obvious. Looking at the topic from a slightly different perspective, healthier workforce are less susceptible to disease, more alert, more energetic and are likely to be able to work longer and more productively (Mehrara and Musai 2011, Bukenya, 2009). In addition, higher curative and preventive health care expenditures improve labor participation in

production activity (Erdil and Yetkiner 2009) as the employees are less likely to be absent from work because of illness (Bloom et al. 2004). As a result, the GDP rises.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth in selected Asian countries during the period of 1996-2009. By using econometric regression techniques, this paper analyzes the effect of health expenditure on economic growth. In addition, in order to explore the long and short-run causal relationships between increases in health care expenditure and economic growth, the study employs Granger causality test to find the direction of mutual causality of these two variables.

The organization of this paper is as follows: the next section explains the purpose of the study, in section 3 we offer literature review, section 4 provides an overview of the data set, section 5 describes the model and empirical results, and finally, the last section presents conclusions.

2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The existence of a positive relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth has been well established. However, the extent of this relationship remains debatable. Hence, it is essential to determine whether this link exists in the developing countries and how strong it is. This study intends to shed light on this question and demonstrate the positive effect of health care expenditure on economic growth.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

The relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth is well recognized in the literature. Most studies find a positive relationship between health care expenditure and the GDP. A strong interest in this research area was initiated by the findings of Kleiman (1974). In his pioneering study, he stated that there is not only a strong positive correlation between health care expenditure and GDP, but also that fluctuations in the GDP can be explained by fluctuations in health care expenditure. This subject became the focus of research for the following three decades. In the following text, we categorize literature on this topic by methods used.

The first group is made up of those analyses that use quantile regression methods. Among them we can highlight the paper by Wang (2011) who reports that in countries with low level of growth, the influence of health care expenditure on economic growth is small. In countries with medium and high levels of economic growth, the influence of health care expenditure on economic growth is positive. As found by Chen (2009) conditional distribution of per capita health care expenditure on GDP is asymmetric. For lower GDP countries, the conditional distribution is skewed to the right which means less health care tends to be consumed, but in high GDP countries the conditional distribution is skewed to the left which means higher expenditure on health.

The second branch of literature consists of unit root and cointegration tests Dreger and Reimers (2005) focused on evidence of cointegration relationship between health care expenditure and GDP for a sample of 21 OECD countries. Also Sulku and Caner (2011) performed a cointegration analysis in Turkey and found evidence of multivariate cointegration relationship between health care expenditure and GDP.

The third branch of literature involves those studies that consider structural breaks. When examining the relationship between these two variables, it is important to determine whether or not this relationship is stable or it exhibits a structural break. Sharma and Srivastava (2011) allowed for a structural break and found a significant long-run relationship between subcomponents of aggregate health expenditure and GDP in Australia. Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000) examined stationary of health expenditure and GDP for OECD countries. Unit root and stationary trend results for their sample indicate both health expenditure and GDP are non-stationary.

Studies on the relationship between health care expenditure and GDP are not limited to the above mentioned findings only. Amiri and Ventelou (2010) used a modified version of the Granger causality test to evaluate relationship between GDP per capita and health care expenditure per capita in the United States for the period of 1965-1984. Their results show that there exists a bilateral relationship between these two variables. Erdil and Yetkiner (2009) inspected the Granger causality relationship between real per capita GDP and real per capita health care expenditure. Their findings show that for low and middle income countries there is one-way causality from income to health, whereas the reverse holds for high income countries. As can be seen, many studies – no matter what method they used – point to the positive relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure.

4 DATA

Analyses of inter-relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth can be conducted at individual level, at regional level within a country, and for aggregate country data (Bhargava et al. 2001). A growing amount of literature focuses on the latter, including McCoskey and Selden (1998), Nancy and Paul (2001), Jewell et al. (2003), Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005), Narayan (2009), Baltagi and Moscone (2010). We follow their method and use country level data as well. However, most of the empirical studies are restricted to OECD countries (Chen et al. 2009). In this paper, our sample consists of 23 Asian countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

The relationship between health care expenditure and GDP can be investigated by using comprehensive data sets and performing either cross-section, time-series or panel-data analysis. Table 1 reports various data sets and methods used in previous research.

Table 1: Previous research and regression methods used

Author	Method
Newhouse (1977)	Cross section
Parkin et al. (1987)	Cross section
Hansen and King (1996)	Time series
Bukenya (2009)	Time series
Hitiris and Posnett (1992)	Panel
Hansen and King (1998)	Panel
McCoskey and Selden (1998)	Panel
Bhargava et al. (2001)	Panel
Jewell et al. (2003)	Panel
Baltagi and Moscone (2010)	Panel
Magazzino and Mele (2012)	Panel

Source: Own elaboration.

Regression analysis based on time series neglects the influence of economic integration, thereby resulting in inefficient testing power. On the other hand, cross-section analysis may overlook the influence of time. Current literature on international economic integration tends to be based on the analysis of panel data, which aims to avoid the inefficient testing power of traditional time-series and cross-section approaches (Wang 2011). Hence, to obtain more powerful results and to avoid the issue of small sample, our results are derived from panel data on 23 countries obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) database.

5 THE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.1 Description of the model

As was already mentioned, this paper aims to supply evidence on the relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure. The empirical pattern is as follows:

$$Y = f(HCE) \quad (1)$$

Economic growth is a function of health care expenditure. The construction of the relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure can be specified as:

$$\text{Log}Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \text{Log}PHCE_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{it} indicates GDP growth of country i at time t , PHCE stands for private expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health of country i at time

t , α_i is the fixed effect of each country, β_i displays the coefficient of explanatory variable and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term of each country at time t .¹

To investigate the relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure we employ standard econometric tests. The process of empirical analysis consists of the following five steps: We start by performing Leamer and Hausman tests to understand whether the regression is panel or not and to choose between fixed or random effect. Second, we use three unit root tests to verify that the data series are stationary. In the third step, likelihood ratio test is implemented to determine whether heteroscedasticity exists. In step four the model is estimated via generalized least squares (GLS). Finally, Granger causality test is applied to uncover the direction of causality both in the short and long term.

5.2 Leamer and Hausman tests

Mixing cross-section dimension (N) and time dimension (T) into panel data leads to reliable results, which is the main advantage of this method (Breitung and Pesaran 2008). However, before estimating the model, we must determine the type of data used. For this purpose, we employ Leamer test. Table 2 shows the results for Leamer test at 5% significance level. As can be seen, since the probability of the test statistic is less than 5 per cent, the null hypothesis of pool data is rejected and panel data method is adequate.

The next step is to choose between fixed effects model (FEM) or random effects model (REM). Baltagi (2001) emphasized that the choice between the fixed and random effects models should be solely based on theoretical consideration. In this study, in order to validate the choice of fixed effects, the Hausman specification test with an asymptotic chi-square distribution is performed. The statements of hypotheses are as follows:

H_0 : existence of random effects model

H_1 : existence of fixed effects model

The result shows that the null hypothesis of a random effects model should be rejected. This confirms that fixed effects model should be used (table 2).

¹ In search for the correct model, we used six other variables as proxies for health care expenditure: social security expenditure on health as a percentage of general government expenditure on health, total (private plus public) expenditures on health as a percentage of gross domestic product, general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health, per capita total expenditure on health (PPP int. \$), per capita government expenditure on health (PPP int. \$) and general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure. However, only the variable of private expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health turned out to be statistically significant, therefore, the other variables were excluded from further analyses.

Table 2: Results of Leamer and Hausman tests

Test	Distribution	Stat.	Prob.
Leamer	F	3.740	0.0000
Hausman	Chi2	0.029	0.5926

Source: Own elaboration.

5.3 Panel unit root tests

Another important test in this perspective is the panel unit root test. Jewell et al. (2003) pointed out that ignoring this test will lead to a spurious regression. Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005) described various types of panel unit root tests in great detail. Levin et al. (2002) applied panel unit root with heterogeneous dynamics, fixed effects and determinant trend. Also, Im et al. (2003) proposed unit root tests for dynamic heterogeneous panels based on the mean of individual unit root statistics. Moreover, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) used Fisher statistic as a type of unit root. While a great deal of research has been devoted to the use of unit root tests, the most popular seem to be the approaches by Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) – LLC and IPS unit root tests. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is also used often (Maddala and Wu 1999). Hence, we use these three tests in our research.

In these tests, the null hypothesis assumes existence of unit root in series. Table 3 presents results of these tests. The results provide evidence that null hypothesis should be rejected at 5% significance level. The variables are stationary and there is no need to use cointegration test.

Table 3: Results of unit root tests

H ₀ : Unit root	LogY		LogPHCE	
	Stat.	Prob.	Stat.	Prob.
LLC	-5.8805	0.0000	-5.4127	0.0000
IPS	-3.4892	0.0002	-3.2841	0.0005
ADF	90.2449	0.0001	83.6668	0.0006

Source: Own elaboration.

5.4 Likelihood ratio tests

For avoiding heteroscedasticity in the model, the Likelihood ratio test has been employed. The result (shown in table 4) indicates that the hypothesis based on the existence of homoscedasticity in variances should be rejected and thus, the model has heteroscedasticity. In this case, the best way to estimate the model is the method of Generalized Least Squares (GLS). By doing this, autocorrelation in error terms will also be removed.

Table 4: Results of Likelihood ratio test

LR Chi2	Prob.
109.37	0.0000

Source: Own elaboration.

For simplicity, we briefly summarize the process of testing in table 5.

Table 5: Summary of the testing process

Leamer	Panel/Pool	Panel
Hausman	Fixed/Random	Fixed
Unit root	Stationary/Non-Stationary	Stationary
Likelihood	Heteroscedasticity/Homoscedasticity	Heteroscedasticity

Source: Own elaboration.

5.5 GLS estimation

Having specified the process of estimation of the model, in order to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity, the so-called GLS regression method is employed. The result is shown in table below. As mentioned previously, the variables in the model are in the form of natural logarithms.

Table 6: Results of GLS regression

Variable	Coef.	Std. error	Z	P> Z
Log HCE	0.3190205	0.1069261	2.93	0.003
Cons	0.3879284	0.4193765	0.93	0.355
Prob. = 0.0034		$\chi^2 = 8.57$		

Source: Own elaboration.

As can be seen, the probability of χ^2 statistics is significant, which indicates that model estimation is well organized. The results give evidence of positive relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure. In other words, the coefficient points out that with a one-per-cent increase in health care expenditure (measured as private expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health), the GDP will rise by 0.319 %.

5.6 Causality

In investigating the relationship between economic growth and health care expenditure an important question is whether this relationship is unidirectional or bidirectional. It is therefore necessary to determine the direction of causality between economic growth and health care expenditure. To do this, we use the Granger causality test. To undertake this test between GDP and PHCE variables, the following error correction models are established:

$$\Delta \text{Log}Y_{it} = \alpha_{1j} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_{11ik} \Delta \text{Log}Y_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_{12ik} \Delta \text{Log}PHCE_{2it-k} + \sigma_{1i} EC_{it-k} + \mu_{1it} \quad (3)$$

$$\Delta \text{Log}PHCE_{it} = \alpha_{2j} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_{21ik} \Delta \text{Log}PHCE_{2it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \theta_{22ik} \Delta \text{Log}Y_{2it-k} + \sigma_{2i} EC_{it-k} + \mu_{2it} \quad (4)$$

Table 7: Results of causality tests

Variable	Short-run causality		Long-run causality
	$\Delta \text{Log}Y_{it}$	$\Delta \text{Log}PHCE_{it}$	EC
$\Delta \text{Log}Y_{it}$	-	5.07 (0.079)	0.0034 {-5.57}
$\Delta \text{Log}PHCE_{it}$	9.01 (0.011)	-	-0.0027 {2.015}

Source: Own elaboration.

As can be seen from table 7, there is a bi-directional causality between economic growth and health care expenditure in the short run. With a negative and significant EC coefficient (-0.0027, t-statistics = 2.015), there is a one-way causality from private health care expenditure (PHCE) to economic growth (GDP) in the long run.

6 CONCLUSION

Health is one of the essential determinants of any country's economic development and therefore plays an important role in economic activities. Analysing the impact of health care expenditure as a key element of economic growth has got a lot of attention in recent decades. The main objective of this study was to find the evidence of relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth. To fulfil this aim we used panel data analysis on 23 selected Asian countries for the period of 1996-2009. To confirm the validity of our results, we applied a series of standard econometric tests consisting of Leamer, Hausman, unit root and likelihood tests. The last test showed that there was a problem with heteroscedasticity. We tackled this problem by using GLS method. Our results provide evidence that a positive and significant relationship between health care expenditure and economic growth exists. Also, with regard to the Granger causality test, the study found bi-directional causality between the variables of health care expenditure and economic growth in the short run and unidirectional causality from health care expenditure to economic growth in the long run.

The policy implication of this study is that health expenditure has direct impact on economic growth. This leads us to the conclusion that countries that desire to have a thriving society must pay more attention to health care expenditures and their structure.

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POSTAVENIE ETIKY NA MEDZINÁRODNÝCH FINANČNÝCH TRHOCH THE STATUS OF ETHICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS

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V súčasnosti sú medzinárodné finančné trhy kritizované najmä pre nedostatok, respektíve absenciu etiky v aktivitách na finančných trhoch, výskyt morálneho hazardu, vysoký podiel špekulatívnych obchodov a neudržateľnú hru s rizikom. V predkladanom príspevku sa venujeme analýze predpokladu významnej úlohy etického správania sa subjektov na medzinárodných finančných trhoch a charakteristike významných faktorov, ktoré prispievajú k zvýšenému sklonu k neetickému správaniu na trhoch. Cieľom skúmania danej problematiky je identifikácia niektorých eticky otázných foriem správania na finančných trhoch, ktoré ponúkame k ďalšej diskusii.

Kľúčové slová: etika, finančné trhy, špekulácie

Nowadays, international financial markets are particularly criticized for a shortage, or absence, of ethics in their activities, creating a presence of moral hazards, as well as a high proportion of speculative trading and therefore competing in an unsustainable game of risk. This article offers an analysis of the significance of ethical behavior in international financial markets. We also examine notable factors that contribute to the increased tendency for unethical behavior in financial markets. The purpose of this research is to identify ethically questionable forms of behavior in financial markets and to discuss them.

Key words: ethics, financial markets, speculation

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1 INTRODUCTION

One of the first references related to ethics in the field of economics is found in Aristotle's *The Nicomachean Ethics*.² Aristotle (2010, p. 67) stated that "regarding things that have a use, it is possible to use them either well or badly and wealth belongs among things useful to us." Aristotle did not consider wealth as something negative or useless, but on the contrary he regarded wealth as beneficial – if it is used correctly. If good or correct usage is equivalent or comparable to ethical behavior, we can state by analogue that financial markets are beneficial to those subjects who interact and use them correctly.

Amartya Sen (1987), in his book *On Ethics and Economics*, attempts to explain the symbioses between ethics and economics, the combination of which can potentially lead to more productive economies. He remarked with regard to the historical evolution of modern economics, that economics and politics were both branches of moral ethics. From the outset, economics has shown a tight coherence with ethics and moral philosophy. As testament to this, economics was formerly taught at Cambridge university as a part of Moral Science, which also referred to the original nature of economics. For instance, Adam Smith, who was later to become the "father" of modern economics, was originally a professor of moral philosophy.

However, Sen also mentioned that some authors (for instance Lionel Robbins in his work *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*) questioned the logic of associating these two disciplines together, seeing them almost as mutual opposites. In Sen's words "he [Robbins] was taking a position that was quite unfashionable then, though extremely fashionable now". We can subsequently add that an effort to separate ethics from economics is today not only fashionable, but for some groups also very advantageous. These groups are able to achieve an enormous profit to satisfy their needs, and on the other hand their behavior contributes to the collapse of whole financial systems.

In this paper we will discuss some of the questionable forms of behavior within financial markets, which do not follow principles of ethics and may also cause turmoil on financial markets. The main **purpose** of this paper is to define the status of ethics in international financial markets, to discuss the need of ethics in financial markets, to identify the main supporters of unethical practices in those markets and to give examples of problematic areas where ethics in financial markets has already collapsed. Using **methods** of analysis and synthesis we will identify ethically questionable forms of behavior in financial markets. The main **contribution** of the present paper consists in methodological summarization of the status of ethics in financial markets which we develop into crucial questions for further research in this field.

² If we consider wealth as a part of economics during that period.

2 DEFINITION OF ETHICS IN THE ECONOMICS

The first section provides a brief summary of general definitions of ethics by different authors. The section refers to different authors who offer various definitions of ethics, not only from the economist's point of view.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, we can define ethics in general as "moral principles that govern a person's behavior or the conducting of an activity". The *English Collins Dictionary* lists a range of items that are covered by the word, such as "conscience, moral code, morality, moral philosophy, moral values, principles, rules of conduct, standards". The term ethics is also used to describe the norms or standard that the community applies to evaluate an individual's behavior (Clements, 2010, p. 6). In general, if we apply the definition of ethics to general perception of world economy, we are able to identify a few common principles that mankind as a "world community" applies to evaluate the behavior of individuals.

Philip J. Clements (2010, p. 2) considered the universal business standards in the following sentences: "We will not break the law", "The customer is always right", and the Golden rule "Do unto others as you would have them to do unto you", as well as "do what is right all of the time." The former statements concerning ethical behavior are also valid in cases where we neglect the diversity of cultural, religious, social, economic and other characteristics of different states, nations and countries in the world. Although the statements are generally applicable, separately they are not sufficient for a perfect description of an ideal relation between ethics and economics, or between ethics and the behavior of economic subjects. Clements (2010, p. 2) claims that the statement about not breaking the law is a minimum standard and not adequate for business. Furthermore he indicated that the "do what is right all the time" statement reinforces the importance of high standards and that the business motto "the customer is always right" only prioritizes the customer over company interests; nevertheless customer interests often break the standards.

John Maxwell, in his work *There's No Such Thing as Business Ethics*, summarized all business principles into the Golden rule. The Golden rule seems to express the basis of ethical behavior or ethics as a whole. It does not deny the concept of homo economicus, which considers humans as rational and self-interested actors able to make their own decisions. Adam Smith (1998, p. 30) wrote in his well-known work *The Wealth of Nations* that "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest", thus he presented a human being as an egoistic actor who only focuses on satisfying his own needs and interests. However, to behave ethically according to the Golden rule is in the interest of every "homo economicus", because "do unto others as you would have them do to you" or in negative form "one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated" brings everybody an advantage or some kind of a benefit. We could also describe ethics according to Dempsey (1999) "as a

long-term consideration and an effort to resolve the conflict between selfishness and selflessness; between our material needs and our conscience“.

3 THE IMPORTANCE AND NEED OF ETHICS IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

The third section of this paper introduces general characterization of financial markets, financial markets' subjects and certain forms of unethical behavior which existence on financial market attack its vulnerability. Moreover, the section discovers the reason of the need of ethics on financial markets.

Generally, each market is defined as a mechanism for implementing the interests of market actors, as a place for an interaction between buyers and sellers. Specifically, a financial market can be defined as a place where supply and demand for financial resources encounter each other and where the owners of available financial resources meet the candidates interested in their use. The financial market is also a place where various financial instruments are traded or exchanged. International financial markets, which connect various national financial markets, can be classified in various ways. The basic classification is divided into three branches – international monetary market, international capital market and international derivatives market.

Among the major players in the international financial markets are: individuals as owners of financial resources with an interest to valorize them effectively; companies interested in advantageous acquirement of capital resources; governments with the need to finance their debts; investment banks seeking opportunities for capital appreciation and commercial banks as mediators for households to access the financial markets; mutual, pension, sovereign and hedge funds as tools for various types of investments; central banks which control the market situation. An outstanding role is played by intermediaries, who simplify the operation and location of free capital movement and who provide direct access to the financial market.

Ethics in financial markets or the financial sector covers all financial activities like banking ethics, stock market ethics, insurance ethics, and ethics of gambling, debt management, microfinance, speculation, black markets, money laundering and others (Stückelberger, 2012, p. 43). The vulnerability of financial markets is mainly affected by unfair trading practices as fraud trading, manipulations with prices and conditions, uncontrollable games of risk, speculative operations, greed of market subjects, contractual difficulties and many others.

Unfair trading practices help decrease investor confidence in the integrity of financial markets and speculative activities produce excess volatility of market prices (Jamnik, 2011, p. 154). The main aim of laws and the self-regulation of exchanges is expressed in the phrase “fair and orderly” markets, which reflects the need in financial markets to balance the twin goals of fairness and efficiency (Jamnik, 2011, p. 154). There is a tendency to make fairness and ethics synonyms. People sometimes say they have been treated unfairly or unethically, by which they usually mean they believe one of their rights has been violated (Shefrin – Statman, 1993, p. 23). In this article we will

consider fairness on financial markets as one of the essential ethical requirements. Fairness can possibly be defined either substantively (meaning that the price of a commodity or security reflects the actual value) or procedurally (when buyers are able to determine actual value of a commodity or security) (Jamnik, 2011, p. 157). Fairness is closely linked to the fact that nowadays not every market participant has the same access to information. Information asymmetry in international financial markets is an important current market feature. At present, information in financial markets could be defined as highly expensive, distorted, and inadequate and each participant evaluates them otherwise. Possession of different information is a pervasive feature of markets that is not always ethically objectionable (Jamnik, 2011, p. 154).

One of the main motivating factors for market subjects to participate in financial market is a mediation of available financial resources from subjects who have an excess of financial resources (a creditor) to another subjects who need it (a debtor). The main reason for a creditor to provide available financial resources to financial markets is an effort to capitalize and benefit from international diversification or price differences. On the other hand, the main reason for a debtor to obtain financial resources from financial markets is to borrow at as low an interest rate as possible. The relation between creditor and debtor has to be inevitably built on trust and control. Every economic system or market needs trust at all levels as a basic condition of economic transactions. Credo (the belief, the convictions, the ethical values of a person, group or institution) leads to credibility, which in turn leads to credit, therefore the simple formula for trust and ethics in finance is: Credo + Credibility = Credit (Stückelberger, 2012, p. 43). According OECD (2003, p. 2) “the ability of financial intermediaries to make credible commitments to a certain number of rules and standards of behavior is the source of investors’ trust and confidence – ethics makes trust possible.” Fairness and trust or credo are important features of current markets, without them we observe a tendency of a violation of ethics in behavior of market participants.

4 SUPPORTERS OF THE UNETHICAL PRACTICES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

We assumed that the existence of unethical behavior has to be driven by “supporters” who enable the presence of unethical practices on international financial markets. In the following paragraphs we seek to identify and describe three main drivers of unethical behavior of market subjects which are closely linked. At present, the functioning of international financial markets is criticized for a high share of speculative financial transactions and the unsustainable risk game, which according to common opinion, does not fit into the framework of ethical behavior, or at least is located on the boundaries between ethical and unethical behavior. We will discuss the issue of speculation as a main supporter for unethical practices in financial markets, also the existence of economic bubbles as a popular phenomenon specific to financial markets that provide a suitable environment for unethical behavior. We will also

discuss financial derivative instruments as tools for this kind of practice. It is possible to identify close relations between speculation, economic bubbles, and financial derivatives. We suppose that questionable ethical issues have their roots in speculative behavior, and that they appear mostly within economic bubbles and are practiced by derivative instruments.

4.1 SPECULATION AS A MAIN SUPPORTER FOR UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

A debate related to the perception of speculation on markets has appeared within the academic community since the end of 18th century. The question examines whether the speculation itself is ethically permissible and whether it is possible to justify using speculation on the market or otherwise. Primarily, the dilemma was based on closer specification of speculation as gambling or as a kind of betting. While betting was considered ethically acceptable because it contained a stronger element of intelligent forecasting of reality, conversely, pure gambling was described as relying only on a random sequence of circumstances (Homann – Koslowski – Luetge, 2007, p.222). The debate was concluded with the statement that speculation is not only a pure gambling, because it also incorporates expectations of future development of the market and its subjects. However, these expectations are based on incomplete information and insufficient quantities of empirical data. For centuries, this speculation was characterized in many ways as an activity to anticipate the behavior of market participants and thus to predict the market behavior (Keynes, 2002), as a stimulus for the economy and the existence of financial transactions (Brockway, 1983), as a means of strengthening the mechanism of Friedman's "the invisible hand of the market" or even as a benefit for society if it fills its economic function (Katsuhito, 2010). This means that if speculation means moving goods from the time of their surplus to the period of scarcity, it follows that it must help improve market efficiency (Samuelson, 2010).

An essential element and a motive of using speculative financial operations is the basic principle of speculative operations – leverage. Financial leverage works on the principle of using a small amount of equity by larger volumes of foreign capital to finance investments. The most common example of using leverage is financing through some form of financial derivative (in the next section we will discuss its role during a crisis). This means that we can dispose of a large volume that we do not have, using only a relatively small amount of equity we really possess. One of the main differences of trading by speculative financial transactions compared with the real trade is change of the nature of a business subject. The speculative operations change trading assets (specific property owned) to trading liabilities (foreign capital). Basically, we do business with something that we do not actually own. The huge amount of foreign capital that can be handled simplifies to recourse to activities connected to risky behavior. The ethical question is based on the extent to which speculative behavior with a high degree of risk is compatible with ethical considerations.

A degree of leverage that causes the illusion of increasing the perceived value of the underlying asset was added to derivative financial instruments, which can be regarded as a materialization of speculative financial operations. We can increase the illusion of increased value of underlying assets by gradual layering of risk, thus by increasing leverage. Speculative trading is becoming more attractive because it offers the possibility of higher profits and at the same time it is more dangerous because it equivalently increases the risk of loss. The leverage principle has been opened to a wide range of economically inexperienced subjects, especially individuals and households, which are prone to make irrational decisions with the only aim to make a profit.

4.2 ECONOMIC BUBBLE AS AN ENVIRONMENT FOR UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

The next significant trend on international financial markets is the economic bubbles boom. Economic bubble is a term usually used for the type of economic cycle, which is characterized by sudden expansion, followed by a decrease, many times more dramatic than the initial expansion was. The economic bubble concept also assumes that prices will always rise above their real value, and the increase will continue until prices fall and the bubble bursts.

Minsky's hypothesis in the environment of economic bubbles distinguishes three different concepts of company funding: hedge finance, speculative finance and Ponzi finance (Kindleberger, 2011, p. 29). While hedge finance is sufficient to cover interest payments plus regular indebtedness reduction, in speculative finance new loans must provide for the funding for these purposes. Nowadays, the term Ponzi finance is a general expression for unsustainable forms of funding. In case that hedge finance prevails in the economy, it has an increased tendency for equilibrium searching; if the speculative or the Ponzi finance concept dominates, we recognize the economy as a system with strong deviations (Sivák – Ochotnícky, 2009, p. 4). Minsky argues that in an economy where bubbles had occurred, after boom phase when economic growth had been slowed, companies' funding began to change. Companies that have previously funded their costs by hedge finance tend to move towards speculative finance concepts and companies that have used speculative finance concepts of funding began to enter into the Ponzi finance model. According to the Minsky hypothesis we assumed a tendency, which significantly increases the negative effects of the bubble burst in the economy. We follow the fact that a certain group of companies, which at the time of the euphoria phase of the bubble had funded their costs by risky finance methods, began to ensure liquidity with even riskier and more dangerous ways of funding in the panic phase.

4.3 FINANCIAL DERIVATIVE AS A TOOL FOR UNETHICAL PRACTICES

Derivatives as financial tools cause the future risk to become negotiable. One of the main reasons of trading is to eliminate uncertainty through market risks

exchange known as hedging. Derivatives serve as an insurance against unwanted and unexpected price fluctuations and they reduce cash flow volatility of the company. Another reason for using derivatives is their perception as an investment. Derivatives trading can be an alternative way of direct investment in assets without a real asset possession. Derivatives also allow investing in the assets that it is not possible to buy directly (for example special types of exotics, which are tied to weather forecasts and offer compensation if the temperature in a given area exceeds or falls below a predefined reference temperature). The main advantage of derivatives trading is risk protection with minimal investment and low total transaction costs in comparison with the investment needed to buy an underlying. Derivatives allow rapid product innovation because new contracts can be swiftly introduced to the market. A major advantage, and at the same time a danger, is that nowadays derivatives are ready to fully customize the terms of trade to specific user needs. Current derivative financial instruments are complex, demanding, more and more flexible, and constantly evolving.

The global economic and financial crisis was an evidence that the presence and implementation of high-risk financial instruments destabilize financial sector. High-risk financial instruments, also called toxic assets are the result of uncontrolled speculative games of risk. The speculative operations are the main engine of creation of dangerous and risky derivative instruments. According to the OECD report, the global financial crisis was caused by a combination of risk underestimation and innovative changes of such derivative instruments that allowed leverage to increase uncontrollably (Wignall – Atkinson, 2011). Derivative trading is a game of risk. No policy and no model can eliminate it (Chorafas, 2008, 227). Risk is defined as the probability or threat of harm, injury, a burden, loss or other negative events, which is caused by external or internal vulnerability (Businessdictionary, 2013). Leverage, which is a fundamental principle of speculative financial transactions, provides its holder with a possibility to trade with a whole range of rate risk and this risk is often very difficult to estimate. The problem of derivative financial instruments is that they allow its holder to simulate any financial activity because he has the opportunity to dispose of large volumes of assets and combine different types of exposures.

We can identify a trend in the financial markets of increasing concentration and accumulation of commercial activities associated with derivatives and their connecting to larger units. Systemic risk created during the crisis by global systemically important financial institutions, which unsustainably interlinked risks in the derivative market, is an alarming danger.

5 THE FAILURE OF ETHICS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

In this part of the present article we would like to note some examples of the problematic areas where the ethics in financial markets has already collapsed.

Nowadays the question of ethics is mostly discussed in the financial sector and many economists emphasize the fact that the global financial crisis (2008) was

primarily the crisis of solvency and trust, the crisis of society values where moral hazard at all levels has played the most significant role.

Moral hazard has become one of the most important issues of the global financial crisis and the main problem was that it had occurred at different levels and in different forms. We defined moral hazards as excessive expenditure due to eligibility for insurance benefits (Marshall, 1976, p. 881). According to the OECD (2013), moral hazard describes behavior when agents do not bear the full cost of their actions and are thus more likely to take such actions. The *Financial Times Lexicon* adds that moral hazard arises when a contract or financial arrangement creates incentives for the parties involved to behave against the interest of others (FT LEXIKON, 2013). In the last definition we noticed the part describing a targeted behavior against the interest of others that is in contradiction with the Golden rule representing ethical behavior defined in the first sections of this paper.

The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in the United States in the beginning of the 21st century could be described as moral hazard behavior at the level of the bank system. Fed started to gamble with interest rates through constant reduction of them to very low niveaus with the aim to stimulate investment activities in the domestic economy. The intention was fulfilled and inhabitants of the United States had an easy access to mortgage loans. Low interest rates and the availability of “cheap” money caused a price deformation and distorted information about the real market prices. The results of artificially created “cheap” money by the Fed were also greatly inflated investment demands, particularly in the mortgage market. Expansionary monetary policy of the Fed meant a purchase of government securities or in other words the issue of uncovered and inflated money in circulation.

Moral hazard appeared also on the governmental level in form of rescue packages provided by the government of the United States in several ways. Thanks to the absence of comprehensive rules of selection of companies for financial assistance, the government favored larger companies over smaller ones. Although the fall of Lehman Brothers was an exception, governments have usually followed the “too big to fail” rule. Government intervention, toxic assets repurchase or financial assistance actually mean the spending of taxpayers’ money for rescuing private banks and companies that had made the wrong business decisions and were responsible for unethical behavior. Large companies have changed to an attitude of risk with the possibility of being saved by a rescue package; they started to rely on government assistance and gained a benevolent approach to risk.

Reparations and compensations for the main actors of the crisis (executive directors and managers of large investment companies) in the form of so-called golden parachutes were another form of institutionalization of moral hazard. According to the dictionary, golden parachutes are substantial benefits given to a top executive in case that the company is taken over by another company and the executive is terminated as a result of the merger or takeover. The question is whether it is ethically acceptable to

reward directors and managers, who led their companies to bankruptcy. According to OECD (2003, p. 2), customers believe that the financial institutions are “ethical” (in the sense that they observe rules for behavior that protect customers’ interests) which makes them willing to entrust these institutions with responsibility to manage their assets. The ability to credibly commit to ethical behavior has always been a core business requirement for financial institutions. The importance of ethically correct behavior of companies or institutions was correctly expressed in Curtis’s work *The Financial Crisis and the Collapse of Ethical Behavior* with these words: “When a corporation behaves ethically, it might be functioning well or poorly, and it might be a good or bad firm to invest in, but at least we know how it will behave: it will obey the law, treat its employees respectfully, be honest in its public disclosures, honor its commitments, be a good citizen in the communities where it operates, and so on. But when a corporation behaves badly, we have no idea what to expect.” (Curtis, 2008, p. 10) In every market a certain degree of predictability significantly helps market subjects make rational decisions.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In the present paper, we have outlined a few aspects describing the relation between ethics and financial markets, and its importance for the functioning of financial markets. Because ethics could be perceived as a subjective category in economics, we would like to conclude the present article with a brief summarization of the status of ethics in form of questions resulting from the article. In our opinion, the following questions (and statements) are important for further discussion:

- (1) Two centuries ago the question of whether speculation itself is ethically permissible and whether it is possible to justify using speculation on the market was examined. Is it not necessary to consider and discuss once again the question whether at present, speculation itself is ethically permissible.
- (2) Information in current financial markets could be defined as highly expensive, distorted, and inadequate and each participant evaluates them in a different way. Is it possible to preserve a certain way of ethical objectivity of market subjects’ behavior in case that they are owners of different information?
- (3) Relations between creditors and debtors have to be inevitably built on trust and control. Could a sustainable credit policy of institutions and companies be built without responsibility and credibility?
- (4) Leverage, a fundamental principle of financial derivatives, provides a possibility to trade with a whole range of rate risk which is often very difficult to estimate. Is it ethically correct to develop such financial instruments which allow its holder to simulate any financial activity and to provide an opportunity to dispose large volumes of assets and combine different types of exposures?
- (5) Many derivate financial instruments are created by using a high degree of leverage that causes illusion of increasing perceived value of the underlying

- asset. Could we consider an increase in the price caused by illusion (as opposed to by real value growth) as ethically correct?
- (6) A certain group of companies, which at the time of the euphoria phase of the bubble had used to fund their costs by risky finance methods, began to ensure liquidity with even riskier and more dangerous way of funding in the panic phase. Is it ethically acceptable that after the bubble burst, some companies started to gain missing liquidity by hazardous behavior with a high level of risk and therefore contributed to the formation of the systematic risk?
 - (7) Moral hazard has become one of the most important issues of the global financial crisis and the main problem was that it has occurred at different levels and in different forms. What went wrong in financial markets during the crisis, that moral hazard had appeared as significant on all levels? Would moral hazard even exist if every individual who becomes an actor in the financial market followed ethics and tried “not treat others in ways that he would not like to be treated?”

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**LAURA J. SHEPHERD:
RODOVÁ POLITIKA, NÁSILIE A BEZPEČNOSŤ**

**LAURA J. SHEPHERD:
GENDER, VIOLENCE AND SECURITY**

ZED BOOKS LTD, LONDON, 2013, 224 PP. ISBN 978-1-78032-797-6

*Veronika Valkovičová*¹

Laura J. Shepherd, associate professor at the University of New South Wales, opens her publication with a short prologue explaining how she came to study the theories of international relations in the first year of her undergraduate studies. At the same time she is not hiding how she struggled with the vocabulary inherent to the discourse of realism and liberalism in political thought. Despite the fact that she is not giving out details about how she got interested in neo-constructivism, it is apparent that she believes the critical discourse analysis to be crucial to the field of political sciences. *Gender, Violence and Security* is definitely not the first, nor the last time this author opted for deconstructivist methodology in her study. As she states at the end of her prologue, dealing with gender-based violence in international relations will always be a challenge. At the same time, she answers the question of why one should do so by simply saying that it is a matter of life and death.

Publication *Gender, Violence and Security* is, according to author's objective, not a discourse analysis. She denominates the group of her own analytical tools with a uniform notion discourse-theoretical analysis which is applied on a United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. This document issued in 2000 deals with violence against women and children in armed conflicts, as well as invests considerable interest in the participation of these groups in conflict resolution. Accompanying texts to the Resolution are reports issued by the Secretary General in 2002 and 2004. These are

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also the object of Shepherd's analysis, which is not limiting itself to textual description, but is approaching the text as a set of statements of meaning. Shepherd is being quite inventive and prefers approaches such as double reading (content and description), nodal points analysis (repeating denominations and notions) and the so-called subject positioning which is devoted to representation of various subjects in the selected document. All this, of course, is applied through the prism of neo-constructivist theories presented by Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and J.L. Austin.

Laura J. Shepherd sees the discourse of Resolution 1325 as a framework which positions subjects and thus produces and reproduces gender roles. In this exact context, she applies the theories of Judith Butler, who gives the notion of gender a performative sense. Hereby we can see that Shepherd clearly positions herself as a feminist researcher with quite extensive knowledge of gender policy. She beholds the Security Council to be a discursive and normative authority. As such, the Council possesses the symbolic power to urge states into adoption of gender perspective in their public policy. This means that the text is not only prescriptive in its normative manner, but it also imposes an independent discourse of gender. Furthermore, Shepherd argues that this is not the only issue worth studying. She also believes this to be an arena, where the discourse of gender meets up with the discourse of security policy which causes tensions. The author's aim is per se quite ambitious – she endeavours to unveil the limits of this arena and therefore pinpoint how the Resolution itself (re)produces stereotypes and sets its own limits of effective feasibility.

The primary aim of Laura J. Shepherd is to study the way relevant discourses create the constructs of violence and security. Apart from the prologue and a chapter devoted to methodology, the reader can find five other chapters comprising theoretical foundations of international relations, Secretary General's reports, the analysis of Resolution itself and, quite surprisingly, one may also find a brief enquiry into the authorship of this text which happens to be debatable. Nevertheless, the author keeps reminding us that the simple aim of this work is to provide a meta-perspective of the international relations theories and of how the notions such as gender, gender-based violence, security and nation state are all constructed within their discourse. What Shepherd argues in this work is that the debate about security is inherently related to nation states, which seem to be the ultimate authorities and sources of security. The Resolution as a document based on these foundations perpetuates the realist logic of security, which according to the author happens to be dominant in Anglo-American scholarly environment, and which is based on the classical assumption of an ever-present conflict among individuals. This of course affects the way we conceive threats, it influences what we make of them. The readers may be also surprised to find a separate sub-chapter devoted to the perception of gender and violence, which is quite unseen in the field of international relations. She makes ontological differences between the notions of violence against women, gender-based violence and the so-

called violent reproduction of gender, to which she adheres herself throughout her study.

At the end of her analysis, Laura J. Shepherd comes to a number of astonishing conclusions. The discourse of humanitarian policy, as well as the discourse of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, often operate with the notion “women and children“. This automatically associates these two groups together and results in cognitive alienation of women’s abilities and capabilities. This idea of womanhood also happens to reside in concepts of maternity, peacebuilding and tenderness/care, which does not open up the scope for different realities of women’s lives. Women are constructed as the weaker sex, which precludes any potential reader of the Resolution from accepting a situation where women would be the active and involved actors of violence – ergo, they would not fulfil the presented vision of womanhood. Furthermore, this concept also ostracises men from the in-need-of-help group. Men who are victims of sexualised and gender violence are implicitly excluded. Shepherd, as much as other authors devoted to the issue of violence, challenges the “concept of consent”, which is ever so vague in legal terminology and imposes a rigorously normative look upon the security of individuals. Laura J. Shepherd, however, goes even further. Author also turns our attention to those assumptions of the Resolution that victimize women and continually speak of their vulnerability. Yet Shepherd does not fail to remind us of the statistical fact that the principal target group of each armed conflict is the civilian male population. Further attention in *Gender, Violence and Security* is given to the tools Resolution 1325 reserves for states to put gendered peace into practice. Shepherd herself claims not to believe in the revolutionary image of gender mainstreaming. Despite these claims, we shall not say that she refuses gender mainstreaming as a method. Shepherd is simply sceptical towards its application based on stereotypical assumptions and biased concepts, as she believes this is the case of the Resolution. These results of Shepherd’s analysis put her into opposition to the statements of the Secretary General who credits the failure of the Resolution application to the lack of political will, accountability and ability of the actors to get involved. It is quite the contrary; the aim of Shepherd’s discourse-theoretical analysis is to suggest the vague and ambivalent character of the Resolution which destines its own application to be limited. This is partially the reason why Shepherd proposes in her first chapter the criticism of ideological foundations of the Resolution. She beholds it as an ambivalent conjunction of two approaches. The liberal one which proclaims the dominance of international and non-governmental organisations; and the realist one which attributes the security policy in anarchic environment to the states.

It is quite apparent that Shepherd refuses the functionalist approach to violence in international relations. She believes violence to be the organising principle that also constitutes social relations and forms subjects themselves. However, she often emphasizes that she does not aspire to hold the ultimate truth about the effective or non-effective functioning of the international security. By contrast, she calls for further

discussion. As she writes herself, each discourse-related work aims to present an alternative (in her case also a feminist) interpretation of a text. In this case, Shepherd succeeded to point out the elusiveness of some concepts retained by the Resolution and the UN policy. Despite this fact, it needs to be noted that those readers who lack the knowledge of feminist theories about gender and essentialism (which for example, is not fully explained) might feel a bit lost at times. The asset of *Gender, Violence and Security* to the academic field of international relations is undoubtable as the primary aim of this publication is to deconstruct the existing concepts and call for new ones, alternative and more effective.



KAROL R. SORBY: ARABSKÝ VÝCHOD (1918-1945)

KAROL R. SORBY: ARABIAN MIDDLE EAST (1918-1945)

SLOVAK ACADEMIC PRESS, BRATISLAVA, 2013, 468 PP. ISBN 978-80-89607-15-0

*Eduard Gombár*¹

Když roku 2009 vyšla v Bratislavě monografie Karola Sorbyho Blízky východ v medzinárodnej politike (1945–1958), mnozí odborníci cítili, že meziválečné období by si – po velmi úspěšné monografii českého historika Karla Durmana z roku 1966 – zasloužilo nové podrobné zpracování. Doc. PhDr. Karol Sorby, DrSc. (nar. 1939), vedoucí vědecký pracovník a bývalý ředitel Ústavu orientalistiky SAV reagoval na tuto „výzvu“ a vydal novou rozsáhlou monografií. Pro tuto práci měl vynikající předpoklady jako autor vědeckých děl Egyptská revolúcia 1952 (1998), Suez 1956 (2003), Arabský východ, 1945–1958 (2005) a Jún 1967 (2010).

Autor monografie rozdělil do dvanácti kapitol. První dvě kapitoly, jež jsou obecným úvodem do problematiky, jsou věnovány mírové konferenci v Paříži a základům britské blízkovýchodní politiky. Autor ukazuje, jak si vítězné velmoci rozdělily „osmanské dědictví“, poukazuje na význam Káhírské konference z roku 1921, kde byly stanoveny konkrétní kroky k uplatňování praktické politiky vůči Arabům. Následujících osm kapitol postupně analyzuje situaci v jednotlivých arabských zemích: Libanonu, Sýrie, Palestině, Zajordánsku, Iráku, Egyptu, Súdánu a na Arabském poloostrově.

V létě 1920 Francouzi vojenskou expedicí odstranili Syrské království a ze Sýrie a Libanonu učinili svůj mandát. V této souvislosti autor provádí zajímavé sondy do vývoje regionu a analyzuje britsko-francouzskou rivalitu za druhé světové války, jež urychlila získání nezávislosti Sýrie a Libanonu. Podrobná je kapitola věnovaná budování státnosti v Iráku, jenž jako samostatná politická jednotka začal existovat až

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Autor je riaditeľom Ústavu Blízkeho východu a Afriky na Univerzite Karlovej v Prahe a významný český arabista.

od konce roku 1918 jako výsledek poválečného uspořádání v souladu se Sykes-Picotovou dohodou z května 1916. Autor erudovaně přibližuje složitou situaci, v níž se ocitly jednotlivé skupiny různorodě nábožensky a etnicky složeného obyvatelstva tří bývalých osmanských provincií, Mosulu, Bagdádu a Basry. Autor přiblížil též mezinárodní souvislosti, jež zabránily vzniku samostatného kurdského státu. Pozoruhodná je i složitá cesta irácké společnosti k formálně nezávislé státnosti a role armády při ovlivňování osudů monarchie. Arabský poloostrov byl poznamenán pádem Hidžázskeho království a vzestupem dynastie Saúdů, jakož i válečnými konflikty mezi nově se etablujícími státy. Autor v kapitole věnované Egyptu sleduje emancipační zápas egyptské společnosti a přibližuje vzájemné vztahy mocenského trojúhelníku, jež tvořili Britové, královský palác a strana Wafd. Všimá si vzniku prvního radikálního islámského hnutí Muslimského bratrstva a jeho postavení v egyptské společnosti.

Poslední dvě kapitoly jsou zaměřeny na druhou světovou válku na Blízkém východě a na založení Ligy arabských států. Za druhé světové války britská vláda pochopila, že existují silné tendence k vytvoření jisté formy arabské unie, a proto podpořila myšlenku založení regionální organizace sjednocující všechny nezávislé arabské státy. Výsledkem bylo založení Ligy arabských států v Káhiře 22. března 1945.

Hluboká až intimní znalost problematiky je výsledkem mnohaletého studia i osobních zkušeností autora z dlouhodobých pobytů na Blízkém východě v rámci studijních stáží a diplomatického působení. Autor je mistrem detailu, zároveň se dokáže soustředit na klíčové období a klíčové události. Je třeba ocenit i velmi spolehlivý vědecký přepis arabských osobních jmen. Monografie je vybavena jmenným rejstříkem a obrazovými přílohami. Autor ve své práci využívá širokou heuristickou základnu: seznam použitých pramenů a literatury s množstvím arabských titulů svědčí o mimořádně širokém záběru autora a je pro případného zájemce spolehlivým vodítkem pro další výzkum. Recenzovaná monografie Karola Sorbyho se nepochybně zařadí do širšího vědeckého výzkumu dějin Blízkého východu ve 20. století.

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